State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1265

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Matthew Lee Ford,
Appellant.

Filed July 1, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-22-971

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Cassandra K. Shepherd, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Patrick Monnens, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the district court’s denial of appellant Matthew Lee Ford’s motion for a
downward dispositional departure from the presumptive sentencing guidelines because the
district court applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion by imposing
the presumptive sentence following Ford’s conviction of felony domestic abuse.
FACTS
In October 2022, Ford was driving in a car with his then romantic partner , S.N.
According to the complaint, Ford began screaming at S.N. and she called the police. When
police officers arrived, they saw that S.N. was upset and crying and that Ford had “his left
arm tightly around S.N.’s back.” Ford initially refused to let go of S.N., but the police
officer was eventually able to help S.N. get out of the car . S.N. told the officer that Ford
threatened to punch her in the face and that she feared for her safety . Police arrested Ford.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ford by amended complaint with domestic
assault-fear, domestic assaul t-harm, and obstr uction of the legal process. The complaint
noted that, at the time of the offense, Ford had “an extensive criminal history,” including
two prior convictions for violating a domestic -abuse no- contact order. The state filed
notice of its intent to seek an aggravated durational departure from the sentencing
guidelines on the basis of Ford’s status as a repeat felony offender.
3
In February 2023, Ford entered a Norgaard plea of guilty to felony domestic assault-
fear.1 The remaining two offenses were dismissed. Ford acknowledged in the plea petition
that the state was seeking an aggravated sentence and noted that the sentence would “be
left to the judge to decide.” He also waived his right to have a jury determine whether
aggravating sentencing factors existed for an upward sentencing depart ure. Ford admitte d
that he had prior felony convictions for: (1) violation of a domestic abuse no- contact order
in 2019, (2) assault in 2016, (3) violation of a domestic abuse no- contact order in 2014,
(4) domestic assault in 2013, (5) violation of an ord er for protection in 2006, and
(6) violation of an order for protection in 2006. And he agreed that these convictions, along
with the present offense, constituted a pattern of criminal activity. 2 The district court
accepted Ford’s Norgaard plea and ordered a presentence investigation (the PSI).
Ford returned to court for sentencing in June 2023. The district court noted that it
had reviewed the PSI, which indicated that the presumptive sentence for felony domestic
assault for a person with Ford’s crim inal history was a commitment to prison for 33
months, with a lower range of 29 months and an upper range of 39 months. At the hearing,
the state moved for an upward departure to a 60- month prison sentence. The defense
moved for a downward dispositional departure to allow Ford to receive treatment in a

1 See State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961) (recognizing
that a defendant may enter a valid plea of guilty despite a failure to recall specifics of the
offense).
2 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303- 05 (2004) (explaining that every fact that
supports an enhanced sentence mus t be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant) ; see
also Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4 (2022) (allowing an aggravated departure from the
presumptive sentence when the offender has five or more prior felony convictions , and the
present offense is a fel ony committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct ).
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probationary setting. The district court denied both departure motions and imposed the
presumptive sentence of 33 months’ imprisonment.
DECISION
Ford makes two arguments on appeal. First, he claims that the district court applied
the incorrect legal standard when it addressed his motion for a downward dispositional
departure. He asserts that, if the court had relied on the correct standard, it would have
granted his motion. Second, he argues that the d istrict court abused its discretion in
denying his departure motion because substantial and compelling reasons support a
departure to probation. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Ford is not
entitled to relief on either ground .
I. The district court applied the correct l egal standard.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe a sentence or a range for the
sentence that is “presumed to be appropriate.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn.
2014) ( quotation omitted). The district court “must pronounce a sentence within the
applicable range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances”
distinguishing the case and overcoming the presumption in favor of the guidelines
sentence. Id. Appellate courts afford a district court “great discretion in the imposition of
sentences” and reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 307- 08 (quotation
omitted). To maintain uniformity and proportionality in sentencing, departures from the
guidelines sentence are discouraged. State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017).
As such, a reviewing court rarely hold s that a district court has abused its discretion in
sentencing. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 305.
5
Ford argues that the district court misapplied the law because it impermissibly relied
on offense-based factors, rather than offender -based factors, to conclude that he was not
particularly amenable to treatment. “[T]o the extent a decision to depart turns on a question
of law, reviewing t he decision for an abuse of discretion . . . calls for resolving the legal
question de novo.” Id. at 308 n.1.
There are two types of sentencing departures: dispositional and durational. State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). Ford sought a d ownward dispositional
departure. A downward dispositional departure occurs when the presumptive guidelines
sentence calls for imprisonment “but the district court instead stays execution or imposition
of the sentence.” Id. “A dispositional departure typically focuses on characteristics of the
defendant that show whether the defendant is particularly suitable for individualized
treatment in a probationary setting.” Id. (quotation omitted). A durational departure , by
contrast, “is a sentence that departs in length from the presumptive guidelines range.” Id.
A downward durational departure is “justified if the defendant ’s conduct is significantly
less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v.
Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985). A district court ’s decision to impose a
durational departure “must be based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the offense”
rather than “the characteristics of the offender.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623 (emphasis
omitted).
Ford argues that the district court relied on offense-based, rather than offender -
based, criteria. But the record does not support this claim. At the sentencing hearing, the
district court noted that it had received the sentencing worksheet, the PSI, memoranda from
6
the parties, a diagnostic assessment, letters from treatment facilities, and letters in support
of Ford, all of which it considered when arriving at its sentencing decision. The district
court gave a detailed explanation of its decision to impose a guidelines sentence. It stated:
All right. Mr. Ford, let me tell you how I look at
sentencing. I take all the documentation well before the
hearing, and I start reading it. I started probably reading [the]
PSI . . . when it came out. I go over it. As things come in, I
mull it over, and then I have [the materials printed] . I take it
home with me, and I go over it and over it to try and decide
what feels right until I get into the courtroom.
And your case is difficult for me because . . . you’ re
right. When you just look at the numbers and you look at the
offenses, all these person related offenses, it doesn’t even seem
like I should be considering other than exactly what [the
prosecutor] is asking for. You fit right into [the aggravated
departure that the prosecutor is] requesting. But I see you in
court, and you seem like somebody who wants to do well. You
seem like somebody who really does want to be a better person.
And I certainly agr ee with [defense counsel] that your
problems and your legal troubles always seem to surround
alcohol use and what happens when you do.
Your work that you’ ve done in the jail and the way
you’ve handled it is the reason why I am not going to upwardly
depart to 60 months. It’s because of the work that you’re doing
and that I truly believe you do want to do well. You do not
[meet] the particularly amenable to probation standard. You
simply don’t. The crime is too serious. Given your time on
probation, it h as not been shown to me that you meet the
standard for me to do a downward departure. But your words
here today, everything that you’ve said here I ’ve taken into
account and believe that you fit not even the top of the box but
the presumptive sentence of 33 months.
Both the state and Ford urged the district court to depart from the guidelines
sentence. The transcript reflects that the district court discussed these motions at the same
time. It ultimately denied both motions and handed down a presumptive sentence. In doing
7
so, the district court addressed both offense - and offender -related reasons to explain its
justification for declining to depart in either direction. This does not constitute error.
Further, c aselaw recognizes that, when considering a dispositional departure, “ a district
court may consider both offender - and offense -related factors.” State v. Walker , 913
N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) (citing State v. Behl , 573 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Minn.
App. 1998) ). Because we are satisf ied that the district court properly considered the
relevant factors for departure, we conclude that it did not err in its application of the law.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ford’s
departure motion.
Ford argues that the dis trict court ’s denial of his departure motion constitutes an
abuse of discretion . When presented with a departure motion, a district court must
determine whether “mitigating circumstances are present” and, if so, whether “those
circumstances provide a subs tantial and compelling reason not to impose a guidelines
sentence.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 (quotations omitted). A defendant’s “particular
amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting” may justify a downward
dispositional departure from a presumptive commitment to prison. State v. Trog, 323
N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). Minnesota courts are guided by several factors, known as
the Trog factors, to determine whether a defendant is particularly amenable to
individualized treatment in a probationary setting. Id. These factors include the
defendant’s age, prior criminal record, level of remorse, cooperation, attitude while in
court, and support of friends or family members. Id.
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Ford faults the district court for determining that he was not eligible for a departure
under this test. He asserts that the record establishes several reasons why a probationary
sentence was warranted, pointing specifically to his amenability to treatmen t and his past
participation in chemical -dependency treatment. Although the district court did not
explicitly address the Trog factors here, “an explanation is not required when the court
considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.” State v.
Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985); see also State v. Pegel , 795 N.W.2d
251, 254 (Minn. App. 2011) ( providing that a district court is not required to discuss each
Trog factor before imposing a sentence). Moreover, even if the record establishes certain
facts showing that an offender is particularly amenable to probation, a district court is not
obligated to depart from the guidelines. Walker, 913 N.W.2d at 468-69; see also Pegel ,
795 N.W.2d at 253 (noting that the “ mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a
particular case does not obligate the court to place [a] defendant on probation” (quotation
omitted)).
Here, although no explanation was required, the district court explained that its
decision to impose the presumptive sentence was based on Ford’s criminal -history score,
his attitude in court, and the “work that [he had] done in jail” to address his chemical -
dependency issues. The district court acknowledged Ford’s past progress and credited him
as “somebody who really does want to be a better person.” But it noted that it had reviewed
the parties’ arguments, the submitted materials, and the statements provided by the
prosecution and the defense and ultimately concluded, based on this review, that Ford was
not amenable to treatment in a probationary setting. The record reflects that the district
9
court “deliberately considered” the circumstances for and against departure and the
relevant evidence and exercised its discretion to impose the presumptive senten ce. State
v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. App. 1984); see also Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255
(determining that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a departure
motion when “ the record demonstrate [d] that the district court carefully considered
circumstances for and against departure and deliberately exercised its discretion ”).
In sum, the district court considered the circumstances for and against departure and
determined that Ford was not entitled to a downward dispositional departure from the
sentencing guidelines. Based on the record, we conclude that t his is not a “rare” case
requiring this court to disturb the presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6,
7 (Minn. 1981) (noting that only in a “rare case” will a reviewing court overturn a
presumptive sentence) . Because the record support s the district court’s decision, and
because appellate courts grant broad discretion to the district court in considering departure
motions, we affirm.
Affirmed.