State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1281

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony N. Poyirier,
Appellant.

Filed September 3, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Cook County District Court
File No. 16-CR-21-14

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Molly Hicken, Cook County Attorney, Grand Marais, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges his convictions of two counts of second-
degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by permitting the state to amend the complaint shortly before the jury was
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selected and by denying his motion for a mistrial based on unnoticed testimony about a
prior bad act by appellant. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial on either basis.
Alternatively, appellant argues that the district court erred at sentencing by imposing a
lifetime-conditional-release term on each of his two criminal-sexual-conduct convictions.
Because appellant’s arguments for a new trial are unavailing, we affirm his convictions.
But because we agree that the district court erred when it imposed a lifetime conditional-
release term rather than a ten-year conditional-release period on each of his convictions,
we reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
In January 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Anthony N.
Poyirier with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexual contact with
an individual under the age of 13 and more than 36 months younger than Poyirier. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2014). The complaint alleged that , when Poyirier was
30 years old, he twice forced a 12-year-old girl to touch his penis. The alleged victim knew
Poyirier because one of her relatives was Poyirier’s romantic partner. According to the
complaint, both offenses occurred between the following date range: on or about June 1,
2016, to August 31, 2016.
The Amended Complaint
The case did not go to trial until April 2023. Before jury selection was complete,
the state filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint modified the date range for
the offenses to between the following dates: on or about September 21, 2015, to September
20, 2016. The change resulted in expanding the date range by approximately nine months.
3
The court heard from the parties regarding the amended complaint. The state
explained that it amended the complaint after meeting with the alleged victim, C.M., in
preparation for trial. At the meeting, C.M. provided the state with information regarding
the timeline of the alleged offenses that “somewhat varied” from her original allegations
in 2021. But, according to the state, C.M. was still certain that the incidents occurred when
she was 12 years old. As a result, the state amended the complaint to reflect the time period
when C.M. was 12 years old.
Defense counsel objected, arguing the amendment was untimely. Defense counsel
also argued that his “entire preparation for this case,” including numerous cross-
examination questions for C.M., was based on his understanding that the alleged offenses
occurred “on or about June 1, 2016.”1
The district court overruled the objection and permitted the amendment of the
complaint to add the expanded date range. The district court then asked defense counsel if
he needed extra time to revise his questioning based on the amendment. Defense counsel
replied that he would need to “modify the questioning on all witnesses” and “the potential
closing argument.” He stated that the additional work would take “most of” a day. The
district court decided to proceed with voir dire of the jury pool that day but noted that it
would “consider providing a break” once the jury was selected to give defense counsel

1 Despite defense counsel’s emphasis on the importance of June 1, 2016, in terms of his
trial preparation, he did acknowledge that the original complaint reflected that the “second
offense might have been one to two months away from the first.”
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extra time to prepare. After the jury was seated, defense counsel did not request a
continuance and the parties gave their opening statements.
Trial Testimony
A total of nine witnesses testified over three days of trial: C.M., C.M.’s sister, the
sister’s boyfriend, a forensic interviewer, two deputies, an expert on child-victim forensic
interviews, a social worker, C.M.’s older cousin (who was Poyirier’s romantic partner and
lived with Poyirier at the time of the alleged abuse), and two of Poyirier’s children. Poyirier
did not testify.
The victim, C.M., testified as follows. When C.M. was between the ages of 11 and
14 years old, she regularly spent time at the home where Poyirier and her older cousin
lived. C.M. was “best friends” with Poyirier’s children and considered them to be family.
She would often spend the night at the house, where she typically slept on a couch in the
living room.
According to C.M.’s trial testimony, Poyirier first sexually assaulted her sometime
between the winter and summer of 2015, when C.M. was 12 years old. While C.M. was
sleeping on the couch, Poyirier entered the living room, laid next to C.M., and forced C.M.
to touch his exposed penis with her hand. Between two weeks and two months after the
first incident, Poyirier again laid next to C.M. while she was sleeping on the couch and
forced her to touch his penis.
5
C.M.’s older sister, L.M., also testified at the trial.2 L.M. is approximately two years
older than C.M. L.M. frequently slept over at Poyirier’s house when she was between the
ages of 9 and 13 years old. On one of those nights, when L.M. was 11 or 12 years old,
Poyirier laid down next to L.M. on the couch that she was sleeping on. L.M. quickly
became agitated and went to the bathroom. A second incident occurred when L.M. was
“13 going on 14.” Again, Poyirier laid down on the couch next to L.M. in the middle of
the night. L.M. immediately got off the couch and went to find another room to sleep in.
L.M. did not tell anyone about what happened at the time. But, after the second incident,
she did not “hang out” at the house with Poyirier’s children anymore.
The state also called L.M.’s boyfriend, K.B., to testify about when C.M. initially
disclosed Poyirier’s sexual abuse. According to K.B., C.M. disclosed Poyirier’s abuse to
L.M. and K.B. in 2021, when L.M. and K.B. were living together at K.B.’s house. During
the state’s questioning of K.B., the following transpired:

2 Before trial, the state moved to admit L.M.’s testimony as Spreigl evidence to corroborate
C.M.’s allegations.

Spreigl evidence is “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act
[that] is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith[, but which]
may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 780 n.1 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)).
Poyirier did not oppose the state’s motion and the district court granted the request. Before
L.M. testified, the district court cautioned the jury to use her testimony for “the limited
purpose of assisting . . . in determining whether Mr. Poyirier committed those acts with
which he has been charged.”
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Q: Okay. Have you ever heard [C.M.] talk about Anthony
Poyirier touching her inappropriately?
A: Yes, I have.

Q: And when did she talk about that?
A: Um, about maybe, um, 2 years ago. It probably was about
November-ish.

Q: Okay.
A: Um, she was staying the night at my house, hanging out
with, um, [L.M.]. And, um, I was playing video games, doing
my own thing. And they came out into the living room and,
um, they were just talking about things that happened when
they were kids, and talking about the times they had stayed the
night in Portage.
And, um, she then went into, um, talking about a
situation where [Poyirier] was possibly under the influence of
drugs and, um, hung them out of a window, thinking it was a
funny game.

Defense counsel objected at that point, arguing that K.B.’s testimony about Poyirier
and the window incident was unnoticed Spreigl evidence. The district court sustained the
objection. The state moved on to question K.B. specifically about C.M.’s disclosure of
Poyirier’s inappropriate touching. K.B. testified that C.M. described Poyirier acting
“creepy with her late at night while she slept on the couch.” According to K.B., C.M. said
that Poyirier “would lay behind [C.M.] and press himself against her.” K.B. further
testified that, when he was at a family party, he told C.M.’s mother about C.M.’s and L.M.’s
allegations regarding Poyirier.
At the next break after the jury exited the court room, Poyirier moved for a mistrial
based on K.B.’s “improper” testimony about Poyirier’s window incident with C.M. and
L.M. when they were girls. Defense counsel argued that it was impossible to “come back”
from K.B.’s allegation that Poyirier hung C.M. and L.M. out of a window while he was
7
possibly under the influence of drugs, and that any attempt to mitigate the testimony would
only “raise more attention to it.” In response, the prosecutor asserted that she had not
intended to elicit such testimony from K.B. She added that the testimony was “brief.” She
also emphasized that the jury had already been instructed, and would be again instructed,
that it should “consider only the crimes against which [Poyirier was] charged with.”
The district court denied Poyirier’s motion for a mistrial. The district court noted
that K.B.’s testimony was “unfortunate,” but did not warrant a mistrial. The district court
found that K.B.’s testimony “all came out fairly quickly” and that “the objection was
sustained quickly.” The district court added that it would consider providing the jury with
a cautionary instruction, should defense counsel request one. Defense counsel rejected the
offer, stating that “there’s no curative instruction that can be made, because it’ll just bring
more attention to the bad act.” Thus, the trial proceeded with testimony from the remaining
witnesses.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Poyirier guilty of both counts of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct. After the jury read its verdict, the district court explained: “based on the jury’s
verdict, convictions will be entered on both counts one and two in this matter.” At
sentencing, the district court imposed executed, concurrent sentences on both counts—48
months on count one and 70 months on count two. The district court also imposed a
lifetime conditional-release term on each sentence.
Poyirier appeals.
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DECISION
Poyirier argues that the district court committed two abuses of discretion that
warrant a new trial. First, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
permitting the state to amend the complaint. Second, he claims that the district court should
have granted his motion for a mistrial after K.B. testified that Poyirier once hung C.M. and
L.M. out of a window while possibly under the influence of drugs. Poyirier also argues—
and the state agrees—that the district court erred in imposing a lifetime conditional-release
term on each conviction rather than a ten-year conditional-release term. We address
Poyirier’s arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the state to amend
the complaint.

“The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny leave to amend a complaint,
and its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Baxter,
686 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. App. 2004). “A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.04, subdivision 2, “[p]re-trial
proceedings may be continued” to amend the complaint for various reasons, such as when
the “initial complaint does not properly . . . describe the . . . offense charged.” Although
rule 3.04, subdivision 2, refers to “[p]re-trial proceedings,” the supreme court has
interpreted the rule to apply to amendments made before jeopardy attaches. See
State v. Bluhm, 460 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. 1990) (discussing rule 3.04 and holding that
9
“since jeopardy had not attached the [district] court was free to allow an amendment”).
Jeopardy attaches once the jury is empaneled and sworn. State v. Large, 607 N.W.2d 774,
778 (Minn. 2000). Thus, a district court is “relatively free” to allow amendments to the
complaint before the jury is sworn, “provided the [district] court allows continuances where
needed.” See Bluhm, 460 N.W.2d at 24.
Poyirier argues that the district court abused its discretion in permitting the
amendment because it was untimely and unfairly forced defense counsel to adjust his trial
strategy on the eve of trial. We are not persuaded. First, the amendment came before the
jury had been selected and sworn. Second, the record reflects that the district court offered
defense counsel the opportunity to request a continuance for more time to prepare in
response to the amendment. Despite the offer, defense counsel never requested a
continuance. On these facts, the district court was “relatively free” to permit an
amendment, and we discern no abuse of the district court’s broad discretion in deciding
this issue. See id.
Poyirier argues that our decision in Baxter suggests otherwise. In Baxter, the
defendant was originally charged with three counts of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct. 686 N.W.2d at 850. On the morning of trial, the state moved to amend the
complaint to charge three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. The district court denied the state’s motion.
Id. The state appealed and we affirmed.
In our decision, we noted that the “district court retains broad discretion over how a
case proceeds once it is filed” and “[t]his includes the power to grant or deny a prosecutor’s
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request to amend the complaint.” Id. at 852. We also emphasized that the “inquiry into
whether a court should grant or deny such a motion [to amend the complaint] is factual and
case specific.” Id. Regarding the specific facts in Baxter, we observed that the proposed
amendment was far more than a “housekeeping amendment,” adding new charges that
would “require that additional elements of a crime be proven, would permit the
presentation of additional defenses, and would allow for a greater penalty.” Id. at 853
(quotation omitted). We also observed that the state’s delay in amending the complaint
was due to its failure to interview the victim until “ more than a month after she had been
located,” which was compounded by the state waiting five more days until the morning of
trial to move for an amendment. Id. For these reasons, we held that the district court acted
within its discretion when it denied the state’s motion to amend the complaint. Id.
Poyirier asserts that the amendment in Baxter is analogous to the amendment in this
case, and therefore the district court abused its discretion when it did not deny the
amendment as untimely and unfair. We disagree. Baxter is distinguishable for at least two
reasons. First, in Baxter we affirmed the district court’s denial of the state’s motion to
amend the complaint. Id. We did not consider whether the district court would have abused
its discretion had it granted the motion to amend. Id.
Second, Baxter involved an amendment that went well beyond “housekeeping”
because the amendment introduced entirely new charges. Here, the amendment only
modified the dates of the charged offenses. Caselaw makes clear that such an amendment
in criminal-sexual-conduct cases does not equate to charging a new offense or modifying
an already -charged offense’s elements. “The complaint must state the essential facts
11
constituting the offense charged.” State v. Becker , 351 N.W.2d 923, 926 (Minn. 1984).
“[T]he precise date is an essential element of the crime only where the act done is unlawful
during certain seasons, on certain days[,] or at certain hours of the day . . . .” Id. at 927.
Otherwise, the date must be “as specific as possible,” especially in criminal-sexual-conduct
cases involving minor victims and delayed reporting. Id. at 926 (quotation omitted). As
such, “specific dates need not be proved in cases charging criminal sexual conduct over an
extended period of time.” State v. Rucker, 752 N.W.2d 538, 547 (Minn. App. 2008), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008). So, amending the alleged date of a criminal-sexual-conduct
crime in a complaint does not constitute charging a different offense. Ruberg v. State,
428 N.W.2d 488, 490-91 (Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 1988). Here, the
amendment at issue only extended the alleged date range of the offense, making it much
closer to “housekeeping” than it is to the substantive amendment in Baxter. We therefore
reject Poyirier’s reliance on Baxter and conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it permitted the state to amend the complaint.
3

3 While we are sympathetic to Poyirier’s concerns over the timeliness of the amendment,
timeliness is not “paramount” under rule 3.04. Baxter, 686 N.W.2d at 853. Here, the
prosecutor filed the amended complaint just before jury selection, which was
approximately two weeks after the prosecutor met with C.M. and learned that C.M.’s
account of the abuse “somewhat varied” from her first statement. We believe that the better
practice would have been for the prosecutor to amend the complaint sooner. Nonetheless,
under rule 3.04’s “relatively free” standard for pretrial amendments, we are not convinced
that the district court abused its broad discretion by permitting the state to make this
“housekeeping” amendment prior to selection of the jury. See State v. Smith, 313 N.W.2d
429, 430 (Minn. 1981) (affirming grant of motion to amend made “shortly before the jury
was selected” where amendment “did not charge any additional or different offense”).
12
Moreover, even assuming the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
amendment, Poyirier has not established any resulting prejudice that would warrant a new
trial. See Smith, 313 N.W.2d at 430 (affirming a conviction based on an amended
complaint when the amendment was made before jeopardy attached, did not charge
additional offenses, and did not prejudice the defendant). The district court afforded
defense counsel an opportunity to request more time to prepare for trial, but defense
counsel never made such a request. See id. (concluding that defendant was not prejudiced
by an amendment when “defense counsel rejected an offer of a 2-day continuance”). In
addition, at the hearing where the district court considered whether to permit the
amendment, Poyirier acknowledged that the state promptly disclosed the information from
the prosecutor’s recent meeting with C.M. to prepare for trial, which formed the basis for
the amendment. Thus, contrary to the assertion in Poyirier’s brief, the amendment was not
a “sandbag.” Poyirier has not met his burden to establish he is entitled to a new trial based
on the amended complaint.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Poyirier’s motion for
a mistrial.

Next, Poyirier argues that we should reverse the district court and order a new trial
based on the district court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. We review the denial of a
motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262
(Minn. 2016). “A mistrial should be granted only if there is a reasonable probability, in
light of the entirety of the trial including the mitigating effects of a curative instruction,
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the incident resulting in the
13
motion not occurred.” Id. And “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to determine whether
an error is sufficiently prejudicial to require a mistrial or whether another remedy is
appropriate.” Id.
Poyirier moved for a mistrial after K.B. testified that he heard L.M. and C.M.
discussing a time when Poyirier hung them out of a window while Poyirier was “possibly”
under the influence of drugs. On appeal, Poyirier argues that K.B.’s testimony about the
window incident amounts to unnoticed Spriegl evidence, and the prejudicial effect of the
testimony warrants a mistrial. Assuming without deciding that K.B.’s testimony about the
window incident meets the standard for unnoticed Spriegl evidence, we conclude that there
is no reasonable probability that the challenged testimony affected the outcome of the trial.
In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that challenged testimony
affected the verdict, we examine the entire record. State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 474
(Minn. 2019). We focus our analysis on the extent of the testimony, whether the state
relied on the challenged evidence to make its case, whether the district court issued a
cautionary instruction, and the strength of the state’s case. See i d. at 474-75;
State v. Chavez-Nelson, 882 N.W.2d 579, 590-91 (Minn. 2016).4

4 Poyirier argues that we should also consider that the “state did not present other,
admissible evidence of Poyirier’s alleged prior bad acts regarding C.M. and L.M.” When
analyzing the effect of inadmissible Spreigl evidence, the supreme court has considered
“whether the [s]tate presented other evidence on the issue for which the other crime
evidence was offered.” State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009). But that
consideration is not relevant here, where the evidence in question was introduced
inadvertently through witness testimony and the district court sustained the objection to the
testimony. Simply put, there is no “issue for which” the window-incident evidence was
offered. Cf. id. (assessing the prejudicial effect of Spreigl evidence that was admitted by
district court on the issues of identity, motive, and possession of a gun).
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Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that Poyirier has not
demonstrated a reasonable probability that the challenged testimony significantly affected
the verdict. First, the record reflects that the challenged testimony was very brief. The
testimony, which was not intentionally elicited by the prosecutor, consisted of only four
lines of K.B.’s testimony. And K.B. was one of nine witnesses to testify during the
three-day trial. Also, the record reflects that the prosecutor did not dwell on the testimony.
After the district court sustained Poyirier’s objection, the prosecutor quickly moved on to
another topic. And the prosecutor did not mention the challenged testimony after the
objection was made.
Next, while the district court did not provide a specific cautionary instruction
regarding the challenged testimony (because Poyirier thought such an instruction would
draw more attention to the testimony), the district court immediately sustained Poyirier’s
objection to K.B.’s testimony. And, at the beginning of trial, the district court instructed
the jury that it should “ignore the question or answer” anytime the court sustained an
objection during testimony. We presume a jury follows the court’s instructions.
State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009).
Finally, the state’s case against Poyirier was fairly strong. The state’s case relied
primarily on the testimony C.M. gave about Poyirier sexually abusing her. Her testimony
was detailed, describing how on two occasions Poyirier had laid next to her on the couch
where she was sleeping and forced her to touch his penis with her hand. C.M.’s credibility
was bolstered by L.M.’s testimony, which helped to demonstrate that Poyirier had a
common scheme or plan involving teenaged girls who stayed over at the house.
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In balancing the foregoing factors, we conclude that the record demonstrates that
there is no reasonable probability that the challenged testimony affected the verdict ,
especially given the very brief nature of the testimony and the fact that the state did not
rely on the testimony to prove its case. The district court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in denying Poyirier’s motion for a mistrial based on the challenged testimony.
III. The district court erred by imposing a lifetime conditional-release term on each
of the two criminal-sexual-conduct counts.

Lastly, Poyirier argues that the district court erred by imposing a lifetime-
conditional-release term on each of his sentences for second-degree criminal sexual
conduct. Poyirier asserts that the district court should have instead imposed a ten-year -
conditional-release term on each count. The state agrees. Based on our independent
review, we conclude that the parties are correct.
A person convicted of second -degree criminal sexual conduct is “subject to
conditional release under [Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455 (2014)].” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.343, subd. 2(c) (2014). Pursuant to section 609.3455, when a district court sentences
a defendant to prison for second-degree criminal sexual conduct, “the court shall provide
that, after the offender has been released from prison, t he commissioner shall place the
offender on conditional release for ten years.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6. But when
a district court sentences a defendant to prison for second-degree sexual conduct “and the
offender has a previous or prior sex offense conviction, the court shall provide that, after
the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the offender on
conditional release for the remainder of the offender’s life.” Id., subd. 7(b). A defendant
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has a “prior sex offense conviction” if he was convicted of “a sex offense before [he] has
been convicted of the present offense, regardless of whether [he] was convicted for the first
offense before the commission of the present offense, and the convictions involved separate
behavioral incidents.” Id., subd. 1(g).
Under section 609.3455, a “prior sex offense conviction” includes “a conviction for
a separate behavioral incident entered before a second conviction, whether at different
hearings or during the same hearing.” State v. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn. 2015);
see also Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 1(g) (defining “prior sex offense conviction”). In
other words, one conviction entered at the same hearing as a subsequent conviction may
nonetheless serve as a prior sex-offense conviction. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d at 81. But when
a district court enters multiple criminal- sexual-conduct convictions simultaneously in the
same hearing, one conviction cannot serve as a prior sex-offense conviction for another.
State v. Brown, 937 N.W.2d 146, 157 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18,
2020). Adjudication is simultaneous when there is “no temporal gap whatsoever between
a district court’s adjudication of offenses, [and] no conviction is entered ‘before’ the other.”
Id.
Here, the record reflects that Poyirier had no prior sex-offense convictions before
this case. The record also reflects that the district court entered simultaneous convictions
for both offenses in this case—in a single utterance, the district court entered convictions
on “both counts one and two in this matter.” (Emphasis added.) Because Poyirier had no
prior sex-offense convictions and the two current convictions were entered simultaneously,
the district court erred by imposing a lifetime conditional-release term on each conviction
17
and should have instead imposed a ten-year conditional- release term for each. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.3455, subds. 6, 7(b).
We therefore reverse the district court’s inclusion of the lifetime conditional-release
term as part of Poyirier’s sentence for each of the two counts of second-degree criminal-
sexual-conduct and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.