In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1307

In re the Marriage of:

Lauren Elizabeth Schrock, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard Albert Kuhn,
Appellant.

Filed September 9, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-17-6938

Victoria M.B. Taylor, Shawn C. Reinke, Reinke Taylor, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Michael Ortner, Theresa A. Bofferding, Ortner & Bofferding, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Richard Albert Kuhn (husband) appeals the district court’s order
modifying spousal maintenance. Husband argues the district court (1) abused its discretion
when it ordered a downward modification of spousal maintenance from $4,000 per month
to $1,500 per month; (2) clearly erred when it found the parties’ minor children had not
returned to school on a permanent, full-time basis in September 2021; and (3) misread the
parties’ November 2020 stipulation to forgive spousal-maintenance arrears. We affirm.
FACTS
Husband and respondent Lauren Elizabeth Schrock (wife) were married in 2009.
Husband was born in Colombia. It is well documented that husband experienced
significant trauma when he lived there. Because of this trauma, husband began suffering
from severe PTSD sometime “in the 2010s.” Husband also suffered a stroke in 2015 that
resulted in a brain injury. Husband’s mental illness manifested as intense hostility and
anger toward wife, as well as extreme anger and paranoia. On October 14, 2017, during
an argument between the parties, husband attempted suicide. Subsequently, on October
19, 2017, wife filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. The district court appointed
a guardian ad litem to represent husband during the dissolution proceedings.
By stipulated judgment and decree (the J&D), the parties’ marriage was dissolved
on November 8, 2019. The J&D provided that wife would take sole legal custody of the
parties’ two minor children, neither party would pay child support, and wife was obligated
to pay husband $4,000 per month in spousal maintenance . The J&D also provided that
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wife would assign $276,000 to husband from her retirement accounts, so that he could
“‘cash out’ the retirement distributions in order to purchase a home for himself without the
need for a mortgage.”
At the time of the J&D, wife’s annual gross income was $229,500, or $19,125 per
month. According to a budget wife produced in June 2019, her monthly expenses during
this same period were $18,338. But wife’s budget described that wife’s parents paid $3,342
of the $18,338.
1 The $3,342 covered the cost of a nanny for the parties’ children so wife
could maintain full-time employment. Wife stated in her budget that, without her parents’
help, she would not have been able to afford the nanny.
In April 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused a significant reduction in wife’s
income, and wife reduced her spousal-maintenance payments from $4,000 to $2,000
without court approval or husband’s consent. A stipulated order filed in November 2020
(the stipulated order) acknowledged wife’s reduction in income, and temporarily reduced
wife’s spousal-maintenance obligation to $2,700 per month, effective November 1, 2020.
According to the stipulated order, the temporary reduction would remain in place until the
parties’ children returned to school on a permanent, full- time basis, at which point wife’s
spousal-maintenance obligation would automatically revert to $4,000 per month. The
stipulated order also provided that “[n]o spousal maintenance arrears shall accrue as a result
of the previous months of reduced payment.”

1 This made wife’s effective expenses $14,996.
4
The stress of the pandemic and the demands of childcare during the pandemic
strained wife professionally, causing her to struggle to fulfill her job duties. To avoid
termination, wife tendered her resignation in January 2022 and took a new position with
the Department of Veterans Affairs in April 2022. Wife’s annual gross income in her new
position was $257,750.
Meanwhile, in February 2022, the parties’ youngest daughter (daughter) was
diagnosed with a severe learning disability. This diagnosis means that daughter will
require extensive additional educational resources, which wife stated in a sworn affidavit,
that she could not afford.
Also in February 2022, husband brought a motion to hold wife in contempt because
she had not resumed paying $4,000 per month in spousal maintenance in September 2021,
when husband alleged the parties’ children returned to in-person school on a permanent,
full-time basis. The motion also sought, in relevant part, $9,100—the allegedly unpaid
balance of spousal maintenance for September 2021 through March 2022. On March 31,
2022, the district court ordered the parties to mediate their dispute.
In May 2022, wife filed a responsive motion, asking the district court to deny
husband’s motion because: (1) husband continued “to be in violation of the express
mediation provision” in the stipulated order and (2) the parties’ children had not returned
to in-person school on a permanent basis. Wife’s motion also sought an order terminating
her spousal-maintenance obligation based on changed circumstances.
In an order filed on June 10, 2022, the district court noted that the parties had not
mediated their dispute due to husband’s lack of communication and cooperation, but once
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again ordered the parties to mediate. The parties participated in mediation on January 31,
2023, but failed to reach an agreement.
On March 8, 2023, wife filed an emergency motion seeking immediate termination
of her spousal-maintenance obligation. To support the motion, wife submitted an affidavit
stating that her savings had been completely depleted, and that she was forced to refinance
her home. The affidavit additionally alleged that wife underwent a total hip replacement.
Complications from the surgery had required wife to take a significant amount of unpaid
leave. The district court denied wife’s emergency motion on March 10, 2023, noting that
a motion hearing was set for April 10, 2023, and determining that it was appropriate to wait
until the district court had the benefit of hearing arguments from both parties before issuing
a decision regarding spousal maintenance.
Following the scheduled hearing, the district court issued its order modifying
spousal maintenance on July 7, 2023. In its order, the district court found that wife’s net
income had decreased from $12,404 per month at the time of the J&D to approximately
$11,000 per month at the time of the order. The district court also found that wife’s
expenses had increased, primarily due to daughter’s diagnosis, while husband’s expenses
had decreased. Further, the district court specifically found that there was not “credible
medical documentation provided which would substantiate Husband’s claims that he
[could] engage in no meaningful employment,” and the district court thus concluded that
husband was capable of “at least some part-time employment.” Because of this, the district
court determined that there had been a substantial change in circumstances, which rendered
the existing spousal-maintenance award unreasonable and unfair. Based on wife’s
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“significant costs related to raising two minor children,” daughter’s “special needs
requiring significant services and intervention, all of which have increased Wife’s
spending,” husband’s ability to engage in some work to supplement his income, and
husband’s lack of substantial monthly expenses, the district court modified wife’s spousal-
maintenance obligation to $1,500 per month. The district court denied all other requests
for relief.
Husband filed a letter requesting permission to file a motion for reconsideration on
July 20, 2023. The district court denied husband’s request. Husband appeals the district
court’s July 7, 2023 order.
DECISION
On appeal, husband argues the district court erred in three ways. First, husband
argues the district court abused its discretion when it ordered a downward modification of
spousal maintenance from $4,000 per month to $1,500 per month. Second, husband asserts
the district court clearly erred when it implicitly found the parties’ children had not returned
to school on a permanent, full-time basis in September 2021, and, consequently, spousal
maintenance did not revert to $4,000 per month at that time. Third, husband argues the
district court legally erred when it concluded the stipulated order forgave spousal-
maintenance arrears. We address husband’s arguments in turn.
I.
Husband first challenges the district court’s decision to modify spousal
maintenance. We review a district court’s decision regarding whether to modify an
existing spousal-maintenance award for an abuse of discretion. See Madden v. Madden,
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923 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. App. 2019). A district court abuses its discretion “if it makes
findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the
matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.” Id. We review legal
questions de novo. Maiers v. Maiers , 775 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). “To the
extent that a modification decision depends on findings of fact, we apply a clear-error
standard of review to those findings of fact.” Madden, 923 N. W.2d at 696. When
reviewing factual findings for clear error, we defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations and will not “reweigh the evidence,” “engage in fact-finding anew,” or
“reconcile conflicting evidence.” In re Civil Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214,
221-23 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted). We will only reverse for clear error when, “on
the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Id. at 221 (quotation omitted).
“A district court may modify an award of spousal maintenance if a party makes a
showing of a substantial change in circumstances that makes the existing award
‘unreasonable and unfair.’” Madden, 923 N.W.2d at 696 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2(a), (b) (2018)). Under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (Supp. 2023),
2 a party
seeking modification of spousal maintenance must first demonstrate that there has been “a
substantial change in one or more of the circumstances identified in the statute,” and then
“show that the substantial change has the effect of rendering the original award

2 We note that in 2024, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2, to limit its
applicability to child support. See 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 101, art. 2, § 10. However,
because the changes took effect on August 1, 2024, see Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (2022), we
review the district court’s July 2023 order under the prior version of the statute.
8
unreasonable and unfair.” See Hecker v. Hecker , 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1997)
(addressing prior version of the statute). A substantial change in circumstances may be
based on, among other things, “ substantially increased or decreased gross income of an
obligor or obligee,” or “substantially increased or decreased need of an obligor or obligee.”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a). The circumstances that existed at the time of the original
judgment serve as “the baseline circumstances against which claims of substantial change
are evaluated.” Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709.
Husband argues the district court made three clearly erroneous findings: (1) wife
had an increase in expenses; (2) husband had a decrease in expenses; and (3) husband is
able to work. For the reasons explained below, we are not left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221.
Husband argues the district court clearly erred when it found that wife’s expenses
had increased and, more specifically, that daughter’s need for additional services
contributed to that increase. Husband observes that wife’s budget prior to the J&D showed
monthly expenses of $18,338, and that wife’s budget in March 2022 showed monthly
expenses of only $14,205. Husband contends that there is nothing in the record to support
wife’s assertion that wife will incur or has incurred additional expenses to address
daughter’s diagnosis. We are unpersuaded for two reasons.
First, according to the budget wife submitted prior to the J&D, her parents paid for
$3,342 of her monthly expenses because she could not afford to pay for the children’s
nanny on her own. Thus, wife’s actual monthly expenses prior to the J&D were $14,996.
9
While $14,205 is still a decrease from $14,996, the decrease is not nearly as dramatic as
husband insists.
Second, wife’s monthly expenses of $14,205 do not fairly reflect the cost of the
additional services daughter requires because wife specifically stated in a sworn affidavit
that she could not afford the required services. Because wife currently cannot afford the
services daughter requires, daughter is not receiving those services and wife has “seen clear
declines in [daughter]’s reading and success.” The district court credited wife’s evidence
and appropriately considered the increased expenses that wife would incur if she had the
ability to provide the educational resources daughter requires.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in its findings
regarding wife’s reasonable monthly expenses. Given these findings, we further conclude
that the district court’s resulting determination that there was a substantial change in
circumstances due to wife’s increase in expenses is not contrary to logic or the facts on
record.3
Husband next challenges the district court’s finding that he had a decrease in
expenses.4 Husband observes that the district court made no specific findings concerning

3 Husband separately argues the district court misapplied the law when it considered
changes to the parties’ incomes and expenses, asserting that wife failed to make the
threshold showing of a substantial change in circumstances. But the district court’s
conclusion that wife demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances was based
primarily on a change in need resulting from daughter requiring extra educational
resources. Because daughter’s diagnosis occurred well after the J&D, and represents a
significant increase in expenses, wife has shown a substantial change in circumstance, and
husband’s argument fails to address that change.
4 Husband separately argues the district court improperly considered “bargained-for
elements of the Stipulated J&D in conducting its analysis.” While the facts husband
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husband’s expenses at the time of the J&D or at the time of the district court’s order
modifying maintenance. We agree with husband that the district court failed to make this
baseline finding. See Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709. But we disagree with husband that the
district court relied on husband’s decrease in expenses as the substantial change in
circumstances that rendered the existing maintenance award unreasonable and unfair. As
explained above, a substantial change in circumstances can be based on “substantially
increased or decreased need of an obligor or obligee.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)
(emphasis added); see also A.A.A. v. Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. , 832 N.W.2d 816, 829
(Minn. 2013) (stating that “when the disjunctive ‘or’ is used, only one of the listed factual
situations needs to be present in order for the provisions to be satisfied”). And we discern
that the district court relied primarily upon the increased expenses associated with
daughter’s diagnosis to conclude a substantial change had occurred. Consequently, even
if the district court clearly erred when it failed to make a baseline finding regarding
husband’s expenses, we conclude that error does not warrant reversal because the district
court had an independent, appropriate justification for its decision. See Sinda v. Sinda, 949
N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 2020) (“These errors [in the district court’s factual findings]

highlights (husband has no mortgage expenses, husband benefited from a downward
deviation of child support, husband does not contribute to supporting the children, and
children reside with wife exclusively) were certainly included in the J&D, husband’s
argument does not address the change in circumstances brought about by daughter’s
diagnosis. Nor does husband cite any authority to support his assertion that the district
court cannot consider these elements when modifying spousal maintenance. Rather, the
caselaw husband relies on suggests only that the district court should be “reluctant to alter
the terms of the decree.” See Sieber v. Sieber, 258 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1977).
11
require reversal only if they resulted in prejudice.”); Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts
to ignore harmless error).
Husband also challenges the district court’s finding that “no credible medical
documentation” showed that he is entirely unable to work. To support his argument,
husband argues that two letters he submitted from his therapist demonstrate that he is
entirely incapable of gainful employment. But it is well established that we do not reweigh
the evidence when reviewing for clear error. See, e.g., Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22.
And, here, the district court acknowledged that husband “has some limitations,” but did
not credit husband’s evidence that “he can engage in no meaningful employment.” Rather,
the district court credited wife’s evidence that husband has been, and is capable of, selling
items online and engaging in regular communications with others. Because th e district
court’s finding is supported by evidence in the record, we conclude the district court did
not clearly err when it found husband is capable of at least some part-time employment.
Husband finally argues the district court’s decision to reduce spousal maintenance
was contrary to logic and the facts in the record because wife continues to enjoy a quality
of life that is “at least as comfortable if not more so” than what she enjoyed during the
marriage, while husband “has started down that path where he will likely become a public
charge.” Husband’s argument is simply not supported by the record. Wife submitted an
affidavit stating that her savings have been completely depleted, and that she was forced to
refinance her home. Wife’s filings indicate that she is struggling to make ends meet
financially. And while husband’s spousal maintenance payments may not be a large sum,
evidence in the record indicates that he has still managed to save money.
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it modified spousal maintenance.
II.
Husband next argues the district court clearly erred when it tacitly adopted wife’s
argument that the parties’ children had not returned to school on a permanent, full-time
basis in September 2021. 5 Husband argues this finding is not supported by the record
because wife’s own exhibit, the COVID Return to School Guide (the guide), indicates that
the children returned to full-time, in -person schooling at the beginning of the 2021 -2022
academic year, on September 8, 2021. Consequently, according to husband, wife owes
him spousal-maintenance arrears dating back to September 2021, per the stipulated order.
We review the district court’s implicit factual findings for clear error. See
Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (evaluating district court’s
implicit findings under same standard as explicit findings); Madden, 923 N.W.2d at 696
(“[W]e apply a clear-error standard of review to . . . findings of fact.”). When reviewing
factual findings for clear error, our “duty is fully performed after [we have] fairly
considered all the evidence and [have] determined that the evidence reasonably supports
the decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted). We will only reverse for

5 Husband is correct that the district court did not make findings bearing directly on this
argument. The district court did, however, deny husband’s request for arrears dating back
to September 2021, implying that the district court determined those arrears were not owed.
The district court’s denial of husband’s request implies that the district court found that the
children did not return to school on a permanent, full-time basis prior to the effective date
of the district court’s order modifying spousal maintenance (June 1, 2022).
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clear error when, “on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 221 (quotation omitted).
We conclude the record supports the district court’s finding that the children had
not returned to school on a permanent, full-time basis in September 2021. In response to
husband’s motion, wife submitted an affidavit and exhibits demonstrating that the children
were not attending school full time and in person. And at a subsequent motion hearing in
June 2022, husband’s attorney acknowledged that the children had not yet returned to
school full time.
Further, the guide husband relies upon does not support an alternative finding.
While the return to school may have been full-time, the guide does not indicate that the
return was permanent, as indicated by the guide’s cautious approach regarding the return
to in-person schooling. The guide states that the “students will begin the school year in-
person” and that the school district “will continue to monitor local and state COVID cases
data and will make changes to this year’s learning plan when appropriate.”
For these reasons, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the district
court made a mistake when it tacitly found the children had not returned to school on a
permanent, full-time basis in September 2021.
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III.
Finally, husband argues the district court legally erred when it denied his request for
arrears accrued between April 2020 and October 2020.6 Because we conclude that husband
was not entitled to arrears under the stipulated order, we affirm the district court.
We treat a stipulated order as a contract for purposes of construction. Nelson v.
Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. App. 2011). Whether a stipulated order is ambiguous
is a question of law that we review de novo. See Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d
578, 582 (Minn. 2010) (stating standard of review for contract interpretation). A stipulated
order is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. See id. If
the stipulation is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d at 872.
Interpretation of an ambiguous stipulated order is a question of fact, see Denelsbeck v.
Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Minn. 2003) (contract), and “[w]e defer to a
district court’s interpretation of its own order,” LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151,
162 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000); see also Palmi v. Palmi, 140
N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn. 1966) (“Construction of its own decree by the trial court must be
given great weight in determining the intent of the trial court.”). When interpreting a
stipulated order, we must construe the stipulated order as a whole. See Burke v. Fine, 606
N.W.2d 909, 911 (Minn. App. 2000) (“The court interpreting a contract must construe the
agreement as a whole.”), rev. denied (Minn. June 13, 2000).

6 The district court did not make explicit findings regarding this issue. However, the district
court’s denial of husband’s request implies that the district court determined that arrears
were not due for April 2020 through October 2020, based on the stipulated order.
15
The stipulated order provides that “[n]o spousal maintenance arrears shall accrue as
a result of the previous months of reduced payment.” Husband argues that the plain
meaning of this provision is that spousal-maintenance arrears would not accrue for the
months governed by the stipulated order—i.e., the months during which wife paid reduced
spousal maintenance of $2,700. Husband bases his argument on the meaning of the word
“shall” which, according to husband, refers to something that will happen in the future.
According to husband, the use of “shall accrue” shows that the parties intended this
provision to apply “only to arrears that would otherwise accrue going forward,” and not
arrears that “had already accrued.” Husband also contends that the phrase “previous
months of reduced payments” refers to the months previous to the children’s return to
permanent, full-time schooling, which is discussed in the stipulated order’s preceding
provision.
Wife argues that the stipulated order specifically addressed the issue of arrears and
conclusively stated that no arrears exist. According to wife, the language that “[n]o spousal
maintenance arrears shall accrue as a result of the previous months of reduced payment”
refers to the months previous to the stipulated order, and the stipulated order therefore
forgave the arrears from April 2020 through October 2020.
Both husband and wife present reasonable interpretations of the stipulated order.
We therefore conclude the stipulated order is ambiguous. See Dykes, 781 N.W.2d at 582.
However, the district court’s denial of husband’s request for relief means that it determined
wife did not owe husband these arrears, and that determination could only have been based
on the stipulated order. Thus, we discern that the district court construed the stipulated
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order as applying to the “months of reduced payment” that were previous to the stipulated
order. See Umphlett v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App. 1995)
(deriving implicit factual findings from district court’s resolution of the matter), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 30, 1995). And because the district court judge who construed the stipulated
order is the same judge who entered the stipulated order, we defer to the district court’s
interpretation. See LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 162. Further, the stipulated order expressly
recognized that wife’s income was “significantly reduced” by the pandemic. A provision
forgiving wife’s underpayments in the months prior to the stipulated order makes sense in
light of this recognition. See Burke, 606 N.W.2d at 911 (a contract must be construed as a
whole).
We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to deny husband’s request for
arrears that accrued between April 2020 and October 2020.
Affirmed.