State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1327

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony Lee Williams,
Appellant.

Filed September 9, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-25929

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Wheelock ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal , appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree assault.
He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. In the alternative,
appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when
2
it calculated his criminal-history score. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction and we discern no error in the district court’s calculation of the
criminal-history score. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Following a disturbance at an auto-parts store in Minneapolis, respondent State of
Minnesota charged appellant Anthony Lee Williams with first-degree aggravated robbery
in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.245, subdivision 1 (2022), and second -
degree assault (fear) in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdivision 1
(2022).
1 The complaint alleged that Williams stole items from the auto-parts store and,
after employees intervened, he brandished a knife, threatened to stab the store’s manager,
and then left the premises. The case proceed ed to a jury trial, at which the following
evidence was presented.
The store manager observed a man, later identified as Williams, arguing with an
employee in the store. The manager overheard Williams tell the employee, “That’s how
people get hurt.” Hoping to defuse the situation, the manager intervened and asked
Williams to leave the store. In response, Williams asserted that he had not stolen anything.
After the manager continued to urge him to leave, Williams got in the manager’s face,
asked him to meet him outside, and told him that he would hurt him. Shortly after, the

1 The state also charged Williams with felony threats of violence in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1 (2022), and theft in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.52, subdivision 2(a)(1) (2022). The state voluntarily dismissed those charges
before trial.
3
manager opened a door at the front of the store, which led to a vestibule. Williams went
through the door and into the vestibule.
An alarm that tracks store merchandise sounded as Williams passed through the
store’s security gates. The manager said to Williams, “I thought you didn’t take nothing.”
Williams, who was still in the vestibule, became more aggressive, pulled out a knife, and
“started waving it around on [the manager].” Williams swung the knife within three feet
of the manager. The manager closed the interior door and shielded himself behind it in
case Williams attacked him. Williams then exited through the exterior set of doors and got
into a car, which drove away. After Williams left, the manager locked the store’s doors
because he feared that Williams “was going to come back or do something with one of [the
employees].”
A video recording of the incident was admitted as an exhibit. While the video
recording was played for the jury, the manager described the events it depicted. Among
other things, he explained that the video recording shows Williams “pull[ing] out a knife
and [] swinging” it while in the vestibule. Stills from the video recording in which
Williams’s knife is visible were also admitted as exhibits. The stills and video show
Williams holding a folding knife. From the stills and video, it also appears that the blade
of the knife is about two to three inches long and approximately one inch wide, narrowing
to a pointed tip.
A sergeant with the robbery-investigations unit of the Minneapolis Police
Department reviewed the video recording during his investigation. The sergeant testified
that the video shows Williams pulling out a knife in the store’s vestibule. The sergeant
4
also testified that robberies are often committed with weapons, including knives. The
sergeant added that knives can cause death, and he affirmed that “there is risk involved
when a knife is involved in a robbery.”
The jury found Williams guilty of second-degree assault (fear) and not guilty of
first-degree aggravated robbery. During sentencing, the district court relied on Williams’s
criminal-record summary, which indicated that Williams had a criminal-history score of
four. Of that, three points were for two prior convictions of possession of a controlled
substance. The district court sentenced Williams to the presumptive sentence based on his
criminal-history score of four—an executed, 45-month prison sentence.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Williams argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction of second-degree assault (fear). He contends that his conviction must be
reversed because the evidence at trial failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the
following elements of the crime: (1) that he intended to cause the manager to fear
immediate bodily harm and (2) that he wielded a dangerous weapon. In the alternative,
Williams contends that we should reverse and remand for resentencing because the district
court erred in its calculation of his criminal-history score. We address Williams’s
arguments in turn.
5
I. The evidence is sufficient to support Williams’s conviction of second -degree
assault.

In a criminal trial, due process requires that the state prove each element of a charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 654 (Minn.
2023). To be convicted of second-degree assault (fear) under section 609.222,
subdivision 1, the state was required to prove that Williams “assault[ed] another with a
dangerous weapon.” Williams argues that the trial evidence is insufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he committed an “assault” or used “a dangerous weapon.”
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conduct “a
painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient
to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” Lapenotiere v. State, 916 N.W.2d 351, 360-61
(Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). In performing this review, we assume that the jury
disbelieved any evidence that conflicts with the verdict. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257,
263 (Minn. 2016).
When proof of an offense, or any element of that offense, is based on circumstantial
evidence, we apply a heightened standard of review to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient. State v. Loveless, 987 N.W.2d 224, 247 (Minn. 2023). Circumstantial evidence
is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did
not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted).
2 The circumstantial-evidence standard of review

2 By contrast, direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or
observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v.
Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
6
involves two steps. State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145, 158 (Minn. 2024). First, we identify
the “circumstances proved, winnowing down the evidence presented at trial to a subset of
facts consistent with the jury’s verdict.” Id. During this step, we “disregard[] evidence
inconsistent with the verdict.” Id. Second, we “independently examine the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole.”
Id. at 158-59. “To sustain [a] conviction, the circumstances prove d, when viewed as a
whole, must be consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Harris,
895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017).
Williams argues that the circumstantial-evidence standard applies to his challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence because the applicable definitions of “assault” and a
“dangerous weapon” both involve intent. “Intent is a state of mind, and therefore, it is
generally proved circumstantially—by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and
actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Jones , 4 N.W.3d at 501 (quotation
omitted). “[D]irect evidence of intent is rare.” Id. (quotation omitted). As relevant here,
an “assault” is “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm
or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (2022) (emphasis added). And a “dangerous
weapon” is any “device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be
used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 6 (2022) (emphasis added).
3

3 Section 609.02 also defines a “dangerous weapon” as “any firearm . . . or any device
designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat.
7
In this case, the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that Williams
(1) intended to cause the store manager to fear immediate bodily harm or death and
(2) intended to use the knife in a manner calculated or likely to produce death or great
bodily harm. Accordingly, we apply the heightened circumstantial -evidence standard of
review in our analysis of whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the disputed
elements of Williams’s conviction.
Our first step is to identify the circumstances proved by “winnowing down the
evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts consistent with the jury’s verdict.” Westrom,
6 N.W.3d at 158. Here, the circumstances proved are that (1) the manager witnessed
Williams arguing with an employee near the cash register and heard him say, “That’s how
people get hurt”; (2) the manager told Williams to leave the store; (3) Williams argued with
the manager, telling the manager that he would hurt him and challenging him to come
outside with him; (4) the anti-theft alarm sounded as Williams exited the store into the
vestibule, which led to the manager and Williams moving to the store’s vestibule where
they continued to argue; (5) Williams brandished a knife and waved it around within three
feet of the manager; (6) the knife’s blade was approximately two to three inches long and
had a pointed end; and (7) the manager felt threatened, shielded himself with the glass door,
and locked the door once Williams left.

§ 609.02, subd. 6(1). Because the intended-use definition is dispositive here, we need not
address the parties’ competing arguments regarding whether there was sufficient evidence
that the knife was “designed as a weapon.”
8
Williams argues that the circumstances proved at trial are consistent with rational
inferences other than guilt, and therefore the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction. We separately address Williams’s arguments regarding the “assault” and
“dangerous weapon” elements of his conviction and conclude that the circumstances
proved are “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 601.
Assault

We begin our analysis by addressing whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams assaulted the store manager. As discussed
above, to prove that Williams committed assault (fear), the state needed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Williams acted “with intent to cause fear in another of immediate
bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (emphasis added).
Viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable
inference that Williams intended to cause the manager to fear immediate bodily harm. A
jury “may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of that person’s
actions.” State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 152 (Minn. 2023). Here, the natural and
probable consequence of Williams’s actions—including telling the manager that he would
hurt him, brandishing a knife, and then swinging and pointing the knife at the manager—
was the manager fearing that Williams was going to attack him with the knife and cause
immediate bodily harm.
We next consider Williams’s argument that there is a rational inference other than
that he intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm. According to Williams, the
9
circumstances proved show that any threat of injury was not “immediate,” and therefore
was not sufficient to meet the controlling definition of assault. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 10(1). To support his argument, Williams relies on the manager’s testimony that
“[Williams] told me he knew what time I got out and where I work.” Williams maintains
that this testimony shows that any threat was of a future “confrontation after [the manger]
got off work,” and therefore was not immediate.
We conclude this argument is unavailing because it impermissibly relies upon
evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict. Under the circumstantial- evidence
test, we consider only the circumstances proved to determine whether there is a rational
alternative hypothesis to guilt. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. And the supreme court has
instructed that the circumstances proved are the “subset of facts consistent with the jury’s
verdict.” Westrom, 6 N.W.3d at 158 (emphasis added). Here, the evidence that Williams
relies on to support his argument that the threat of harm was not immediate is inconsistent
with the jury’s verdict because, by convicting Williams of second-degree assault (fear), the
jury necessarily found that Williams intended to place the manager in fear of “immediate”
bodily harm or death. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subd. 10(1), .222, subd. 1. Thus, we
must disregard the evidence on which Williams relies to support his argument.
Williams also understates the totality of the circumstances proved, which show that
he brandished a knife, waved it around and pointed it at the manager after they had an
argument, and threatened to hurt the manager. When assessing the reasonable inferences
from the circumstances proved, we must consider those circumstances proved “as a
whole.” State v. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d 178, 186 (Minn. 2021). Considering the
10
circumstances proved as a whole, the only rational inference is that Williams intended to
place the manager in fear of immediate bodily harm. There is no alternative rational
hypothesis.
Dangerous Weapon4

We next consider whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the knife brandished by Williams meets the statutory definition of a
“dangerous weapon” as used in the second -degree assault statute. The definition of
“dangerous weapon” for purposes of th is offense includes any “device or instrumentality
that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death
or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subd. 6, .222, subd. 1.
We conclude that the only rational inference to draw from the circumstances proved
is that Williams intended to use the knife as a dangerous weapon. “When determining
whether an object . . . is a dangerous weapon, the [fact-finder] must examine not only the
nature of the object itself, but also the manner in which it was used.” State v. Abdus-Salam,
1 N.W.3d 871, 879 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). The circumstances proved include
Williams arguing with and threatening the manager, brandishing a knife, and pointing the
knife at the manager . These circumstances are consistent only with the inference that
Williams intended to use the knife as a dangerous weapon amid an escalating conflict with

4 The state asserts that Williams did not argue that the knife was not a dangerous weapon
below and has therefore forfeited the issue on appeal. But the forfeiture doctrine is
typically not applicable in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, which “raise[]
essentially the same argument on appeal that [was] presented to the jury at trial: that [the
defendant] was not guilty of a crime.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 918-19 (Minn.
2019). We therefore address Williams’s dangerous-weapon argument on the merits.
11
the manager. See State v. Moss, 269 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn. 1978) (holding that evidence
supported inference that defendant intended to use scissors during a robbery if their use
became necessary, making the scissors a dangerous weapon).
Williams argues that a reasonable alternative inference from these circumstances is
that he brandished the knife only to facilitate his departure from the store. Williams asserts
that, based on the circumstances proved, the jury could reasonably infer that he intended
to use the knife only to intimidate the manager—not to harm the manager. Considering
the circumstances proved as a whole, we conclude that this inference is not reasonable. See
Westrom, 6 N.W.3d at 158-59 (noting that the inferences drawn from the circumstance
proved must be reasonable). Before Williams pulled out his knife, the manager implored
Williams to leave the store, and no one attempted to physically stop Williams from leaving
after the alarm sounded. Because there was no one obstructing Williams from departing,
it is unreasonable to infer that Williams intended to use the knife to scare the manager and
facilitate his departure.
The only reasonable inference from the circumstances proved is that Williams
intended to use the knife as a dangerous weapon. We reject Williams’s alternative
hypothesis because it is not rational. Thus, the evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s
finding that Williams assaulted the manager with a dangerous weapon.
II. The district court did not err in calculating Williams’s criminal-history score.

Finally, Williams argues that the district court erred by assigning one -and-one-half
points to each of his prior drug-possession convictions. A sentence based on an incorrect
criminal-history score is an illegal sentence and can be corrected at any time. State v.
12
Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007). This court reviews a district court’s
criminal-history-score calculation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown,
937 N.W.2d 146, 157 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2020). “But, if the
issue of the correct criminal-history score turns on an interpretation of the sentencing
guidelines or of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” State v. Morgan,
953 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. App. 2020), aff’d, 968 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 2021). “We apply
the same principles of interpretation to the Guidelines as we apply to statutes, including
the canons of statutory interpretation set forth in Minn. Stat. 645.08 [(2022)].”
State v. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 306-07 (Minn. 2019).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive prison-sentence
durations for offenders for whom imprisonment is proper. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5(2)
(2022). The presumptive sentence is determined by the guidelines in effect on the date of
the offense at issue. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2 (2022). The guidelines contain grids used
for calculating a presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (2022). The
presumptive sentence lies in the cell at the intersection of the severity level for the current
offense and the offender’s criminal-history score. Id. An offender’s criminal-history score
is the sum of points assigned from, among other things, various prior offenses. Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.B (2022). The point value assigned for a prior offense is determined
by assessing its severity level as set forth in the applicable guidelines. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.B.1.a (2022). “The severity level ranking in effect at the time the current
offense was committed determines the weight assigned to the prior offense.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.B.1 (2022).
13
Here, the prior offenses at issue are Williams’s 2008 conviction of third-degree
possession of a controlled substance and his 2015 conviction of second-degree possession
of a controlled substance. Under the 2022 guidelines, the severity levels of second- and
third-degree possession of a controlled substance are D7 and D6, respectively. Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 5.A (2022). And D7 and D6 offenses are each assigned one-and-one-
half points under the 2022 guidelines. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.a. Thus, the district
court assigned Williams three points for his two prior controlled -substance-possession
offenses.
Williams argues that this calculation is incorrect because his prior offenses, both of
which involved possession of cocaine, “are equivalent to fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance under current law. ” Williams bases his argument on the 2016 Drug
Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA) . The DSRA increased the possession threshold for
controlled-substance crimes committed on or after August 1, 2016. 2016 Minn. Laws. ch.
160, §§ 3-5, at 577-85 (codified at Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021-.023 (2016)). Prior to the DSRA,
possession of more than six grams of cocaine met the definition for a second-degree
controlled substance crime and possession of more than three grams of cocaine met the
definition for a third -degree controlled substance crime. Minn. Stat. §§ 152.022,
subd. 2(a)(1), .023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014). But, after the DSRA’s enactment, those
thresholds rose to 25 and 10 grams, respectively. 2016 Minn. Laws. ch. 160, §§ 4-5, at
579-82 (codified at Minn. Stat. §§ 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1), .023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016)).
Williams’s 2008 conviction involved 5.2 grams of cocaine, and his 2015 conviction
involved 8.6 grams of cocaine. Because those quantities fail to meet the post -DSRA
14
thresholds for second- or third-degree controlled substance offenses, Williams asserts that
both prior offenses would be punishable as only fifth-degree controlled substance crimes
under current law. See Minn. Stat. § 152.024, subd. 2 (2022). Under the 2022 guidelines,
fifth-degree possession carries a severity level of D2, which corresponds to a point value
of just one-half of one point. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.a, 5.A. On this basis, Williams
argues that he should have received at total of just one criminal-history point, instead of
three points, for his 2008 and 2015 drug-possession offenses. We disagree.
Even if Williams is correct that his prior offenses, if committed today, would only
be punishable as fifth-degree controlled substance crimes, his argument is unavailing. To
support his argument, Williams relies mainly on Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303. In Strobel, the
defendant was convicted of a drug offense in 2016. 932 N.W.2d at 305. At the time of his
conviction, the defendant had a prior conviction of fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance from 2012. Id. In 2012, fifth-degree possession was classified as a felony
offense. Id. But, after the DSRA’s enactment in 2016, certain fifth-degree possession
offenses were reclassified as gross misdemeanors. Id. The defendant’s criminal-history
score included one-half of one point on account of his 2012 felony conviction of
fifth-degree possession. Id. The defendant argued on appeal that, under the guidelines in
effect at the time of his most recent offense, his prior offense should have been classified
as a misdemeanor rather than a felony for purposes of calculating his criminal-history
score. Id. at 306. The supreme court agreed, applying section 2.B.7.a of the guidelines,
which concerns the classification of a prior offense. Id. at 308. Section 2.B.7.a provides
that “[t]he classification of a prior offense as a . . . gross misdemeanor[] or felony is
15
determined by current Minnesota offense definitions.” Id. at 308-09 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.7a (2018)).5 Thus, the supreme court agreed with
the defendant, concluding that the district court should apply the present-offense
classification rather than the pre-DSRA classification. Id. at 309-10.
The supreme court’s reasoning in Strobel does not apply here because Williams
does not argue that his prior offenses should be classified as misdemeanors instead of
felonies. Rather, Williams’s argument is based on changes to the elements of the offenses
themselves, i.e., the weight thresholds for second- and third-degree controlled substance
possession crimes. And Williams cites no authority to support his contention that the
district court should have applied those revised elements to the facts of Williams’s prior
offenses to determine his criminal-history score.6
Unlike the offense-classification determination at issue in Strobel, nothing in the
guidelines requires, nor authorizes, a district court to determine whether the underlying
facts of a prior offense match the elements of another crime under current law. Instead,
the guidelines plainly provide that “[t]he severity level ranking in effect at the time the
current offense was committed determines the weight assigned to the prior offense.” Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1. Under the guidelines applicable at the time of the current offense,

5 The 2018 and 2022 versions of section 2.B.7.a are identical. Compare Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.B.7.a (2018), with Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.7.a (2022).

6 In fact, as Williams concedes, we have recently rejected this same argument in various
nonprecedential decisions. See, e.g., State v. Haakenstad, No. A23-0170, 2023 WL
5838528, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Sept. 11, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2024); State v.
Jacobson, No. A21-0013, 2021 WL 5767871 , at *3-4 (Minn. App. Dec. 6, 2021), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 2022).
16
Williams’s prior convictions of second- and third-degree controlled substance possession
were each worth one-and-one-half criminal-history points. The district court therefore did
not err in calculating Williams’s criminal-history score.
Affirmed