State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1341

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gerald Willie Dixon,
Appellant.

Filed August 12, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-21468

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Presiding Chief Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, appellant challenges the district court’s pretrial order denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search of a minivan. Appellant argues
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the district court erred when it concluded that the search was lawful under the automobile
exception to the search -warrant requirement, and, in a pro se supplemental brief, argues
that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. Because we conclude the district court
did not err by determining that the search of appellant’s vehicle was permitted under the
automobile exception, and because appellant did not preserve his other argument for
appeal, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Gerald Willie Dixon with one
count of felony possession of a firearm by an ineligible person in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2020), after law enforcement found an assault-
style rifle in a minivan. At a scheduled hearing, Dixon orally moved to suppress evidence
of the rifle, arguing the minivan search was not authorized by an exception to the
search-warrant requirement because the search lacked probable cause. The state opposed
the motion and presented testimony from two Minneapolis Police Department officers, a
patrol officer and an undercover investigator with the gun unit. The district court also
admitted video recordings from the patrol officer’s body- worn camera and from a
city-owned surveillance camera focused on an intersection south of where the minivan was
parked. The district court reviewed a longer, confidential version of the surveillance video
in camera.
The evidence received at the hearing established the following facts. On October 6,
2020, at around 8:15 a.m., the investigator was surveilling the intersection of Logan
Avenue North and Lowry Avenue when he saw something suspicious. The investigator
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was located just south of the intersection in an unmarked vehicle. The investigator saw a
man, later identified as Dixon, holding a large, long, blanket-covered object as one would
hold a rifle. Dixon was standing at the intersection near a gas station. After observing
Dixon holding the blanket-covered object, the investigator used binoculars and observed a
gun stock “sticking out from underneath the blanket.” The investigator concluded that
there may be “a long gun” underneath the blanket, meaning there may be a gun like “a
shotgun or a rifle.” Around the same time, a confidential reliable informant (CRI) told the
investigator that there was a man at the intersection carrying a rifle underneath a blanket. 1
Shortly thereafter, the investigator observed Dixon walk northbound. The
investigator then relocated his vehicle closer to the minivan in question. The investigator
testified that he observed Dixon enter the minivan through the passenger-side sliding door.
The investigator relayed his observations to a patrol officer, whom he had contacted for
assistance. The patrol officer then drove to the area to arrest Dixon . The patrol officer
initially approached a red car on the opposite side of the street as the minivan. The
investigator, watching nearby, redirected the patrol officer to the minivan. The patrol
officer saw Dixon sitting inside the minivan. As he approached the minivan, Dixon exited
through the passenger-side sliding door, leaving the door slightly ajar. The patrol officer
handcuffed Dixon and placed him under arrest. The patrol officer then looked into the
minivan through the open sliding door and saw a blanket in plain view next to where Dixon
had been sitting. The patrol officer slid the minivan door open further, moved the blanket,

1 “A CRI is a distinct type of informant characterized by a proven track record of accurate
tips . . . .” State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138, 149 (Minn. 2024).
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and found an assault-style rifle. The investigator, who arrived as the patrol officer was
placing Dixon under arrest, also saw the rifle. The patrol officer secured the firearm before
having the vehicle towed. The video evidence shows that a little less than ten minutes
elapsed between when the investigator first saw Dixon at the intersection carrying an object
resembling a long gun under a blanket and when the patrol officer arrived at the minivan
after being directed there by the investigator.
At the omnibus hearing, defense counsel argued the state lacked probable cause to
search the minivan for two reasons. First, defense counsel argued that “[n]obody
confirmed that there was in fact a firearm” under the blanket when the investigator first
saw Dixon. Second, defense counsel argued that the investigator was not “in a position to
be able to observe [Dixon] going to and from [the] van.” To support this second argument,
defense counsel pointed to the confusion over the red car, which the patrol officer
approached before the minivan. Defense counsel also called into question the
investigator’s credibility. In response, the state emphasized that the investigator testified
that he saw Dixon get into the minivan and accurately redirected the patrol officer away
from the red car and towards the minivan. The state also emphasized that the patrol officer
observed Dixon exit the minivan as he approached and then saw the blanket in the minivan
next to where Dixon had been sitting.
The district court concluded that the search of the minivan was supported by
probable cause and therefore lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. Weighing the investigator’s testimony, the district court credited the relevant
parts and rejected the defense’s claim that the investigator was not in a position to observe
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Dixon going to and from the minivan.2 The district court emphasized that the investigator’s
ability to direct the patrol officer to the correct minivan showed that he had a clear view of
Dixon. And the district court also credited the patrol officer’s testimony in concluding that
the search of the minivan was supported by probable cause and denying the motion to
suppress.
The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence trial pursuant to Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. The agreement preserved Dixon’s ability to
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress but waived his right to appeal
any other pretrial issues. The district court found Dixon guilty as charged and sentenced
him to 48 months of imprisonment with credit for 935 days served.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
On appeal, Dixon argues that the district court erred by concluding the search of the
minivan was supported by probable cause. Dixon further argues, in his pro se supplemental
brief, that his arrest was unsupported by probable cause. We address Dixon’s arguments
in turn.

2 The district court did not credit all of the investigator’s testimony. After reviewing the
longer version of the surveillance video in camera, the district court concluded that the
investigator did not drive north on Logan Avenue to reposition his vehicle as the
investigator recalled at the hearing, but instead must have taken a different route.
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I. The district court did not err by determining that a search of the minivan was
authorized by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 10. A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it satisfies
an established exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d 682,
685 (Minn. 2023). The state bears the burden to prove an exception to the warrant
requirement applies. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 799 (Minn. 2012).
One well-established exception to the warrant requirement, the “automobile
exception,” authorizes police officers to search a car if they have probable cause to believe
the search “will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” Barrow, 989 N.W.2d
at 685 (quotation omitted). “Probable cause is an objective inquiry that depends on the
totality of the circumstances in each case.” State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 169
(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “It is a common-sense, nontechnical concept that
involves the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771
(Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted). “In addition, the totality of the circumstances includes
reasonable inferences that police officers draw from facts, based on their training and
experience, because police officers may interpret circumstances differently than untrained
persons.” Id. Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances show
that there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 169 (quotations omitted).
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Dixon challenges the district court’s pretrial order concluding there was probable
cause to support the search of the minivan under the automobile exception and denying his
motion to suppress evidence from the search . In an appeal from a pretrial order on a
suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. State v. Wilde, 947 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Minn. App. 2020), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2020). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it does not have
evidentiary support in the record or if it was induced by an erroneous view of the law.”
State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 403 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
The district court determined that the search was supported by probable cause based
on several key findings of fact, including: (1) the investigator saw a man holding an object,
concealed by a blanket, as one would hold a long gun; (2) using his binoculars, the
investigator saw a gun stock or butt sticking out from under the blanket and was concerned
it was a rifle; (3) around the same time, a CRI told the investigator that a man was carrying
a rifle under a blanket at the same intersection; (4) after relocating his vehicle, the
investigator saw the man enter a minivan through the sliding passenger-side door; (5) the
patrol officer, under the investigator’s direction, saw the man exiting the minivan, leaving
the sliding door ajar; and (6) the patrol officer observed a blanket in the minivan in plain
view next to where he had seen Dixon sitting before exiting the vehicle.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court’s
factual findings establish that the search of the minivan was supported by probable cause.
Minnesota Statutes section 624.7181, subdivision 2 (2020) , prohibits carrying “a BB gun,
rifle, or shotgun on or about the person in a public place.” The investigator reasonably
8
believed Dixon had violated that statute by carrying a long gun in public based on the fact
that he saw Dixon carrying a blanket-covered object like a long gun, he saw a gun stock
underneath the blanket, and a CRI told the investigator that a man was carrying a rifle under
a blanket at that location. The investigator also testified that, after relocating his vehicle,
he saw Dixon get into a minivan. The patrol officer, who was contacted by the investigator,
later arrested Dixon at the minivan. After the arrest, the patrol officer saw a blanket in the
minivan in plain view where Dixon had been sitting. Under the totality of these
circumstances, it was reasonable to believe that the minivan contained evidence of a
crime: the long gun Dixon had been holding in a public place minutes earlier. Accordingly,
the search was supported by probable cause, and the search was lawful under the
automobile exception.
To convince us otherwise, Dixon advances four arguments: the investigator did not
observe Dixon placing the firearm in the minivan; the CRI’s basis of knowledge was not
established in the record; possession of a firearm in public is not “obviously a crime or
contraband”; and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply after
Dixon was arrested. We are not persuaded.
The Investigator’s Observations
Dixon claims that law enforcement lacked probable cause to search the minivan
because the investigator “did not testify that he saw that [Dixon] was carrying anything
when he got into the van.” This argument is unpersuasive because the state did not need
to prove that law enforcement observed Dixon place the firearm in the minivan before
conducting the search under the automobile exception. See State v. Yarbrough,
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841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014) (“[D]irect observation of evidence of a crime at the
place to be searched is not required.”). Instead, the state needed only to establish probable
cause—a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found in the
place to be searched. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 169 (quotation omitted). Here, the record
reflects that the officers reasonably believed, based on their observations, that there was a
fair probability that the firearm would be found in the minivan. Those observations
included: Dixon carrying a blanket-covered object resembling a long gun in public,
Dixon’s presence in the minivan within ten minutes of the investigator’s observation, and
the patrol officer’s observation of a blanket in the minivan in plain view next to where
Dixon had been sitting before exiting. Moreover, the district court heard the officers’
testimony and found it credible. We defer to the district court’s credibility determination.
State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012).
CRI’s Basis of Knowledge
Dixon also argues that the state did not establish “the [CRI’s] basis of knowledge
for what he told” the investigator—namely, there was a man carrying a rifle under a blanket
at the intersection—and therefore probable cause is lacking . This argument is unavailing
for two reasons. First, the district court concluded that the investigator “had probable cause
before receiving the CRI’s information” and thus “the CRI’s information only added to the
probable cause already possessed by the officer.” We agree that probable cause existed
independent of the CRI’s tip for the reasons discussed above.
Second, even if the CRI’s information is considered, the record supports the
conclusion that the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability. To determine whether a CRI ’s
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tip has “sufficient indicia of reliability” to establish probable cause, we typically consider
the CRI’s reliability and the basis of their knowledge. State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883,
890 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). A CRI’s track record of providing accurate
information to police can establish reliability. Id. Police also can establish that a CRI’s
basis of knowledge is satisfactory by corroborating the tip. Id. at 891.
Here, the state established that the CRI’s tip was reliable. The investigator testified
that the CRI has provided reliable, verifiable information “dozens of times.” See
State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (holding that CRI was reliable
because CRI “had given the police reliable information in the past”). And the CRI’s basis
of knowledge was established by the investigator’s concurrent corroboration of the tip
through the investigator’s own observation of Dixon with a blanket covering an object
resembling a long gun and the patrol officer’s plain-view observation of the blanket in the
minivan next to where Dixon had been sitting before the officer’s search of the minivan .
Accordingly, we conclude the CRI’s tip was reliable. And like the district court, we
conclude that the CRI’s tip was not necessary to find probable cause but only provided
further support for that determination.
Possession of the Firearm
Dixon also argues that the investigator’s observation of Dixon carrying a blanket-
wrapped object did not necessarily indicate illegal activity, either because Dixon could
have had a permit to carry or the object could have been a facsimile. But Minnesota
caselaw provides that an officer’s observation of an individual in possession of a firearm
in a public place is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that unlawful activity is
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occurring, unless the officer knows that the suspect is carrying the firearm in compliance
with the terms of a valid permit. State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 872-73, 875
(Minn. 2011) (explaining that a permit is an affirmative defense to an unlawful-possession
offense, but the absence of a permit is not an element). And probable cause to search under
the automobile exception requires only a fair probability that evidence or contraband will
be found in the place to be searched. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 169. It does not require
absolute certainty that the object the officer observed was in fact a firearm and not a
facsimile. See Williams, 794 N.W.2d at 873. As a result, neither the fact that the
investigator did not know whether Dixon had a permit nor the possibility that the object
could have been a facsimile negate the probable cause that Dixon unlawfully possessed a
firearm.
Automobile Exception After Arrest
Lastly, in his pro se supplemental brief, Dixon argues that the officers would have
had time to secure a warrant to search the vehicle and therefore should have done so rather
than conducting a warrantless search. Dixon emphasizes that any exigency justifying a
warrantless search ended once he was arrested. This argument was not raised below, and
therefore it is forfeited. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (“This court
generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court, including
constitutional questions of criminal procedure.”). Even if this argument was not forfeited,
the automobile exception to the search -warrant requirement applies when officers have
probable cause to believe a car contains evidence or contraband . Barrow, 989 N.W.2d at
685. The automobile exception does not cease as soon as a defendant is in custody. See
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State v. Schell, 994 N.W.2d 326, 330 -31 (Minn. App. 2023) (holding that the automobile
exception still justified search of vehicle on impound lot six days after defendant’s arrest),
rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2023). In other words, the officers did not need to seek a
warrant because they had probable cause to search the minivan under the automobile
exception irrespective of Dixon’s arrest.
In sum, because the search of the minivan was supported by probable cause and
therefore lawful under the automobile exception, the district court properly denied Dixon’s
motion to suppress.
II. Dixon did not preserve for appeal his argument that his arrest lacked probable
cause.

Dixon also argues in his supplemental brief that there was not probable cause to
arrest him. Dixon did not make this argument to the district court, and the district court
did not consider it in its pretrial order. Because Dixon agreed to a stipulated-evidence trial,
our review “is expressly limited to the pretrial ruling by the district court.” State v. Marsh,
931 N.W.2d 825, 829 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019); see also
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. Dixon agreed to preserve his ability to appeal
“only . . . that pretrial ruling from [the district court judge] as to the search of the van.”
The pretrial ruling did not concern whether there was probable cause to arrest Dixon.
Therefore, Dixon forfeited the issue when he agreed to proceed under rule 26.01,
subdivision 4.3 See Marsh, 931 N.W.2d at 829 (concluding defendant forfeited challenge

3 Even if Dixon’s argument was not forfeited and we agreed that his arrest lacked probable
cause, it would not warrant suppression of the gun because the gun was not discovered as

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that the warrant was overbroad when pretrial ruling concerned whether the officers
exceeded the scope of the warrant).
Affirmed.

a fruit of Dixon’s arrest. Rather, the gun was a fruit of the minivan search under the
automobile exception, which was supported by probable cause gathered independently of
Dixon’s arrest and likely would have occurred even if Dixon had been merely detained and
not immediately arrested. See State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 203 n.2 (Minn. 1996)
(describing independent-source and inevitable-discovery doctrines which would prevent
suppression of the gun here).