State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1351

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jaime Rodrigo Guairacaja Chafl,
Appellant.

Filed November 12, 2024
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-19447

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Samuel J. Edmunds, Sieben Edmunds Miller PLLC, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction for second-degree
criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues that the prosecuting attorney committed
misconduct during rebuttal argument by vouching for the credibility of the state’s key
witness. We determine that prosecutorial misconduct occurred. But even if we assume that
the misconduct was unusually serious, we conclude that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jaime Rodrigo Guairacaja Chafl1
with one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.343,
subd. 1a(e) (2020). The following summarizes the evidence received at Guairacaja’s jury
trial.
In 2022, D.D., then nine years old, lived in her grandmother’s house in Minneapolis
with her mother, three siblings, aunt, uncle, grandmother, and grandmother’s husband,
Guairacaja. D.D., her mother, and her three siblings shared a room.
One day in June 2022, D.D. and her mother folded laundry together in a bedroom.
D.D. left the bedroom to get a snack from the kitchen. Guairacaja entered the kitchen,
walked toward D.D., and touched D.D.’s chest under her shirt. D.D. tried to “[g]et away,”

1 This opinion will refer to appellant as Guairacaja, which is how his attorney referred to
him during district court proceedings.
3
but Guairacaja “grabbed” her “hard” and like “a hook.” Guairacaja said, “Don’t tell [your]
mom.”
D.D. returned to the bedroom. Her mother later testified that D.D. “looked really
shocked.” D.D. told her mother that Guairacaja “just touched [her].” Her mother asked
D.D. where he touched her, and D.D. “pointed to her breast area and her vaginal area.”
D.D.’s mother went “to speak to” Guairacaja. She told Guairacaja that D.D. said he
“touched her.” Guairacaja said, “No, I didn’t.” Later in the conversation, Guairacaja stated
that D.D. “came down” to the basement and that he “put [his] leg around her and bit her
ear.”
A few weeks later, D.D.’s mother moved D.D. and her siblings out of their
grandmother’s house. D.D.’s mother reported the incident with Guairacaja to law
enforcement, who referred D.D. for a forensic interview at CornerHouse. 2
At Guairacaja’s March 2023 jury trial, the state called the following witnesses:
D.D., her mother, the forensic interviewer, and a law-enforcement officer. A video
recording of D.D.’s CornerHouse interview was admitted into evidence and played for the
jury. Along with the facts outlined above, D.D.’s mother agreed on cross-examination that
D.D. would sometimes say things that were not true to avoid getting in trouble. D.D.’s
grandmother testified on Guairacaja’s behalf and said that, in her experience, D.D. was not
an honest child. Guairacaja did not testify.

2 The forensic interviewer testified that CornerHouse is “an accredited child advocacy
center” that “assist[s] kids who have been abused sexually and physically.”
4
After the parties rested, the district court instructed the jury. The prosecuting
attorney and Guairacaja’s attorney gave closing arguments that focused on D.D.’s
credibility. The prosecuting attorney ended the rebuttal argument by stating:
There’s no evidence whatsoever that [D.D. and her mother]
colluded with each other to lie about this, there’s no reason that
they would do that, and it’s unreasonable, I believe—it’s
unreasonably—unreasonable to believe that this mother and
child, for no reason whatsoever, colluded on a lie against this
man. Because if you believe what the defense is saying, [D.D.]
would have had to come up with this to avoid trouble and then
her mom would have had to have supported her in this lie and
given her information to give to the court and to you, and that
doesn’t hold water. That’s not a reasonable doubt. I think
[D.D.] was very credible, and I ask that yo u find [Guairacaja]
guilty of the charges. Thank you.

Immediately after the prosecuting attorney finished, the district court stated, “One
thing I just have to touch on: It doesn’t matter what [the prosecuting attorney] thinks with
respect to [D.D.’s] credibility. What really matters is what you think. So you can disregard
his comments and— in that regard. I’m assuming you probably would have done that
anyway.”
Outside the presence of the jury, Guairacaja’s attorney moved for a mistrial and
objected to the state’s closing argument about D.D.’s credibility as prosecutorial
misconduct. Guairacaja’s attorney argued that “[i]t’s not proper for a prosecutor to endorse
the credibility of a witness in closing statements.” The prosecuting attorney stated that his
use of “I believe” was accidental.
The district court denied the motion for mistrial, noting that it had already given a
curative instruction. The district court explained, “[T]hat’s why I felt it necessary, before
5
the jury was excused, to . . . clarify for them it’s not [the prosecuting attorney’s] view of
whether [he] thinks [D.D.’s] credible or not, and that that’s not evidence, so I thought
appropriate to correct him on whatever they may have drawn from that.” The district court
also stated that the jury understood that the prosecuting attorney was “arguing [D.D.] was
credible rather than telling them that . . . [D.D.] was credible.”
The jury found Guairacaja guilty of second -degree criminal sexual conduct. The
district court sentenced Guairacaja to 36 months in prison, stayed for five years, and 180
days in the Hennepin County Adult Corrections Facility.
Guairacaja appeals.
DECISION
Guairacaja raises one issue on appeal: whether his right to a fair trial was denied
“when the prosecutor injected his personal belief into the proceeding regarding the key
witness’s credibility in a sexual abuse case.” The state counters that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Guairacaja’s motion for mistrial because the objected-to
statements during rebuttal argument did not deprive Guairacaja of his right to a fair trial.
A criminal defendant’s due-process rights include a right to a fair trial. State v.
Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. 2002). “Prosecutors have an affirmative obligation
to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted). “Whether a new trial should be granted because of prosecutorial
misconduct is governed by no fixed rules but rests within the discretion of the trial judge,
who is in the best position to appraise its effect.” State v. Steward, 645 N.W.2d 115, 121
(Minn. 2002).
6
In considering a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, our analysis follows two steps.
Appellate courts must first determine “whether or not there was an objection at trial to the
claimed misconduct.” State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 749 (Minn. 2010); see also
State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 393-94 (Minn. 2007) (determining that “the prosecutor’s
conduct was improper” and applying a harmless-error analysis). Second, “[w]hen defense
counsel objects to instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial,” ap pellate courts
have applied “a two-tiered harmless-error test under which the standard of review varies
based on the seriousness of the misconduct.” Woodard v. State, 994 N.W.2d 272, 277 n.2
(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Steward, 645 N.W.2d at 121 (describing a
two-tiered harmless-error test for “unusually serious” and “less serious” misconduct).3
Guairacaja argues that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct during
rebuttal arguments by “vouching for [D.D.’s] credibility.”4 Guairacaja’s brief to this court
focuses on the prosecuting attorney’s rebuttal statement, quoted in full above, and argues

3 In State v. Whitson, the supreme court observed that “[r]ecent cases have questioned
whether the two-tiered . . . standard for reviewing objected-to misconduct remains viable”
and declined to resolve the issue in that case. 876 N.W.2d 297, 304 n.2 (Minn. 2016). The
question appears to remain unresolved. Although the supreme court purported to apply the
standard for “nonserious” misconduct in Woodard, it did so as dicta because it did not
conclude that misconduct occurred. 994 N.W.2d 277- 78, 277 n.2 (citing Whitson,
876 N.W.2d at 304).

4 In his brief to this court, Guairacaja also points out that the prosecuting attorney’s opening
statement and initial closing argument included statements about D.D.’s credibility. When
asked during oral argument whether Guairacaja also was contending that these other
statements amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, Guairacaja’s attorney stated that the
appeal contends misconduct occurred during the rebuttal argument and that his brief
mentions other statements by the prosecuting attorney to provide context. We have
reviewed the entirety of the opening statements and closing arguments, along with the rest
of the trial transcript, to consider the context of the rebuttal arguments.
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that “the last words the jury heard from the prosecutor were, ‘I think D.D. was very
credible, and I ask that you find him guilty of the charges. Thank you.’” As noted above,
the district court immediately gave a curative instruction on its own initiative and then,
outside the presence of the jury, Guairacaja’s attorney objected to the prosecuting
attorney’s rebuttal argument and asked for a mistrial, which the district court denied.
We first determine whether the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct. See
Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 393-94. Vouching for a witness’s credibility is prosecutorial
misconduct and “occurs when the prosecutor implies a guarantee of a witness’ s
truthfulness . . . or expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’ s credibility.” State v.
Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 106 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). “While a prosecutor must
not personally endorse a witness’s credibility, the State may, in closing argument, argue
that a witness was or was not credible.” Id. The supreme court has instructed that, when
evaluating an argument for misconduct, appellate courts should not take statements out of
context but “look at the closing argument as a whole.” State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645,
656 (Minn. 2006); see State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn. 2000) (stating that
an appellate court should not “focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out
of context or given undue prominence” in considering prosecutorial misconduct in a
closing argument (quotation omitted)).
Here, we consider whether the prosecuting attorney impermissibly vouched for
D.D.’s credibility during rebuttal when he stated, “I think D.D. was very credible.” A
prosecuting attorney’s use of the phrase “‘I think’ to interject personal opinion into a
closing argument is improper.” State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 375 (Minn. 2005); see
8
also Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 656 (determining that the prosecuting attorney
impermissibly vouched for the credibility of a witness by stating, “The state believes she
is very believable”). We conclude that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by
expressing his personal opinion about D.D.’s credibility.
Next, this court must determine whether the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct was
harmless. See State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 121 (Minn. 2009). We will assume
without deciding that the more stringent standard applies to the prosecuting attorney’s
misconduct. “In cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct, that
misconduct will not be characterized as harmless unless there is certainty beyond a
reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless.” Steward, 645 N.W.2d at 121. An
error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt only if the verdict rendered was surely
unattributable to the error.” Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 658 (quotations omitted).
Guairacaja argues that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because
“the evidence here was not overwhelming and rested solely on the credibility of [D.D.]”
and the prosecuting attorney vouched for D.D.’s credibility in “his final statement” to the
jury. Guairacaja explains that “[t]he jury, trusting the prosecutor’s authoritative viewpoint,
entered a guilty verdict.”
We conclude that the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt for two reasons. First, the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct was a single
brief statement during rebuttal. The prosecuting attorney vouched for D.D.’s credibility in
one sentence, which was part of a longer 14-page closing argument and rebuttal. The short
duration of the misconduct militates against the harmfulness of the error. See Wren,
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738 N.W.2d at 394-95 (determining that the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and noting that “the objectionable conduct was brief”).
Second, the district court gave a spontaneous curative instruction that directed the
jury to disregard the prosecuting attorney’s statement and make its own determination of
credibility. The district court stated: “It doesn’t matter what [the prosecuting attorney]
thinks with respect to [D.D.’s] credibility. What really matters is what you think. So you
can disregard his comments and— in that regard. I’m assuming you probably would have
done that anyway.”
The supreme court and this court have determined in other appeals that a district
court’s immediate curative instruction may render prosecutorial misconduct harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 107 (stating that “any possible
misconduct by the prosecutor was harmless” where “the jury was instructed to disregard
the [prosecutor’s] statements”); In re Welfare of D.D.R., 713 N.W.2d 891, 900 (Minn. App.
2006) (determining that the district court’s “instructions were sufficient to negate . . . any
prejudice that may have occurred as a result of” the prosecuting attorney’s improper
vouching).
Guairacaja argues that the curative instruction did not lessen the prejudice because
the district court told “the jury they can choose to disregard the [prosecutor’s] opinions as
opposed to they must disregard them.” But Guairacaja ignores the rest of the district court’s
instruction, which informed the jury that “[i]t doesn’t matter” what the prosecuting attorney
“thinks” about D.D.’s credibility. When the entire curative instruction is considered in
10
context, the district court’s statement that the jury “can disregard” the prosecuting
attorney’s comments remedied the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct.
Also, the district court was in the best position to assess the prejudicial effect of the
rebuttal argument. See Steward, 645 N.W.2d at 121. The district court determined that the
immediate curative instruction was appropriate to “correct” the prosecuting attorney’s
misconduct and “whatever [the jury] may have drawn from that.” The district court found
that the jury understood that it was to make its own assessment of credibility. In denying
the motion for mistrial, the district court stated: “I think [the jury] understand[s] their role
and understand[s] that [the prosecuting attorney was] arguing [D.D.] was credible rather
than telling them that . . . [D.D.] was credible.”
Thus, even if we assume that the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for
unusually serious misconduct applies, the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt because it was brief and immediately corrected by the district court.
The jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct. See
Whitson, 876 N.W.2d at 304-05 (assuming that the standard for unusually serious
misconduct applied and concluding that the prosecutor’s misconduct was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt). We therefore also conclude that Guairacaja’s right to a fair trial was
not abridged and that he is not entitled to a new trial.
Affirmed.