Dian Mullis, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1360

Dian Mullis,
Appellant,

vs.

Professional Plating, Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed April 1, 2024
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge *

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-21-5439

Christopher J. Moreland, Ross D. Stadheim, MJSB Employment Justice LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Nicholas L. Klehr, Hugh E. Mulligan, Klehr & Mulligan, PLLC , Edina, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary -judgment dismissal of her reprisal claim under
the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) , Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01- .50 (Minn. 2022 &

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
Supp. 2023), against her former employer. Because we conclude there are no genuine
disputes of material fact regarding whether appellant engaged in statutorily protected
conduct, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Dian Mullis began working as the Director of Engineering at respondent
Professional Plating , Inc. in February 2020.1 On January 14, 2021, Craig Ingalls,
Professional Plating’s president, gave a tour to a prospective employee. During the tour,
Ingalls introduced the prospective employee to two Professional Plating engineers ,
Mercedes Anderson and Israel Hassan . He introduced Anderson by her name, but he
introduced Hassan as the company’s “Black, Jewish, Muslim” engineer.2 Hassan is neither
Jewish nor Muslim.
Mullis, whose office was nearby, overheard the introduction of Hassan . Afterward,
she apologized to Hassan for Ingalls’s introduction, and he thanked Mullis and said that
the introduction made him “uncomfortable.” A few days later, on January 18, 2021, Mullis
confronted Ingalls about his introduction of Hassan . Besides this incident, Mullis was
unaware of other instances of racially or religious ly discriminatory statements or conduct
by Professional Plating employees.

1 Consistent with the standard of review, w e present the facts in the light most favorable to
Mullis as the nonmoving party. See Kenneh v. Home ward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222,
228 (Minn. 2020).
2 The district court noted that the record suggests that Hassan had “a different account of
this event, which he recalled as ‘[Ingalls] introduced me as Israel Todd Hassan and he said
that I have Judaism going with my first name, then I have a Muslim last name and a
Western middle name.’” The district court determined “the difference in detail regarding
the exact wording is not a material fact in this litigation.”
3
On February 1, 2021, Professional Plating fired Mullis. Ingalls made the final
decision, which he informed Mullis was because of “core v alues.”
Mullis brought a reprisal claim against Professional Plating under the MHRA,
alleging that Professional Plating fired her for opposing Ingalls’s discriminatory treatment
of Hassan. Professional Plating moved for summary judgment, which Mullis opposed. The
district court granted Professional Plating’s motion, determining that Mullis identified no
“adverse employment consequences” suffered by Hassan and therefore Mullis could not
reasonably believe that Professional Plating engaged in conduct forbidd en by the MHRA.
As a result, the district court concluded that Mullis did not engage in statutorily protected
conduct required to sustain a MHRA reprisal claim.
Mullis appeals.
DECISION
Mullis argues that the district court erred by granting Professional Plating’s motion
for summary judgment and dismissing her MHRA reprisal claim.3 Appellate courts review
the grant of summary judgment de novo, examining “whether there are any genuine iss ues
of material fact and whether the district court properly applied the law.” Henry v. Indep.

3 Mullis also argues that the district court erred by hearing Professional Plating’s summary-
judgment motion because it was heard on May 26, after the May 8 scheduling order
deadline. Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.02, “[a] schedule shall not be modified except by leave
of court upon a showing of good cause.” But “whether or not to enforce its own scheduling
order is clearly within the district court’s discretion.” Maudsley v. Pederson, 676 N.W.2d
8, 11-12 (Minn. App. 2004). Mullis did not identify any prejudice when requesting that the
district court d ecline to hear Professional Plating’s summary -judgment motion, nor does
she identify any prejudice in opposing that motion on appeal. As a result, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to hear the summary-judgment motion
on the merits.
4
Sch. Dist. No. 625, 988 N.W.2d 868, 880 (Minn. 2023). We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to Mullis, the nonmoving party, and resolve all doubts and factual
inferences against Professional Plating, the moving party. See Kenneh , 944 N.W.2d at 228.
An actionable reprisal claim exists if an employer retaliates against an employee
because the employee engaged in statutorily protected conduct by “oppos[ing] a practice
forbidden” by the MHRA. Minn. Stat . § 363A.15(1); Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d
76, 81 (Minn. 2010) . Mullis alleges that she was fired for confronting Ingalls about his
introduction of Hassan, which she argues she reasonably believed to be racial and religious
discrimination forbidden by the MHRA. The sole issue before us is whether Mullis’s
confrontation qualifies as statutorily protected conduct.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a plaintiff must “plead
opposition to a practice that is actually forbidden under the MHRA” or merely “a good -
faith, reasonable belief that the opposed practice was forbidden under the MHRA” to
sustain a MHRA reprisal claim. See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 82. Because we conclude that
Mullis did not engage in statutorily protected conduct even under the good-faith,
reasonable-belief standard, we need not address Mullis’s argument that the district court
improperly applied an actual -violation standard .
Under a good-faith, reasonable-belief standard, a plaintiff must show that they acted
in subjective good faith and that it was “objectively reasonable” to believe the opposed
conduct violated the MHRA. Id. There is no dispute that Mullis acted in good faith. Instead,
the parties dispute whether it was objectively reasonable for Mullis to believe that what she
was opposing was prohibited by the MHRA. For thi s objective component , “the
5
reasonableness of a party’s belief must be connected to the substantive law” governing
unfair employment practices. Id. at 83. “If a practice is not unlawful under the plain terms
of the MHRA, a party’s belief that the practice is unlawful cannot be reasonable.” Id. at 84.
As relevant to Mullis’s allegation that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct ,
the MHRA forbids an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a person with respect to
hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities or privileges of
employment.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2(3). Under Minnesota caselaw, a n employer
engages in unlawful discrimination within the meaning of section 363A.08, subdivision
2(3), by subjecting an employee to an “ adverse employment action ” because of race or
religion.4 Id. at 83. To prove an adverse employment action, t he Minnesota Supreme Court
has generally “required plaintiffs to demonstrate some tangible change in duties or working
conditions that leads to some material employment disadvantage.” Henry , 988 N.W.2d at
884 (quotation omitted) . For example, “termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes
that affect an employee’s future career prospects are significant enough to meet the
standard, as are circumstances amounting to a constructive discharge.” Id. (quotation
omitted). But “minor changes in working conditions are insufficient.” Bahr , 788 N.W.2d
at 83.

4 The Minnesota Supreme Court recently clarified that there are two theories for relief
under section 363A.08, subdivision 2(3): disparate-treatment claims, “based on differential
treatment due to a plaintiff’s protected status” and hostile-work-environment claims “based
on harassing conduct due to a plaintiff’s protected status.” Henry , 988 N.W.2d at 885.
Mullis’s reprisal claim is premised upon the first theory—that Ingalls subjected Hassan to
differential treatment b ased on his protected status.
6
Mullis argues that she could reasonably believe that Hassan was subjected to
unlawful employment discrimination because of Ingalls’s introduction of Hassan . But
Mullis does not identify any changes to Hassan’s duties or working conditions at
Professional Plating or disadvantages in his position or career . See Henry, 988 N.W.2d
at 884. The evidence related to Hassan’s employment shows that he worked for
Professional Plating since June 2014 and received multiple promotions, with pay raises ,
during that time . The record does not include evidence that Hassan received negative
performance reviews, written discipline, or other adverse consequences to his employment.
In short, there is nothing to suggest a change to Hassan’s “hiring, tenure, compensation,
terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment ,” tangible or
otherwise. See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 84 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2(3)). 5
Mullis relies on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Lamb v. Village of
Bagley to argue that “race-based comments” may constitute an adverse employment action,
and it was therefore reasonable to believe that introducing Hassan as the “Black, Jewish,
Muslim” engineer was forbidden by the MHRA. 310 N.W.2d 508, 509 (Minn. 1981). Lamb
involved an employment-discrimination claim brought by a Native American police officer
based on extensive verbal abuse by the police chief, including racial slurs and other

5 Mullis also asserts that the district court erred by analyzing her reprisal claim differently
because she opposed allegedly discriminatory conduct directed at Hassan rather than
conduct directed at herself . We agree that neither the MHRA reprisal provision nor
Minnesota precedent suggest that a reprisal claim requires different proof depending on the
target of the underlying discriminatory c onduct. But because the district court properly
analyzed whether the record supports a reasonable belief that Hassan suffered an adverse
employment action, we discern no error in the district court’s conclusion that Mullis did
not engage in statutorily protected conduct.
7
derogatory remarks ; lower pay than white officers; and withholding of a clothing
allowance. Id. at 509-10, 512. But Lamb did not hold that “race -based comments” are
adverse employment actions. Rather, t he supreme court noted “[t]he racially derogatory
remarks directed at [the plaintiff] establish a prima facie case of unequal treatment” and
concluded “the racial epithets, admittedly made, coupled with the admittedly disparate
treatment, establish impermissible discrimination as a matter of law .” Id. at 511 (emphasis
added) . Lamb does not suggest that Ingalls’s introduction of Hassan, absent any other
consequences to Hassan’s employment, could reasonably be believed to constitute a
practice forbidden by the MHRA .
In sum, even when viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mullis as the
nonmoving party, the undisputed evidence establishes that Hassan did not experience any
alterations or disadvantages in the terms or conditions of his employment. As a result,
Mullis could not have an objectively reasonable belief that Professional Plating’s treatment
of Hassan was forbidden by the MHRA . See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 84. The district court
did not err by concluding that there are no disputed facts regarding whether Mullis engaged
in statutorily protected conduct under the MHRA and dismissing Mullis’s reprisal claim.
Affirmed.