State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1378

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Edward Wilson,
Appellant.

Filed September 3, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-4994

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant argues that his convictions for two counts of fifth-degree criminal sexual
conduct must be reversed because the evidence is insufficient to prove that he engaged in
lewd exhibition of his genitals or masturbated while knowing or having reason to know
2
that he was in the presence of a minor. Alternatively, he argues that he is entitled to a new
trial on one count because the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for
a special verdict to identify which act the jury unanimously agreed that he committed. We
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Edward Wilson with two counts
of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.3451, subdivision 1a(2) (2022). Count I alleged that Wilson had engaged in
lewd exhibition of his genitals or masturbation in the presence of a minor during the period
from December 1, 2021, through July 19, 2022. Count II alleged that Wilson had engaged
in lewd exhibition of his genitals or masturbation in the presence of a minor on or about
July 16 to 17, 2022. The following facts were established at trial.
From January to July 2022, Wilson resided with his girlfriend and his girlfriend’s
child at her apartment. The child , I.W., was under the age of 16. The apartment had two
bedrooms on one side, a living room in the middle, and a kitchen on the other side; a person
had to pass through the living room to get from the bedrooms to the kitchen.
One day during that time period, I.W. was in her room. Wilson knocked and, as I.W.
described, “peeked open the door” to ask her if she knew where the computer charger was.
I.W. fully opened the door. Wilson had a blanket over part of his lower body, but his penis
was exposed. I.W. hurried out of her room, found the computer charger, gave it to Wilson,
and went back to her room. When I.W. thereafter left her room to do laundry, Wilson asked
her to plug in the computer charger at various places in the apartment. He then asked I.W.
3
to plug in the computer charger in her room, and she did. Later, Wilson asked I.W. what
percent the computer’s battery was at. I.W. brought the computer out of her room to the
other bedroom, where Wilson was. Wilson called I.W. into the bedroom. He was lying
down without any clothes on. I.W. tried to give the computer to him, but he could not reach
it. So I.W. took “little steps” to pass the computer to Wilson because she did not want to
be too close to him.
On another occasion during the same time period, I.W. walked out of her bedroom
to go to the kitchen. Wilson was in the living room on the couch. He had a blanket on, but
his penis was exposed and he was masturbating. I.W. returned to her room.
On or about July 15 to 16, 2022, I.W. had two friends over to her apartment to spend
the night. I.W.’s two friends are sisters, and both sisters were under the age of 16. The three
girls spent time in I.W.’s bedroom. Late in the evening, the girls went to the kitchen, put
some food in the oven, and then returned to I.W.’s room to finish watching a movie. The
younger sister, S.C., left the room to check on the food in the kitchen. As she was walking
back to I.W.’s room through the living room, Wilson was on the couch touching his
exposed penis. S.C. returned to I.W.’s room and told the other girls what she had seen. To
make sure S.C. was not “hallucinating,” her older sister went to check. The older sister left
the room and walked to the kitchen. As she was returning to I.W.’s room, Wilson came out
of the pantry. His pants were down, and she saw his exposed buttocks. The sisters texted
their mother, who immediately came and picked them up from the apartment.
4
The jury found Wilson guilty on both counts, for engaging in “masturbation or lewd
exhibition of the genitals” in the presence of I.W. (Count I) and in the presence of S.C.
(Count II).
Wilson now appeals.
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to sustain both convictions for fifth-degree criminal
sexual conduct.

A person is guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct if “the person engages in
masturbation or lewd exhibition of the genitals in the presence of a minor under the age of
16, knowing or having reason to know the minor is present.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3451,
subd. 1a(2). Wilson argues that his convictions must be reversed because the state failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he engaged in lewd exhibition of his genitals with
respect to either I.W. or S.C. because “there is no evidence that he engaged in any behavior
designed to call the girls’ attention to his exposed penis” or (2) he masturbated while
knowing or having reason to know that a minor was present.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court
“is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to
reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Crow, 730 N.W.2d 272, 280 (Minn. 2007)
(quotation omitted). “The verdict will not be overturned if, giving due regard to the
presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a
5
reasonable doubt, the factfinder could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the
charged offense.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
A. Lewd Exhibition
The district court instructed the jury that “lewd” means “openly lustful or indecent.”
Wilson agrees that this definition accords with caselaw. See City of Mankato v.
Fetchenhier, 363 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn. App. 1985) (“The commonly accepted definition
of lewdness is the quality of being openly lustful or indecent.”). But Wilson argues that the
evidence is insufficient to prove that his conduct met that definition because, he contends,
when the conduct occurs in one’s own home, lewd exhibition requires proof that the
defendant took action to attract attention to their exposed genitals and no su ch evidence
exists here. He relies on caselaw applying the indecent-exposure statute. Wilson’s
argument is unconvincing.
The indecent-exposure statute states, “A person who commits any of the following
acts in any public place, or in any place where others are present, is guilty of a
misdemeanor: (1) willfully and lewdly exposes the person’s body, or the private parts
thereof . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1(1) (2022). Wilson points to State v. Peery, in
which the supreme court reversed the appellant’s conviction for indecent exposure after
the appellant was observed naked through the window of his ground-floor dormitory room.
28 N.W.2d 851, 853, 855 (Minn. 1947). The supreme court explained that the statute
requires sufficient evidence to find that the exposure “was committed with the deliberate
intent of being indecent or lewd.” Id. at 854. The supreme court continued, “To establish
intent where the act does not occur in a public place or otherwise where it is certain to be
6
observed, some evidence further than the act itself must be presented.” Id. It explained,
“Ordinarily, intent is established by evidence of motions, signals, sounds, or other actions
by the accused designed to attract attention to his exposed condition, or by his display in a
place so public and open that it must be reasonably presumed that it was intended to be
witnessed.” Id. Wilson argues that evidence of actions to attract attention was therefore
required here, where his exposure was in the home, to prove that his conduct was “lewd.”
But, in cases since Peery , the supreme court has made clear that the indecent-
exposure statute does not provide any special protection for lewd conduct in the home. In
Fordyce v. State, the supreme court affirmed the indecent-exposure conviction of a person
who was nude in his own backyard. 994 N.W.2d 893, 896, 904 (Minn. 2023). Interpreting
the statute’s phrase “in any place where others are present,” the supreme court rejected the
argument that the phrase should be defined “based on strict geographical boundaries.” Id.
at 902. Rather, the supreme court explained, the location of the alleged behavior is relevant
only to whether the defendant’s conduct was volitional rather than accidental, and it cited
Peery as an example of an accidental-exposure case. Id. And in State v. Stevenson, the
supreme court affirmed the defendant’s conviction under the indecent-exposure statute for
masturbating in his truck close to an occupied playground. 656 N.W.2d 235, 237, 241
(Minn. 2003). The supreme court rejected the idea that a defendant’s privacy expectations
are relevant to determining whether the defendant’s conduct violated the statute. Id. at 240-
41. Rather, quoting Peery, the supreme court stated that “[t]he relevant question is whether
[the defendant’s] conduct was so likely to be observed ‘that it must be reasonably presumed
that it was intended to be witnessed.’” Id. at 241 (quoting Peery, 28 N.W.2d at 854). Based
7
on these cases, we reject Wilson’s argument that, to convict a person of “lewdly exposing”
their genitals in their own home under the indecent-exposure statute, the state must prove
that the defendant took action to attract attention to their exposed genitals.
Moreover, the present case does not involve the indecent-exposure statute but rather
the fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct prohibition of “lewd exhibition of the genitals in
the presence of a minor . . . , knowing or having reason to know the minor is present.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1a(2). In Stevenson, the supreme court affirmed not only the
appellant’s conviction for indecent exposure but also his conviction for attempted fifth-
degree criminal sexual conduct. 656 N.W.2d at 240. The supreme court ruled that the
conduct occurs “in the presence of a minor” when the conduct is “reasonably capable of
being viewed by a minor.” Id. at 239. Under that standard, the supreme court found the
evidence sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction because he parked his truck in a
place where he knew children were playing and could, if they looked, see into his truck
windows. Id. at 240. We are not persuaded that the fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct
statute imposes a different standard to prove that a person engages in “lewd exhibition” in
a minor’s presence when the person is in their home.
We conclude that , under the definition of “lewd” as “openly lustful or indecent,”
see Fetchenhier, 363 N.W.2d at 79, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict, see Crow, 730 N.W.2d at 280, the evidence is sufficient to prove that Wilson
engaged in “lewd” exhibition of his genitals in the presence of I.W. four times.
First, Wilson knocked on the door of I.W.’s room and subsequently partially opened
the door while his penis was exposed. He then spoke with I.W., asking her where the
8
computer charger was, and permitted her to open the door farther. Second, Wilson again
interacted with I.W. when he called her into the bedroom while he was lying on the bed
with his penis exposed. When she tried to pass him the computer, he could not reach it, so
I.W. had to move closer to Wilson’s exposed body to give him the computer. Third, on
another occasion, I.W. walked out of her bedroom to go to the kitchen. Wilson was in the
living room on the couch. He had a blanket on, but his penis was exposed and he was
masturbating. Fourth, while I.W. and her friends were going back and forth to the kitchen
to prepare food, Wilson had his penis exposed while he was on the couch in the living room
between the kitchen and I.W.’s bedroom. Each of these exposures qualifies as openly
indecent, and Wilson’s conduct met the definition of lewd exhibition of his genitals.
B. Masturbation
Wilson also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he engaged in
masturbation knowing or having reason to know that a child was present. A person is guilty
of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct if “the person engages in masturbation . . . in the
presence of a minor under the age of 16, knowing or having reason to know the minor is
present.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1a(2) (emphasis added). The presence requirement
is not an actual-presence requirement; instead, the act must be “reasonably capable of being
viewed by a minor.” Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d at 239.
The state’s case involved two instances of Wilson masturbating on the living room
couch.
9
In one instance, the conduct was observed by I.W. She testified that she left her
room to go to the kitchen and saw Wilson with his penis exposed and masturbating on the
couch. The state asked I.W:
Q: And when that happened did -- to your knowledge, did
[Wilson] know you were in the house?

A: I’m guessing because I didn’t leave out the door or
anything. I was just in my room. And because I didn’t really
feel like being out there for other situations that happened that
I really can’t remember that well. So I just stayed in my room
all the time when my mom was gone.

I.W. also testified that the apartment was somewhat small. Viewing this evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, see Crow, 730 N.W.2d at 280, because I.W. had
not left the apartment, the apartment was somewhat small, and Wilson was masturbating
in the living room between the bedrooms and the kitchen, we conclude that the state proved
that Wilson knew or had reason to know that his masturbation was reasonably capable of
being viewed by a minor.
In the second instance, S.C. was present. Again, Wilson chose to masturbate in the
living room even though the girls were going back and forth from the bedroom to the
kitchen to prepare food. S.C. observed Wilson masturbating. Again, we conclude that,
when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see id., the evidence
is sufficient to prove that Wilson knew or had reason to know that his conduct was
reasonably capable of being viewed by a minor.
10
II. A new trial is not required on Count I.

Wilson argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to
provide a special verdict form to the jury on which to indicate which of Wilson’s acts—the
exposure during the computer incident or his masturbation on the couch in view of I.W.—
constituted fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct against I.W. He contends that, if we agree
that one or more of these incidents is not supported by sufficient evidence, we must remand
for a new trial because there is no way to know which behavior t he jury unanimously
decided that he engaged in and it is possible that they agreed on an incident that lacks
sufficient evidence.
This argument fails. The district court instructed the jury: “To find [Wilson] guilty
of Count I, you must unanimously agree on at least one instance of masturbation or lewd
exhibition of the genitals.” We presume that the jury followed this instruction. See State v.
Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 167 (Minn. 2024). As we explained above, the evidence is sufficient
to prove that Wilson engaged in masturbation or lewd exhibition in the presence of I.W.
on every occasion that was alleged. Thus, whether the jury unanimously found that he had
lewdly exposed himself to I.W. or whether the jury unanimously found that he had
masturbated in the presence of I.W., the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction on
Count I and the denial of a special verdict form does not require a retrial on that count.
Affirmed.