State of Minnesota, Respondent,

1
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1389

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Deandre Washington Leroy Craig,
Appellant.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-11259

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Scoggin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant raises challenges based on (1) the district court’s denial of his requested
jury instructions; (2) the district court’s evidentiary rulings; (3) the district court’s denial
2
of a hearing about alleged jury misconduct; (4) cumulative error; (5) insufficient evidence;
and (6) the postconviction court’s denial of his postconviction petition for relief. We
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Deandre Washington Leroy Craig
with one count of second-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1)
(2020), one count of attempted second-degree murder under the same statute, and one count
of prohibited person in possession of a firearm or ammunition in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020). These charges arose out of events on June 7, 2021, which
were captured on surveillance videos. We lay out the facts as shown in the surveillance
videos.
On June 7, 2021, S.T., D.S., and C.F. approached appellant on the sidewalk outside
of a liquor store in North Minneapolis.
1 After a short discussion, D.S. brandished a firearm.
A physical fight ensued between S.T., D.S., and appellant. During the fight, D.S.’s firearm
fell, S.T. retrieved it, and it later went off leading someone to scream. S.T. ended up with
the firearm, which she put in her pants pocket. S.T. stepped away while appellant and D.S.
continued the fight in an enclave outside the liquor store with D.S. on top of appellant.
Once appellant got out from under D.S., appellant ran away from him and into the
parking lot, where S.T. had gone during the fight. Appellant drew his own firearm, pointing

1 The parties varyingly refer to this community as “North Minneapolis,” the “North,” the
“Northside,” the “North Side,” and the “neighborhood.” For consistency, we use “North
Minneapolis.”
3
it at S.T. S.T. also drew her firearm and pointed it towards appellant. D.S. crouched behind
and then hid beneath a parked car. Appellant fired two shots at S.T., hitting S.T. once, and
both S.T. and her firearm fell to the ground near the parked car. A few seconds later, D.S.
stood up. Appellant fired one more shot, hitting D.S., who cried out and fell to the ground.
Appellant left the scene. Others carried D.S. and put him into a car to drive him to the
hospital. D.S. spent between two and three weeks in the hospital but ultimately survived.
S.T. died from her injuries.
Jury Trial
The case proceeded to jury trial in November 2022. Several people testified
including two sergeants from the Minneapolis Police Department, D.S.’s grandmother, and
appellant.
In addition to the originally charged offenses, both appellant and the state sought to
add certain lesser-included offenses to the jury instructions. For the second-degree murder
charge, appellant sought an instruction based on first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter
under Minn. Stat. § 609.20(1) (2020), while the state sought an instruction for unintentional
felony murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2020). For the attempted second-
degree-murder charge, the state requested a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault
under Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2020).
After the close of evidence, the district court issued the final jury instructions based
on five counts: (1) second-degree murder of S.T. with intent but without premeditation ;
(2) unintentional felony murder of S.T. ; (3) attempted second- degree murder of D.S. ;
(4) first-degree assault of D.S.; and (5) ineligible person in possession of a firearm or
4
ammunition. The district court also included an instruction on self-defense. The jury found
appellant guilty of counts 2, 4, and 5 and not guilty of counts 1 and 3.
Posttrial Proceedings
Appellant timely moved for a judgment of acquittal, a new trial, and a Schwartz
hearing.2 The district court denied each of these requests.
The district court convicted and sentenced appellant to prison based on the three
guilty verdicts: 252 months for count 2; 103 months for count 4; and 60 months for count
5. The district court ordered the sentences for counts 2 and 5 to run concurrent with each
other, but consecutive with the sentence in count 4, for a total sentence of 355 months in
prison.
Appellant filed an appeal from the final judgment and moved to stay the appeal for
postconviction proceedings. This court granted the stay. Appellant then petitioned for
postconviction relief, seeking reversal and a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation
and newly discovered evidence. 3 The state agreed to an evidentiary hearing. After the
hearing, the postconviction court denied appellant’s petition, determining that appellant
could not establish the elements required to support his claims.
Upon appellant’s request, we dissolved the stay of this appeal.

2 “A Schwartz hearing is a procedure which allows a district court to investigate alleged
juror misconduct.” Kambon v. State, 23 N.W.3d 576, 577 n.2 (Minn. 2025) (quotation
omitted) (citing Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301 (Minn.
1960)); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(6) (permitting hearing to impeach
verdict).
3 “A Brady violation occurs when the [s]tate suppresses material evidence favorable to the
defendant despite a request for production by the defense.” Griffin v. State, 941 N.W.2d
404, 410 n.2 (Minn. 2020) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
5
DECISION
Appellant raises challenges based on (1) the district court’s denial of his requested
jury instructions; (2) the district court’s evidentiary decisions; (3) the district court’s
Schwartz-hearing denial; (4) cumulative error; (5) insufficient evidence; and (6) the
postconviction court’s denial of his postconviction petition for relief . We address each
argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request
for a jury instruction on heat-of-passion manslaughter.

Appellant first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
request to include heat -of-passion manslaughter as a lesser-included offense in the jury
instructions. We are not persuaded.
“Determining whether to give a jury instruction lies within the discretion of the
district court and will not be reversed but for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Baker,
13 N.W.3d 401, 408 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion
when it “refuse[s] to give an instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case [when] there
is evidence to support it.” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn.
2006)). The district court “must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party requesting the instruction” and may not “weigh the evidence or discredit witnesses
and thereby deny an instruction.” Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 626 (quotation omitted); State
v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588, 598 (Minn. 2005).
First-degree heat -of-passion manslaughter requires a defendant to “intentionally
cause[] the death of another person in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts
6
of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self- control under like circumstances. ”
Minn. Stat. § 609.20(1). There are two elements of this conviction: a subjective element
of heat of passion and an objective element of provocation. Eason v. State, 950 N.W.2d
258, 264 (Minn. 2020). We need not consider the heat-of-passion element if the
provocation element is not met. See id. at 264-65.
Caselaw provides guidance on what may constitute sufficient provocation in the
context of heat-of- passion manslaughter. For example, a victim shooting a defendant in
the head can be sufficient provocation. See Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 628. But many acts
have not amounted to sufficient provocation, including: a victim “reaching for a gun ,”
Stiles v. State, 664 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Minn. 2003); a victim “grabb[ing] a knife” after a
defendant “smacked” her, State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704, 706-07 (Minn. 1990); a victim
“reach[ing] for a weapon after [a defendant] assaulted him,” Eason, 950 N.W.2d at 262,
265; and a victim ’s physical gesture “challenging [a defendant] to a fight,” State v.
Nystrom, 596 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. 1999).
In Johnson, the state and the appellant disagreed about whether the victim shot the
appellant. 719 N.W.2d at 622. The appellant further argued “that he [did] not remember
what happened after [the victim] shot him.” Id. The appellant requested a jury instruction
on a lesser-included offense of first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter as well as a self-
defense instruction, but the district court denied both requests. Id. at 624. A jury convicted
the appellant of second-degree intentional murder. Id. at 622. On appeal, the supreme
court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the appellant’s requested
lesser-included-offense instruction for heat-of-passion manslaughter. Id. at 628. On the
7
provocation prong, the supreme court concluded that “a jury viewing all of the evidence in
the record could determine that [the appellant] engaged in an increasingly heated argument
with [the victim] that escalated to a physical altercation in which [ the victim] shot [the
appellant]— provoking [the appellant] to shoot her back just seconds later.” Id.
Key facts differentiate this case from Johnson. Perhaps most importantly, there is
video evidence of the incidents here, providing direct evidence of the circumstances
surrounding the shooting. See State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 40 (Minn. 2024) (holding
that video may be direct evidence of what it shows). Appellant also received two jury
instructions: a self-defense jury instruction, which the jury rejected, and a lesser-included-
offense instruction for second-degree intentional felony murder, for which the jury found
him guilty. Unlike in Johnson, there is no speculation here as to whether S.T. injured
appellant. See 719 N.W.2d at 622. Viewing all the evidence, the district court determined
that there was no rational basis on which a jury could find that appellant committed heat-
of-passion manslaughter. Because we agree that appellant cannot satisfy the provocation
prong, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
request for a heat-of-passion jury instruction.
II. The district court’s evidentiary decisions did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.

Appellant claims that the district court prevented him from (1) cross-examining
police witnesses about “the violent nature of [North Minneapolis]” as well as “[t]he gas
station video evidence ” and (2) “explaining how he felt when he was attacked. ” We
address each argument in turn.
8
Appellate courts “review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived
him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). “ A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). The
appellant has the burden of establishing that the district court committed an abuse of
discretion that prejudiced appellant. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003).
A. Cross-Examination Decisions
The district court “shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence” to make the m “effective for the
ascertainment of the truth” and “avoid needless consumption of time.” Minn. R. Evid.
611(a)(1)-(2).
The record shows that appellant requested, and the district court permitted,
questioning the police witnesses “about their experiences in that neighborhood.” In this
discussion outside the presence of the jury, the district court conceded “it’s a rough
neighborhood,” but explained that it did not know “whether that excuses [appellant] from
his duty to flee . . . [as] a legal matter.”
During cross-examination, the district court sustained two relevance-based
objections to appellant ’s questioning of the police witnesses about North Minneapolis .
These questions were, “Would you say the area has changed at all since 2007?” and “You’d
agree that drug sales are prevalent in that area?” By contrast, the district court overruled
9
an objection to the question, “And you’ ve had to go out to the scene quite a few times,
right?”
The record also shows that appellant played in open court several minutes of a
surveillance video from a gas station across the street from the liquor store. The video
included no audio and showed only a few individuals gathering at the gas station and
pointing at the liquor-store parking lot at issue. After the jury adjourned for the day, the
district court questioned the relevance of the video. The district court explained: “I want
your client to get a full defense, but I don’t for the life of me understand how this is at all
relevant.” Although appellant argued that the video supported his claim of self- defense
because it showed that people were gathering and planning in front of a nearby gas station
before the incident, the district court explained that it did not think the video was “at all
relevant.” The district court elaborated that appellant “didn’t know those folks were over
there” and that “[t]here’s no evidence that there was some concerted action against
[appellant] beyond what we’ve already seen in the video.” It asked appellant to “move
forward to the actual incident” for the following day of trial.
The district court based each of its evidentiary rulings on the importance of relevant,
effective, and timely presentation of evidence. See Minn. R. Evid. 402, 611(a). Appellant
was able to make his points about North Minneapolis effectively. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
B. Testimony Decisions
As a preliminary matter, appellant’s second argument rests in part on claims that the
district court limited his testimony about how he felt during the encounter with S.T. and
10
D.S. This is contrary to the facts in the record, in which the district court first sustained
but then overruled the state’s objection, allowing the testimony. To the extent that
appellant asserts that he could not testify about his feelings on this matter, the record does
not support that assertion.
Appellant also argues that the district court “sustained numerous relevance and
speculation objections when [appellant] testified about [S.T.] and [D.S.] going through his
pockets.” There is only one related objection in the record:
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Did anything—was anything
said that you—what do you think [S.T.] was grabbing for?

RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL: Objection. Speculation.

THE COURT: Sustained.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Your Honor, I would ask that
[appellant] be able to say what he thought at the time as to what
she was going for, and the jury, of course, will have the video
to hear what she says.

THE COURT: That’s the definition of speculation, it’s not a
permissible question or answer. Next question, please.

The rules of evidence limit opinion or inference testimony from lay witnesses to
what is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; (b ) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Minn. R. Evid. 701. “[T]he
key inquiries in determining the admissibility of lay opinion are personal knowledge and
helpfulness to the jury.” Muehlhauser v. Erickson, 621 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Minn. App. 2000).
11
Appellant does not claim that he had personal knowledge of S.T.’s intentions.
Further, any potential inference he did have would not have helped the jury. This is
particularly true for his self-defense claim, which requires the jury to inquire into the
objective reasonableness of his actions. See State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Minn.
2010) (“Whether one is justified in using deadly force is an objective inquiry . . . not an
evaluation of the defendant’s subjective state of mind.”). The jury had access to several
videos, from multiple angles, documenting the events as they unfolded. Nothing in the
record shows that appellant was any more qualified than the jurors to draw an inference
from the events or that appellant needed to give his opinion to help the jury understand his
testimony. See, e.g., Muehlhauser, 621 N.W.2d at 29. We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by sustaining this objection.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
for a Schwartz hearing.

Appellant claims that he established a prima facie case of juror misconduct based
on extraneous prejudicial information during jury deliberations, specifically race-based
pressure, requiring a Schwartz hearing. We are not persuaded.
Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a request for a Schwartz hearing
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Chauvin, 989 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. App. 2023), rev.
denied (Minn. July 18, 2023). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State
v. Fernandez Sorto, 12 N.W.3d 207, 212 (Minn. App. 2024) (quotation omitted), rev.
denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2024).
12
A district court need not hold a Schwartz hearing “unless the party seeking review
first establishes a prima facie case of juror misconduct or bias.” Pulczinski v. State, 972
N.W.2d 347, 361 (Minn. 2022). The requesting party establishes a prima facie case of
juror misconduct by “submit[ting] sufficient evidence which, standing alone and
unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” State v. Pederson, 614
N.W.2d 724, 730 (Minn. 2000). The prima facie case may be established through “oral
assertion by counsel or hearsay affidavit.” Zimmerman v. Witte Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d
260, 263 (Minn. 1977). If the requesting party establishes a prima facie case of jury
misconduct, a Schwartz hearing should be “liberally granted.” Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at
361.
A district court may deny a motion for a Schwartz hearing if the allegation would
require juror testimony prohibited un der Minnesota Rule of Evidence 606(b), such as
statements made during deliberations or what influenced a juror to reach a certain verdict.
State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 226 (Minn. 2000). However, rule 606(b) includes an
exception that allows jurors to testify about “whether extraneous prejudicial information
was improperly brought to the jury’s attention ,” including race-based pressure. See also
State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 536 (Minn. 1995).
To support his Schwartz-hearing request, appellant submitted an affidavit by a juror.
The juror made two relevant allegations. The first allegation stated: “I did feel like I was
reprimanded when I said I don’t think all of us are trying to put ourselves in [appellant’s]
shoes. Some jury members said I would never live in that area.” The second allegation
explained: “I recall one jury member talking about how they took someone out of the
13
neighborhood. . . . [Their] daughter has a classmate that lives over North. They let this
person move [in] with them to escape the problems in North.”
When denying appellant’s motion for a Schwartz hearing, the district court
described the juror’s allegations as “largely conclusory in nature. ” The district court
disputed the relevance of State v. Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 2002), which appellant
relied on, stating that “the allegation [there] was that a juror had made a specific reference
to race and the risk of a white person being beaten up or robbed in a particular
neighborhood.” Here, instead, the district court analyzed the juror’s second allegation and
noted that the “problems” in North Minneapolis were “unspecified”: “There is no mention
of race, racial animus, or racial pressure. Such an ambiguous statement is insufficient to
trigger the Schwartz process.”
Appellant’s defense rested in part on the concept of neighborhood violence, which
he argued was crucial to his case because the state claimed that “he should have fled” in a
particular direction while appellant asserted “that [was] not a viable option.” At most, the
juror’s statements are ambiguous as to race. There is no evidence that these statements
included race- based pressure that qualifies for the “extraneous prejudicial information ”
exception to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 606(b). We conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request for a Schwartz hearing.
IV. The cumulative effect of any errors did not deny appellant a fair trial.

Appellant next argues that the cumulative effect of the district court’s alleged errors,
discussed above, denied him a fair trial. His argument is unavailing.
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“An appellant may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where the errors, when
taken cumulatively, have the effect of denying the appellant a fair trial.” State v. Fraga,
898 N.W.2d 263, 278 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “are more
inclined to order a new trial for cumulative errors in very close factual cases.” Id. at 279.
We conclude that the district court committed no errors. Moreover, none of the
factual issues are close. The surveillance videos create a strong factual record to support
appellant’s guilt. Cf. id. (denying cumulative-error claim, despite presence of errors,
because “evidence of [appellant’s] guilt was strong”). We therefore deny appellant’s
cumulative-error claim.
V. The state presented sufficient evidence to support the charge of first-degree
assault.

Appellant claims that the state presented insufficient evidence to support the charge
of first-degree assault because “[t]he state failed to produce any evidence of the extent of
[D.S.’s] gunshot injury.” We are not convinced.
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a defendant’s
conviction differs “depend[ing] on whether the [s]tate relied on direct or circumstantial
evidence at trial.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 155 (Minn. 2024). “[D]irect evidence
is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a
fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). Witness testimony “is direct evidence when it reflects a
witness’s personal observations and allows the jury to find the defendant guilty without
having to draw any inferences.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). A video
15
may also be direct evidence of what it shows. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d at 40. Because we
conclude that direct evidence presented here sufficiently supports appellant’s conviction,
we need not consider the circumstantial evidence or the standard of review for
circumstantial evidence. Cf. State v. Flowers, 788 N.W.2d 120, 133 n.2 (Minn. 2010)
(declining to apply circumstantial-evidence standard of review when direct evidence
existed).
“In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a conviction, we painstakingly review
the record to determine whether that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” State v.
Hassan, 977 N.W.2d 633, 639-40 (Minn. 2022). Appellate courts “will not overturn a
verdict if, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and to the [state’s] burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could reasonably have found the
defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 551 (Minn. 2023)
(quotation omitted).
To convict a defendant of first-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.221,
subd. 1, the state must prove that the defendant “assault[ed] another and inflict[ed] great
bodily harm.” See also 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 8.01 (2024) (using similar
language). Minnesota law defines “great bodily harm” as “bodily injury which creates a
high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which
causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2020). The district
court here included nearly identical language in its jury instructions.
16
The state argues that it presented sufficient evidence to prove that D.S. incurred
“other serious bodily harm.” This term “is not defined by statute and it should be taken in
the context of the . . . alternative definitions.” State v. Dye, 871 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn.
App. 2015) (quotation omitted). “To determine whether a victim’s injuries constitute
‘other serious bodily harm,’ courts must consider the totality of the victim’s injuries.” Id.
Appellant relies on Dye to argue that the state failed to prove “other serious bodily
harm.” But Dye is factually distinct. There, the victim was shot in the abdomen and the
bullet traveled through “eight inches of tissue.” Id. at 920. A doctor testified that “if the
bullet had traveled the same distance in other directions,” it could have hit vital organs
which “would have been life-threatening.” Id. The state argued alternative theories that
the victim suffered “great bodily harm” under either the “high -probability of death” or
“other serious bodily harm” statutory prongs. Id. at 921-22. This court held that the
evidence presented did not support a finding of great bodily harm under either prong. See
id. at 922. We noted that: the bullet “did not hit any critical body parts”; the victim “was
able to talk, breathe, and walk to the ambulance with some help”; she was released from
the hospital the day after the shooting; and the victim “did not testify, [so] the extent of her
pain . . . [is] unknown.” Id.
Both here and in Dye, the victims did not testify. See id. But the remaining facts of
this case diverge from those in Dye. Appellant shot D.S. in the upper chest or shoulder.
After being shot, D.S. yelled out in pain, fell to the ground, and continued screaming. He
could not stand up on his own. Two people grabbed D.S. under his arms, carried him to a
car, and put him inside to drive him to the hospital. Police witnesses testified that, on his
17
first day in the hospital, D.S. was listed in “critical condition” and underwent surgery. D.S.
spent between two and three weeks in the hospital. At trial, D.S.’ s grandmother testified
that these injuries were significant, and appellant testified that they were significant “as of
now.” We conclude this is sufficient to prove other serious bodily harm.
The facts of this case also diverge from Ibrahim v. State, 14 N.W.3d 294 (Minn.
App. 2024), cited by appellant. That case concerned, in relevant part, the accuracy of a
defendant’s guilty plea for first-degree assault. Ibrahim, 14 N.W.3d at 299. We reversed,
concluding that “the factual basis was insufficient to satisfy the accuracy requirement of a
valid plea.” Id. at 303. But in determining plea accuracy, “an adequate factual basis is
usually established by questioning the defendant.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716
(Minn. 1994). We held the factual basis to support “other bodily harm” to be insufficient
in Ibrahim because the defendant “did not admit to causing ‘other serious bodily harm’ or
expressly acknowledge medical evidence in the record pertaining to the type and severity
of the victim’s injuries.” Ibrahim, 14 N.W.3d at 303. We declined to consider other
allegations that the defendant did not expressly confirm. Id.
For sufficiency-of-the -evidence claims, by contrast, we need not rely on a
defendant’s admission or confirmation. Instead, as discussed above, we have a record that
we “painstakingly review . . . in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Hassan, 977
N.W.2d at 639-40. We can rely on videos and witness testimony as direct evidence. See
Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 40; Blevins, 10 N.W.3d at 40 . In this case, t he video evidence as
well as testimony from appellant, D.S.’s grandmother, and two police witnesses support
the jury’s determination that D.S. suffered other serious bodily harm. We therefore
18
conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction of
first-degree assault.
VI. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
postconviction petition.

Appellant next argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying
his postconviction petition for relief, which he contends sufficiently established claims
based on Brady and newly discovered evidence. We discuss and analyze appellant’s claims
only regarding the alleged Brady violation “[b]ecause the ultimate standard of materiality
applicable to a Brady violation should be more lenient to the defense than the standard
applied to newly discovered evidence.” Gorman v. State, 619 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn.
App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001).
A Brady claim involves the state’s failure to disclose material, exculpatory
evidence. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88. Minnesota courts employ a three-prong test to
determine whether a Brady violation has occurred:
(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it
would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the
evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution,
intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be
material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must
have caused prejudice to the defendant.

Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010). “The facts alleged . . . , if proven at
an evidentiary hearing, must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.”
Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).
Appellant claims that the state failed to disclose: (1) “evidence that [D.S.], [C.F.],
and [S.T.] were members of or associated with” certain gangs; (2) “evidence that [these]
19
gangs have a reputation for violence” in North Minneapolis; and (3) “evidence that [D.S.]
and [C.F.] had a reputation for violence” in North Minneapolis.
Appellant concedes that the state disclosed several police reports with checked
boxes identifying D.S., C.F., and appellant as gang members.4 Appellant argues that these
checkboxes are notoriously unreliable, so it did not trust them as evidence of gang
membership. But the postconviction court correctly stated that, through these police
reports, “the defense was put on notice that the victims were gang members.” Distrust of
provided information is not the same as suppression of evidence, and it does not support a
Brady claim. We conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by
denying appellant’s postconviction petition.
Affirmed.

4 To the extent that appellant claims that two of the police reports listed conflicting
information, this concern was dispelled at the evidentiary hearing: both parties had access
to only one of the reports before trial because the other report was printed after trial.
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LARSON, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
I concur with the opinion of the court with respect to Parts I-IV and VI. But I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that the state presented sufficient evidence
to prove D.S. suffered “great bodily harm” to sustain Craig’s first-degree-assault
conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2020).
Under section 609.221, subdivision 1, “[w]hoever assaults another and inflicts great
bodily harm” is guilty of first-degree assault. The legislature defined the phrase “great
bodily harm” to mean “bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which
causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2020) (emphasis added).
Here, the majority concludes that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
prove Craig inflicted “other serious bodily harm” to D.S. “Other serious bodily harm” is
not defined by statute but must “be taken in the context of the other three alternative
definitions.” State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Minn. 2005). “Accordingly, courts
must consider the totality of the injuries to determine whether the injuries constitute ‘other
serious bodily harm.’” Ibrahim v. State, 14 N.W.3d 294, 302 (Minn. App. 2024).
We have issued three precedential decisions describing the evidentiary requirements
to prove “other serious bodily harm.” In State v. Gerald, Gerald held a knife against the
victim’s neck, and the victim chased Gerald following the altercation. 486 N.W.2d 799,
800 (Minn. App. 1992). The state charged Gerald with first- degree assault. See id. A
physician testified at trial that the victim “was not medically unstable” at the emergency
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room. Id. at 801. The victim had “a half- inch long cut on the back of [his] neck and a
wound of approximately the same size in his right ear.” Id. The neck injury was closed
with stitches. Id. The victim was admitted to the hospital for observation for the ear injury,
but—after testing —the physician determined the victim had no serious damage. See id. A
jury convicted Gerald of first-degree assault. Id. We reversed on the ground that the state
presented insufficient evidence to prove “great bodily harm.” Id. at 802-03. Analyzing
whether the victim’s injuries constituted “other serious bodily harm,” we concluded that
because the victim only suffered two cuts requiring minimal intervention, and the victim
was able to chase Gerald following the injury, the evidence did “not support a finding that
[the victim] suffered other serious bodily injury within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at
801-02. We lamented this result, noting that “we find it anomalous that an individual who
commits a grievous assault on another may escape a first degree assault conviction because
the victim is fortunate enough to escape serious injury.” Id. at 802-03. Nonetheless, we
concluded that the “legislature mandates that we focus on the injury to the victim rather
than the actions of the assailant.” Id. at 802.
Over two decades later, we applied this precedent in State v. Dye. 871 N.W.2d 916,
921-22 (Minn. App. 2015). There, the victim called 911 after Dye shot her in the lower
back. Id. at 919. The state called law enforcement, paramedics, and a physician to testify
at trial. Id. at 919-20. Law enforcement testified that when they arrived on the scene the
victim was “hunched over” and “appeared to be in a lot of pain.” Id. at 919. The victim
was “trying to position herself to breath e comfortably and was having trouble
communicating and speaking.” Id. One paramedic testified that, when they arrived at the
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scene, the victim was able to “walk, talk, and breathe,” but the paramedics treated the
“injury as life-threatening.” Id. at 920. The emergency-room physician also testified that
the victim’s injury was treated “as life-threatening.” Id. After testing, the physician
determined the bullet did not hit any vital organs and removed the bullet “with a small
incision.” Id. at 920-21. The victim spent one night in the hospital. Id. at 920. The state
did not present any evidence regarding follow-up treatment, but the physician testified that
this injury could cause “a permanent lump due to scar tissue” and pain “for an extended
period of time.” Id. A jury convicted Dye of first-degree assault. Id. We reversed on the
ground that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove “great bodily harm.” Id. at
922. Analyzing whether this injury constituted “other serious bodily harm,” we noted that
the bullet “did not hit any critical body parts,” the victim could “talk, breathe, and walk”
when paramedics arrived, she had a short hospitalization, a small incision to remove the
bullet, and—because the victim did not testify —there was no evidence regarding the extent
of the victim’s pain or scarring. Id. Accordingly, we concluded the state presented
insufficient evidence to prove the victim suffered “other serious bodily harm” within the
meaning of the statute. Id.
Most recently, in Ibrahim, we considered a first-degree-assault conviction in the
context of a guilty plea. 14 N.W.3d at 299. There, during the plea hearing, Ibrahim
admitted that he fought with the victim, he stabbed the victim in the chest with a knife, the
stab wound caused the victim’s lung to collapse, the injury was “serious,” and this was “the
kind of injury that could cause a person to die.” Id. at 299-300 (emphasis added). Ibrahim
filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his plea was inaccurate because the
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factual basis did not establish that he caused “great bodily harm” to the victim. Id. at 298.
Specifically, Ibrahim argued his plea colloquy did not meet the “great bodily harm”
standard because “the only evidence in the record [was] that the victim suffered a single
collapsed lung, for which there [was] no evidence pertaining to any lasting impact on the
victim.” Id. at 300. The district court denied the postconviction petition. Id. at 298. We
reversed. Id. at 305. We concluded that “Ibrahim did not admit to causing ‘other serious
bodily harm’” because “the only evidence in the record [was] that the victim suffered a
single collapsed lung, for which there [was] no evidence pertaining to any lasting impact
on the victim.” Id. at 303. We further noted that “[t]he record [did] not contain evidence
that this injury created a high probability of death, that it permanently disfigured the victim,
or had any long-term effects on the victim’s breathing.” Id. We therefore concluded that
the record lacked sufficient facts to support a conclusion that Ibrahim’s conduct fell within
the charges to which he desired to plead guilty. Id. at 299, 303.
Here, the state presented the following evidence to prove that D.S.’s injuries met
the “other serious bodily harm” standard: (1) law-enforcement testimony that D.S. was
shot in the “shoulder, upper chest area”; (2) video footage depicting D.S. yelling and falling
to the ground after being shot; (3) video footage of D.S. being dragged to a car; (4) law-
enforcement testimony that bystanders brought D.S. to the hospital; (5) law-enforcement
testimony that, upon their arrival at the hospital, D.S. was not able to talk because he was
in surgery; (6) law-enforcement testimony that, at some point, D.S. was listed in “critical
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condition”; (7) general testimony from D.S.’s grandmother and Craig 1 that the wound
inflicted was “significant”; and (8) testimony that D.S. spent two-and -a-half weeks in the
hospital. Notably absent from the record is any specific evidence regarding the severity of
D.S.’s injury or any lasting impact from the injury.
Applying the caselaw above to these facts, I would conclude the state did not present
sufficient evidence to prove Craig caused D.S. to suffer “other serious bodily harm.” Like
in Dye and Ibrahim, the record is devoid of any evidence that D.S. suffered a lasting
physical impact from the assault. See Ibrahim, 14 N.W.3d at 303 (noting “the only
evidence in the record [was] that the victim suffered a single collapsed lung, for which
there is no evidence pertaining to any lasting impact on the victim”); Dye, 871 N.W.2d at
922 (stating that, despite physician testimony that “this type of injury could leave a
permanent lump and cause[] persistent pain,” lack of testimony on realized scarring and
pain rendered evidence insufficient to prove “other serious bodily injury”). And upon
thorough review of appellate precedential and nonprecedential
2 decisions, I could not find
a case where we affirmed a first-degree-assault conviction based on “other serious bodily
harm” without specific evidence—such as medical records or testimony from the victim or

1 During cross examination, the prosecutor asked Craig, “[a]nd you are aware that he
suffered significant injury and spent weeks in the hospital after being shot in the chest by
you?” Craig answered, “[a]s of now, yes.” I view this exchange as relating to Craig’s
knowledge of the seriousness of D.S.’s injuries, not D.S.’s condition at the time of trial.
2 I cite nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
D-6
medical personnel —demonstrating the severity of the harm to the victim or the lasting
effect on the victim.3

3 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706, 708, 710 (Minn. 1978) (concluding “other
serious bodily harm” occurred when victim testified she had ongoing numbness in teeth
and treating physicians testified about injuries); State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 703, 705-
06 (Minn. App. 1985) (concluding “other serious bodily harm” occurred where “surgical
scar remain[ed] a permanent reminder to the victim which extend[ed] from her lower
[abdomen] to her upper chest”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 19, 1985); State v. Neal, No. A23-
0409, 2024 WL 912627, at *4-5 (Minn. App. Mar. 4, 2024) (concluding “other serious
bodily harm” occurred when state presented photographs of injuries and medical testimony
about injuries sufficient to prove both other bodily injury and disfigurement), rev. denied
(Minn. May 29, 2024); State v. Abikar, No. A17-1119, 2018 WL 3213030, at *4-5 (Minn.
App. July 2, 2018) (concluding “other serious bodily harm” occurred when a premature
infant with “severe breathing problems” suffered nine broken ribs and state presented
medical testimony and medical records concerning injury), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26,
2018); State v. Kramer , No. A15-1646, 2018 WL 1247424, at *7 (Minn. App. Mar. 12,
2018) (concluding, in sentencing context, “other serious bodily harm” occurred when
victim suffered, among other things, ongoing pain), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2018);
State v. Aleman, No. A15-1453, 2016 WL 4723340, at *3 n.2, *4 (Minn. App. Sept. 12,
2016) (concluding “other serious bodily harm” occurred when victim suffered, among
other things, scarring, a broken tooth, and ongoing rib pain and state presented photographs
of and testimony about injuries and scars), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 2016); State v.
Merritt, No. A12-0189, 2013 WL 141637, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Jan. 14, 2013) (concluding
“other serious bodily harm” occurred when victim suffered several lacerations, bruising,
fractures, and ongoing numbness and state presented victim and medical testimony about
injuries), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2013); State v. Nelson, No. A12-1037, 2013 WL
3155409, at *4 (Minn. App. June 24, 2013) (concluding “other serious bodily harm”
occurred when victim suffered “numerous severe injuries” and required hospitalization and
state presented medical testimony about injuries), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013); State
v. Nelson , No. A08- 1038, 2009 WL 1515494, at *2-3 (Minn. App. June 2, 2009)
(concluding “other serious bodily harm” occurred when state presented law-enforcement
and medical testimony, as well as medical records, about victim’s facial gunshot injury,
medical treatment, and recovery), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009); State v. Walls, No.
C4-96-498, 1997 WL 20346, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 21, 1997) (concluding “other serious
bodily harm” occurred when victim suffered, among other things, permanent scarring and
nerve damage), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 1997); State v. Blumke, No. C8-93-1042, 1994
WL 85799, at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 15, 1994) (concluding “serious permanent
disfigurement or other serious bodily harm” occurred when at least one-third of victim’s
ear was bitten off); Dopkins v. State, No. A23-1355, 2024 WL 2813952, at *5 (Minn. App.
June 3, 2024) (concluding, in plea-withdrawal context, state did not prove “other serious
D-7
The majority disagrees that the absence of any specific evidence regarding the
severity of D.S.’s injury or lasting impact on D.S. is dispositive, relying on six facts. I
address each in turn.
First, D.S. suffered a gunshot wound to the shoulder or chest. But we determined
in Dye that the mere fact that an individual was shot in the back was not sufficient. 871
N.W.2d at 922. And in Ibrahim the mere fact that the victim was stabbed in the chest was
not sufficient. 14 N.W.3d at 299-300, 302-03. Thus, the fact that D.S. suffered a gunshot
wound to the shoulder or chest, by itself, is not sufficient to demonstrate “other serious
bodily harm.”
Second, D.S. was in severe pain at the time he was shot and could not stand on his
own. But again, in Dye, evidence that the victim was “hunched over,” “appeared to be in
a lot of pain,” tried “to position herself to breathe comfortably,” and had “trouble
communicating and speaking” was not sufficient. See 871 N.W.2d at 919, 922; see also
Dopkins, 2024 WL 2813952, at *4 (noting absence of precedential authority holding that
temporary loss of consciousness constitutes great bodily harm for the purpose of first-
degree assault). Here, the only evidence we have in the record is that, at the time he was

bodily harm” when record contained no evidence showing more than “temporary,
unmeasured periods of unconsciousness” and “significant bruising”) , rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2024); State v. Galle, No. A19-0126, 2020 WL 1845966, at *5 (Minn. App. Apr.
13, 2020) (concluding state did not prove “other serious bodily harm” when victim’s
injuries—“a tibia fracture, a concussion, and symptoms stemming from the concussion”—
“resolve[d] within a normal time frame for recovery” and were not “severe” or “long-
lasting”).
D-8
shot, D.S. was in severe pain, which says nothing about the severity of the injury or long-
term consequences of the injury to D.S.
Third, law-enforcement testimony that D.S. was in “critical condition.” But “the
record contains no medical explanation of what ‘critical condition’ means, or how it is
determined.” United States v. Alexander, No. 20-6154, 2022 WL 2763689, at *9 (10th Cir.
July 15, 2022) (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 4 In fact, unlike Gerald
or Dye, the state did not present any medical evidence. See Gerald, 486 N.W.2d at 801
(recounting treating physician’s testimony); Dye, 871 N.W.2d at 920 (recounting
paramedics’ and treating physician’s testimony). And for all we know, this case is like
Dye, and “critical condition” was a term the hospital automatically applied because D.S.
suffered a gunshot wound to a particular part of the body. See 871 N.W.2d at 921 (“Based
on the location of the bullet’s entry, both the paramedic and the doctor treated [the victim’s]
injury as if it were life-threatening.”); see also Alexander, 2022 WL 2763689, at *9 (“[F]or
all we know, [‘critical condition’] could be an automatic term applied to gunshot wounds
by 911 dispatchers.”). Thus, in my view, law -enforcement testimony on this issue is not
akin to medical evidence regarding the severity of D.S.’s injury.
Fourth, D.S. needed surgery. But the victim in Dye needed minor surgery to remove
the bullet. See 871 N.W.2d at 922. And, even if we assume D.S. had a more severe wound,
we concluded in Ibrahim that damaging a vital organ, “without any evidence pertaining to

4 Although we are bound only by U.S. Supreme Court and Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions, we may use other federal court decisions as persuasive authority. See Citizens
for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App.
2003).
D-9
the lasting impact,” is not sufficient to prove “other serious bodily harm.” See 14 N.W.3d
at 303. Again, this case similarly lacks any evidence pertaining to lasting impact on D.S.
Fifth, grandmother’s and Craig’s testimony that the injury was “significant.” But
in Ibrahim, the defendant testified that the wound was “very serious,” and “could cause”
death, yet we determined the factual basis was insufficient to show “other serious bodily
harm.” Id. Thus, under our caselaw, a generalized statement that an injury was “serious”
or “significant,” without more, is not sufficient to prove “other serious bodily harm.”
Sixth, the length of D.S.’s hospital stay. But we do not know the reason for D.S.’s
two-and-a-half-week hospital stay because the state did not present any evidence on that
point.
In sum, because the state failed to prove either the severity of D.S.’s injury or that
the injury had a lasting impact on D.S., I would conclude the state presented insufficient
evidence to prove “other serious bodily harm.” Accordingly, I would reverse Craig’s first-
degree-assault conviction.