State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1397

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Keith Ashely Doering,
Appellant.

Filed August 26, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-21-1364

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kenneth G. Janssen, Glencoe City Attorney, Gavin, Janssen & Stabenow, Ltd., Glencoe,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment of conviction for third-degree driving while
impaired (DWI)— test refusal, appellant Keith Ashely Doering argues that the district court
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erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence because he was unlawfully seized
without reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. We affirm.
FACTS
Doering challenges the district court’s pretrial order denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained during an investigatory stop and to dismiss the complaint. At the
suppression hearing, the district court received into evidence an audio recording of a 911
call, testimony from responding officer Deputy Jonathan Robbin, Deputy Robbin’s squad-
car video, a computer-aided dispatch (CAD) entry related to the investigatory stop, and an
aerial map of Doering’s residence. This evidence established the following facts.
On August 9, 2021, around 11:30 p.m., a woman driving in McLeod County called
911 to report “an accident” at a residence. The woman reported that a vehicle, which she
thought was an all-terrain vehicle (ATV), was lying on its side at the end of the driveway.
The woman informed dispatch that she was pulling up to the driveway and that another
vehicle was already pulled over; she speculated that the occupants of that vehicle had
witnessed the accident.
When the woman got out of her vehicle to see if anyone was around the ATV, an
occupant of the other vehicle warned her to “get back in [her] vehicle.” After speaking with
the occupants for about 20 seconds, the woman told dispatch, “Apparently, the guy is
really, really drunk. He just ran from his [ATV].” After observing the man get onto a
tractor, the woman stated, “I’m gonna back up here. I don’t want to get hit by him if he’s
really drunk.” The woman described the man as wearing shorts with no shirt.
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The woman identified herself and provided her telephone number to the 911
dispatcher. Thereafter, the woman continued to relay her observations, stating that the man
got off the tractor and connected it to the ATV, using the tractor to lift the ATV back onto
its wheels. The woman added, “He’s definitely like really panicking though. He’s like
running everywhere.” It did not appear to the woman that the man was injured, unless he
was “in shock.” The call ended as the woman saw a squad car parking behind her vehicle.
The squad car was operated by Deputy Robbin, who had been dispatched to the
residence. Dispatch had informed Deputy Robbin about the details of the 911 call,
including that a man had crawled out of a rolled-over ATV near the residence and that the
man was wearing shorts with no shirt and was “possibly drunk.” Dispatch also provided
Deputy Robbin with the CAD entry, which included the 911 caller’s name, date of birth,
and telephone number. Deputy Robbin testified that, at that point, based on the information
he received from dispatch, he did not have a suspicion of criminal activity.
When Deputy Robbin arrived at the residence, it was dark and rainy, and he
activated his squad car’s lights. After initially parking behind the 911 caller’s vehicle,
Deputy Robbin moved his squad car closer to the driveway. Another parked vehicle nearby
then drove away.
Deputy Robbin saw an ATV on its wheels at the end of the driveway, partially in
the ditch. He also observed a man wearing shorts with no shirt who was covered in dirt.
The man got onto a tractor and drove away from the ATV, toward the house. Deputy
Robbin got out of his squad car and walked up the driveway. He watched as the man parked
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the tractor near a large shed on the property and then tripped over a piece of farm
equipment.
Deputy Robbin called out to the man, who was still by the shed, to “come here a
minute.” The man complied, and Deputy Robbin identified the man as Doering. While
speaking with Doering, Deputy Robbin smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Doering.
Deputy Robbin testified that he had a suspicion of criminal activity after observing the man
driving the tractor.
Later, respondent State of Minnesota charged Doering with third-degree DWI— test
refusal, alleging that Doering refused to submit to a blood or urine test as required by a
search warrant obtained after the investigatory stop. Doering moved to suppress the
evidence obtained during the investigatory stop and to dismiss the complaint. The district
court denied the motion. A jury found Doering guilty of third-degree DWI—test refusal.
The district court entered judgment of conviction for that offense, stayed imposition of
sentence, and placed Doering on probation for two years.
Doering appeals.
DECISION
Doering argues that Deputy Robbin lacked the necessary reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity to conduct the investigatory stop and that the evidence that
followed should have been suppressed and the complaint dismissed. “When reviewing a
district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] review
the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district
court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008)
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(quotation omitted). A factual finding “is not clearly erroneous if it is reasonably supported
by the evidence as a whole.” State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 2016).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Evidence obtained during an
unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836,
842 (Minn. 2011). Warrantless seizures are generally unreasonable. State v. Taylor, 965
N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021). But a n officer may conduct a limited investigatory stop
without a warrant if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of crimi nal activity.
State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22
(1968)).
“The factual basis necessary to maintain a routine traffic stop is minimal and need
not arise from an officer’s personal observations.” Rose v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 637
N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2002). Information
obtained by an officer from another person, including an informant, may supply the factual
basis. Id. A private citizen providing relevant information for a stop is presumed to be
reliable. Id. In evaluating a stop based on an informant’s tip, Minnesota courts focus on
two factors: “(1) identifying information provided by the informant; and (2) the facts
supporting the informant’s assertion that a driver is under the influence.” Id. Neither factor
is dispositive, and the overall determination of reasonable suspicion is based on the totality
of the circumstances. Id.
The parties agree that Doering was seized when Deputy Robbin asked Doering to
“come here a minute.” The district court determined that, based on the totality of the
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circumstances, the seizure was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. The district court explained its decision as follows:
At the time Deputy Robbin seized [Doering], Deputy Robbin
had information through dispatch from [the 911 caller] that a
male was drunk and had run from a flipped vehicle. The
supplied information included that the involved vehicle was
located at the address of [House Number] US Hwy 212; the
involved male was wearing shorts and no shirt; and the male
drove a tractor to the flipped vehicle, connected the tractor to
the vehicle, and appeared to be panicking. Upon arrival at the
scene, Deputy Robbin observed a male, wearing shorts and no
shirt, drive a tractor at approximately 11:35 p.m. Deputy
Robbin also observed the male stumble over farm equipment
after exiting the tractor. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, Deputy Robbin had reasonable articulable
suspicion that [Doering] had violated the law, making it further
reasonable for Deputy Robbin to conduct a brief investigatory
detention to determine whether criminal activity had occurred.
Therefore, the investigatory seizure was proper, and
[Doering’s] motion is denied.

Doering argues that the 911 caller’s tip was too unreliable to support reasonable,
articulable suspicion and that nothing that Deputy Robbin observed upon arrival supplied
a sufficient factual basis.
Doering contends that the tip was unreliable because the caller was merely repeating
what she was told by a stranger when she told dispatch, “Apparently, the guy is really,
really drunk,” and that she provided no factual basis for that statement. Doering compares
his case to two cases in which a Minnesota appellate court held that an informant’s tip did
not provide the requisite reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop: Olson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1985), and Rose, 637 N.W.2d 326.
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In Olson, two officers received a dispatch that an anonymous caller had reported
“possibly a drunken driver” and gave the location and description of the vehicle. 371
N.W.2d at 553. There was no information about how the informant concluded that the
driver was “possibly” drunk. Id. at 556. The officers located the vehicle and followed it for
about a half mile but observed no erratic driving behavior. Id. at 553. Based on the tip
alone, the officers stopped the driver. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that there was
no reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop because the anonymous tip lacked the requisite
minimal indicia of reliability, stating, “ If the police chose to stop on the basis of the tip
alone, the anonymous caller must provide at least some specific and articulable facts to
support the bare allegation of criminal activity.” Id. at 556.
In Rose, an identified gas-station employee reported that a “possible intoxicated
driver” was driving a vehicle, which the employee described, along a highway near the
intersection where the gas station was located. 637 N.W.2d at 327. A police officer located
the vehicle, observed no erratic or illegal driving conduct, and stopped the vehicle based
on the tip alone. Id. at 327-28. We held that reasonable suspicion to stop the driver did not
exist because “the record does not support an inference that the gas-station employee
personally observed appellant, and there is no information in the record regarding how the
employee concluded that the driver might be drunk.” Id. at 330.
Contrary to Doering’s argument, neither case compels reversal here. The caller’s tip
here was not limited to a mere statement that a driver might be drunk. The 911 caller both
identified herself to police and personally observed Doering. She also remained at the
residence until Deputy Robbin arrived. While on the phone with dispatch, she reported that
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she had pulled up to an accident; that there was another vehicle present and the occupant
of that vehicle warned her to “get back in [her] vehicle”; that she saw a man run from the
crashed vehicle, retrieve a tractor, and hook up and pull the vehicle; and that the man was
“really panicking” and “running everywhere.” When an informant has personally observed
a driver and reports a suspected violation of a traffic law, investigatory stops have been
upheld. See Marben v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980)
(holding that sufficient basis existed for stop where unidentified trucker, who reported
being tailgated, was in close proximity to driver); City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420
N.W.2d 887, 890 -91 (Minn. 1988) (holding that sufficient basis existed for stop where
identified gas-station employee’s report of “intoxicated driver” was supported by inference
that informant personally observed driver); Jobe v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 609 N.W.2d
919 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that sufficient basis existed for stop where motorist
described personally observing driving conduct of drunk driver, despite inability to confirm
informant’s identity). Moreover, Deputy Robbin did not stop Doering on the basis of the
tip alone. Deputy Robbin observed Doering driving the tractor and tripping over farm
equipment before stopping him.
Given the totality of the circumstances here, we conclude that Deputy Robbin had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Doering to investigate a possible DWI offense.
Affirmed.