State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1407

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chris Henry,
Appellant.

Filed August 26, 2024
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge *

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-20881

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment of conviction for first -degree criminal sexual
conduct, appellant argues that his conviction must be reversed , and the case remanded for
a new trial, because the district court committed prejudicial plain error by (1) allowing the
investigator to offer lay opinion testimony identifying appellant in video evidence and
(2) admitting an unredacted recording of the complainant’s interview that contained
inadmissible character evidence. Alternatively, appellant argues that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his motion for in camera review of the complainant’s
private medical, therapy, and school records, requiring a remand for further procee dings.
We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Chris Henry
with one count of first -degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 609.342, subdivision 1a(e) ( Supp. 2021). The matter proceeded to a jury trial from
which these facts are derived.
According to the complainant in this case, K.W., she first met Henry on October 2,
2021.1 On that date, K.W. and her friend were walking to CVS when they were approached
by Henry in a red SUV. Henry asked the girls how old they were , and K.W. replied that
she was 16 years old, although she was only 13 years old. Henry offered to drive K.W. and

1 K.W. initially knew Henry only as “King.” K.W. subsequently identified “King” as Henry
via his driver’s license photo prior to trial and in court during trial.
3
her friend to CVS and the girls accepted. After going into CVS, K.W. and Henry exchanged
phone numbers and Henry brought the girls back to K.W.’s friend’s apartment. Henry and
K.W. communicated by phone calls and text messages over the next couple days.
On October 4, Henry and K.W. agreed to meet up and Henry promised K.W. that
he would take her shopping. When Henry picked up K.W., he was driving the same red
SUV that he drove on October 2.
Instead of going shopping, Henry drove K.W. to multiple locations over the course
of the day. Henry first brought K.W. to a drive -thru and then to an apartment that Henry
took grocery bags into. After Henry returned to the vehicle , he told K.W. to lean over the
center console and hug him, and Henry kissed K.W.
Next, Henry drove to a strip mall parking lot where he provided alcohol to K.W.
Henry then drove to a gas station where he got out of the vehicle and K.W. saw that he had
a firearm in his pocket. K.W. was also aware of another, larger firearm in the vehicle.
K.W. returned to Henry’s vehicle, and Henry drove her to a shopping mall. Once at
the mall, Henry dropped off K.W. and she went inside alone to place her phone in some
bushes inside the mall so her mother could not track her true location.
After K.W. returned to the vehicle, Henry drove to pick up a female friend. After
picking up the friend, Henry drove to another gas station where he gave the friend “some
weed” and the friend rolled a “blunt.” Henry drove to a liquor store parking lot where K.W.
got out of the vehicle, sat down on the sidewalk, and smoked the marijuana. Henry got
angry and raised his voice at K.W. because the sidewalk was dirty. Henry drove them to
4
another gas station where K.W. cried because she was scared of Henry and Henry’s friend
tried to calm down K.W. Henry then dropped his friend off at her house.
Henry drove to a building that he described as his brother’s house. K.W. testified
that the building looked like the same place Henry had brought groceries to earlier that day.
Henry told K.W. to get into the backseat and K.W. complied “[b]ecause [she] was
scared and [she] didn’t know what else to do.” Henry got into the backseat with K.W. and
told her to take off her pants. Henry got on top of K.W. and penetrated her vagina with his
penis. K.W. testified that she told Henry to stop but he told her to “just let me finish” and
continued to sexually penetrate her until he ejaculated.
Henry dropped off K.W. at her friend’s apartment where she sat outside and told a
woman that she had been sexually assaulted. K.W.’s mother picked her up and took K.W.
to the hospital where K.W. underwent a sexual assault examination and spoke with a police
officer. Henry’s Y-chromosomal DNA was present on K.W.’s sexual assault kit swab. On
October 22, K.W. completed a forensic interview where she disclosed that “King” had
sexually assaulted her.
At trial, several witnesses testified , including K.W., the lead investigator, and the
forensic interviewer. K.W.’s forensic interview was admitted into evidence and played for
the jury. Still images from surveillance video at various locations Henry and K.W. had
visited on October 4 were admitted. Additionally, a video K.W. had recorded on her phone
from the inside of Henry’s vehicle was admitted and played for the jury. Following trial,
the jury found Henry guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 234 months in prison.
Henry appeals.
5
DECISION
On appeal, Henry makes two claims of evidentiary error: (1) allowing the
investigator to offer lay opinion testimony identifying him in video evidence and
(2) admitting an unredacted recording of K.W.’s forensic interview that contained
inadmissible character evidence. Alternatively, Henry argues that the district court abused
its discretion by denying his motion for in camera review of K.W.’s private medical,
therapy, and school records, requiring a remand for further proceedings. We address each
argument for reversal in turn.
I. Evidentiary Error
We begin our analysis by assessing whether Henry is entitled to a new trial based
on his evidentiary-error claims . Henry did not object to the admission of the officer’s
testimony at trial, and he objected to the admission of the forensic interview on a different
ground than what he asserts on appeal. We therefore review his claims of error for plain
error. See State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 814 (Minn. 2017) ; State v. Myhre , 875
N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016) .
To establish reversible error under the plain- error test, “a criminal defendant must
show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the
defendant ’s substantial rights.” Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804. “If any prong of the test is not
met, the claim fails.” State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 690 (Minn. 2006). And even if a
defendant demonstrates plain error, an appellate court should “correct the error only when
it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022).
6
“With respect to the substantial-rights requirement, [the defendant] bears the burden
of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have
had a significant effect on the jury ’s verdict.” State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted). In evaluating the reasonable likelihood that admission of the
evidence significantly affected the verdict, appellate courts consider “(1) the manner in
which the State presented the testimony, (2) whether the testi mony was highly persuasive,
(3) whether the State used the testimony in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense
effectively countered the testimony.” State v. Matthews , 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn.
2011). The strength of the evidence against the defendant is also a relevant consideration.
State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 277 (Minn. 2017).
We are satisfied that any error in the admission of this evidence did not affect
Henry’s substantial rights and therefore he is not entitled to a new trial. We address both
of Henry’s evidentiary-error claims in turn.
A. The Officer’s Testimony
Henry’s first argument on appeal is that the district court committed prejudicial
plain error by allowing the admission of the investigator’s testimony identifying Henry in
still photos taken from surveillance videos and identifying Henry’s voice in the video that
K.W. recorded while she was in Henry’s vehicle. Specifically, Henry argues that the
officer’s testimony was admitted in violation of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 701 because
it was not helpful to the jury. See Minn. R. Evid. 701 (allowing a lay witness to testify to
“opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness;
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ s testimony or the determination of a
7
fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”).
Because we conclude that Henry failed to establish that the testimony affected his
substantial rights , we do not resolve Henry’s rule 701 argument. See Matthews, 800
N.W.2d at 634 (“If the defendant fails to establish that the claimed error affected his
substantial rights, we need not consider the other plain error factors.”).
At trial, the state elicited the following testimony from the police officer regarding
the still photos taken from surveillance videos:
Q: Okay. Moving to [Exhibit] 4. All right. What are we seeing
in this picture?

A: The closest male to us looks —is unidentified, but the one
standing by the exit doors is Chris Henry.

Q: And that’s the white shirt?

A: Correct.

Q: Exhibit 5, what are we seeing in this photograph?

A: Seeing an unidentified male closest to us. Bus shelter. This
is outside of CVS. Chris Henry with the white shirt, red pants.
[K.W.] is standing next to him.

. . . .

Q: Moving to the next slide, [Exhibit] 17. What do we see in
this photo?

A: We see Chris Henry dressed all in red, entering the
Speedway in Richfield.

The state later recalled the police officer to have him identify the voice captured on the
video that K.W. recorded while she was in Henry’s vehicle. The officer testified that he
recognized the voice on the recording as Henry’s. The officer based this identification on
8
his familiarity with Henry’s voice from speaking with him directly and listening to his
recorded jail phone calls.
Henry argues that the Matthews factors demonstrate that the admission of this
testimony significantly affected the verdict and that the evidence against him was too weak
to conclude that the admission did not significantly affect the verdict. We are not
persuaded.
We begin by addressing the first and second Matthews factors: the manner in which
the state presented the testimony and whether the testimony was highly persuasive . We
recognize that presenting the evidence through the lead investigator’s testimony ordinarily
renders it more persuasive and tends to weigh in favor of the evidence significantly
affecting the verdict. But the effect of the testimony on the verdict in this case was
mitigated by the fact that the testimony was given in the form of short, general descriptions
of the photo exhibits, and was not emphasized or followed -up on during the rest of the
officer’s extensive testimony. Similarly, the voice -identification testimony was brief and
not emphasized after it was admitted. Under the circumstances of this case, these Matthews
factors do not weigh in Henry’s favor.
We next turn to the third Matthews factor: whether the state used the testimony in
closing argument . Although the state mentioned the officer’s identification testimony
during closing argument, it was only mentioned once and not emphasized repeatedly
throughout the argument. We agree with Henry that this factor weighs in his favor, but its
weight is minimal.
9
We next address the fourth Matthews factor: whether the defense effectively
countered the testimony. Here, the defense countered the evidence by cross-examining the
investigator about his identifications of Henry. In particular, the defense elicited an
admission from the investigator that he could not examine the facial features of the
individual in exhibit 4 and that he could not compare the facial features of the individual
in exhibit 5 to Henry. The defense also asked several questions to highlight the fact that
the officer did not witness the scene captured in the video still s in person. This factor does
not weigh in Henry’s favor.
Finally, the evidence against Henry was strong enough to support the conclusion
that the testimony at issue did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict. Extensive
surveillance video corroborated K.W.’s testimony about all of the places she went with
Henry on October 2 and 4. K.W. identified Henry before trial in a photo and during trial in
court. And DNA evidence linked Henry to the crime by the presence of his Y-chromosomal
DNA on K.W.’s sexual assault kit swab and his DNA as a major profile in the re d SUV.
In reviewing the Matthews factors and the strength of the evidence against Henry,
we are satisfied that any error in the admission of the officer’s testimony did not affect
Henry’s substantial rights and he is therefore not entitled to a new trial on this basis.
B. Forensic Interview
At trial, the state admitted K.W.’s full, unredacted forensic interview which lasted
for over one hour and two minutes. On appeal, Henry contends that the district court
committed prejudicial plain error by failing to sua sponte redact or strike the following
statements from the video:
10
K.W.: [H]e does wear red all the time because he said he like
leads his own Minneapolis Blood gang.

Interviewer: Okay.

K.W.: ‘Cause I asked him, I said, are you in gang, ‘cause he
was wearing all red.

Interviewer: Mm-hmm.

K.W.: And he said , I’m not in a gang. I lead a gang.

. . . .

K.W.: Um, he did say that he was like apparently involved —
he said he wasn’t actually involved, but the police thought he
was involved in a shoot-out the day before.

Interviewer: Okay.

K.W.: And he said that he had just beat a murder charge.

Interviewer: Okay.

K.W.: But at the same time, he said last—we were driving
through Minneapolis, and he said, last time I was in this
neighborhood, I popped a N word.

Henry also points to K.W.’s statement during the interview that Henry brought her to a
park where he sold “weed” and her description of the event as “just like a regular drug
exchange.”
Henry argues that these statements were “inadmissible as unnoticed, irrelevant, and
highly and unfairly prejudicial” violations of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), which
provides requirements for the admission of “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act.”
But, because we conclude that Henry failed to establish that th is evidence affected his
11
substantial rights, we do not resolve his rule 404(b) argument. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d
at 634.2
We again begin by addressing the first two Matthews factors. The evidence was
presented by showing the jury the entire forensic interview. The statements at issue
constitute one minute and 50 seconds of an interview that is over one hour and two minutes
long. Further, the state did not highlight the statements by questioning K.W. or other
witnesses about the statements. Because the statements were presented in a brief, cursory
manner, these factors do not weigh in Henry’s favor.
We next turn to the third and fourth Matthews factors. The state referenced some of
the content of the statements in closing argument, but only as evidence of grooming K.W.
by instilling fear—not for any improper purpose. 3 And although the defense did not counter
the evidence, we are satisfied that it did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict because
the manner in which it was presented and used rendered its persuasive value as to an
impermissible purpose minimal.

2 We note that the state argues that K.W.’s statements were admissible “immediate-episod e
evidence” because they tend to prove that Henry engaged in grooming behavior with K.W.
“Immediate-episode evidence” is a narrow exception to the general prior-bad-acts rule and
allows the state to “prove all relevant facts and circumstances which tend to establish any
of the elements of the offense with which the accused is charged, even tho ugh such facts
and circumstances may prove or tend to prove that the defendant committed other
crimes.” State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted) . While
we are inclined to agree with the state that there likely was no error in admitting K.W.’s
statements because they were evidence of grooming behavior, we need not rely on this
basis because we resolve this issue on the substantial -rights prong of plain- error analysis.

3 The state did not reference K.W.’s statements about the drug deal in its closing argument.
12
Finally, as discussed above, the strength of the evidence against Henry demonstrates
that this evidence did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict. We therefore conclude that
any error in admitting these statements did not affect Henry’s substantial rights and he is
not entitled to a new trial on this basis.
II. In Camera Review
We next turn to Henry’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his request for in camera review of K.W.’s private medical, therapy, and school
records.
Before trial, Henry moved for in camera review of
any and all therapy records and notes from [K.W.’s]
therapist(s), psychiatrist(s), counselor(s), and/or medical
providers . . . in which [K.W.] made any statements regarding
allegations with [Henry], her treatment and substance[] abuse
history, as well as but not limited to any records indicating any
controlled substances that were in her system on or about
October 5, 2021.

In his request, Henry identified the providers he sought information from. Relevant
to this request, K.W. mentioned in her forensic interview that she tested positive for opiates
and not marijuana after the assault. In his supporting memorandum, Henry explained that
he was seeking this evidence for “impeachment purposes” and to determine whether K.W.
made inconsistent statements. The district court denied Henry’s motion, finding that Henry
“failed to make a plausible showing that the records sought will be favorable and material
to his defense.”
Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a motion for in camera review
for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the district court’s decision is contrary to
13
law or “is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark , 927 N.W.2d 281,
291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 872 (Minn.
2008) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to review a district court ruling on a motion
for in camera review).
To obtain in camera review of confidential records, a defendant must make a
“plausible showing” that the requested material would be “material and favorable to the
defense.” State v. Conrad (In re Hope Coal.), 977 N.W.2d 651, 659 n.6 (Minn. 2022). The
request must be reasonably specific, State v. Lynch , 443 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. App.
1989), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 1989), and “[f]ishing expeditions” are not sufficient to
meet the defendant’s burden, In re Hope Coal., 977 N.W.2d at 659 n.6 (quotation omitted).
But the legislature has enacted laws making a person’s therapy records privileged
and prohibiting disclosure of those records without the person’s consent. See, e.g., Minn.
Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(d), (g) (2022); see also In re Hope Coal., 977 N.W.2d at 659. Unlike
confidential records, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that statutorily
privileged documents, like sexual -assault-counselor records, cannot be pierced through in
camera review in criminal proceedings. In re Hope Coal., 977 N.W.2d at 661. This court
recently extended the supreme court’s approach in In re Hope Coalition to the privileges
established in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(d) and (g), which relate to
records maintained by medical and mental -health professionals. See State v. Ramirez (In
re State), 985 N.W.2d 581, 586 (Minn. App. 2023) (“[P]aragraphs (d) and (g) prohibit
custodians of protected records from disclosing them except when a specifically stated
14
exception applies.”), rev. granted (Minn. Mar. 14, 2023) and appeal dismissed (Minn. July
31, 2023).
As an initial matter, Henry has not shown that K.W. consent ed to the disclosure of
her medical or therapy records, nor has he established that some other statutory exception
applies. Those records, therefore, are categorically protected from disclosure—even for in
camera review —and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Henry’s
motion for in camera review. See In re State, 985 N.W.2d at 586 (“Following the supreme
court’s approach in In re Hope Coalition, we hold that a district court may not order the
production of records protected by these privileges absent an express exception.”); see also
Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1( d) (“A licensed physician . . . shall not, without the consent
of the patient, be allowed to disclose any information or any opinion based thereon which
the professional acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was
necessary to enable the professional to act in that capacity . . . .”), (g) (“A . . . psychologist,
consulting psychologist, or licensed social worker engaged in a psychological or social
assessment or treatment of an individual at the individual ’s request shall not, without the
consent of the professional ’s client, be allowed to disclose any information or opinion
based thereon . . . .”).
Even if in camera review were allowed, we are satisfied that the district court did
not err by concluding that Henry failed to meet his burden to make a plausible showing
that the records sought would be material and favorable. In his memorandum in support of
his motion, Henry claimed that “it is highly likely [K.W.] discussed [the sexual -assault
allegations] with her [in -patient treatment] provider” and that “[p]resumably, the positive
15
opioid test must have been obtained by medical personnel when she was in the hospital.”
Henry’s memorandum suggests that he was unsure whether the information he requested
existed and, if it did exist, in which provider’s records the information would be found.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for in camera review
on the gr ound that the request was “unsubstantiated and broad” and “more akin to [a]
fishing expedition.”
Further, Henry already had evidence of the material he sought to find in the records,
including K.W.’s admission that she consumed alcohol and marijuana on the date of the
offense, her statement that she tested positive for opioids, her blood -alcohol test results
showing she was under the influence when she spoke with the police, and her c onflicting
statements about her substance use on the date of the offense. The district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Henry’s motion for in camera review on the ground that he
failed to demonstrate how the records would help his defense.
Affirmed.