State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1498

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Pharoah Gerald Ashley,
Appellant.

Filed October 20, 2025
Affirmed; motion to strike granted
Ede, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-7019

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Ede , Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This appeal follows a jury trial, stay, and remand for postconviction proceedings.
Appellant asserts that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting his ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in denying his petition for postconviction relief and that
the trial evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of attempted second-degree
murder. In a self-represented brief, appellant also makes several arguments for reversal and
remand; respondent moves to strike portions of that brief. We affirm and grant respondent’s
motion to strike.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Pharoah Gerald Ashley with:
possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
624.713, subdivision 2(b) (2022) (Count I) ; possession of ammunition by an ineligible
person, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 2(b) (Count II) ;
second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.222, subdivision 1 (2022) (Count III); and attempted second-degree murder, in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2022) (Count IV).
According to the probable cause statement in the complaint, in the early morning hours of
October 4, 2022, Ashley came to the apartment door of the victim (R.T.), knocked, and
fired a gun through the door as R.T. grabbed the doorknob on the other side. The matter
proceeded to a jury trial resulting in Ashley’s conviction of all four counts. Ashley
3
petitioned for postconviction relief, which the district court denied after an evidentiary
hearing.
Below, we summarize relevant facts that are set forth in the record of the pretrial,
jury trial, and postconviction proceedings.
Pretrial Proceedings and Jury Trial
In discussing motions in limine during a pretrial conference, Ashley’s trial counsel
asserted that R.T. “was a friend of . . . Ashley’s,” “that [R.T.] was concerned
about . . . Ashley’s alcohol and drug use,” and that “the argument and the nature of any
problem that [R.T. and Ashley] were having” related in part to the fact that R.T. “was
counseling [Ashley] on . . . [his] alcohol and drug use.” The district court ordered the state
to instruct its witnesses to refrain from testifying about Ashley’s purported substance use
issues. Although the district court also ordered that “sanitized” evidence of R.T.’s 2008
felony controlled-substance conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes, the
court otherwise ordered that the parties were not to “get into alcohol and drug use” by R.T.
and that R.T.’s gross misdemeanor convictions of driving while impaired and a separate
controlled substance offense were inadmissible.
During the jury trial, R.T. testified. He stated that, on the evening of October 3,
2022, he and two other friends met at one bar in St. Paul before later visiting another. At
the second bar, R.T. encountered Ashley, whom R.T. had known for seven or eight years.
Ashley and R.T. got into a verbal altercation. Although he did not recall what the argument
was about, R.T. testified that he and Ashley often argued about their “lifestyles.” When
Ashley’s trial counsel asked R.T. to explain further, the trial prosecutor interjected and
4
asked the district court if the parties could approach for a sidebar conference. The trial
prosecutor later explained that the concern prompting his request for a sidebar was that the
pending question by the defense might have invited R.T. to provide an answer that would
violate the district court’s pretrial order precluding evidence about Ashley’s drug and
alcohol use.
The district court paused the proceedings and discussed the issue at sidebar with the
attorneys. At that time, Ashley and R.T. engaged in a contentious exchange while the jury
was present:
R.T.: What if my babies was in there, man? What if you shot
one of my kids?
ASHLEY: It wasn’t me, brother. I don’t know. It wasn’t me.
R.T.: All right.
THE COURT: Whoa, whoa.
. . . .
R.T.: B--ch a-- n-gga.
ASHLEY: Hey, man.
R.T.: Coward.
ASHLEY: You the police now, huh?
R.T.: Yeah. I’m the police, yeah. I’m here.
. . . .
R.T.: Coward a-- n-gga. B--ch. Shooting – can’t look at me;
like a coward now, a coward then. Coward a-- n-gga.

Trial counsel resumed questioning R.T. and asked if R.T. had consumed any alcohol
on the night of October 3, 2022. R.T. responded that he had not. R.T. also claimed: that he
had been “on probation for 13 years,” during which he could not drink; that he had
“successfully passed probation”; that he did not use drugs “or anything of that sort”; and
that his “abstinence . . . [was] important to [him].” As trial counsel continued to ask about
5
what happened when R.T. encountered Ashley at the second bar, R.T. again directly
addressed Ashley in front of the jury:
R.T.: How we get there, P?[1]
THE COURT: . . . [R.T.], don’t talk directly to . . . Ashley.
R.T.: This my brother, man. I don’t feel good sitting here.
THE COURT: I know you don’t.
R.T.: This hurting me.
THE COURT: I know.
R.T.: I want to break down in tears. This is killing me, fam.
THE COURT: I know. But we’ve got the rules of the court.
R.T.: This somebody I loved, man. Laid on my couch and
cried. Shot up my house.
ASHLEY: It wasn’t me.
PROSECUTOR: Judge, could we maybe take a recess?
THE COURT: Yes.
R.T.: I don’t need no recess. Cause when I leave, I leave and
I’m not coming back.

As to the charged conduct, R.T. testified that, after he and Ashely argued at the
second bar, Ashley eventually drove away in his green Camaro. R.T. said that on October
4, 2022, at around 2 a.m., an individual knocked on the door of his St. Paul apartment. R.T.
looked through the peephole in the door and saw Ashley. Before R.T. could open the door,
Ashley fired multiple gunshots through the door into the residence. After hearing the
gunshots, R.T. ducked down. Neither R.T. nor the other occupants of his apartment were
struck by the gunfire. The bullets damaged R.T.’s door, window, and ceiling. R.T. opened
the door after the shooting stopped and saw “nothing but bullet casings and holes in [the]
door.” After R.T. called the police and they arrived at the apartment, Ashley continuously

1 During his testimony, R.T. referred to Ashley by his first initial, “P.”
6
called R.T.’s phone. At this point in R.T.’s testimony, Ashley and R.T. engaged in yet
another exchange of words before the jury:
ASHLEY: I didn’t call him at all.
R.T.: While the police were standing there. It’s in the report. I
gave the police the phone. They answered it and talked to
them.
. . . .
R.T.: Yes. They did. It’s in the report.
ASHLEY: You’re a liar.
THE COURT: . . . Ashley, I’m gonna warn you one more time.
R.T.: No, don’t warn him.
THE COURT: Don’t say anything.
R.T.: I’m gonna leave so you can get out of jail. And you know
what’s next.
THE COURT: Don’t volunteer anything else, [R.T.] . . .

And another such outburst occurred as the district court dismissed R.T. from the witness
stand:
R.T.: God bless you, brother.
ASHLEY: (Unintelligible speaking.)
R.T.: No, I’m gonna stay –
THE COURT: Stop talking to each other.
R.T.: Ho-a--, n-gga. You gonna get what you go – you deserve
coward.
THE COURT: [R.T.], stop talking.
R.T.: F--king coward. My kids was in there, you coward.

After the district court excused R.T., the court asked the parties outside the jury’s
presence if they would like to make a record about the preceding sidebar. The district court
also admonished Ashley not to speak again unless testifying under oath and warned trial
counsel that she had been “dangerously close to opening the door” by asking R.T. to
explain what he meant when he referred to his and Ashley’s “lifestyles.” Trial counsel
agreed with the district court’s statement that she had been “dangerously close to opening
7
the door” but expressed her belief that she “walked it so that it was not actually doing so.”
And trial counsel neither objected nor asked the district court to take any action regarding
R.T.’s comments in front of the jury.
Following R.T.’s testimony, St. Paul police officer M.B. testified. Officer M.B. said
that he was dispatched to R.T.’s apartment on the morning of the incident, that he observed
brass bullet casings outside the front door, 2 and that R.T. did not slur any of his words
when officer M.B. spoke with him after the shooting. And officer M.B. did not recall that
R.T.’s apartment smelled of alcohol at that time.
Another St. Paul police officer, M.C., testified that, while law enforcement was
attempting to locate and arrest Ashley, officer M.C. had obtained certain cell-tower
location data via search warrant. The data concerned the period of October 1 to November
14, 2022, and it provided the general location of Ashley’s cell phone before and after the
time of the shooting. Neither trial counsel nor the trial prosecutor was aware of the data
before this testimony. The parties further discussed the matter outside the presence of the
jury during a lunch recess. Officer M.C. revealed that, although the data included the period
of October 1 to 4, 2022, he had not reviewed that portion of it, had not provided it to the
trial prosecutor, and had believed the overall data was only relevant to law enforcement’s
attempts to locate Ashley after the crime occurred. The district court directed officer M.C.
to provide the data to the parties during the lunch recess.

2 Although officer M.B. testified that the casings were “40mm,” a St. Paul police sergeant
later clarified that the casings collected by officer M.B. and received into evidence were
“40 caliber.”
8
After the recess, trial counsel introduced cell -tower location data from October 4,
2022 into evidence through officer M.C.’s testimony. Officer M.C. explained that the data
showed that a cell-phone tower located in St. Paul had connected with Ashley’s phone at
12:51 a.m. on October 4. The next time that Ashley’s phone connected with a cell-phone
tower on October 4 was at 1:22 a.m.; that tower was in Minneapolis. There were no further
connections between Ashley’s phone and any cell-phone tower until 8:58 a.m. on October
4, when Ashley’s phone once again connected with a tower in Minneapolis.
Other relevant evidence admitted at trial included the following. A St. Paul police
sergeant testified that, in January 2023, law enforcement searched a bedroom in the home
where Ashley resided and found a high-capacity, .40-caliber drum magazine and Ashley’s
Minnesota identification card. And the state introduced: testimony about the brass .40-
caliber casings that were found at the scene of the shooting; surveillance video taken near
R.T.’s home around the time the crime occurred, which depicted a “dark vehicle leaving
the area that appear[ed] to be consistent with a dark Chevy Camaro”; and evidence that
Ashley drove a green Camaro at the time of the incident.
Before closing arguments, the district court provided instructions to the jury that
included the following charge regarding nontestimonial statements:
You might have heard statements made by individuals present
in the courtroom during the proceedings this week which were
not testimony. You are reminded that [the] only statements you
are to consider as evidence in this matter must come from
witnesses called to testify under oath, and in response to
questions from the attorneys. Any other statement or
statements made by someone present in the courtroom must be
disregarded.

9
During her closing argument, trial counsel referenced the cell-tower location data
and contended that it exonerated Ashley by establishing that he went home to Minneapolis
and slept after he left the bar where he had encountered R.T. She also referenced R.T.’s
behavior while testifying, stating that, “on the stand, [R.T.] obviously wasn’t pleased with
. . . Ashley[,] . . . [b]ut that doesn’t mean that [R.T.] is a reliable testifier to an
identification.”
The jury found Ashley guilty of all four charged counts.
Postconviction Proceedings
Ashley filed a notice of appeal. We stayed appellate proceedings to allow Ashley to
petition the district court for postconviction relief. Ashley did so, raising claims of
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on
Ashley’s postconviction petition.
Trial counsel testified that she only began representing Ashley about one month
before trial, which she did not feel was sufficient time to prepare. She also stated that,
although she would have liked more preparation time, Ashley “wanted a speedy trial
because he believed . . . that he was not there, he did not commit this [crime], and that he
needed to be out of jail as quickly as possible. ” And trial counsel stated that she believed
the same.
Ashley’s postconviction counsel questioned trial counsel about her decision to not
impeach R.T.’s credibility after R.T. testified that he had abstained from substance use
during his 13 years of probation and had successfully completed that term of supervision.
More specifically, postconviction counsel confronted trial counsel with records showing
10
that a district court had revoked R.T.’s probation for driving while impaired, failing to
submit to court-ordered drug testing, and failing to abstain from mood-altering chemicals.
In response, trial counsel conceded that there was no reason she did not impeach R.T. with
this probation violation, that it was not a strategic decision, and that “[i]t was an error on
[her] part.” Moreover, trial counsel testified that R.T.’s credibility was important in this
case “[b]ecause his testimony was a primary factor in [Ashley’s] conviction”—a conviction
that trial counsel believed was “erroneous.”
Postconviction counsel also questioned trial counsel about how she handled the mid-
trial disclosure of the cell-tower location data by officer M.C. After explaining her prior
litigation experience with cell -tower location data, trial counsel testified that she did not
object to the evidence and instead conveyed that she was “seeking” it. She also stated that
she did not ask for a mistrial because “[i]t was [her] understanding, in [her] conversations
with . . . Ashley, that he wanted to proceed with the trial.” And trial counsel said that she
“[a]bsolutely” would have asked for a mistrial and that it would have been her trial strategy
to do so if she had not had those conversations with Ashley.
But trial counsel also testified that Ashley did not have the right to decide whether
to request a mistrial, that he was not a lawyer, that he had never tried a case, that he had no
experience analyzing cell-tower location data, and that whether to ask for a mistrial
“[u]ltimately . . . [was her] decision.” On cross-examination by the postconviction
prosecutor, trial counsel elaborated that she had discussed with Ashley that the cell-tower
location data “was a very critical piece of information” and “that it was important whether
or not [they] went forward with the trial.” Trial counsel further expressed her
11
“understanding . . . that [the] evidence showed, in correlation to [her] speaking
with . . . Ashley, that . . . [Ashley was] in a different location than where he was alleged to
have been during the incident.” And she explained that, during the trial, she “attempted to
get the jury to understand that the data for the specific dates and time showed that . . .
Ashley was in Minneapolis and not in St. Paul during the timeframe of this incident.”
When asked about R.T.’s statement to Ashley during trial that R.T. was going to
leave so Ashley could get out of jail and that Ashley knew “what’s next,” trial counsel said
that she did not interpret R.T.’s remark as a threat. Trial counsel could not recall R.T.
calling Ashley a “coward” and saying that Ashley was going to “get what . . . [he]
deserve[d],” but she nonetheless acknowledged that such statements were “inappropriate
in front of a jury” and would “usually [be] objected to.” And trial counsel admitted both
that she did not object to R.T.’s outburst and that her failure to object was not a strategic
decision that benefitted Ashley’s case. Under questioning by the postconviction prosecutor,
trial counsel recalled that R.T.’s testimony was “extremely adversarial” and that she had
advised Ashley to remain calm after the exchanges with R.T. occurred. And in his
testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the trial prosecutor pointed out that, while Ashley did
not testify at trial, his exchanges with R.T. allowed Ashley “to make statements
proclaiming his innocence, [which] he repeated . . . over and over again.”
At the end of her testimony, trial counsel said “that [she had] failed [her] client . . . in
not making sure that . . . evidence [of the cell-tower location data] was part of the trial from
the beginning.” She also stated her belief that, “if [she had] had more time, prior to the
beginning of trial, [she] would have been able to get that evidence as part of the pretrial
12
discovery,” but she “was not able to do that.” And trial counsel said that “not moving for a
mistrial[] severely hampered . . . Ashley’s case.” At the same time, when asked whether
she had “work[ed] to do the best [she] could for [her] client” throughout the trial, trial
counsel responded: “One hundred percent.”
Determining that Ashley was not entitled to a new trial because he did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court filed an order denying Ashley’s petition
for postconviction relief. The district court reasoned that trial counsel made a strategic
decision to not request a mistrial after the state’s late disclosure of cell-tower location data,
that trial counsel’s failure to impeach R.T.’s credibility did not so prejudice Ashley that a
different outcome would have resulted but for that error, and that trial counsel made a
strategic decision to not highlight the nontestimonial exchanges between R.T. and Ashley,
which did not prejudice Ashley in any event.
After we granted Ashley’s motion to dissolve the stay of his direct appeal, this
appeal proceeded.
DECISION
In challenging his convictions and the district court’s order denying his petition for
postconviction relief, Ashley maintains that the district court abused its discretion by
rejecting his ineffective-assistance- of-trial-counsel claim in denying his postconviction
petition and that the trial evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of attempted
second-degree murder. Ashley also makes several arguments in a self-represented brief,
portions of which the state moves to strike. We address each issue in turn.
13
I. The district court acted within its discretion in denying Ashley’s petition for
postconviction relief.

Ashley argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
postconviction petition, claiming that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by:
(A) failing to request a mistrial based on the mid-trial disclosure of the cell-tower location
data; (B) neglecting to impeach R.T.’s testimony about his sobriety and compliance with
probation; and (C) declining to request a mistrial based on R.T.’s nontestimonial statements
before the jury.
Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of postconviction relief for an abuse
of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). “A postconviction
court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “Because
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact, [appellate
courts] review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions on such questions de novo.”
State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013).
“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 6, of
the Minnesota Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant ‘the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’” Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). To establish that counsel was
ineffective under the two-prong Strickland test, a defendant must show (1) that his trial
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that,
14
but for counsel’s unreasonable performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694. If an
appellant cannot meet one of the Strickland prongs, the claim fails, and appellate courts
need not address the other prong. Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020).
A. The district court did not err in determining that trial counsel made a
strategic decision to not request a mistrial after the state be latedly
disclosed the cell-tower location data.

Ashley contends that trial counsel was ineffective because she did not request a
mistrial when the state disclosed the cell-tower location data mid-trial. On the first
Strickland prong, Ashley has failed to establish error in the district court’s determination
that trial counsel ’s performance did not fall “below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” White v. State, 711 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted);
see also Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372.
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, our “scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential.” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 844 (Minn.
2003) (quotation omitted). “To allow counsel flexibility to represent a client to the fullest
extent possible, [an appellate court’s] review of trial counsel’s performance does not
include reviewing attacks on trial strategy.” White, 711 N.W.2d at 110 (quotation omitted).
Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has “rejected ineffective assistance of counsel
claims where counsel failed to move for a mistrial or object to alleged errors at trial because
these actions are trial strategy decisions.” Id. “Matters of trial strategy lie within the
discretion of trial counsel and will not be second-guessed by appellate courts.” Leake v.
State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. 2007).
15
Trial counsel testified that she had prior litigation experience with cell -tower
location data and that she did not object to the evidence because she was instead “seeking”
it. She discussed with Ashley that the cell-tower location data “was a very critical piece of
information” and “that it was important whether or not [they] went forward with the trial.”
Trial counsel assessed the evidence as showing “that . . . [Ashley was] in a different
location than where he was alleged to have been during the incident.” And she “attempted
to get the jury to understand that the data for the specific dates and time showed
that . . . Ashley was in Minneapolis and not in St. Paul during the timeframe of this
incident.”
We acknowledge that trial counsel stated that she did not ask for a mistrial because,
after discussing the matter with Ashley, she understood “ that he wanted to proceed with
the trial.” Moreover, we are mindful that trial counsel said that she “[a]bsolutely” would
have asked for a mistrial and that it would have been her trial strategy to do so if she had
not had those conversations with Ashley. But trial counsel also acknowledged that Ashley
had neither legal training nor experience with cell-tower location data. In addition, she
testified that Ashley did not have the right to decide whether to request a mistrial and that
whether to make that request “[u] ltimately . . . [was her] decision.” And notwithstanding
trial counsel’s concern that she had “failed [her] client . . . in not making sure
that . . . evidence [of the cell-tower location data] was part of the trial from the beginning”
and that “not moving for a mistrial[] severely hampered . . . Ashley’s case,” she “[o]ne
hundred percent” agreed that she had done the best she could for Ashley throughout the
trial.
16
Based on this testimony, the district court neither exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary or capricious manner, nor based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, nor
made clearly erroneous factual findings in determining that trial counsel made a strategic
decision to not request a mistrial after the state’s late disclosure of cell-tower location data.
See Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 627. And we discern no error in the district court’s determination
that, after consulting her client, trial counsel made a strategic decision to not request a
mistrial that did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Nicks, 831
N.W.2d at 503; see also White, 711 N.W.2d at 110. As the district court explained in its
order denying Ashley’s petition for postconviction relief, trial counsel “convinced the state
to let her introduce the evidence, without laying the requisite foundation, and then talked
the state into making an exhibit for her.” And trial counsel then used the evidence of the
cell-tower location data both in cross-examining officer M.C. and in her summation to
argue that it exonerated Ashley.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in determining that trial
counsel made a strategic decision to not request a mistrial after the state’s late disclosure
of cell-tower location data.
B. The district court did not err in determining that trial counsel’s failure
to impeach R.T.’s credibility did not prejudice Ashley.

Ashley maintains that trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to impeach
R.T.’s testimony about his sobriety and compliance with probation. On the second
Strickland prong, Ashley has failed to establish error in the district court’s determination
17
that he was not “prejudiced as a result” of trial counsel’s performance. See White, 711
N.W.2d at 110 (quotation omitted); see also Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that, “under the prejudice prong, a
defendant must show that counsel’s errors actually had an adverse effect in that but for the
errors the result of the proceeding probably would have been different.” Rhodes, 657
N.W.2d at 842 (quotation omitted). “The reviewing court considers the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury in making this determination.” Id.
Although trial counsel conceded that there was no reason she did not impeach R.T.,
that it was not a strategic decision, and that “[i]t was an error on [her] part,” 3 the district
court determined that “the decision not to impeach R.T. with his behavior 5 or 6 years
before this incident did not prejudice . . . Ashley to the extent that but for this error the
result of the trial would have been different.” The totality of the evidence shows that the
district court did not err in this determination. See id. Officer M.C. testified that R.T. did
not slur any of his words when the officer spoke with him after the shooting, and officer
M.B. stated that he did not recall R.T.’s apartment smelling of alcohol at that time. And
the evidence also established: that R.T. immediately told responding officers that he had
seen Ashley through the peephole before the gunshots were fired; that Ashley repeatedly

3 Despite her concessions during the postconviction evidentiary hearing, we note that trial
counsel agreed with the district court’s statement at trial that she had been “dangerously
close to opening the door” vis-à- vis the court’s pretrial ruling that the parties were not to
“get into alcohol and drug use” by R.T. and her statement that she thought she “walked it
so that it was not actually doing so.” Trial counsel’s contemporaneous characterization of
her treatment of R.T.’s testimony therefore suggests that her decision to not impeach R.T.
was within her strategic discretion. See White, 711 N.W.2d at 110; see also Leake, 737
N.W.2d at 536.
18
called R.T.’s cell phone while officers were inside R.T.’s apartment; that surveillance video
showed Ashley’s distinctive Camaro was near R.T.’s apartment around the time of the
shooting; that .40-caliber brass bullet casings were left outside the front door of R.T.’s
apartment; and that law enforcement found a .40-caliber drum magazine and Ashley’s
Minnesota identification card in a bedroom of the home where Ashley resided after the
incident.
We therefore discern no error in the district court’s determination that, “[w]hether
or not R.T. was impeached . . . [as to] his claims of sobriety, this admitted ‘error’ on [trial
counsel’s] part did not so prejudice . . . Ashley as to alter the outcome of the trial.”
C. The district court did not err in determining that trial counsel made a
strategic decision to not draw attention to the interactions between R.T.
and Ashley during the trial and that R.T.’s nontestimonial outbursts did
not prejudice Ashley.

Ashley argues that trial counsel should have requested a mistrial because R.T.’s
nontestimonial statements were highly prejudicial. This contention is unavailing on both
Strickland prongs. Ashely has failed to establish error in the district court’s determination
that trial counsel’s performance did not fall “below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and that Ashley was not “prejudiced as a result.” White, 711 N.W.2d at
110 (quotation omitted).
As mentioned above, our review of trial counsel’s performance excludes challenges
to trial strategy, which encompasses the decision whether to move for a mistrial. See id.;
see also Leake , 737 N.W.2d at 536. And we must consider the trial record in its totality
before deciding whether Ashley was prejudiced. See Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842.
19
Trial counsel cited R.T.’s behavior while testifying in arguing to the jury that R.T.
was not credible. She asserted that, “on the stand, [R.T.] obviously wasn’t pleased
with . . . Ashley[,] . . . [b]ut that doesn’t mean that [R.T.] is a reliable testifier to an
identification.” Furthermore, trial counsel testified at the postconviction evidentiary
hearing that she did not consider it a threat when R.T. stated that he was going to leave so
Ashley could get out of jail and that Ashley knew “what’s next.” She recalled that R.T.’s
testimony was “extremely adversarial” and that she had advised Ashley to remain calm
after the exchanges with R.T. occurred. As the trial prosecutor explained in his testimony
at the evidentiary hearing, Ashley did not testify at trial, but his exchanges with R.T.
allowed Ashley “to make statements proclaiming his innocence, [which] he
repeated . . . over and over again.” Based on this record, we cannot say that the district
court erred in its determination that “[t]rial counsel’s decision to not request a mistrial in
this instance was not so outside the norm that no other reasonable attorney would have
opted to continue with the trial and use the situation to her client’s advantage.” See White,
711 N.W.2d at 110.
That said, trial counsel did acknowledge that her failure to object to some of R.T.’s
statements was not a strategic decision that advanced her case. But even assuming without
deciding that trial counsel’s decision to not request a mistrial based on R.T.’s
nontestimonial statements fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we discern
no error in the district court’s determination that “the outbursts between the two men did
not create sufficient prejudice that denied . . . Ashley a fair trial.” As the district court noted
in its order denying Ashley’s postconviction petition, the court admonished both R.T. and
20
Ashley about their conduct and specifically instructed the jury that the “only statements [it
was] to consider as evidence in this matter must [have] come from witnesses called to
testify under oath, and in response to questions from the attorneys,” and that the jury must
disregard “[a]ny other statement or statements made by someone present in the courtroom.”
And appellate courts “presume that juries follow instructions given by the district court.”
State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 167 (Minn. 2024).
Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that trial counsel
made a strategic decision to not emphasize the interactions between R.T. and Ashley during
the trial and that R.T.’s nontestimonial outbursts did not prejudice Ashley.
II. Sufficient circumstantial evidence supports Ashley’s conviction of attempted
second-degree murder.

Ashley contends that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction of attempted second-degree murder because it is consistent with a rational
hypothesis other than guilt. More specifically, Ashley maintains that the state did not
disprove the reasonable theory that he intended to cause fear rather than to kill R.T. when
he fired a gun at R.T.’s apartment door. The record defeats this claim.
Due process requires the state to prove each element of the charged offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 654 (Minn. 2023). When
analyzing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, “[t] he applicable standard of review
depends on whether the conviction— or . . . the specific element at issue—is supported by
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Nyonteh, 24 N.W.3d 271, 283 (Minn.
2025). “[D]irect evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation
21
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895
N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence
from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
“When reviewing the sufficiency of direct evidence, [appellate courts] painstakingly
review the record to determine whether that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” Segura,
2 N.W.3d at 155 (quotation omitted). But “[w]hen the direct evidence of guilt on a
particular element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict, . . . [appellate courts] apply
a heightened two-step standard . . . called the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.”
Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). This “two- step process” requires
appellate courts to first identify the circumstances proved. State v. Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d
266, 275 (Minn. 2023). At this step, appellate courts “winnow down the evidence presented
at trial to a subset of facts that is consistent with the jury’s verdict and disregard evidence
that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotations omitted). At the second step ,
appellate courts must analyze “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other
than guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, the charged offense at issue is attempted second-degree murder, in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1). Minnesota law defines an attempt
as occurring when a person, “with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a
substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime .”
22
Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1 (2022). Thus, attempted second-degree murder is a specific-
intent crime. See State v. Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 912 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 6. 2013); see also State v. Alladin, 408 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. App. 1987)
(“An essential element of the crime of attempted second degree murder is that appellant
acted with intent to kill.”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 12, 1987). Specific intent requires “an
intent to cause a particular result.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 30 3, 308 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
To prove the intent element of attempted second-degree murder, the state must
establish that a defendant intended to cause the death of another person as provided by
subdivision 1(1) of section 609.19, which defines this crime as causing the death of a
human being “with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without
premeditation.” A person’s intent “is inferred from words and acts of the actor both before
and after the incident.” State v. Balandin, 944 N.W.2d 204, 216 (Minn. 2020) (quotation
omitted). Intent is rarely proved by direct evidence; in general, it must be proved by
drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence. State v. McAllister , 862 N.W.2d 49, 53
(Minn. 2015). And “the fact-finder may infer that a person intends the natural and probable
consequences of that person’s actions.” State v. Bilbro, 24 N.W.3d 827, 835 (Minn. 2025)
(quotation omitted).
Here, the circumstances proved are as follows:
• Ashley and R.T. argued at a bar in St. Paul on October 3, 2022;
• Ashley left the bar driving his green Camaro;
• R.T. returned home to his apartment in St. Paul;
23
• R.T. heard a knock on his front door around 2 a.m. on October 4, 2022;
• R.T. saw Ashley through the peephole;
• Before R.T. could open the door, Ashley fired shots through it;
• Four .40-caliber casings were recovered at the scene;
• Ashley called R.T. after the police had responded to R.T.’s apartment on
October 4, 2022;

• Surveillance video from a nearby business captured images of a vehicle
matching the description of Ashley’s distinctive Camaro in the area when the
shooting occurred;

• Evidence showed that Ashley drove a green Camaro at the time of the
incident; and

• Law enforcement later found a .40-caliber magazine and Ashley’s Minnesota
identification card in a bedroom at the home where Ashley resided.

Ashley maintains that, based on the jury’s determination that he had the specific
intent to cause fear to support his guilt of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon,
“it is reasonable to conclude that [he] only had the specific intent to cause fear and not to
kill.” Under Minnesota law, a conviction of second -degree assault with a dangerous
weapon requires the defendant to have the specific intent “to cause fear in another of
immediate bodily harm or death” while committing an act using a dangerous weapon. See
Minn. Stat §§ 609.02, subd. 10(1), .222, subd. 1 (2022).
Given the specific facts of this case, the intent elements of second- degree assault
and attempted second-degree murder are not mutually exclusive because the circumstances
proved show that Ashley had the intent both to cause R.T. fear of immediate bodily harm
or death and to take a substantial step toward effecting R.T.’s death. Cf. State v. Cole, 542
24
N.W.2d 43, 51–52 (Minn. 1996) (affirming the denial of a postconviction petition
challenging the defendant’s convictions of second-degree assault and reckless handling
and use or intentional pointing of a gun based on the conclusions that “[i]ntent to commit
assault and intent to point a gun are not inconsistent mental states” and that the defendant
“certainly could have intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm at the same time he
was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk that fear of immediate bodily
harm would result from the manner in which he handled a gun” because “the terms
‘recklessness’ and ‘intent’ are not mutually exclusive”).
In particular, the circumstances proved establish that Ashley only fired the shots
after R.T. heard a knock at his apartment door and R.T. saw Ashley through the peephole.
Because the natural and probable consequences of Ashley’s discharge of multiple gunshots
through R.T.’s door after the knock show that Ashley took a substantial step toward
intentionally causing R.T.’s death, we conclude that the circumstances proved are
consistent with the hypothesis that Ashley had the requisite intent to support his conviction
of attempted second-degree murder and are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other
than his guilt of that crime. See Bilbro, 24 N.W.3d 827, 835; see also Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d
at 275; State v. Berg, 358 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Minn. App. 1984) (affirming the defendant’s
convictions of second-degree attempted murder and second-degree assault, concluding that
“[t]he evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that appellant was guilty
of the offenses charged [,]” and reasoning that “intention to kill was easily inferable from
appellant’s threats, his pointing the gun at [one of the victims], and his shots through the
door”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 5, 1985).
25
III. The arguments set forth in Ashley’s self-represented brief do not merit relief.
Ashley also asserts five arguments in a self-represented brief, none of which warrant
reversal.
First, Ashley contends that the district court erred by allowing a “50 round drum
style magazine to be admitted into evidence.” “Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound
discretion of the district court, and [appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling
absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A
district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810
(Minn. 2017). “[P]hysical objects connected with a crime or which are the subject matter
of an investigation are admissible, as are objects that connect the defendant to the crime
scene.” State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 624 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). And “the
fact that the objects are not directly tied to a defendant only affects the weight of the
evidence.” Id. Given these legal principles, the district court acted within its discretion in
determining that the .40-caliber drum magazine was “relevant based on the fact that the
allegation [was] that a [.]40-caliber weapon was used in this offense” and that, despite the
defense’s argument that “there was no forensic evidence linking [Ashley] to [the
magazine],”
4 that issue went “to the weight [of the evidence], not the admissibility.”

4 Notwithstanding this acknowledgement by the district court, we reiterate the record
evidence that Ashley’s Minnesota identification card was found in the same room as the
magazine.
26
Second, Ashley maintains that “[t]he state[’]s inaction to correct [R.T.’s]
testimony[,] which was known . . . to be perjured[,] is without due process of law.” But the
testimony that Ashley challenges was elicited by his own trial counsel. When trial counsel
asked R.T. about whether he had consumed alcohol on the night of the shooting, R.T.
volunteered: “I’ve been on probation for 13 years. I have successfully passed probation. I
don’t do no drugs, anything of that sort.” Ashley cites no caselaw holding that the state had
to correct R.T.’s testimony under these circumstances—particularly in light of the district
court’s pretrial ruling that the parties were not to “get into alcohol and drug use” by R.T.—
and we are aware of none. We therefore conclude that this argument does not warrant
reversal.
Third, Ashley asserts that R.T.’s comments “made in front of the [j]ury were
[inflammatory], inadmissible, and [h]ighly prejudicial.” For the same reasons set forth
above, R.T.’s nontestimonial outbursts did not prejudice Ashley.
Fourth, Ashley cites Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) , asserting that his due
process rights were violated by the state’s failure to timely disclose the cell-tower location
data. “A Brady violation occurs when the State suppresses material evidence favorable to
the defendant despite a request for production by the defense.” Griffin v. State, 941 N.W.2d
404, 410 n.2 (Minn. 2020) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). “The State violates the
constitutional guarantees of due process when, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it
suppresses ‘material evidence favorable to the defendant.’” Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d
295, 304 (Minn. 2021) (quoting Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010)).
Because alleged Brady violations present mixed questions of law and fact, appellate courts
27
apply de novo review. Walen, 777 N.W.2d at 216. Minnesota courts employ a three-prong
test to determine whether a Brady violation has occurred:
(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it
would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the
evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution,
intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be
material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must
have caused prejudice to the defendant.

Id. “The facts . . . must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes
v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017). We discern no Brady violation here. The state
ultimately did disclose the cell-tower location data, albeit belatedly during trial. And trial
counsel used that evidence to argue that Ashley could not have committed the charged
crimes. Given that evidence of the cell-tower location data was admitted at trial, Ashley
has failed to show prejudice from the late disclosure and has therefore not established a
violation of his due process rights under Brady.
5

5 The third and fourth arguments set forth in Ashley’s self-represented brief include
descriptions of his feelings about R.T.’s nontestimonial statements and the cell-tower
location data. In offering these descriptions, Ashley does not rely on evidence that is part
of the record before us. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 8 (providing that “[t]he record
on appeal consists of the documents filed in the district court, the offered exhibits, and the
transcript of the proceedings, if any.”). Instead, Ashley describes his version of events
through statements that lack support in the record. Because we cannot consider such extra-
record references and because the state has properly moved to strike them, we grant the
state’s motion and order such descriptions stricken from pages 4 through 9, 21, and 26
through 28 of Ashley’s self-represented brief. See State v. Breaux, 620 N.W.2d 326, 334
(Minn. App. 2001) (explaining that “[t]he general rule is that this court will not consider
evidence outside the record” and that “[a] reviewing court cannot base its decision on
matters outside the record on appeal and any matters not part of the record must be stricken”
(citation and quotation omitted)).
28
Finally, Ashley argues that the cumulative effect of these errors rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair and violated his right to a fair trial. But we are mindful of “the well-
established principle that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial,” Danforth
v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Minn. 2009), and we have identified no prejudicial error
based on Ashley’s arguments. We therefore conclude that Ashley is not entitled to relief
based on his cumulative-error argument. See State v. Zielinski, 10 N.W.3d 1, 24 n.12
(Minn. 2024) (rejecting a cumulative-error argument when “any assumed errors [were]
harmless . . . and did not deny [the defendant] a fair trial”).
Affirmed; motion to strike granted.