In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Christopher Cody Johnson a/k/a Natasha Johnson (“Tasha”).

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1506

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Christopher Cody Johnson a/k/a Natasha Johnson (“Tasha”).

Filed February 26, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Renville County District Court
File No. 65-PR-21-39

Krystal M. Lynne, Stermer & Sellner, Chtd., Montevideo, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Jones, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kelsie Stahl, Renville County Attorney, Olivia, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges her commitment as a sexually dangerous person. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2022, respondent Renville County Human Services (petitioner)
petitioned to commit appellant Christopher Cody Johnson a/k/a Natasha Johnson (“Tasha”)

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) and sexual psychopathic personality (SPP).1 Before
the commitment hearing , Johnson stipulated that she meets the statutory defi nition of an
SDP, and petitioner dismissed the SPP portion of the petition. Johnson also stipulated to
the admission of documents supporting her commitment.
The district court held a hearing on the sole remaining issue: whether there was a
less-restrictive treatment option available other than commitment to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) facilit ies at Moose Lake and St. Peter. After considering the
evidence, t he court committed Johnson to MSOP-Moose Lake as an SDP for an
indeterminate period. The court made the following findings in support of Johnson’s
commitment.
At the time of the commitment in 2023, Johnson was 32 years old. In 2008, Johnson
was adjudicated delinquent after being found guilty of first - and second-degree criminal
sexual conduct for sexually assaulting a 15 -year-old female. Johnson completed sex -
offender programming and was discharged from probation in June 2009.
In 2010, Johnson sexually assaulted a 17 -year-old female. Johnson was charg ed
with first -degree criminal sexual conduct and ultimately pleaded guilty to an amended
charge of fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court sentenced Johnson to
365 days in jail, with 245 days stayed, and placed her on probation for two ye ars. The
court prohibited Johnson from accessing pornography and ordered her to complete sex -

1 Johnson is a transgender female who prefers she/her pronouns.
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offender programming and cooperate with probation. Johnson entered outpatient sex -
offender treatment.
In November 2011, the district court found that Johnson vi olated probation by
accessing pornography. In January 2013, the court found that Johnson violated probation
by failing to complete sex-offender treatment. The court extended Johnson’s probation for
one year and again ordered her to complete sex-offender treatment. In February 2013, the
court found that Johnson violated probation by failing to maintain contact and cooperate
with probation. The court once again ordered Johnson to complete sex-offender treatment.
In May 2013, Johnson was charged with failing to register as a predatory offender,
and she ultimately pleaded guilty to the charge. In November 2013, while the predatory -
registration charge was pending, Johnson sexually assaulted a 17-year-old female.
In January 2014, the district court place d Johnson on probation for the predatory -
registration offense. In June 2014, Johnson admitted that she had violated probation, and
the district court revoked her probation and committed her to the custody of the Minnesota
Commissioner of Corrections (COC).
Johnson ultimately pleaded guilty to a third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charge
stemming from the November 2013 sexual assault, and the district court committed her to
the custody of the COC for 41 months in January 2015. Johnson began serving this
sentence in August 2015.
During a sexual -history polygraph, Johnson admitted that between the ages of 18
and 23, she had numerous sexual partners and estimated that five to ten of them were 15-16
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years old and one may have been 14 years old. Johnson also a dmitted that as a juvenile,
she sexually assaulted additional victims, including two nine- or ten-year-old children.
In September 2016, Johnson was released from prison on intensive -supervised-
release (ISR). In January 2017, an ISR agent alleged that John son violated ISR by failing
to complete sex-offender treatment, viewing pornography, and accessing the internet. The
hearings and release unit (HRU) revoked Johnson’s ISR and returned her to prison for 130
days.
Johnson was admitted to the Minnesota Correctional Facility (MCF) at Lino Lakes,
and in May 2017, Johnson was again released on ISR. In September 2017, an ISR agent
alleged that Johnson violated ISR by having an unapproved visitor and by possessing
pornography, internet-capable devices, and a cel l phone. Johnson was returned to prison
in September 2017. Later, she was once again released on ISR.
In June 2018, Johnson was allowed to enter CORE, a community-based sex -
offender program, for a sixth time. Johnson “admitted she was complacent in sex offender
treatment before” and “thought she had had eight or nine treatment exposures.” In January
2019, Johnson was terminated from CORE for possessing and accessing pornography.
CORE noted that Johnson had been terminated from the program twice in 2017 for similar
behavior.
In January 2019, an ISR agent alleged that Johnson violated ISR by being
terminated from sex -offender treatment, accessing the internet, visiting chat rooms,
possessing pornography, and failing to cooperate with ISR. The HRU found that Johnson
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violated ISR and revoked her ISR for 240 days. Johnson was admitted to MCF-Lino Lakes.
In September 2019, Johnson was released on ISR.
In December 2019, an ISR agent alleged that Johnson violated ISR by having
contact with a 16 -year-old female and by possessing a weapon. The HRU found that
Johnson violated ISR by having contact with a minor, and the HRU revoked Johnson’s ISR
and returned her to prison at MCF-Lino Lakes. Johnson was again released on ISR in June
2020.
In August 2020, an ISR agent alleged that Johnson violated ISR by accessing online
social networks and having contact with minors. The agent noted it had been nine years
since Johnson was referred for sex-offender treatment and that she had yet to complete any
program. The HRU revoked Johnson’s ISR and returned her to prison for 365 days.
Johnson was admitted to MCF -Stillwater. She stated that she would not complete
sex-offender treatment at a male facility because of safety concerns.
In October 2020, MCF-Lino Lakes accepted Johnson into its sex-offender treatment
program. In February 2021, Johnson made a harassment report, but a subsequent
investigation showed that her report was false. Johnson was cited for lying, admitted the
violation, and was placed in segregation for seven days . Johnson’s participation in the
sex-offender program was terminated based on her admitted violation. In April 2021,
Johnson agreed to return to the sex-offender program at MCF-Lino Lakes.
In May 2021, Johnson met with a psychologist. She denied committing the offenses
underlying two of her convictions, and she stated that sex -offender treatment in the
community was a waste of time and money and that she had doubts that programming at
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MCF-Lino Lakes would be better. Also in May 2021, Johnson was cited for possessing an
altered razor, admitted to that violation, and received another seven days in segregation.
Johnson was terminated from sex -offender programming based on the violation. She
appealed her termination, and her appeal was deni ed. Johnson did not reapply to the
sex-offender program at MCF-Lino Lakes until February 23, 2023.
As part of the commitment proceedings, the district court appointed two examiners,
Dr. Marshall and Dr. Vaccarella. Both testified in support of Johnson’s stipulation that she
is an SDP and opined that she was competent to enter into the stipulation. Dr. Marshall
stated that Johnson “manifested an inability to adequately control her sexual behavior” and
was “highly likely to engage in future acts of harmful sexual conduct.” Dr. Marshall further
opined that Johnson “needs continued sex offender specific treatment with the structure
and support of a secure treatment facility” and that MSOP was “the only program available
that can meet [Johnson’s] treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.”
Dr. Vaccarella likewise contended that Johnson’s disorders do not allow her “to
adequately control her sexual impulses” and that Johnson was “highly likely to engage in
future acts of harmful sexual conduc t.” Dr. Vaccarella opined that Johnson required
“intensive sex offense specific treatment in a secure (locked) institutional setting” but that
treatment at MCF-Lino Lakes could meet Johnson’s needs and protect the public.
However, Dr. Vaccarella stated t hat MSOP was the only program available to Johnson
because the MCF-Lino Lakes sex-offender program’s admission criteria did not “allow for
a person under civil commitment to be admitted to the program.”
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The district court concluded that MSOP was the approp riate setting for Johnson to
receive the necessary treatment and that there was no evidence that a less -restrictive
environment would meet Johnson’s needs and the needs of the public. The district court
found that MCF-Lino Lakes could provide the needed t reatment and satisfy public-safety
concerns, but that the MCF-Lino Lakes sex-offender treatment program was not available
to Johnson.
Johnson moved for a new trial, amended findings, and to vacate the order for
commitment, arguing that the county did not s ubmit all of the exhibits to which she had
stipulated. She asserted that “approximately 1,377 pages were removed from the exhibits
without [her] knowledge.” She also challenged several of the district court’s findings.
Lastly, she requested a new trial on the following grounds: (1) the evidence supported a
conclusion that a less-restrictive treatment option was available, (2) her right to due process
was violated because she was denied treatment at MCF-Lino Lakes based on the
commitment proceedings, and (3) sex-offender treatment could be accomplished in a
less-restrictive setting.
The district court denied Johnson’s motion , reasoning that, although petitioner did
not submit all the exhibits to which Johnson had stipulated, the court did not receive any
evidence that was not disclosed to Johnson before the commitment hearing and that
Johnson was not prejudiced . The court declined to amend its findings and rejected
Johnson’s constitutional arguments.
Johnson appeals.

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DECISION
I.
Johnson contends that the district court erred by denying her request for a new trial.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01
for an abuse of discretion . Dostal v. Curran , 679 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Minn. App. 2004),
rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2004). “[P]rejudice is the primary consideration in determining
whether to grant a new trial.” Torchwood Props., LLC v. McKinnon, 784 N.W.2d 416, 419
(Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted). A new trial is required only if the alleged error
had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the trial’s outcome. See Becker v. Mayo Found.,
737 N.W.2d 200, 218 (Minn. 2007) (“To require a new trial, the wrongfully excluded
evidence must have had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict.”).
Johnson’s request for a new trial was based on petitioner’s failure to submit all of
the documents contemplated by the parties’ stipulation. Prior to the commitment hearing,
petitioner submitted exhibits 1-27 through “MNDES” 2 and offered those documents into
evidence. The district court asked Johnson’s attorney for “any comments,” and counsel
informed the court, “I believe we have all copies or the complete copies of the exhibits.
So, as long as those are t he copies that were provided to us, we have no objection . . . .”
The court asked petitioner if that was the case, and petitioner stated: “That is the case. In

2 MNDES is the Minnesota Digital Exhibit System, “ a way to share digital exhibi ts with
the court and the other parties in a case for evidentiary hearings or trials without the need
for physical copies.” Minn. Judicial Branch, Help Topics, Evidence & Exhibits, Minnesota
Digital Exhibit System (MNDES) , https://www.mncourts.gov/Help-Topics/Evidence-and-
Exhibits.aspx [https://perma.cc/R7CB-TDNX].

9
fact, our office provided . . . more exhibits than what were actually submitted to the
[c]ourt.”
The district court proceeded to generally describe on the record the contents of the
exhibits, noting that the individual exhibits contained multiple documents. Petitioner
stated that exhibit 10 include d approximately 3 ,000 pages of documents. Johnson’s
attorney agreed, informing the district court that exhibit 10 contained “the entirety of the
[department of corrections’] [r]ecords.” The district court asked Johnson’s counsel, “[A]ny
objection then, or any other objection ?” Counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” The
district court received exhibits 1-27.
Next, petitioner informed the district court that Johnson had agreed to “admit that
there is sufficient evidence to find that she meets the statutory criteria as [an SDP],” and
based on that stipulation, petitioner would dismiss the allegation that Johnson is also an
SPP. Johnson waived her right to “object to exhibits” and made the following admissions:
(1) she had engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct, (2) there was a substantial
likelihood of physical or emotional harm caused to the victims by her harmful sexual
conduct, (3) the evidence would show that she had manifested a sexual personality or other
mental disorder, (4) the evidence supported a finding that she lacked adequate control of
her sexual impulses, and (5) without treatment, it was highly likely that she would engage
in acts of harmful sexual conduct in the future . Johnson also provided the court with a
signed stipulation reflecting those admissions and her waiver. The hearing proceeded on
the sole remaining issue: whether a less -restrictive treatment alternative was available to
Johnson.
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The record shows that, when Johnson stipulated to the admission of exhibits 1 -27,
she was fully aware that the documents in those exhibits did not include all of the
documents that petitioner had provided to Johnson before the commitment hearing . Yet
Johnson did not object to the admission of exhibits 1-27. Generally, to preserve issues for
appeal, including evidentiary rulings, counsel must make a timely objection, and failure to
do so precludes our review. State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 617-18 (Minn. 2014); In
re Gonzalez , 456 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. App. 1990). A party may not raise an
evidentiary objection for the first time in a motion for a new trial . Poppler v. O’Connor,
235 N.W.2d 617, 619 n.1 (Minn. 1975); Helm v. El Rehbein & Son, Inc., 257 N.W.2d 584,
587 n.2 (Minn. 1977) . We therefore question whether Johnson’s evidentiary issue is
properly before us. But we need not answer that question because even if the issue were
preserved for appeal, it would fail on the merits because Johnson has not shown prejudice.
To obtain relief on appeal, a party must show both error and prejudice. Kallio v.
Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987); Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr .,
Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring that harmless
error be ignored). In district court and on appeal, petitioner explained that it removed only
duplicative and inconsequential documents from exhibits 1 -27. Johnson responde d, in
district court and on appeal, that she cannot show prejudice because she “ does not know”
which documents were actually submitted in exhibits 1 -27. When this court asked
Johnson’s counsel at oral argument why counsel did not examine e xhibits 1 -27 to
determine whether any substantive information had been removed, she claimed that she
could not do so because the record was sealed.
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In response, petitioner confirmed that Johnson may not have had access to the
exhibits after they were submitted, due to a technical issue. However, petitioner explained
that Johnson nonetheless should have known exactly which documents were and were not
included in exhibits 1-27 because petitioner provided Johnson an amended document index
that set forth every document included in exhibits 1-27, as originally provided to Johnson,
and specifically noted which documents within each exhibit were submitted to the district
court.
When this court asked Johnson’s attorney, at oral argument, whether she had
received the amended document index and therefore had the ability to determine exactly
which documents were contained in the exhibits, she responded , “I know I received a list;
I don’t think . . . I received any sort of list that said . . . we are not submitting pages this,
this, this, and this.”
Johnson has not shown that she had no way of knowing which documents were
contained in exhibits 1 -27 as submitted to the district court and, therefore, no way of
determining whether she was prejudiced as a resu lt of petitioner submitting fewer
documents than anticipated. Because the sole issue at trial was the availability of a less -
restrictive treatment program, only the omission of documents favorable to Johnson
regarding that issue could have been prejudicia l. We fail to see why Johnson could not
have used the amended document index to ascertain whether such documents had been
omitted.3 We also fail to see why Johnson could not have simply asked the district court

3 Our review indicates that the amended document index enabled a determination regarding
the documents that were submitted to the district court.
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to confirm its receipt of any documents th at she thought were important regarding the
availability of a less-restrictive option. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3 (2022) (placing
the burden of establishing a less -restrictive treatment option upon the person subject to
commitment).
In sum, assuming without deciding that the evidentiary issue is properly before us,
we conclude that Johnson is not entitled to relief from this court because she has not shown
that she was prejudiced by petitioner’s failure to submit all of the documents contemplated
by the parties’ stipulation. And in the absence of such a showing, there is no basis for this
court to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying Johnson’s request
for a new trial. See Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 218 ( stating that a new trial is not required
unless the wrongfully excluded evidence had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the
outcome).
II.
Johnson contends that the district court’s factual findings are erroneous. We review
a district court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn.
1995). In doing so, we review the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the
decision. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021). “When
the record reasona bly supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the
record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.”
Id. at 223 (quotation omitted).
When applying the clear -error standard of review, appellate courts (1) view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do
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not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221 -22.
“Where the findings of fact rest almost entirely on expert testimony, the [district] court’s
evaluation of credibility is of particular significance.” Knops, 536 N.W.2d at 620.
“We review the district court’s denial of a motion for amended or additional findings
for an abuse of discretion.” In re Guardianship of Guaman, 879 N.W.2d 668, 672 (Minn.
App. 2016); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02 (permitting a motion for amended or additional
findings).
Because Johnson stipulated that she meets the statutory criteria for commitment as
an SDP, findings on th at issue cannot be prejudicial and do not provide a basis for relief.
We therefore limit our review of the challenged findings to those that are relevant to the
contested issue: whether there was a less -restrictive treatment alternative available to
Johnson.
Johnson argues that the district court should have made a finding that she was denied
sex-offender programming at MCF -Lino Lakes because of the pending commitment
proceeding. Johnson requested an amended finding on that point , and the district cou rt
denied her request. Johnson does not argue that she was harmed by the absence of such a
finding. She merely argues that the district court clearly erred by failing to make the
finding. Because Johnson does not show prejudice stemming from the absence of the
requested finding, she is not entitled to relief.
Johnson also challenges finding 207, which states: “Dr. Marshall testified [that]
[MSOP] is the only program available that can meet [Johnson’s] treatment needs and the
requirements of public safe ty.” Johnson assigns error to that finding because during
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cross-examination, Dr. Marshall admitted that the sex -offender treatment program at
MCF-Lino Lakes could meet Johnson’s treatment needs. However, as explained in section
III of this opinion, the record does not clearly and convincing ly show that the MCF-Lino
Lakes sex-offender treatment program is available and willing to accept Johnson . Thus,
the finding that MSOP is the only “available” program is not clearly erroneous.
In sum, Johnson has not established a clearly erroneous and prejudicial finding of
fact entitling her to relief from this court.
III.
Johnson contends that the district court erred by finding that no less -restrictive
treatment program was available to her . If the district court finds that a person meets the
criteria for commitment as an SDP, the person shall be committed to a “secure treatment
facility” unless the person shows by clear and convincing evidence that (1) “a less
restrictive treatment program is available, ” (2) the program “is willing to accept the
[person] under commitment,” and (3) the program “is consistent with the person’s
treatment needs and the requirements of public safety. ” Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3
(emphasis added).
We review a district court’s finding regarding the availability of a less-restrictive
program for clear error. See In re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 25-26 (Minn.
2014) (analyzing whether the evidence supported the district court’s finding on the
availability of a less-restrictive alternative to MSOP); Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co.,
832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013) (“[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for
15
clear error.”). In doing so, we review the record to confirm that evidence exists to support
the decision. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.
Johnson argues that the sex -offender treatment program at MCF -Lino Lakes is a
less-restrictive treatment program because it has a fixed duration . She further argues that
Dr. Vaccarella testified that treatment at Lino Lakes could meet Johnson’s treatment needs
and protect the public. Thus, Johnson argues that the district court clearly erred by finding
that no less-restrictive treatment program was available to her.
We ne ed not decide whether the sex -offender treatment program at MCF -Lino
Lakes is a “less restrictive treatment program” within the meaning of Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.07, subd. 3, because a director of that program testified that the program does not
accept committed individuals. Indeed, Johnson concede s that the MCF-Lino Lakes
sex-offender treatment program “cannot admit any individuals who are under a civil
commitment.” Thus, it is clear that the sex-offender treatment program at MCF-Lino Lakes
is not available to Johnson while she is under a commitment as an SDP.
In addition, Johnson does not cite, and we are not aware of, any authority that would
enable the district court—pursuant to its SDP commitment order—to re-imprison Johnson
at MCF-Lino Lakes for the purpose of receiving treatment at its sex-offender program .
Decisions regarding where to house a prisoner and what treatment to provide the prisoner
are entrusted to the COC. See Minn. Stat. §§ 241.01, subd. 3a(b) (providing that the COC
has the power and duty “[t]o determine the place of confinement of committed persons in
a correctional facility or other facility of the Department of Corrections ”); 244.03
(providing that the COC “must develop, implemen t, and provide, as
16
appropriate[,] . . . sexual offender treatment programming ”) (2022). We discern no
authority for the district court to place Johnson in the sex -offender treatment program at
MCF-Lino Lakes pursuant to the SDP commitment against the wishes of the COC.
In sum, the record does not establish that any other sex-offender treatment program,
much less a less -restrictive program, was both available and willing to accept Johnson
under civil commitment. Although Johnson asserts that these circumstances resulted in a
violation of her right to due process, her argument is unpersuasive. See State, Dep’t of Lab.
& Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to
consider an inadequately briefed question); In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d
647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017) (applying Wintz in a commitment matter), rev. denied (Minn.
June 20, 2017).
IV.
Johnson contends that the commitment process improperly circumvented her right
to treat ment in prison. Specifically, she complains that she was denied sex -offender
treatment at MCF-Lino Lakes as a result of the civil-commitment process.
Johnson asserts that “the big issue” in this appeal is “whether a prisoner can be
deprived of access to sex offender treatment while in prison.” As we understand Johnson’s
argument, she complains that , but for the civil -commitment action, she would have been
able to re-enroll in treatment at MCF-Lino Lakes.
Caselaw establishes that a petition for commitment as an SDP may be pursued even
though the proposed patient is under commitment to the COC with remaining time to serve.
See In re Civ. Commitment of Nielsen , 863 N.W.2d 399, 40 3 (Minn. App. 2015) (stating
17
that a county attorney may petition for commitment of a proposed patient as a n SDP and
SPP “even when the proposed patient is serving a life sentence with an indeterminate
release date, as long as the county attorney determines that there is good cause to do so ”),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 14, 2015). Because the commitment proceeding in this case was
properly initiated and, as a result of that proceeding, Johnson is no longer in prison, there
is no occasion to determine whether Johnson was denied a “right” to treatment at MCF -
Lino Lakes prior to or as a result of that proceeding. Again, Johnson suggests a due process
violation, but her argument is not persuasive. See Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d
at 480; Kropp, 895 N.W.2d at 653.
V.
Johnson contends that the commitment process circumvented her right to due
process because her prison term does not expire until February 2027 , sex -offender
treatment at MCF -Lino Lakes would be sufficient to meet her needs, and she could
complete treatment at MCF -Lino Lakes before her prison term expires. She therefore
argues that she could receive adequate rehabilitation at MCF-Lino Lakes and that “the
state’s compelling interest can be met without sentencing her to a likely lifetime sentence
at MSOP.”
Johnson complains that “the current language of the statute doesn’t allow for other
appropriate options, such as staying the commitment while an individual is in prison and
still has time on their sentence to allow them to receive treatment” or ordering that “an
individual shall stay in prison while completing treatment as long as there is still time to
serve on their sentence.” In sum, Johnson argues that “[b]ecause other realistic and viable
18
options exist to meet the [s]tate’s compelling interests, the statute as it exists is not narrowly
tailored.”
Given Johnson’s consistent history of treatment failure —including at MCF -Lino
Lakes—there is little reason to believe that she would complete treatment at MCF -Lino
Lakes if she had the opportunity to do so. Re gardless, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
held that “civil commitment under the Sexually Dangerous Person Act does not violate
substantive due process under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.” In re
Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 868 (Minn. 1999). Johnson’s substantive-due-process claim is
inconsistent with the supreme court’s determination that the SDP act does not violate
substantive due process, and she has not met her heavy burden to show that the act is
unconstitutional on the grounds she has provided. Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d
353, 356 (Minn. 1979) (“A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless the party
challenging it demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates some
constitutional provision.”).
Affirmed.