State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1521

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Kinte Dawon Battle,
Appellant.

Filed September 3, 2024
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge *

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-1285

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges his conviction arguing that his speedy-trial
right was violated and that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that he caused
substantial bodily harm. In a pro se supplemental brief, appellant argues that the district
court admitted inadmissible video footage and that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Because appellant’s speedy-trial right w as not violated, the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to find that appellant caused substant ial bodily harm, the video
footage was admissible, and appellant cannot establish he received ineffective assistance
of counsel based on the trial record , we affirm.
FACTS
At around 2:30 a.m. on October 8, 2022, a state trooper noticed that a vehicle was
weaving, had a br oken taillight, and was traveling at varying high rates of speed. When
the vehicle exited the freeway, the trooper turned on his emergency lights to initiate a traffic
stop. As the trooper was walking to the vehicle, the “vehicle took off ” at about 50 to 70
miles per hour. The trooper returned to his squad car and began pursuing the vehicle.
The trooper came across “a large dust cloud,” which he believed had resulted from
a vehicle “entering” the center median. T he trooper located a tire and a rim. While the
trooper was stopped, another officer pulled up and told him that the vehicle was the next
block up.
The trooper drove to the location of the vehicle. The vehicle was stopped in the
middle of a road and a person, later identified as appellant Robert Kinte Dawon Battle, was
3
lying on the ground and yelling that the passengers of the vehicle were not involved. Battle
told the trooper that he and the passengers had been at a bar earlier that night. Battle also
told the trooper that he drove away following the initial stop because his license was
cancelled, which the trooper later confirmed. The trooper observed that Battle had
bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech, an odor of alcohol, and was having a hard time
following instructions. The vehicle sustained damage to the driver’s side and was missing
the rear driver’s side tire. One passenger, N.K., had injuries to their face, was bloody, and
appeared confused.
The trooper took Battle to a hospital to obtain a blood sample pursuant to a search
warrant and to have him checked for injuries. Test results from a sample of Battle’s blood
taken around 4:00 a.m. reflected a blood alcohol concentration of about 0.232. N.K. also
went to a hospital for treatment on their nose.
On October 10, respondent State of Minnesota charged Battle with two counts of
driving under the influence in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subds. 1(1), (5) (2022),
one count of criminal vehicular operation in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 2(4)
(2022), and one count of fleeing in a motor vehicle in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487,
subd. 4(c) (2022) (the first complaint).1 On February 23, the eve of trial, the state dismissed
the complaint because it learned that a key witness was unavailable. Battle remained in
custody on a Minnesota Department of Corrections hold (DOC hold ). On March 7, the

1 We note that the first complaint is not in the record, but both parties agree on the date and
content of the first complaint. We therefore rely on their description for purposes of this
appeal.
4
state recharged Battle with the same counts. On March 27, Battle made a speedy -trial
demand. The trial began on May 16.
Shortly after the start of the first witness’s testimony, Battle waived his right to
counsel and represented himself at trial. Battle also testified as follows. Battle noticed in
his rearview mirror the trooper approaching him at a high rate of speed. Battle stopped
when the trooper turned on his squad -car lights but became uneasy because he did not
believe that he had done anything wrong. Battle moved his car forward when the trooper
was walking to Battle’s car, but Battle stopped again. The trooper hit Battle’s car, pushing
Battle’s car up against the curb. The hit was so forceful that the back wheel of Battle’s car
came off. Battle then drove to an active crime scene and stopped there. Battle also testified
that certain video footage was fabricated and that it depicted events that did not occur .
The jury found Battle guilty on all counts. Battle moved to dismiss based on a
violation of his speedy-trial right. The district court denied Battle’s motion, reasoning that
the trial began almost 60 days after the second complaint was filed and within 60 days of
when Battle made his speedy -trial demand , and that the analysis did not turn on the
dismissal of the first complaint.
The district court convict ed Battle of one count of driving under the influence and
for f leeing in a motor vehicle but did not adjudicate the remaining counts because they
were included offenses. Battle was sentenced to 66 months’ imprisonment for driving
under the influence followed by a 5- year conditional release period, and 33 months’
imprisonment for fleeing in a motor vehicle, to be served concurrently.
Battle appeals.
5
DECISION
Battle asserts that his speedy-trial right was violated and that the state did not present
sufficient evidence that he caused substantial bodily harm. In his pro se supplemental brief,
Battle argues that the district court admitted inadmissible video footage and that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each argument in turn.
I. Battle’s speedy-trial right was not violated.
Under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, a criminal defendant has the
right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The speedy- trial
right protects against “undue and oppressive” pretrial incarceration, reduces the “anxiety
and concern accompanying public accusation,” and avoids delay that may impair the
accused’s ability to present a defense. State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 190 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted). “ When a defendant ’s speedy trial right is violated, the only possible
remedy is dismissal of the indictment. ” Id. (quotation omitted).
Whether a defendant has been denied their speedy-trial right is a question we review
de novo. Id. In doing so, we consider a “nonexclusive” list of factors referred to as the
Barker factors: (1) “the length of the delay,” (2) “the reason for the delay, ” (3) “the
defendant’s assertion of the right,” and (4) any “prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the delay.” State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 245 (Minn. 2021) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 529-33 (1972)); State v. Paige , 977 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2022)
(referring to these factors as the Barker factors). The Barker factors are not “a check-the-
box, prescriptive analysis,” and no single factor is necessary or independently sufficient to
show deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245. Rather, we
6
carefully balance these factors, in the context of each case, to determine whether the delay
“endanger[ed] the values that the speedy trial right protects.” Id. at 244-45.
The parties agree that the prosecution of this matter began with the first complaint
and that the length of the delay between the filing of the first complaint in October 2022
and the start of trial in May 2023 was presumptively prejudicial, such that review of the
remaining Barker factors is appropriate. Id. at 245, 249- 50 (noting that a six-month delay
without a speedy-trial demand is presumptively prejudicial and concluding that the delay
between the initial filing of charges and trial, exclusive of the period between when the
charges were dismissed and recharged, was presumptively prejudicial). The parties also
agree that the reason for the delay —the dismissal and recharging of this matter —is a
neutral factor for this analysis. See id . at 251 (noting that if there is good cause for the
delay, including a key witness for the state being “unavoidably unavailable,” the delay does
not weigh against the state). We therefore focus on the remaining two Barker factors:
Battle’s assertion of the speedy-trial right and the prejudice caused to him by the delay.
A. Assertion of the Right
When considering the defendant’s assertion of their speedy- trial right, we consider
the frequency and force of the demand as evidence of the seriousness of the potential
prejudice at play. See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 252 (“ A defendant ’s demand for a speedy
trial is evidence that he believes that he will be harmed if the trial is delayed. ”); Paige, 977
N.W.2d at 840 (“[T]he strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent
of the prejudice which has resulted.” (quotation omitted)).
7
Battle argues and the record reflects that Battle made repeated assertions of his
speedy-trial right. Battle made a speedy -trial demand at the omnibus hearing and
reasserted that demand at two later hearings. Because of Battle’s repeated demands, we
conclude that this factor weighs slightly in Battle’s favor.
B. Prejudice
We consider three interests when assessing prejudice: “(1) preventing oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at
253 (quotation omitted). The third interest is the “most serious.” Jones, 977 N.W.2d at
192 (quotation omitted) . And it “is typically suggested by memory loss by witnesses or
witness unavailability.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 253 (quotation omitted).
Battle argues that he need not show prejudice, but that he was prejudiced here
because he was in custody during the delay and “[i]t is possible that the delay hampered
[his] ability to fully obtain and present the evidence” used to support his defense s that law
enforcement caused the crash and doctored the videos, and that the state withheld evidence.
As for pretrial incarceration, t he record reflects that Battle was in custody while he
was awaiting trial on the first complaint and was in custody on a conditional release order
following the filing of the second complaint. The state notes that Battle was in custody on
a DOC hold for the period during the dismissal and refiling of the charges. But the period
between dismissing the charges and filing the second complaint was only about two weeks,
and the reason for and extent of the DOC hold is unclear from the record. We therefore
8
consider the impact of Battle’s pretrial incarceration for purposes of our speedy- trial
analysis despite the DOC hold .
As for the impairment of his defense, Battle need not prove that his defense was
actually impaired by the delay in trying his case. See id. at 254 (explaining that a court
may consider speculative harm to a defendant because “excessive delay presumptively
compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter,
identify” (quotation omitted)). But Battle does not identify the specific ways in which
being in custody may have impaired his ability to raise his defenses. The record reflects
that all the state’s evidence was disclosed before the first complaint was dismissed in
February 2023. To the extent that Battle’s defenses depended on evidence that the state
did or did not disclose, Battle had that information for months before his May 2023 trial.
Battle does not explain how this delay in going to trial impacted his ability to argue that
the state altered or withheld evidence. And we note that law enforcement ’s testimony
during trial did not reflect that they lost their memory regarding relevant details. See id. at
253 (noting that impairment of defense “is typically suggested by memory loss by
witnesses or witness unavailability” (quotation omitted)).
We do not weigh this factor in Battle’s favor , particularly because he has not
established even a speculative impairment to his defense caused by the delay .
C. Balancing of Factors
Finally, we must conduct “the delicate and sensitive balancing required to answer”
whether the state brought Battle to trial “quickly enough so as not to endanger the values
that the speedy trial right protects.” Id. at 255. Just over six months passed between the
9
filing of the first complaint and the start of trial. The state dismissed the first complaint
about four months into its prosecution of Battle because a key witness was unavailable for
trial. Battle made no speedy -trial demand before the first complaint was dismissed. The
state then recharged Battle a few weeks later, at which point Battle made a speedy -trial
demand. Battle reasserted that demand at later hearings . Battle was in custody the entire
time awaiting trial, a few weeks of which was because of a DOC hold. But the record does
not reflect that Battle was prevented from supporting his defense theory because of the
delay in getting to trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Battle’s speedy-trial
right was not violated.
II. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Battle caused N.K.
substantial bodily harm.

Battle argues that we should reverse his conviction for fleeing in a motor vehicle
and vacate the finding of guilt for criminal vehicular operation because the state was
required under both counts to prove that Battle caused substantial bodily harm —
specifically that N.K. suffered a broken nose based on the state’s theory of the case —but
the state failed to do so. We do not consider Battle’s challenge with respect to the finding
of guilt for criminal vehicular operation because he was not convicted of that count. See
State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979) (declining to consider a sufficiency -
of-the-evidence challenge to two counts for which the defendant was not formally
adjudicated and sentenced ). As to Battle’s challenge to his conviction for fleeing, w e
disagree.
10
N.K. testified that they received treatment for their injured nose at a hospital. When
asked how their nose was injured , they stated, “Well, when we crashed, like, it hit me
smack right here [], in the middle of my nose . . . . I was bruised and in pain for like three
months after the car crash. And I don’t even know if it was broken or not.” The state also
offered images showing N.K.’s bloody face as exhibits. The resident physician who treated
N.K. testified that, based on diagnostic imaging, N.K. had a “possible, subtle nasal bone
fracture,” that “subtle nasal bone fracture” means a broken nose, and that she treated N.K.
for a subtle nasal bone fracture. And an officer testified that there was blood in the driver’s
side rear passenger seat, and their body-worn camera footage depicted the same.
When an element of an offense is supported by direct evidence, our review for
sufficiency of the evidence is limited to a “painstaking analysis of the record to determine
whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was
sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d
24, 39-40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “We will not overturn the verdict if the jury,
acting with regard for the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty.”
State v. Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 502 (Minn. 2024). And “w e view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact -finder disbelieved any testimony
conflicting with that verdict .” Id. at 500 (quotations omitted).
Substantial bodily harm is an element of fleeing in a motor vehicle . Minn. Stat.
§ 609.487, subd. 4(c). To prove substantial bodily harm, the state must show “bodily injury
which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but
11
substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which
causes a fracture of any bodily member. ” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a (2022). “[T]he
nose of a person is a bodily member.” State v. Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Minn.
1983).
Evidence that an injury could have been of the sort sufficient to support a finding of
a particular degree of harm is not enough to actually support such a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt . See, e.g., State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 801- 02 (Minn. 1992)
(concluding that a physician’s testimony that a cut in the victim’s ear was close to a major
artery and could have caused the victim to bleed to death, but that the victim ultimately did
not suffer that injury, did not show great bodily harm because “[t]he fact that a lesser injury
is located near a major organ or vessel and therefore could have been more serious is not
sufficient to satisfy” the statutory definition of great bodily harm).
But this is not a case in which the jury inferred the severity of an injury based on
evidence of how severe the injury could have been, but ultimately was not. In a similar
case, State v. Burgos , No. A12- 1193, 2013 WL 1707086, at *1- 2 (Minn. App. Apr. 22,
2013), we concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the victim
suffered substantial bodily harm based on a broken nose.
2 The evidence presented to the
jury included the victim’s testimony that her nose was broken and picture s of the victim’s
swollen and cut nose. Id. at *1. The treating physician stated that swelling, bruising, and
tenderness suggested that the victim had a “nasal bone fracture” which means a “broken

2 We cite nonprecedential opinions for their persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
12
nose.” Id. The treating physician testified about how a physician can diagnose a broken
nose, and that they “felt like clinically [the victim] had evidence of a nasal bone
fracture. . . . And so based on, again, the degree of swelling and experience as an ER
physician, I felt it was very likely [the victim] had a broken nose.” Id.
Here, t he state presented evidence showing N.K.’s actual injuries: that N.K. was
bruised and in pain for three months following the crash, pictures of N.K.’s injuries just
after the crash, and the resident physician ’s testimony that they concluded that N.K. had a
“possible nasal subtle fracture” based on diagnostic imaging. This evidence was sufficient
to permit the jury to infer that N.K. suffered a broken nose.
We note that t he resident physician’s qualification of their diagnosis of N.K.’s
condition as “possible” does not make this evidence insufficient for a jury to find that N.K.
suffered a broken nose. See id. (recounting that the physician described the diagnosis as a
“suggest[ion]” based on an “estimation” and as “very likely”). Unlike cases in which the
evidence of harm was insufficient, the resident physician’s testimony was not about
hypothetical injuries that could have resulted from Battle’s actions. See , e.g., Gerald, 486
N.W.2d at 801- 02. And the state was not required to elicit affirmative and explicit
testimony from N.K. that their nose was broken. N.K.’s testimony about the nature of their
injuries, paired with the other evidence the state presented, was enough to permit the jury
to determine that Battle caused N.K. substantial bodily harm .

13
III. The district court did not plainly err by admitting the state’s video evidence of
the incident.

In his pro se supplemental brief, Battle argues that the district court erred by
admitting certain video footage depicting the incident, which was inadmissible because of
a “breach of the squad video’s chain of evidence.” Battle argues that because the footage
was in the care of the prosecutor, it was not “secure and safe from contamination and
breach,” and that because the footage was used in a different matter and wa s in other
prosecutor’s files, the “security of the evidence is broken.” We disagree.
Because Battle did not object to the admission of any of the squad-car or body-worn
camera footage of the incident , we review the admission of th is evidence for plain error.
See State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 617- 18 (Minn. 2014) (noting that appellate courts
generally will not consider a challenge to unobjected-to evidence, but that an appellate
court may still “take notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights” (quotation omitted)).
Battle must show that there is “( 1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected the
defendant ’s substantial rights.” Id. at 618 (quotation omitted). “ If those conditions are
met, we assess whether we should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of
the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted ).
The chain-of-custody rule requires “the prosecution to account for the whereabouts
of physical evidence connected with a crime from the time of its seizure to its offer at trial.”
State v. Johnson, 239 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Minn. 1976); see also Minn. R. Evid. 901(a) (“The
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
14
proponent claims.”). This rule “serves the dual purpose of demonstrating that (1) the
evidence offered is the same as that seized, and (2) it is in substantially the same condition.”
Johnson, 239 N.W.2d at 242. It also ensures “ that the items seized have not been
exchanged for others more incriminating, and that they have not been contaminated or
altered.” Id. That said, there is “no rigid formulation of what showing is necessary in order
for a particular item of evidence to be admissible.” Id. Instead, the chain-of-custody rule
requires the district court to “be satisfied that, in all reasonable probability, the item offered
is the same as the item seized and is substantially unchanged in condition.” Id. “In the
absence of any indication of substitution, alteration, or other form of tampering, reasonable
probative measures are sufficient.” State v. Hager , 325 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1982)
(quotations omitted). Speculation regarding tampering or substitution “may well affect the
weight of the evidence accorded it by the factfinder but does not affect its admissibilit y.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
Before the district court admitted the exhibits, t he trooper testified that he reviewed
the footage of the exhibits from his body-worn and squad-car cameras and that the exhibits
were “a true an d accurate representation” of the events recorded by his body-worn and
squad-car camera s. And another officer testified that he reviewed the footage of the
exhibits from his body-worn and squad-car cameras and that the exhibits were “a true and
accurate representation” of his body-worn and squad -car camera footage. After his
testimony, the district court admitted the exhibits. Based on this testimony, the district
court could “be satisfied that, in all reasonable probability, the item offered is the same as
the item seized and is substantially unchanged in condition.” Johnson, 239 N.W.2d at 242.
15
And we note that in response to Battle’s questions challenging the authenticity of the
footage, the trooper testified that video evidence is handled by a third party and that he
cannot “erase or do any of that sort of thing from the evidence site.” And the officer agreed
with Battle that “body cams and cameras are tamper -proof.” The district court did not
plainly err by admitting this evidence.
IV. Battle has not established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Also in his pro se supplemental brief, Battle argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his first attorney, who represented him before the first
complaint was dismissed, failed to obtain certain evidence, did not object to the state
untimely introducing footage and tampered footage, refused to argue that the footage was
altered, failed to argue that the state violated double jeopardy by dismissing the complaint
and filing the same charges, told Battle that he had more time than he did to obtain evidence
for trial, and failed to make a record of their mistakes. Battle also seems to argue that his
second attorney, who represented him after the second complaint was filed and until Battle
waived his right to counsel at trial, failed to secure a contested hearing to argue that the
state was withholding evidence, obtain certain evidence , and sufficiently communicat e
with Battle.
“Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be raised in a
postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal.” State v. Gustafson ,
610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000). A post -conviction proceeding allows for the
development of “additional facts to explain the attorney ’s decisions, so as to properly
consider whether a defense counsel’s performance was deficient. ” Id. (quotation omitted).
16
But a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must be brought on direct appeal when it
can be decided based on the trial -court record. Torres v. State , 688 N.W.2d 569, 572
(Minn. 2004). We conclude Battle’s assertions can be decided on the trial-court record.
We apply the two- prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), to evaluate an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim. State v. King, 990 N.W.2d
406, 417 (Minn. 2023). The first prong requires the appellant to show that his “attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (quotations
omitted). The second prong requires the appellant to show that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id. (quotations omitted). “A court may address the two prongs of
the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the
other.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Battle cannot show prejudice with respect to his claims against his first attorney.
The first attorney’s representation ended with a dismissal of the case against Battle based
on the unavailability of a key witness for the state. The result would not have been different
had his attorney done the things that Battle asserts fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
And Battle cannot show prejudice with respect to his claims against his second
attorney. First, Battle has not established that there is a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different had his second attorney pursued a
hearing to contest evidence or to argue that other evidence that Battle asserts exists but was
not disclosed by the state . In a conference before voir dire, Battle’s second attorney ma de
17
a record of certain motions that Battle wanted raised. The attorney explained that he
declined to argue the motions because he did not believe that they were supported by law.
One of the motions that the attorney declined to argue was that the state withheld evidence
and “that actual evidence of the case was withheld from the prosecution, specifically
related to . . . dash cam videos and body cameras” that Battle believed were “from the real
crime scene.” Later, while discharging his second attorney and waiving his right to
counsel, Battle asserted that certain videos he had seen were now missing. Battle’s second
attorney stated , “From my review of the evidence, I believe every single video has been
disclosed. I don’t believe a Brady violation3 had been committed. I would also note, I
spoke with the attorney on the previous case, and she is of the same mind.”
The record does not reflect that the state withheld evidence that Battle’s second
attorney could have obtained or could have shown was improperly withheld. The state
asserted that it “produced all evidence in this case from multiple jurisdictions,” including
remedying a classification issue with the police department involved in the incident. Battle
offered no evidence other than his own assertions that evidence was withheld or altered.
And the trial testimony reflected that the video evidence was accurate , and that law
enforcement did not tamper with it. There is no reasonable probability that the result of
the proceeding would have been different had Battle’s second attorney pursued a hearing
to challenge the validity of evidence or withholding of evidence or made further efforts to

3 “A Brady violation occurs when the State suppresses material evidence favorable to the
defendant despite a request for production by the defense.” Griffin v. State, 941 N.W.2d
404, 410 n.2 (Minn. 2020) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
18
obtain evidence when the record reflects that all the evidence was accurate and was
disclosed.
Second, Battle has not established that there is a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different had his second attorney communicated
with him more. Battle does not assert on appeal that he would not have chosen to discharge
his second attorney had the second attorney communicated with him more. And, unlike
his evidence-based claims, the record does not otherwise reflect that Battle’s decision to
discharge his second attorney related to the amount of attorney- client co mmunication he
received. Without attacking his decision to discharge his second attorney, waive his right
to counsel, and proceed through the majority of the trial pro se, Battle cannot show that the
result of the proceeding would have been different .
We therefore conclude that we cannot provide Battle relief based on his assertion
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.