State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1531

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Laron Doshon Underwood,
Appellant.

Filed September 3, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-561

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Joseph G. Vaccaro, The Law Office of Joseph G. Vaccaro, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, appellant Laron Doshon Underwood asserts that the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress evidence that was discovered following his arrest pursuant to a
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complaint warrant. Underwood argues that, because the complaint warrant did not specify
a bail amount, it violated the rules of criminal procedure and his constitutional rights and
the evidence must therefore be suppressed. We conclude that, even if the absence of a bail
amount violated a rule of criminal procedure, suppression is not warranted. We also
conclude that the absence of a bail amount did not violate Underwood’s constitutional
rights. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Shortly after midnight on February 1, 2022, a police officer on patrol in Ramsey
County came upon Underwood’s parked vehicle. The officer ran the license plate and
discovered that the registered owner, Underwood, had a felony warrant from Dakota
County on a complaint charging him with one count of harassment and one count of
unlawful possession of a tear gas compound or electronic incapacitation device by a felon.
The Dakota County warrant stated, “Bail is in the amount of: Hold Without Bond.”
The officer made an investigatory stop of the vehicle. When the officer approached
the vehicle, he shined his light into the vehicle and discovered Underwood sleeping in the
vehicle. The officer arrested Underwood pursuant to the felony warrant. After the arrest,
the officer discovered a firearm on the driver’s seat underneath where Underwood had been
sleeping.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Underwood with one felony count of
unlawful possession of a firearm. Underwood moved to suppress the evidence discovered
as a result of his arrest pursuant to the Dakota County warrant and to dismiss the charge.
After the motion hearing, the district court issued an order denying Underwood’s motion
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to suppress and dismiss. Underwood waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties
proceeded with a stipulated-facts trial. Following the trial, the district court found
Underwood guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm. Underwood was convicted and
sentenced to 60 months in prison.
Underwood appeals.
DECISION
Underwood challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. When
reviewing a district court’s decision on a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, appellate
courts review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations
de novo. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006).
Underwood argues that suppression was required because the complaint warrant
violated Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.02 and his constitutional rights by failing
to specify a bail amount. We address each argument in turn.
I. Rule Violation
Underwood contends that the Dakota County complaint warrant violated Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.02. Not every violation of a rule or statute requires the
suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the violation. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d
163, 168 (Minn. 2007). Evidence obtained because of a violation of a rule or statute will
be suppressed if the violation is a serious violation that subverts the basic purpose of the
rule or statute. Id. at 168, 174 (holding that suppression was required when search seriously
violated nighttime search statute). But if the violation is “merely technical” and does not
subvert the basic purpose of the rule or statute, suppression is not required. Id. at 168; see
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also State v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 1985) ( ruling that suppression was not
required based on violation of Minnesota Government Data Practices Act).
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 governs warrants issued upon a complaint.
Rule 3.01 provides that a warrant or summons must issue when the facts in a complaint
and any supporting documents or testimony establish probable cause to believe the
defendant has committed an offense. It further provides that a warrant, rather than a
summons, may issue only when there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant will not
respond to a summons, the defendant’s location is not reasonably discoverable, or arrest is
necessary to prevent imminent harm to a person. Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.01. That rule also
directs that a complaint warrant for the defendant’s arrest be issued to any person
authorized to execute it.
Rule 3.02, subdivision 1, outlines various requirements for the contents of a
complaint warrant. It states that the warrant “must be signed by a judge[,] . . . contain the
name of the defendant, or, if unknown, any name or description by which the defendant
can be identified with reasonable certainty[,] . . . [and] describe the offense charged in the
complaint.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.02, subd. 1. It also provides, “For all offenses, the amount
of bail must be set, and other conditions of release may be set, by a judge and stated on the
warrant.” Id.
Here, the complaint warrant did not set a dollar amount of bail but rather stated,
“Hold Without Bond.” The parties disagree about whether a rule violation occurred. The
state argues that no rule violation occurred because rule 3.02, subdivision 2, requires that
the defendant be brought before the issuing court within 36 hours of arrest and the
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comments to rule 3 contemplate that the defendant can seek a remedy for being in custody
during that initial court appearance. The state also argues that Minnesota Statutes
section 629.72 (2022) supersedes the requirement to state bail on a warrant in
circumstances involving certain charges, including harassment. Underwood, on the other
hand, contends that the plain language of rule 3.02, subdivision 1, requires that bail be set
on the face of the complaint warrant and disputes that section 629.72 applies to complaint
warrants.
We need not resolve the parties’ dispute about whether a rule violation occurred
here because, even assuming that the complaint warrant violated rule 3.02 by not stating a
bail amount, suppression is not warranted because Underwood has not persuaded us that it
was a serious violation that subverted the basic purpose of the rule.
Underwood contends that the basic purpose of rule 3.02 is to “set[] minimum
requirements for a complaint warrant to be issued in Minnesota” and “to only allow
defendants to be seized and searched based upon warrants after minimum requirements are
satisfied.” He asserts that the rule’s bail-amount requirement “guarantee[s] criminal
defendants the right to bail the moment probable cause is judicially found.”
We are not convinced that the purpose of the rule is to prevent arrests that are based
on probable cause simply because bail is not immediately set for the defendant. Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.04, subdivision 1, specifically provides that individuals who
are “arrested under a warrant . . . must not be discharged from custody . . . because of any
defect in form in the warrant . . . if the warrant . . . is amended to remedy the defect.” Rule 3
itself thus contemplate s that an arrest may be made pursuant to a defective complaint
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warrant and addresses the process for curing the defect. And, as the state points out, the
rule requires that the defendant be brought before the court within 36 hours after the arrest
and the comments to rule 3 state, “The remedy of a defendant who has been arrested by
warrant is to request the imposition of conditions of release under Rule 6.02, subd. 1 upon
the initial court appearance.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 3 cmt. The failure to set a bail amount in
the complaint warrant can therefore be remedied in that timeframe.
In light of these provisions, we conclude that the purpose of rule 3.02 is not to
prevent arrests pursuant to warrants that are defective only because they do not include a
bail amount. Consequently, Underwood has not shown that the issuance of the complaint
warrant without a bail amount subverted the basic purpose of the rule. See Jackson, 742
N.W.2d at 168. Accordingly, suppression of the evidence that was obtained as a result of
Underwood’s arrest pursuant to the complaint warrant was not justified on the basis of a
rule violation.
II. Constitutional Violation
“Generally, evidence seized in violation of the constitution must be suppressed.” Id.
at 177-78. Underwood asserts that the complaint warrant violated his constitutional rights
in two ways and that the evidence obtained in the search incident to his arrest therefore
must be suppressed as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
First, Underwood asserts that his arrest pursuant to the complaint warrant violated
his constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. “[U]nreasonable searches
and seizures” are prohibited by the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Underwood contends that r ule 3.02 expands on this
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constitutional protection and that the rule’s purpose is, in part, to protect individuals who
are subject to warrants from unreasonable seizures.
We are not persuaded that rule 3.02’s bail-amount requirement can be construed as
a protection against unreasonable seizures. Arrests made upon probable cause without a
warrant are reasonable even though, in those cases, the defendant is not provided with a
bail amount right away. Underwood does not convincingly argue that an arrest made upon
probable cause with a warrant is unreasonable merely because the warrant lacks a bail
amount. We conclude that the failure to include a bail amount in the complaint warrant did
not violate Underwood’s constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.
Second, Underwood argues that the failure to include the bail amount in the
complaint warrant violated his right to bail under article I, section 7 of the Minnesota
Constitution. The Minnesota Constitution provides, “All persons before conviction shall
be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or
the presumption great. ” Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Underwood contends that the plain
meaning of this language is that a defendant has a right to post bail for the entirety of a
criminal case and, in complaint- warrant cases, signing the complaint warrant based on
probable cause is the point at which the right to post bail attaches because that is the first
point at which the court could address bail. Underwood argues that any other interpretation
would be “absurd” because the right to bail could be satisfied by setting bail as late as “one
instant before the verdict.”
Underwood’s constitutional argument is not supported by caselaw. In State v. Mohs,
the police arrested the defendant pursuant to a bench warrant and, in the process, discovered
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and seized a plastic bag of controlled substances. 743 N.W.2d 607, 609-10 (Minn. 2008).
The defendant was charged with a controlled-substance offense, and he moved to suppress
evidence on the ground that the bench warrant violated his constitutional rights because it
did not specify a bail amount. Id. at 610. The district court denied the motion, and the
supreme court affirmed. Id. at 609-10. In so doing, the supreme court rejected the argument
that article I, section 7, requires that bail be set on the face of the warrant. Id. at 614-15. It
stated, “The only temporal condition in the constitutional text specifies that persons are
bailable ‘before conviction,’ not immediately upon arrest.” Id. at 614. It is true, as
Underwood points out, that the warrant at issue in Mohs was a bench warrant, not a
complaint warrant. But, while that difference matters with respect to whether a rule of
criminal procedure was violated, we do not see that it makes a difference with respect to
Mohs’s guidance on the meaning of the constitutional right to bail. See id. at 615
(concluding that “neither Article I, section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution nor the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require that a bail amount be specified on the face
of a bench warrant”).
We discern no error in the district court’s denial of Underwood’s suppression
motion.
Affirmed.