August Ventures, LLC a Minnesota limited liability company, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1577

August Ventures, LLC a Minnesota limited liability company, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Gedney Foods Company,
Defendant,

PMC Global, Inc., et al.,
Appellants.

Filed July 8, 2024
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge *

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CV-19-999

Matthew P. Kostolnik, Aaron P. Minster, Sara E. Filo, Moss & Barnett, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents August Ventures, LLC, Capstone Investors, LLC, and 915
South 9th Street, LLC )

Ryan T. Murphy, Steven R. Kinsella, Katherine A. Nixon, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant PMC Global Inc.)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After pickle company defendant Gedney Foods Company (the Old Pickle
Company) stopped paying rent to its landlord , respondent August Ventures LLC , and
abandoned its warehouse, the landlord sued for breach of contract. The district court agreed
that the Old Pickle Company breached its lease and a jury later awarded money damages
to the landlord. The landlord tried to collect on this award by sending a garnishment
summons to the Old P ickle Company’s bank, Wells Fargo Bank , N.A. Appellant PMC
Global Inc, the parent company that owned the pickle company, objected and claimed that
the money in the bank account belonged t o the parent company. In response, the bank
deposited the money with the district court. The district court determined that the money
was due to the pickle company and, therefore, could be released to the landlord, August
Ventures. PMC appeals. Because the district court did not err in determining that the
money in the bank account was due to the pickle company, we affirm.
FACTS
August Ventures, the judgment creditor, sought to recover unpaid rent from t he Old
Pickle Company, the judgment debtor , after prevailing in a breach -of-contract action.
August Ventures is a commercial real-estate management company and the landlord of the
Old Pickle Company’s former property. The Old Pickle Company is a food -processing
company that previously owned a commerci al warehouse in Chaska, Minnesota (the
property) used for bottling and packaging pickles for distribution, and for office space.
3
PMC is a privately held management company with more than 20 subsidiaries. The Old
Pickle Company was one of PMC’s subsidiaries.
Before addressing the facts surrounding the garnishment of funds central to this
case, we briefly revisit the circumstances which led to the judgment underlying the
garnishment. In 2007, the Old Pickle Company sold the property to a predecessor of
August Ventures. 1 The transaction included a sale leaseback allowing the company to
continue operating at its location. In 2018, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (the
MPCA) identified several permit violations at the property requir ing corrective action. In
2019, the Old Pickle Company informed the MPCA that it would cease operations at the
property. A few months later, the Old Pickle Company stopped paying rent and vacated
the property. In response, August Ventures’ predecessor filed suit against the Old Pickle
Company for breach of contract , among other things. August Ventures moved for
summary judgment on its breach-of-contract claim. The district court granted the motion
in August Ventures ’ favor. However, the district court found that the damages resulting
from the breach were “unclear .” The district court also noted that the lease permitted
August Ventures to recover attorney fees but found that the specific amount of reasonable
attorney fees was a question of fact. Therefore, the district court determined that the issues
of damages, mitigation of damages, and the amount of contractual attorney fees would
proceed to a jury trial. This court affirmed the district court’s summary-judgment decision

1 After the suit commenced, the parties stipulated to substitute Stoughton Avenue Ventures,
LLC, the original plaintiff, with August Ventures, LLC, Capstone Investors, LLC, and 915
South 9th Street LLC, after Stoughton assigned its interests in the property and the lease to
August Ventures.
4
on appeal. Aug. Ventures, LLC v. Gedney Foods Co., No. A23- 0760, 2024 WL 1152575,
at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 18, 2024).
Following trial on the issues related to damages, the jury returned a special verdict
form finding that August Ventures was entitled to compensation in the amount of
$1,459,952.30 for the Old Pickle Company’s breach of contract. The district court awarded
August Ventures damages in that amount.2 In January 2023, August Ventures docketed its
judgment. As judgment creditor, i t then served a garnishment summons on Wells Fargo.
The Old Pickle Company had two bank accounts at Wells Fargo. One account ended in
1013, which received payments from customers. The second account, ending in 6788, was
used to pay the Old Pickle Company’s accounts payable. Both of the Old Pickle Company
accounts were connected to, and part of, a larger “zero-balance account structure” with
PMC. Under this structure, any funds deposited in the Old Pickle Company’s account
ending in 1013 were “swep t” up on a daily basis from the Old Pickle Company’s account
and the funds were transferred to PMC’s master account. Additionally, any time an item
was presented for payment to the account ending in 6788, funds were automatically
transferred from a PMC account to the Old Pickle Company account to pay the presented
item.
On the day the garnishment summons was served, Wells Fargo conducted an
account balance inquiry, which revealed that the Old Pickle Company account ending in

2 The district court also awarded August Ventures contractual attorney fees, in light of the
jury’s verdict.
5
1013 had an “intraday balance”3 of $566,325.77, less exceptions of $163.52, leaving an
available balance of $566,162.25. The Old Pickle Company was “the titled account owner”
of the account ending in 1013. A ccording to the bank, this am ount “was available to [the
Old Pickle Company ] at that time. ” After conducting the intraday balance, W ells Fargo
retained possession and control of the $566,162.25 balance (the first garnishment) .
Counsel for Wells Fargo explained that the bank took thi s action because it believed it was
required to do so in accordance with the garnishment summons and the garnishment statute,
Minnesota Statutes section 571.71 (2022). The bank later identified two additional sources
of funds, of $14,237.32 (the second garnishment) and $26,563.78 (the third garnishment),
which it determined were due or belonging to the Old Pickle Company.
After Wells Fargo took control of the funds, PMC sent letters to the bank demanding
release of the garnished funds on the ground that the funds belonged to PMC and its related
affiliates—not to the Old Pickle Company. In response, Wells Fargo asserted that PMC’s
demand was adverse to Wells Fargo’s duty to retain the funds and disclose the retention to
August Ventures, the judgment creditor. But i n the face of this demand, Wells Fargo
sought leave to deposit the garnished funds in its possession with the district court to relieve
it of any further responsibility. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 67.02 (permitting a disinterested third
party in possession of money claimed adversely by two other parties, neither of whom has
brought an action against the party in possession, to place the money in the custody of the
court).

3 “Intraday” means “[o]ccuring within a single day.” Black’s Law Dictionary 984 (12th
ed. 2024).
6
In response to Wells Fargo’s motion to deposit the funds with the district court ,
PMC moved to intervene in August Ventures’ breach- of-contract suit against the Old
Pickle Company and demanded that the garnished funds be releas ed to PMC. In its
intervention motion, PMC asserted that the Old Pickle Company ceased operations in
October 2022 because it could not produce sufficient revenue to pay its expenses. The Old
Pickle Company’s assets were sold through a public foreclosure sale to PMC and its
assignee, Gedney Foods Product LLC ( the New Pickle Company ), a newly -formed
subsidiary of PMC. PMC asserted that this public sale “effectively ended” the Old Pickle
Company’s operations. As a consequence, PMC claimed that the Old Pickle Company had
no present ownership interest in the garnished funds.
The district court held a hearing on Wells Fargo’s motion for leave to deposit funds
with the court and on PMC’s motion to intervene and to release funds to PMC. It granted
Wells Fargo’s request for leave to deposit the funds with the court. And by stipulation of
the parties, PMC was permitted to intervene in the action.
PMC and August Ventures then filed cross -motions for release of the garnished
funds. Counsel for PMC and August Ventures agreed that the district court could rely on
the parties’ submissions, including the testimony and exhibits contained in the parties’
affidavits, when making its decision. This included Wells Fargo’s evidence and affidavits
regarding the operation of the account structure. Following a hearing, the district court
released the garnished funds to August Ventures. The district court determined that the
funds were due, owing, or belonging to the Old Pickle Company, the judgment debtor, and
7
were properly garnished by the bank for August Ventures, the judgment creditor . Based
on this ruling, t he district court denied PMC’s motion.
PMC appeals.4
DECISION
PMC argues that the district court erred by determining that August Ve ntures was
entitled to the garnished funds because those funds were not due, owing, or belonging to
the Old Pickle Company. Based on our de novo review, we conclude that the district court
did not err in its factual findings or in its analysis of the law because the funds were due to
the Old Pickle Company at the time the bank garnished the funds from its account. In
reaching this determination, we consider (1) the appropriate burden of proof , (2) whether
the district court erred in its determination regarding the first and third garnishments, and
(3) whether the district court erred in its determination related to the second garnishment. 5
I. PMC bears the burden of proving its interest in the garnished funds.
As a threshold matter, PMC and August Ventures disagree about which part y bears
the burden of proof in a dispute regarding garnished funds. PMC asserts that the
garnishment statutes do not address which party carries the burden of proof and urges this
court to perform a burden- shifting analysis.
6 In response, August Ventures argues that

4 The district court stayed further action pending the outcome of this appeal.
5 The funds for the second garnishment were identified in a different manner than the funds
for the first and third garnishments. These garnishments are therefore addressed separately.
6 PMC relies on Savig v. First National Bank of Omaha, 781 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 2010) , in
support of its argument. Savig involved personal funds in a joint marital account and is
inapposite here. Id. at 338.
8
PMC bears the burden of proof as the party claiming to have a superior interest in the
garnished funds .
We agree with August Ventures . Under long- standing law, an intervenor in a
garnishment proceeding bears the burden of proving its right to garnished funds.
Conroy v. Ferree, 71 N.W. 383, 383 (Minn. 1897); N. Star Boot & Shoe Co. v. Ladd, 20
N.W. 334, 335 (Minn. 1884). As a result, when PMC asserts that the Old Pickle Company
had no material assets and that Wells Fargo erroneously captured PMC funds when it
garnished the funds in the Old Pickle Company’s bank account, PMC bears the burden of
supporting those claims. See Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, 895
N.W.2d 623, 635 (Minn. 2017) (discussing the burdens of proof, production, and
persuasion in a civil action).
Additionally, to the extent that PMC challenges the district court’s fa ctual findings
now on appeal, PMC also bears the burden of demonstrating clear error. See Loth v. Loth,
35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (“[T]he burden of showing error rests upon the one who
relies upon it.”). This court reviews the interpretation and application of the garnishment
statute de novo. B & B Floor Covering Co. v. Country View Builders, Inc ., 504 N.W.2d
272, 274 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993). In a garnishment case, an
appellate court reviews the district court ’s findings of fact for clear error. In re Sw. Glass
Co., Inc., 332 F.3d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (noting that
findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous). Clearly erroneous findings
are those that are “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” N. States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc.,
9
229 N.W.2d 521, 524 ( Minn. 1975). Thus, PMC carries the burden of proving that the
district court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Loth, 35 N.W.2d at 546.
II. The district court did not err in determining that the funds identified
in the first and third garnishments were properly attached because
they were due to the Old Pickle Company.
The primary issue on appeal is whether the funds in the Old Pickle Company’s
account ending in 1013 were due, owing, or belonging to the Old Pickle Company and thus
available for garnishment to satisfy August Ventures’ garnishment summonses . 7
Garnishment procedures are governed by statute. Savig, 781 N.W.2d at 338; see also Minn.
Stat. §§ 571.71-.932 (2022). Accordingly, we turn first to examine the garnishment statute.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo. Moore v. Robinson
Env’t, 954 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Minn. 2021). The first step in statutory interpretation is to
determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous. Peterson v. City of Minneapolis,
892 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 2017). If the statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous,
then the plain language of the statute controls and our inquiry on appeal ends there . 328
Barry Ave., LLC v. Nol an Props. Grp., LLC , 871 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 2015). After
any necessary statutory interpretation, we then apply Minnesota Statutes chapter 571 to the
record before us to determine whether the disputed funds were due to the Old Pickle
Company under that framework.
The garnishment statutes are designed to assist a judgment creditor in collecting a
judgment by providing a means to reach the judgment debtor ’s assets that are in the hands

7 This issue relates to the first and third garnishments.
10
of a third party, the garnishee. Peterson v. Wilson Township, 672 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Minn.
2003). Garnishment proceedings are initiated when the judgment creditor serves the
garnishee with a garnishment summons. Minn. Stat. § 571.72. A creditor may begin an
ancillary proceeding to a civil action for recovery of mone y through a garnishment
summons “at any time after entry of a money judgment in the civil action.” Minn. Stat.
§ 571.71(3). The process begins with a creditor —in this case, August Ventures —serving
a garnishment summons on the debtor, the Old Pickle Compa ny, and on the garnishee,
Wells Fargo. See Minn. Stat. § 571.72, subds. 2, 4, 5 (setting forth general garnishment
provisions). After receiving a garnishment summons, a bank “shall retain as much of the
amount under section 571.73 as the financial instit ution has on deposit owing to the
debtor.” Minn. Stat. § 571.911 (emphasis added) . Section 571.73 provides that all
“money, or other property due or belonging to the debtor and owing by the garnishee or in
the possession or under the control of the garni shee” is attachable by garnishment. Minn.
Stat. § 571.73, subd. 3(2) (emphasis added) .
The parties agree that the question before this court is whether the funds in the
account ending in 1013 were due, owing or belonging to the Old Pickle Company. The
statute does not define these terms. See, e.g., Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326, 335
(Minn. 2007) (recognizing that the statute does not define section 571.73’s terms). But an
appellate court may turn to dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary
meaning of terms. See Lagasse v. Horton, 982 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Minn. 2022) (“When a
term is not defined by statute, we may use dictionary definitions.”) ; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 645.08(1) ( 2022) (noting that words and phrases are construed “according to their
11
common and approved usage”) . Here, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “due” as
“[i]mmediately enforceable” and “[o]wing or payable; constituting a debt.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 630 (12th ed. 2024). “Owing” is defined as “[t]hat is yet to be paid; owed,
due.” Id. at 1329). And to “belong” is “[t] o be the property of a person or thing.” Id. at
190. Accordingly, the definition of “due” in section 571.73 includes “immediately
enforceable” or “payable.”
But PMC asserts that this statutory interpretation of “due” is flawed because t he Old
Pickle Company’s access to funds, alone, does not mean that the funds are due, owing, or
belonging to that company. This interpretation renders the word “due” superfluous and
turns the entire focus on what “belongs” to the debtor. The canons of statutory construction
require us to give effect to all of the provisions of a law. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). That
is, no “word, phrase, or sentence” may be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.
Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999) . A garnishment summons
attaches money that is owing, due, or be longing to a debtor. See Minn. Stat. §§ 571.73,
subd. 3(2) (providing that money “due or belonging to the debtor” is attachable by
garnishment); 571.911 (authorizing a bank to retain money that it “has on deposit owing to
the debtor”). Thus, each word has its own distinct meaning. PMC’s interpretation of these
statutes would make redundant the word “due.”
Applying the plain language of the garnishment statute to the facts before us, we
conclude that the evidence supports the district court’s findings that the funds in the Old
Pickle Company’s account were due to the Old Pickle Company. Wells Fargo’s counsel
submitted affidavit s explaining how these funds were identified and garnished. After
12
receiving the garnishment summons, the bank conducted an account balance inquiry of the
Old Pickle Company’s account ending in 1013. This account was titled to the Old Pickle
Company. The uncontroverted testimony reveals that the Old Pickle Company had the
right to demand payment of these funds from Wells Fargo based on how the account was
structured. The account structure put in place by PMC allowed the Old Pickle Company
to debit this a ccount. The inquiry revealed that the account had an intraday balance of
$566,325.77, less exceptions of $163.52, leaving $566,162.25. This amount was available
to the Old Pickle Company at that time.
And while PMC had a zero -balance account structure in place at Wells Fargo, t he
undisputed evidence shows that the bank drew the funds directly from the Old Pickle
Company’s account. Wells Fargo did not transfer funds from the PMC account to the Old
Pickle Company account in order to garnish the funds. Rather, Wells Fargo’s counsel
explained, it debited the intraday balance, less exceptions, directly from the Old Pickle
Company account . Wells Fargo’s counsel stated that “[a]ny of the account owners of the
[subsidiary] accounts could have requested, and would have received, the intraday balance
less exceptions available through the account structure —including [the Old Pickle
Company].” In other words, if the Old Pickle Company had requested the amount of
$566,162.25 from the bank, then that amount “would have been automatically available
and delivered to [the Old Pickle Company] at that time .” Thus, the funds were due to the
Old Pickle Company. Regarding the sale of the Old Pickle Company’s assets to the New
Pickle Company, Wells Fargo noted that: “For the avoidance of doubt, regardless of any
sale of the [the Old Pickle Company] loan from PMC to a special purpose entity created
13
and o wned by PMC, [the Old Pickle Company] Account was titled to [the Old Pickle
Company] at the time the Garnishment Summons was served.” 8
Based on the testimony and evidence presented, we conclude that the funds in the
account ending in 1013 were due to the Old Pickle Company , the titled account holder.
The affidavits submitted by Wells Fargo satisfy us that Wells Fargo took possession of the
funds directly from the Old Pickle Company’s bank account, which was titled in its name
and held funds of $566,162.25 at the time of the balance inquiry. Because these funds were
due to the Old Pickle Company, the bank properly garnished the funds on behalf of August
Ventures, the judgment creditor, under Minnesota Statutes section 571.73, in response to
the summonses.
To persuade us otherwise, PMC argues that the district court ’s factual findings are
clearly erroneous . And it further asserts that nonprecedential caselaw from this court
suggests that an account agreement can provide a right to withdraw funds without creating
an ownership interest. We address each issue in turn.
With regard to the factual findings, PMC claims that the district court (1) relied on
clearly erroneous factu al findings regarding the Deposit Account Control Agreement, and
(2) made clearly erroneous factual findings regarding the zero -balance account structure. 9
PMC argues that neither of these two factual findings have adequate support in the record.

8 After the garnishment, PMC changed its account structure.
9 Specifically, PMC argues first that the district court erred by finding that a Deposit
Account Control Agreement authorized Wells Fargo to transfer funds to satisfy a
“settlement item,” including a garnishment summons. Second, PMC argues that the district
court erred by characterizing PMC’s master account as a “clearinghouse” for its
subsidiaries.
14
Assuming without deciding that the district court erred in these factual findings, any
such errors were harmless because they were not central to the question of whether the
funds in the Old Pickle Company’s account —as opposed to the PMC master account —
were due to the Old Pickle Company. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to
be ignored); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987) (stating that
“[a]lthough error may exist, unless the error is prejudicial, no grounds exist for reversal”).
Wells Fargo’s attorney testified in his affidavit that the bank withdrew money from the
account ending in 1013, which “was titled to [the Old Pickle Company ] at the time the
[g]arnishment [s]ummons was served.” Th is uncontroverted testimony establishes that
Wells Fargo captured the funds while they were in the Old Pickle Company’s account. It
was not drawn from PMC’s account. Thus, PMC’s argument regarding the relationship
between PMC and its subsidiary accounts under the Deposit Account Control Agreement
is not relevant.
Moreover, while PMC objects to how Wells Fargo responded to the garnishment
summonses, it points to no agreements or other evidence that contradicts Wells Fargo’s
approach here. During the motion hearing, PMC and August Ventures stipulated that the
district court could consider the bank’s evidence and the declarations in the record in
making its decision. And we do not presume error on appeal. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn ,
13 N.W.2d 461, 464- 65 (Minn. 1944) ( noting that an error “must be made to appear
affirmatively before there can be reversal”). PMC acknowledges that the only evidence in
the record is the Deposit Account Control Agreement. The parties agree that there should
be other agreements relating to these accounts and the zero -balance structure itself, but
15
they were unable to locate any additional agreements to submit into evidence. If there were
additional documents that PMC believed were relevant to the bank’ s duties here, it bore
the burden of proving t hat, just as it bore the burden of proving that the bank erred. It has
not done so. Because the errors—if any —are immaterial to the district court’s resolution
of the issue, and because the record supports the district court’s ultimate determination that
the funds were due to the Old Pickle Company, we decline to reverse on the basis of factual
error.
We are similarly unpersuaded by PMC’s argument that the district court’s two
alleged factual errors—which we reject —conflict with nonprecedential caselaw from this
court. We are not bound by nonprecedential opinions. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd.
1(c). Additionally, these cases are distinguishable because they do not concern zero-
balance account structures such as exist here. See, e.g., Vill. at Izatys Ass’n v. Jaskowick,
No. A09- 1030, 2010 WL 10423, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 5, 2010) (regarding a business
account owned by a sole proprietor); Dooner v. Pui Yuen, No. 16-CV-1939, 2017 WL
3172986, at *2 (D. Minn. July 25, 2017) ( relating to the application of the Multiparty
Accounts Act to joint account holders); Phillips v. Messerli & Kramer P.A ., No. 08-4419,
2008 WL5050127, at *6 (D. Minn. Nov. 20, 2008) (same); Pokela v. Dana, No. C5- 92-
1067, 1992 WL 333606, at *1 (Minn. App. Nov. 17, 1992) (regarding a certificate of
deposit). Because these cases are factually distinct , we do not find their analysis
persuasive.
Instead, we determine , based on the uncontroverted testimony in the record and
under the plain language of the garnishment statut e, that the funds in the Old Pickle
16
Company account ending in 1013 were payable—that is, du e—to the Old Pickl e Company.
As a result, the district court did not err in ordering the distribution of the garnished funds
to August Ventures.
III. The district court did not err in its decision related to the second
garnishment.

In its final argument, PMC contends that the funds attached in the second
garnishment were not due, owing, or belonging to the Old Pickle Company. According to
PMC, Target Northern Campus ma de a payment to the Old Pickle Company account for
pickles. Wells Fargo put a garnishment hold on the account for those funds. PMC asserts
that this payment was incorrectly routed by Wells Fargo to the Old Pickle Company ’s
account. It claims that, because these funds were mistakenly put into the wrong account,
the bank did not have a garnishable interest in those erroneously deposited funds .
The record does not show that the district court clearly erred by finding that these
funds were subject to garnishment. In response to a garnishment summons, Wells Fargo
identified $14,237.32 in the Old Pickle Company’s bank account, which the bank
determined was due to the Old Pickle Company. The record shows that, based on how the
accounts were structured , the “intraday balance,” less exceptions, w as “automatically
available” to all of the account holders , including the Old Pickle Company. Additionally,
while PMC asserts that the bank made an error, it does not identify any evidence
establishing that the fu nds from Target were incorrectly routed to the Old Pickle
Company’s account. Because PMC has not adequately supported its claim of error,
reversal is not appropriate. See Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass ’n, 804
17
N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. App. 2011) ( “[E]rror is not presumed on appeal, and the burden
of showing error rests on the party asserting it.”) .
Affirmed.