State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1589

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Xavier Isaac Rodriguez,
Appellant.

Filed November 25, 2024
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-21-744

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of second-degree controlled-substance
possession and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the district court should have
2
suppressed incriminating evidence because the search warrant that led to the discovery of
evidence lacked probable cause. We affirm.
FACTS
Officers suspected appellant Xavier Isaac Rodriguez of involvement in an armed
robbery in Yellow Medicine County. 1 While officers investigated the robbery, a
confidential informant (CI) contacted a Yellow Medicine County Sheriff’s Office
investigator. The CI informed the investigator that the CI’s electronic communications
with appellant revealed that appellant was present at a certain Holiday Inn in Willmar. The
investigator passed the CI’s tip to an officer (affiant) working for a drug and gang taskforce.
Relying on this information, officers went to the Holiday Inn. Although appellant’s
name did not appear on the guest registry, the officers learned that appellant’s friend and
former romantic partner’s name did appear. The officers began surveilling the room where
they believed the friend to be staying.
While surveilling the room, the officers observed through a window an individual
that, according to the affiant, matched appellant’s description. The individual returned to
the window but tried to conceal his identity. The officers later observed an individual take
a photo of the officers from what they thought to be another window in the same room. At
some point during the surveillance, the affiant spoke with the CI, who informed the affiant
that appellant posted an image of himself on his social media account in what appeared to
be a hotel room.

1 In describing these facts, we rely on the district court’s omnibus order and the search-
warrant application.
3
Shortly thereafter, the affiant sought and obtained a search warrant authorizing
officers to search the hotel room and appellant’s person for firearms, ammunition, and
money. Appellant allegedly used these items in the commission of the robbery or obtained
them from the robbery. Officers executed the search warrant at the hotel room later that
night, where they encountered appellant. After identifying what they suspected to be
controlled substances, officers obtained a second search warrant for controlled substances.
Appellant does not challenge this second warrant. Among other objects, officers recovered
methamphetamine paraphernalia and various substances that lab testing revealed to be
methamphetamine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with: (1) second-degree
controlled-substance possession; (2) possession of drug paraphernalia; and (3) possession
of a small amount of marijuana. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1), .092(a), .027,
subd. 4a (2020). Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search, arguing
that the search warrant lacked probable cause. The district court denied appellant’s motion.
The parties agreed to a trial on stipulated facts pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4, to preserve the pretrial suppression issue, at which the district court found appellant
guilty of Count I and Count II and not guilty of Count III. The district court sentenced
appellant to 108 months in prison on Count I.
This appeal follows.

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DECISION
The district court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence
officers obtained in the hotel-room search because probable cause supported
the search warrant.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress by
finding the CI (1) reliable and (2) with a sufficient basis of knowledge to serve as the source
of information in the search-warrant affidavit. We disagree.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
[appellate courts] review the district court’ s factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752
N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). However, appellate courts give “great
deference” to the issuing judge’s determination of probable cause at the time of the
warrant’s issuance. State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001).
The U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Absent exceptions, officers
must secure a search warrant supported by probable cause before conducting a search. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; see State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 795
(Minn. 2000) (listing exceptions to search-warrant requirement).
To determine whether probable cause exists for a warrant, appellate courts assess
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis
for determining that a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place” existed. State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn. 1995) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). In arguing that the district court erred by
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finding the CI reliable, appellant relies exclusively on State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304,
rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2004), which outlines several factors that courts may consider
when assessing the reliability of a known CI when that CI ’s information serves as the
probable-cause basis for a search warrant. 2 Id. However, our supreme court “[has] not
specifically endorsed” these factors, noting that caselaw “contemplates a totality of the
circumstances analysis for the assessment of probable cause, and such an assessment could
include the factors listed in Ross.” State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883, 887 n.4 (Minn. 2023).
Our analysis is therefore not limited to the Ross factors but rather looks at the totality of
the circumstances.
The totality-of-the-circumstances test includes reviewing the veracity and basis of
knowledge of “persons supplying hearsay information.” State v. McCloskey, 435 N.W.2d
700, 702-03 (Minn. 1990) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 438). Appellate courts generally limit
their review of whether there is probable cause to the warrant application and any
supporting affidavits. See Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 633; State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532,
539 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006).

2 The Ross factors include:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an informant who
has given reliable information in the past is likely also currently reliable;
(3) an informant’ s reliability can be established if the police can
corroborate the information; (4) the informant is presumably more
reliable if the informant voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases,
“controlled purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a statement
against the informant’s interests.
676 N.W.2d at 304.
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I. The district court properly found the CI to be reliable.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by finding the CI to be reliable. Courts
presume that a first-time citizen informant or a confidential reliable informant (CRI) is
reliable. State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138, 149 (Minn. 2024). For an informant to have this
status, the application must also designate a first-time citizen informant as “not part of the
criminal milieu” and a CRI as having a “proven track record of accurate tips.” Id.
When a CI is not presumptively reliable, a court may nonetheless find the CI reliable
when indicators of reliability are present. Id. Indicators of reliability include identifying
oneself to police, providing statements against interest, and corroboration of facts in the
tip. Id. In contrast, indicators of unreliability include involvement with criminal activity
and providing “information that conflicts with other known facts.” Id.
In denying the suppression motion, the district court reasoned that the “informant’s
status as a known, private citizen” with no known involvement in the defendant’s criminal
matter and who does not “work[] with the government to curry favor. . . . supports a finding
that the information they provided to law enforcement was credible. ” The district court
also found that officers substantially corroborated the CI’s tips because (1) the hotel
registry listed appellant’s friend in the room where officers found appellant; (2) officers
saw an individual matching appellant’s description at what they believed to be the hotel
room at which the friend’s name appeared on the guest registry; and (3) officers observed
that individual attempting to conceal his identity.
Appellant contends that the district court erred because the relevant Ross factors
support finding the CI unreliable, arguing that : (1) the CI is not a presumptively reliable
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first-time citizen informant; (2) the CI is not a presumptively reliable CRI; (3) the affidavit
fails to corroborate the CI’s statements; (4) officers failed to corroborate the CI’s tips
sufficiently; and (5) the CI did not make an incriminating statement that would enhance
the CI’s reliability. We disagree with appellant’s assertion that the warrant application’s
failure to designate the CI as a first-time citizen informant or a CRI weighs against finding
the CI reliable. The failure to designate the CI accordingly merely means that the CI is not
presumptively reliable. See Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d at 149. When these presumptions do not
apply, other factors may show reliability. See id.
More specifically, appellant argues that the information in the warrant lacked
corroboration because the CI never gave a physical description of appellant, never alleged
that appellant engaged in illegal activity, and lacked information that appellant possessed
the firearm, ammunition, and money that the search warrant listed. Notwithstanding these
points, the warrant application shows significant indicators of corroboration. Here, the
affidavit notes that officers went to the specific hotel that the CI m entioned in the tip.
There, they learned that appellant’s friend booked a room at the hotel. Officers additionally
observed an individual that matched the description of appellant in the window of the room
that appellant’s friend purportedly reserved. The affidavit further states that the same
individual returned to the window and attempted to obscure his identity. Looking at the
totality of the circumstances, these facts make the CI’s information more reliable by
offering information that supports the CI’s tip that appellant was present at the hotel.
Additionally, officers’ knowledge of the CI’s identity enhances the CI’s reliability.
See id. at 149. The absence of any indication that the CI did not contact police voluntarily
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offers further support to the CI’s reliability. See id. Based on these facts, we conclude
that, because there are sufficient indicators of the CI’s reliability in the warrant application,
the district court did not err by determining that probable cause supported the warrant,
especially considering the “great deference” appellate courts give to the issuing judge’s
probable-cause determination. See Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d at 804.
II. The CI had a sufficient basis of knowledge.
Appellant also argues that the search warrant lacked probable cause because the CI
had an insufficient basis of knowledge for the tips included in the warrant application. We
are not convinced.
As mentioned above, a CI must have an adequate basis of knowledge for the
information the CI provides. McCloskey, 435 N.W.2d at 702-03. A CI may supply this
information directly by first-hand information or indirectly “through self-verifying details
that allow an inference that the information was gained in a reliable way and is not merely
based on a suspect’s general reputation or on a casual rumor circulating in the criminal
underworld.” Cf. State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn. App. 2000) (applying this
analysis to case involving CRI rather than CI). An informant’s “recent personal
observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred basis for an
informant’s knowledge.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985). When
evaluating the CI’s basis of knowledge, this court looks to the “quantity and quality of
detail in the [CI’s] report and whether police independently verified important details of
the informant’s report.” Cf. Cook, 610 N.W.2d at 668.
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Here, the affidavit indicates that the CI learned of appellant’s specific location by
directly communicating with appellant via social media and had seen a recent photograph
of appellant in what appeared to be a hotel room. These communications included a
discussion of appellant’s plans to leave the state at a time when officers suspected him of
robbery, raising an inference under Wiley that the CI recently observed appellant engaging
in incriminating conduct. 366 N.W.2d at 269. Under Cook, there is a sufficient basis of
knowledge because the CI provided officers with firsthand information by giving them
appellant’s specific location. Cf. 610 N.W.2d at 668. Officers then independently verified
details of the CI’s report. Cf. id. Because the warrant application provides sufficient
indicators of the CI’s reliability and basis of knowledge, the district court correctly
determined that probable cause supported the search warrant under the deferential
substantial-basis standard.
Affirmed.