State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1590

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kenny Lenard Peaches,
Appellant.

Filed September 23, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-CR-22-2598, 62-CR-22-5304

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the presumptive prison sentences of appellant Kenny Lenard Peaches for
his convictions of unlawful possession of ammunition and violating a domestic -abuse no-
contact order (DANCO) because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
his motions for downward dispositional and durational departures.
FACTS
In May 2022, Peaches was charged with two counts of unlawful possession of a
firearm or ammunition and with one count of violating a DANCO protecting R.B. In
September of that year , he was charged, in a separate matter, with violating the DANCO
protecting R.B.
In June 2023, Peaches pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of
ammunition and to the later -charged DANCO violation in exchange for the state’s
agreement to a dispositional departure, dismissal of the remaining charges in those matters,
and dismissal of two other matters. The agreement was conditioned, in part, on Peaches
“remaining law abiding with no new charges” between the guilty plea and sentencing the
following month. The district court advised Peaches that if he violated that or any ot her
condition of the agreement, it could sentence him to “something worse,” which “could
mean prison instead of probation.” Peaches said he understood. In early July, Peaches was
again charged with violating the DANCO protecting R.B.
At his sentencing hearing on July 26, Peaches moved to continue the hearing until
the new charge was resolved, arguing that if he were acquitted , then “potentially the plea
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agreement would be enforceable.” The district court denied the motion, explaining that
Peaches agreed specifically to “pick up no additional charges.” Peaches then made an oral
motion for downward dispositional departures for both offenses on the ground that he was
participating in outpatient treatment and “[t]hings are going fairly well,” or for a downward
durational departure for the ammunition offense on the ground that it did not involve any
use of a firearm. The district court denied the departure m otion and sentenced Peaches to
presumptive sentences of 60 months ’ imprisonment for the ammunition offense and a
concurrent prison term of 29 months for the DANCO violation.
DECISION
A district court must impose the presumptive sentence indicated in the sentencing
guidelines unless it finds substantial and compelling circumstances that justify a departure.
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.A, 2.D.1 (Supp. 2021); State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 532
(Minn. 2017). “Whether to depart from the sentencing guidelines rests within the district
court’s discretion, and the district court will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). Only in a “rare case”
will we reverse the district court ’s refusal to depart. State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917,
925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted) .
Dispositional Departure
A district court may grant a downward dispositional departure based on a
defendant ’s “particular amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.”
State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) . The defendant must be “particularly”
amenable, not “merely . . . amenable to probation,” to establish the substantial and
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compelling circumstances that set him apart from others and justify a departure.
State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308- 09 (Minn. 2014) . When determining whether the
defendant is uniquely amenable to a probationary disposition, the district court should
consider “the defendant ’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude
while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31. Even
if a mitigating factor is present, a district court is not obligated to grant a departure .
State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984) .
Peaches argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining his request
for downward dispositional departures because he is particularly amenable to probation.
To show such amenability, Peaches asserts that he (1) started outpatient treatment, (2) was
working a job, and (3) took responsibility for his offenses.
The only one of these apparent from the record is Peaches’ participation in
outpatient treatment. Although counsel also said that Peaches “was working,” that phrase
immediately follow ed a reference to treatment and contains no employment details ,
meaning that Peaches was “working” on treatment rather than a job. And while Peaches
pleaded guilty and stated that he was not “putting [his] problems on nobody else,” he also
repeatedly declared his desire to “just . . . get it over with.” He never expressed re morse,
and any such claim rings hollow given his repeated DANCO violations against the same
victim—including the charged DANCO violation that undermined his plea deal. In short,
the record demonstrates, at most, that Peaches had started treatment, which d oes little to
demonstrate a particular amenability. Given this sparse record and Peaches’ failure to
abide by the minimal requirement that he not incur additional charges in the one month
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between his guilty plea and sentencing, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that Peaches failed to present substantial and compelling circumstances
justifying a downward dispositional departure.
Durational Departure
A downward durational departure is justified only if the defendant ’s conduct was
“significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”
State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted) .
Peaches contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for
a durational departure because the state did not “rebut” his argument and the district court
did not “discredit the offense -related characteristics that [he] presented in support of a
durational departure.” This argument is unavailing for two reasons.
First, Peaches appears to assign error to the district court’s failure to explain its
decision not to depart, but no explanation was necessary. “Although the district court is
required to give reasons for departure, an explanation is not required when the court
considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.”
State v. Musse, 981 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation omitted) , rev. denied
(Minn. Dec. 28, 2022).
Second, Peaches did not demonstrate a sufficient basis for departure. He argued
that his unlawful possession of ammunition was less serious than the typical offense
because even though there wa s evidence, he also unlawfully possessed a firearm in a
separate room, there was no evidence of him “threatening people with firearms or using a
firearm in any fashion, which sometimes would —we would see with charges like this.”
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This argument is essentially that he did not also commit a firearms offense . But just as the
commission of such an additional offense would not have made the ammunition possession
itself more serious, the absence of an additional offense does diminish the seriousness of
the ammunition possession. Cf. State v. Edwards , 774 N.W.2d 596, 602 (Minn. 2009)
(“[F]acts underlying an uncharged separate incident are an impermissible basis for
departure because those facts do not show that the offense being sentenced was committed
in a particularly serious way.”). Because Peaches failed to demonstrate that his offense
was less serious than typical, the district court did not abuse its discretion by treating it as
a typical offense and imposing a presumptive sentence.
1
Affirmed.

1 In a pro se supplemental brief, Peaches asserts several arguments regarding the search of
his home and the evidence against him. But “ a valid guilty plea waives all non -
jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d
873, 878 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted) . He also contends he was not advised “about
catching new charges” and deprived of the deal that he “signed” when it was revoked based
on a charge rather than a conviction. The record defeats this argument because it plainly
shows the district court’s advisory and Peaches’ acknowledgement that the plea agreement
was conditioned on him not incurring additional criminal charges.