State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1593

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daquan Christopher Savon Ledbetter,
Appellant.

Filed December 30, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-22-5516

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm and four counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-degree
2
murder, appellant Daquan Christopher Savon Ledbetter argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions for aiding and abetting attempted murder. We affirm.
FACTS
Ledbetter’s convictions stem from his involvement in a shooting that injured four
people in the afternoon of July 6, 2022. The following facts were established at trial.
On the day of the shooting, two groups of men and juvenile males gathered in
anticipation of a fistfight between L.J. and T.S. to settle a dispute. One group, which
included L.J. and the four victims of the shooting, gathered in a park. The second group,
which included Ledbetter, Bryant Garth II, and T.S., gathered in the nearby parking lot of
an apartment complex.
What happened next was captured on video by a surveillance camera overlooking
the parking lot. Around 5:44 p.m. Jamarcus Morris, driving a white Nissan Sentra, arrived
at the parking lot. He pulled into a space surrounded by other cars, backed up, turned his
vehicle around, backed into the space, and parked so that the car was facing the parking
lot’s exit. Wearing a mask covering his face, a hooded sweatshirt with the hood over his
head, and gloves, Morris got out of the car, shut the car door, and walked to the group that
Ledbetter was in.
Quickly thereafter, Morris returned to the car with Ledbetter, Garth, and T.S.
Morris walked to the driver’s side and opened the front door. Garth walked to the front
passenger’s side and pulled the door handle, but it was locked. T.S. and Ledbetter both
walked to the same rear passenger side of the car. As the four men approached the car ,
3
persons from the other group began taunting them, saying such things as, “They leavin’?”
and “What are you doing here? You got beat up already?”
The four men, still standing outside the car, stopped and looked toward the other
group. Ledbetter took a few steps away from the car and looked back toward Garth. T.S.
also turned toward Garth. Garth reached into his pants pocket, pulled out a pistol, and held
the pistol down behind his right leg. Ledbetter and T.S. stepped away from the car, spread
apart, and looked again at Garth. Ledbetter moved a cigarette that he was smoking from
his right hand to his left and placed his right hand in his pants pocket. Garth started walking
briskly past Ledbetter and T.S. and toward the other group, his weapon visible by his side.
Ledbetter and T.S. followed. Morris, who was on the driver’s side of the car, left the
driver’s door open, pulled out a gun, and started walking briskly toward the other group,
passing Ledbetter and T.S. Ledbetter also started walking toward the group, behind and
between Garth and Morris. T.S. followed behind Ledbetter.
As Garth and Morris rapidly approached the other group, some of the group’s
members started running away. Morris began running toward the group. Either Garth or
Morris then began shooting at the group. More members of the group started fleeing. After
advancing toward the group, Morris stopped behind some debris in the parking lot, planted
his legs, and—shifting his aim several times—continued shooting toward the fleeing
group. Meanwhile, Ledbetter, who had followed Garth and Morris toward the group,
briefly flinched or ducked down behind a car when the first shot was fired. Ledbetter then
stood up and started shooting at the group, advancing several steps toward the group as he
was firing and the other group continued to run away. After Ledbetter, Garth, and Morris
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had fired a combined 28 shots, they and T.S., who had crouched down and run to the side
when the shooting broke out, ran back to Morris’s car. Morris unlocked the passenger
doors, they all got in the car, and they fled the scene.
The gunshots struck four individuals. The first victim sustained a gunshot wound to
his elbow and arm, fracturing a bone. The second victim suffered one gunshot wound to
his head and one to his trapezius muscle. The third victim sustained a gunshot wound to
his chest, fracturing two ribs and causing a collapsed lung. The fourth victim suffered a
gunshot wound to the head. A medical professional testified that the victims were lucky
that the gunshots did not cause fatal injuries. Though investigators were unable to identify
which shooter’s bullets hit which victim, they discovered six shell casings near where
Ledbetter had been standing during the shooting.
In an amended criminal complaint, respondent State of Minnesota charged
Ledbetter with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, four counts of aiding and
abetting second-degree assault, and four counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-
degree murder. See Minn. Stat. §§ 624.713, subd. 1(2), 609.222, subd. 1, .185(a)(1), .05,
subd. 1, .17, subd. 1 (2020). The jury instructions for the eight counts of aiding and abetting
other crimes allowed the jury to convict Ledbetter as a principal or as an accomplice. The
jury found him guilty of all nine counts as charged. The district court convicted Ledbetter
of the one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and four counts of aiding and abetting
attempted first-degree murder. Imposing consecutive sentences, the district court sentenced
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Ledbetter to a total of 760 months in prison for the four attempted-murder convictions.1
When sentencing Ledbetter, the district court commented that it could not “fathom what
teenagers possibly could have said or done that would so infuriate grown men that they
couldn’t just ignore it and walk away.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Ledbetter argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
committed attempted first-degree murder as either a principal or an accomplice. Regarding
guilt as a principal, Ledbetter argues that the evidence is insufficient because it supports a
reasonable alternative hypothesis that he lacked the mental state required to commit
attempted first-degree murder of the four specified victims. Regarding guilt as an
accomplice, Ledbetter argues that the evidence is insufficient because it supports a
reasonable alternative hypothesis that he did not aid and abet attempted first-degree murder
because, even assuming that at least one of the other shooters acted with the required mental
state (which Ledbetter disputes), Ledbetter lacked knowledge that the other shooters were
going to commit a crime and did not intend to aid the other shooters in the commission of
the crime. We are not persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
To convict a criminal defendant, the state must prove each element of the charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v.

1 The district court also imposed a 60-month sentence for the unlawful-possession
conviction, to run concurrently with the first attempted-murder conviction.
6
Peterson, 673 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn. 2004). When evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove the elements, appellate courts view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any
evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn.
2016).
There is no dispute that proof of the challenged elements here relies on
circumstantial evidence. Appellate courts “apply heightened scrutiny when reviewing
. . . verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.” State v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn.
2012). In doing so, appellate courts employ a two-step analysis. State v. Ortega, 813
N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). F irst, the reviewing court identifies the “circumstances
proved.” Id. At this step, the reviewing court “defer[s] to the jury’s acceptance of the proof
of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the State.” State v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted). Second, the reviewing court independently examines “the
reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, ”
giving “no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. ” Id. at 641
(quotations omitted). To sustain a conviction, “the circumstances proved, when viewed as
a whole, must be consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Though an inference inconsistent with guilt need not be the most likely inference, see State
v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 831 (Minn. App. 2015), appellate courts “will not overturn a
guilty verdict on conjecture alone,” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
7
B. Aiding and Abetting Attempted First-Degree Murder
A person may be guilty of a crime either by committing the crime as a “principal”
or by aiding and abetting another’s commission of a crime as an “accomplice.” State v.
Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020). Aiding and abetting is a theory of liability, not
a separate substantive offense. Id. Ledbetter argues that the evidence is insufficient to
convict him either as a principal or as an accomplice. We begin with the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain his conviction an accomplice.
The jury found Ledbetter guilty of four counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-
degree murder. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1), .05, subd. 1, .17, subd. 1. To prove
attempted first-degree murder, the state must prove that an individual, “with intent to
commit a crime, d[id] an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation
for” “caus[ing] the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the
death of the person or of another.” Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, subd. 1, .185(a)(1). To prove that
a person aided and abetted a crime, the state must prove that the person “intentionally
aid[ed], advise[d], hire[d], counsel[ed], or conspire[d] with or otherwise procure[d] the
other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1. Under the aiding-and-abetting
theory of liability, the state must prove that the person “knew [their] alleged accomplice
was going to commit a crime and . . . intended [their] presence or actions to further the
commission of that crime.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 808 (Minn. 2012).
Ledbetter argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove (1) that any of the
shooters acted with premeditation, (2) that Ledbetter knew that any of the shooters was
8
going to commit a crime, and (3) that Ledbetter intended to further the commission of that
crime.2 We address each issue in turn.
1. Premeditation
For Ledbetter to be convicted of attempted first-degree murder as an accomplice,
there must be sufficient evidence that at least one of the other shooters committed
attempted first-degree murder, requiring at least one of them to have acted with
premeditation. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1.
“‘[P]remeditation’ means to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit,
the act referred to prior to its commission.” Minn. Stat. § 609.18 (2020). “[ T]o prove
premeditation, the state must show that, after the [individual] formed the intent to kill, some
appreciable time passed during which the consideration, planning, preparation or
determination required by Minn. Stat. § 609.18 prior to the commission of the act took
place.” State v. Hurd, 819 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Because a
finding of premeditation does not require a specific period of time for deliberation, State v.
Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn. 2008), premeditation can occur when a person makes
a decision shortly before acting on it, see State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 91 (Minn. 2014).
Appellate courts consider evidence of premeditation as a whole, including events
before and after the killing or attempted killing. See Hurd, 819 N.W.2d at 599 (applying
this analysis to first-degree murder). Three categories of evidence are relevant to
premeditation: planning activity, motive, and the nature of the act. Id. Planning activity

2 Ledbetter does not dispute that his act of shooting was a substantial step toward causing
the death of the victims, as required under section 609.17.
9
includes “facts about how and what the defendant did prior to the actual killing which show
he was engaged in activity directed to the killing.” State v. Galvan, 912 N.W.2d 663, 669
(Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). Planning activity can include procuring a weapon and
bringing the weapon to the scene of the crime. See State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 242
(Minn. 2010) (applying this analysis to first-degree murder); State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d
412, 423 (Minn. 2007) (applying this analysis to first-degree murder). Motive evidence can
include “prior conduct by the victim known to have angered the defendants.” State v.
Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2018). Nature-of-the-act evidence can include the
number of wounds on the victim, the location of the wounds, and the defendant’s decision
to escape rather than render aid to the victim. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 242.
Here, all three categories of evidence demonstrate premeditation. Regarding
planning activity, Morris, a member of Ledbetter’s group, parked his car in a way that
could make it easier to flee the parking lot. Morris’s wearing of a mask is consistent with
an attempt to obscure his identity and evade detection. Morris, Garth, and Ledbetter
brought firearms to what was supposed to be a fistfight, suggesting that they planned to use
them. These acts qualify as planning activity that supports a finding of premeditation. See
Galvan, 912 N.W.2d at 669; Petersen, 910 N.W.2d at 7-8.
Regarding motive, one of the victims testified that the groups had previously played
basketball together but had fallen out. On the day of the offenses at issue here, they were
gathered for a fistfight between L.J. and T.S. Before the shooting, the other group taunted
Ledbetter and the other men at Morris’s car. These facts demonstrate that the shooters had
motive. “Evidence of motive strengthens a finding that the defendant deliberated over his
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actions and weakens the argument that the killing was spontaneous.” Petersen, 910 N.W.2d
at 8 (quotation omitted).
Regarding the nature of the act, the shooters fired 28 times, striking four people.
After Morris or Garth fired the first shot, the other group started running away.
Nonetheless, Morris, Garth, and Ledbetter shot another 27 times as the other group fled in
the other direction. The three shooters were not shooting at the sky to inflict fear in the
other group; they were aiming at individual people between shots and struck four. Morris,
for example, stopped running after the other group, planted his feet, and bent his knees,
suggesting an attempt to have better aim. He then deliberately shifted his aim toward
different individuals. Further, Ledbetter could have stayed safely behind the car after
hearing the first shot but chose to stand up and start shooting at the other group. The lapse
between Ledbetter hearing the first shot and starting to shoot, however brief, suggests
premeditation because he had time to decide to refrain from shooting. See State v. Palmer,
803 N.W.2d 727, 736-37 (Minn. 2011) (holding that five-second pause between shots is
circumstance proved that supports premeditation).
The serious injuries that the victims suffered also point to premeditation. Two of the
victims were shot in the head. One was hit in the torso, which caused his lung to collapse.
One victim was struck twice. The number of shots that the shooters fired and the location
of wounds near vital organs support an inference of premeditation. See, e.g., State v.
Kendell, 723 N.W.2d 597, 606 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he number of times the defendant used
the murder weapon and the number of wounds inflicted are relevant to an assessment of
premeditation.”); State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 413 (Minn. 2016) (observing that
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inflicting wounds to vital organs supports an inference of premeditation). So, too, does the
shooters’ decision to flee rather than to render aid to the victims. See Anderson, 789
N.W.2d at 242.
Together, the circumstances proved amply support an inference of premeditation.
But Ledbetter argues that the circumstances proved also support a reasonable hypothesis
that Ledbetter and the other members of his group did not premeditate the shootings but
rather shot their guns as “an impulsive and reckless overreaction to taunting by a group of
teenagers.” Ledbetter contends that the fact that he and the others went to Morris’s car
when Morris first arrived, even though three of them were already armed, suggests that
they were planning to leave rather than shoot. Ledbetter also identifies other circumstances
that he asserts support a lack of premeditation—including that T.S. was not armed; Morris
did not unlock the other car doors before the shooting; Ledbetter flinched when the
shooting started, suggesting surprise; the surveillance video does not capture any
conversation between the shooters; and the surveillance video does not, in his view, show
a “planned and coordinated attack.” Finally, he contends that the district court’s statement
at sentencing—that it could not “fathom” what the victims could have said to provoke such
a shooting—bolsters support for the hypothesis that it was an impulsive overreaction to
harmless taunting.
Ledbetter’s argument is unavailing. Both groups were in the area for a fistfight
between their respective members, and the other group’s taunting of Ledbetter and the
other three men added to the shooters’ preexisting motive of anger toward the other group.
And, though there is no evidence as to what, if anything, was said at Morris’s car, the
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absence of this information does not raise an inference inconsistent with premeditation
when considered in the full context of the other indicators of premeditation. These
indicators include that, when the taunting started, the shooters stopped and exchanged
looks, withdrew their weapons, moved apart, and made deliberate movements toward the
victims while openly carrying guns; the presence of wounds near vital organs; and the
shooters’ decision to flee rather than to render aid. Further, around ten seconds passed
between when the shooters started walking toward the victims and the first gunshot—more
than sufficient time for premeditation to occur under our caselaw. See Palmer, 803 N.W.2d
at 738 (holding that five-second pause between shots was not inconsistent with
premeditation because defendant had enough time to stop shooting). Because
premeditation is generally proved through circumstantial evidence, the absence of direct
evidence does not alone raise an inference inconsistent with guilt. See Hughes, 749 N.W.2d
at 312.
In addition, that Ledbetter appears to have flinched or ducked upon the first shot
does not reasonably imply surprise given that he was following his two associates
advancing toward the group with their guns visibly drawn and he already had his hand in
his pocket with the gun. The fact that Morris did not take the step of unlocking all the car
doors before the shooting does not reasonably suggest a lack of premeditation when
considering the rest of the circumstances proved. And Ledbetter’s assertion that the
shooters did not appear to be engaging in a “planned and coordinated attack” does not
square with the video evidence, which shows the shooters spreading apart and moving
quickly toward the other group. Lastly, the district court’s interpretation of evidence at
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sentencing is not a circumstance proved that appellate courts consider in a sufficiency
review based on circumstantial evidence. See Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d at 648 (focusing the
circumstances-proved inquiry into the jury’s acceptance of the circumstances proved at
trial). Ledbetter’s theory that the shooting, by multiple shooters, was unplanned and simply
the product of a rash impulse is not reasonable in light of all the circumstances proved.
Even focusing only on the time between when the shooters gathered at the car and when
they started shooting, they had sufficient time to consider, plan for, and determine to kill.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.18; see also Cox, 884 N.W.2d at 412 (explaining that merely “some
appreciable passage of time” needs to occur between the formation of the intent to kill and
the act of killing).
Ledbetter argues, however, that the evidence is insufficient to show premeditation
because it does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the shooters had the
specific intent to kill the four particular victims. We are unpersuaded. As described above,
the shooters arrived at a planned encounter with a group of young people with whom they
had had a falling out. They were armed even though there was supposed to be only a
fistfight. After members of the other group started taunting them, the shooters exchanged
looks, took out their weapons, advanced deliberately toward the group, and fired 28 shots.
Garth and Morris ran toward the victims, showing an intent to directly target them. Morris,
after initially running toward the group that included the victims, stopped running, planted
his feet, and began shooting while shifting his aim to different individuals.
The four victims who were actually shot were part of the group of young people that
the shooters intended to shoot. To strike the four victims, the shooters had to aim and shoot
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at each victim. Ample time existed for the shooters to select a person to target. Further,
regarding the severity of the wounds, the fact that two of the victims were shot in the head
and another victim was shot in the chest points to these shots being targeted at the specific
victims. See Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 242. The only rational inference from these
circumstances is that at least one of the shooters premeditated the shooting of the four
victims.3

3 In challenging his guilt as a principal, Ledbetter argues that the evidence is insufficient
to convict him because there is no evidence that Ledbetter “fired the gun at any of the four
named victims, let alone hit any of them, or that he specifically intended to kill any
particular person.” The state responds that the “doctrine of transferred intent” allows for
affirmance of Ledbetter’s convictions. The doctrine of transferred intent, which is
incorporated into the first-degree murder statute, provides “that a defendant may be
convicted if it is proved [that they] intended to injure one person but actually harmed
another.” State v. Cruz-Ramirez, 771 N.W.2d 497, 507 (Minn. 2009) (quotations omitted);
see also Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (criminalizing “caus[ing] the death of a human being
with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another”
(emphasis added)). Ledbetter counters that the doctrine of transferred intent can not be
considered because, here, the district court’s jury instructions referenced only the intent to
effect the death of the four named victims and did not include the phrase “or of another.”

We need not decide whether the district court’s jury instructions foreclose
consideration of transferred intent, or whether transferred intent is relevant here, because,
as described above, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that at least one of
the shooters acted with premeditation to kill the four victims—supporting Ledbetter’s guilt
as an accomplice. We note that other jurisdictions have addressed the effect of jury
instructions that differ from the statutory elements of a crime on an appellate court’s review
of sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges. See, e.g., Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S.
237, 243-44 (2016) (holding that a reviewing court’s sufficiency review “does not rest on
how [a] jury was instructed” when “a jury finds guilt after being instructed on all elements
of the charged crime plus one element”); State v. Johnson, 399 P.3d 507, 514, 517 (Wash.
2017) (holding that the state must prove every element in the jury instructions even when
they add an element not required by statute). But we do not address the issue further.
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2. Knowledge of Plan to Commit the Crime
For Ledbetter to be convicted as an accomplice, the state also had to prove that
Ledbetter knew that his accomplices were going to commit a crime . See Milton, 821
N.W.2d at 808.
Ledbetter argues that there is an alternative reasonable inference inconsistent with
him having knowledge of a plan to commit a shooting. Similar to his argument regarding
premeditation, Ledbetter contends that the following circumstances reasonably suggest that
Ledbetter did not know of a plan to shoot: (1) Ledbetter’s group approached Morris’s car
shortly before the shooting, suggesting a plan to leave; (2) the shooters approached the
victims in an uncoordinated fashion, suggesting it was not planned; (3) Ledbetter initially
ducked when the shooting started, suggesting surprise; and (4) at sentencing, the district
court stated that it could not “fathom” what the victims could have said to provoke such a
shooting, suggesting that the shooting was impulsive.
On the first point, even assuming that Ledbetter’s group planned to leave prior to
the taunting, there was still sufficient time following the taunting for Ledbetter to have
developed knowledge of the other members’ plan to imminently commit the shooting,
especially considering that he observed the other shooters walking toward the victims with
guns drawn. Second, the way the shooters walked toward the victims does not suggest the
lack of a plan to commit a shooting. Third, the fact that Ledbetter appeared to flinch when
the shooting started, even if it suggests initially being startled by the sound, fails to raise
an inference that Ledbetter lacked knowledge of the shooting when considered along with
the other indicators of his knowledge. These indicators include that Ledbetter followed
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Morris and Garth, who were both visibly carrying guns, as they approached the victims;
that Ledbetter moved the cigarette he was holding from his right hand to his left hand and
then reached into his right-hand pants pocket for his gun, suggesting knowledge of a plan
to imminently use the guns; that Ledbetter’s hand was in the pocket with his gun when the
shooting began; and that, rather than staying safely ducked behind the car, Ledbetter chose
to stand up, draw his gun, and join Morris and Garth in firing toward the other group.
Lastly, the district court’s comment at sentencing does not establish a circumstance proved.
See Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d at 648 (explaining that the circumstances proved are those
accepted by the jury). Together, the circumstances proved reasonably lead to only one
rational inference about knowledge—namely, that Ledbetter knew of his accomplices’ plan
to shoot.
3. Intent to Aid the Commission of the Crime
Ledbetter’s conviction as an accomplice also requires the state to have proved that
Ledbetter intended his presence or actions to further the commission of this crime . See
Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 808. Again, Ledbetter argues that the surveillance video allows for
“a reasonable alternative inference: that the shooting was an impulsive reaction rather than
a planned and coordinated attack, meaning that the three men were operating independently
from one another.” Ledbetter also highlights that there is no evidence that Ledbetter
provided Morris or Garth with weapons or ammunition, that Ledbetter was not the first to
start walking toward the group, and that Ledbetter did not drive the getaway car.
We concluded above that the only reasonable inference from the circumstances
proved is that the shooting was a premeditated attack and that Ledbetter knew of the
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planned attack, even if just for a few moments before it occurred. Especially in light of
those facts, Ledbetter’s intent to aid the commission of the crime is easily established by
his actions of following his accomplices toward the other group, drawing his gun , and
shooting at the other group. The circumstances proved do not reasonably suggest the three
shooters were acting independently or that Ledbetter did not intend his presence and actions
to aid in the commission of the crime.
We conclude that the only reasonable inferences from the circumstances proved are
that at least one of the shooters acted with premeditation, that Ledbetter knew of the plan,
and that Ledbetter, by his presence and participation, intended to aid in this plan. The
evidence is therefore sufficient to support his convictions for aiding and abetting attempted
first-degree murder. Because the evidence is sufficient to support Ledbetter’s guilt as an
accomplice, we need not evaluate his culpability as a principal.
Affirmed.