State of Minnesota v. Malik Deshone Williams

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1598

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Malik Deshone Williams,
Appellant.

Filed February 3, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-21026

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie L. Nelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
On direct appeal from his conviction of aiding and abetting second-degree
intentional murder, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
a recording of the 911 call made by the victim’s mother and body- camera footage of a
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police officer rendering first-aid to the victim before he died. Because the admission of
the challenged evidence was harmless, we affirm.
FACTS
Following the shooting death of the victim, respondent State of Minnesota charged
appellant Malik Deshone Williams with aiding and abetting second-degree intentional
murder in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2020).
Williams pleaded not guilty. At the jury trial, the state presented a variety of witnesses,
including the victim’s mother, a responding police officer, and Williams’s cousin, J.W.
The state also introduced over 200 exhibits, including the two recordings at issue on appeal.
Williams testified in his own defense. The trial lasted seven days, where the evidence
established the following.
The Shooting
On October 17, 2021, the victim, Sean Johnson, was shot and killed in his apartment
in Hopkins. Johnson lived on the third floor of the apartment building, and his mother
lived on the fifth floor. Earlier that evening, Johnson was with his mother and a friend in
his mother’s apartment. Around 6:00 p.m., Johnson announced that “he had some business
to take care of” and went to his apartment.
At 7:36 p.m., Johnson’s mother texted him that she wanted to go to sleep, and that
Johnson should get his friend from her apartment. Johnson’s mother smoked a cigarette
on her patio in the meantime. While on the patio, she heard several gunshots and then
heard her son screaming. She and Johnson’s friend then rushed down to Johnson’s
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apartment, where they found Johnson lying on the ground. Johnson told his mother that
“they” shot him but did not provide any names.
At 7:42 p.m., Johnson’s mother called 911. A recording of the 911 call was played
for the jury and admitted as an exhibit. In the recording, Johnson’s mother tells the
dispatcher that Johnson had been shot in the side and that she has “no idea” who shot him.
Johnson’s mother can be heard asking Johnson who shot him, to which Johnson responds,
“I don’t know.” As the call goes on, Johnson’s mother grows increasingly distraught. The
call ends when the dispatcher announces that police officers are on scene.
Law Enforcement Arrives
A Hopkins police officer responded to Johnson’s apartment complex after receiving
a call from a dispatcher. Once in Johnson’s apartment, the officer found Johnson lying on
a bedroom floor with a small amount of blood next to him. The officer testified that
Johnson was “light pale,” was gasping for breath, and “appeared to be in distress.”
The officer checked for Johnson’s pulse but felt nothing, so he began performing
chest compressions on Johnson. Soon paramedics arrived and took over performing chest
compressions, but they were unable to save Johnson’s life. Johnson was declared dead at
7:59 p.m. A recording from the officer’s body-worn camera was admitted at trial and
published for the jury over Williams’s objection. The recording shows the officer’s arrival
at the apartment, his administration of chest compressions to Johnson, the emotional
reactions of Johnson’s mother and friend, and the arrival of paramedics.
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The Investigation
In the weeks following the shooting, police acquired surveillance footage from
around Johnson’s apartment and spoke with potential witnesses. Through the
investigation, police developed three primary suspects: Williams, S.P. (who Williams
referred to as his “partner” at trial), and J.W. (who is one of Williams’s cousins).
During the investigation, L.S., who described herself as Johnson’s best friend,
reported that she had a video call with Johnson around 6:30 p.m. on the night of the
shooting. L.S. lived in an apartment across the street from Johnson. In the background of
the video call, L.S. noticed someone wearing a blue, hooded sweatshirt. During the call,
Johnson asked L.S. to retrieve some guns that he had stored in her apartment and bring
them to him. Around 7:15 p.m., L.S. met Johnson outside her apartment to give him the
guns. The man in the blue sweatshirt was with Johnson when he retrieved the guns.
Police also spoke with a witness who lived near Johnson’s apartment complex. The
neighbor reported that he saw two men walking along a pathway away from the apartment
complex at 7:41 p.m., about 25 minutes after L.S. gave Johnson the guns. One of the men
was wearing a blue sweatshirt with white block lettering. The men proceeded on the path
until they encountered a fence, which they jumped over. Less than a minute later, the
neighbor saw “a fleet of squad cars” approach Johnson’s apartment complex. Pol ice
showed the neighbor a picture from Williams’s social media in which Williams is wearing
a blue sweatshirt with block lettering. Police cropped Williams’s face from the photo so
that only the blue sweatshirt was visible. The neighbor was “absolutely certain” that the
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sweatshirt from the picture matched the one worn by one of the men he saw walking away
from Johnson’s apartment complex after the shooting.
Based on the neighbor’s information, police obtained surveillance video from the
area. Footage from behind Johnson’s apartment complex matched the neighbor’s account,
showing two men, including one in a blue sweatshirt who was later identified as Williams,
walking away from the complex shortly after the shooting. Police also obtained
surveillance footage from a gas station a few blocks from Johnson’s apartment. The
footage, captured roughly two hours before the shooting, shows Williams and three other
men pumping gas and shopping in the convenience store. The three other men were later
identified as Williams’s “partner,” S.P., and Williams’s cousins, J.W. and K.W.
In November 2021, police received a tip about some clothing found in a park near
Johnson’s apartment complex. Among the clothing was a blue sweatshirt with white block
lettering. The blue sweatshirt had “areas of bloodlike substance,” but there was insufficient
DNA on it to perform any scientific analysis.
Surveillance footage from a nearby restaurant showed that Williams entered the
restaurant following the shooting. Williams was shoeless and his white t-shirt was mud-
stained. Williams approached a teenage boy who was patronizing the restaurant and asked
if he could use the boy’s phone to make a call. Williams claimed he had been robbed while
trying to buy a car. The boy let Williams use his phone. Soon thereafter, Williams exited
the restaurant and got into a car, which drove off with Williams.
After reviewing the surveillance footage, police went to the boy’s house and took
the boy’s statement about encountering Williams at the restaurant. While giving the
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statement, the boy positively identified Williams from a photo lineup as the man who had
asked to use his phone.
During the investigation, law enforcement also received a call from a woman, S.H.,
who reported that she possessed a handgun that she wished to turn over to police. S.H. was
in a relationship with Williams’s cousin, J.W. An officer went to S.H.’s house, where he
collected a backpack that contained a .45 caliber gun and some ammunition. Ballistic
testing on the gun revealed that the .45 caliber cartridge casings police recovered from the
crime scene were ejected from the gun and that a bullet found in Johnson’s body was
consistent with a test bullet fired from the gun.
Police arrested Williams on November 29. Investigators obtained a DNA sample
from Williams, which matched DNA found on the .45 caliber gun that was involved in the
shooting.
Williams and J.W. Testify, Implicating Each Other
At trial, J.W. implicated Williams in the shooting. He testified that Williams and
S.P. were in Johnson’s apartment during the shooting. J.W. also testified that Williams
told him that Williams and S.P. shot Johnson. Williams testified in his own defense and
claimed that J.W. was the shooter. The following summarizes the testimony of each.
According to J.W., on the day of the shooting, he drove Williams, S.P., and K.W.
to Johnson’s apartment in K.W.’s car. Once they arrived at the apartment building,
Williams used J.W.’s cell phone to set up a meeting with Johnson for a drug deal. Williams
did not have his own cell phone at the time. Both Williams and S.P. then went into
Johnson’s apartment, while J.W. and K.W. waited in the car. J.W. testified that Williams
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and S.P. took so long that J.W. and K.W. decided to leave and go to K.W.’s girlfriend’s
apartment in Minneapolis. Once he was back in Minneapolis, J.W. received a call from
Williams via Johnson’s phone. Williams asked J.W. to pick him up at Johnson’s
apartment. J.W. departed Minneapolis for Hopkins in his own car. When J.W. arrived at
the apartment complex, he parked, started calling Johnson’s phone, heard gun shots, and
then left immediately.
J.W. testified that he slept at S.H.’s house the night of the shooting. According to
J.W., Williams and S.P. came to S.H.’s house the following morning. Williams brought a
gun with him and “put it in the drawer.” S.H. and J.W. then got into a fight because J.W.
wanted to leave the gun at S.H.’s house. J.W. testified that S.H. did not want the gun in
her house and so she called J.W.’s parole officer.
J.W. further testified that he spoke with Williams about what happened in Johnson’s
apartment. According to J.W., Williams told him that Williams and S.P. were “try[ing] to
take something from [Johnson]” but Johnson “stood up” to them, so Williams and S.P. shot
him.
Williams testified and denied being involved in the shooting of Johnson. According
to Williams, he rode with J.W., S.P., and K.W. to Johnson’s apartment for a drug deal with
Johnson. Williams said that he went up to the apartment alone, where Johnson offered to
smoke with Williams. The others left while Williams and Johnson hung out at the
apartment complex. After a while, Williams called J.W. and asked for a ride home. During
the phone call, Williams also told J.W. that Johnson had “a lot of merchandise.” Williams
testified that J.W. wanted to speak with Johnson about the “merchandise,” and that, after
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they talked, J.W. stated that he was coming back to Johnson’s apartment. J.W. arrived with
S.P. at the apartment. J.W. spoke with Johnson for a while and then asked Williams to
retrieve money from his car. Williams testified that he found the money in J.W.’s car and
made his way back into the apartment complex. According to Williams, when he opened
the stairway door, he heard a series of gunshots and then heard S.P. coming down the stairs.
Williams testified that S.P. said that they had to leave, and so Williams fled the apartment
complex on foot with S.P.
Cell Phone Records
Records from the involved parties’ cell phones generally corroborated J.W.’s
version of the events. Around 4:15 p.m. on the day of the shooting, a text was sent from
J.W.’s phone to Johnson’s phone regarding a drug deal. A little while later, there was a
text from Johnson’s phone to J.W.’s phone saying, “Let me know when you’re on your
way.” At 5:42 p.m., the person texting with J.W.’s phone confirmed that he was outside
Johnson’s apartment. Cell-phone mapping showed that J.W.’s phone was back in
Minneapolis at 7:14 p.m. when it received a call from Johnson’s phone. At 7:41 p.m.,
J.W.’s phone was back in Hopkins and called Johnson’s phone. The call resulted in a
78-second voicemail, which featured only ambient sounds associated with driving, such as
a turn signal activating.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Williams guilty of aiding and abetting second-degree intentional
homicide. The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Williams to
367 months in prison.
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Williams appeals.
DECISION
Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the 911
recording and the responding officer’s body- worn-camera footage. He further contends
that he is entitled to a new trial because the admission of this evidence was highly
prejudicial. We are not persuaded.
We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Maye, 6 N.W.3d 103, 108 (Minn. 2024). “The district court abuses its discretion
when it exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, bases its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Munt v. State,
984 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “We generally will not reverse a
verdict even when improper evidence is presented to the jury unless there is a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.”
State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). The defendant has
the burden to make such a showing. Id.
Under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, all “relevant evidence” is presumptively
admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. “Relevant evidence” is “evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid.
401. But relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
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jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting both the
911 recording and the body-worn -camera footage, asserting that the challenged evidence
was not probative of the issues at trial and that any probative value was greatly outweighed
by the risk of unfair prejudice. We need not determine whether the district court abused
its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence because, as discussed below, Williams
has not established that there is a reasonable possibility that the challenged evidence
significantly affected the jury’s verdict.
When assessing the likelihood that wrongfully admitted evidence significantly
affected the verdict, we consider the following nonexclusive factors: “(1) the manner in
which the party presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive,
(3) whether the party who offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether
the defense effectively countered the evidence.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54. (quotation
omitted). In addition, “strong evidence of guilt” is a factor to consider because it
“undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. at 54, 59 (quotation
omitted). We address each factor below and conclude, on balance, that there is no
reasonable possibility that the challenged evidence significantly affected the jury’s verdict.
The Manner of Presentation
We first consider the manner in which the state presented the challenged evidence.
In assessing this factor, the supreme court has considered the prominence of the challenged
evidence by looking at “among other things, the relative number of transcript pages that
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the evidence occupies” and “whether the evidence was used throughout the [s]tate’s case.”
Id. at 56. Williams does not contend, nor does the record suggest , that the challenged
evidence played a prominent role in the state’s case. The challenged evidence —the 911
recording and body-worn-camera footage—combined, ran just 16 minutes and forty-four
seconds. The transcript of the 911 recording, which was admitted as an exhibit, is only
five pages long. In contrast, the transcript of the trial testimony from the seven-day trial is
over 1,000 pages. In addition, there were over 200 exhibits introduced during the trial,
including over 100 photographs, several audio and video recordings (other than the two at
issue here), and a variety of physical evidence . And other than when these two exhibits
were published, the state did not reference the contents of either exhibit at any point during
trial. When considered relative to the totality of the evidence at trial, and how the state
presented the evidence, we conclude that the challenged evidence did not play a prominent
role in the state’s case.
This conclusion is reinforced by the district court’s limitation on the state’s
presentation of the body-worn-camera footage. The district court ruled that, while the state
could publish the video for the jury to view during trial, the jury would not be permitted to
view the video again during deliberations. This ruling limited the state’s presentation of
the video, further indicating that the manner in which the state presented the challenged
evidence likely did not affect the verdict.
Williams disagrees, arguing that the order in which the state offered the challenged
evidence shows that it was harmful. The state published the body-worn-camera recording
during the testimony of the officer who responded to the victim’s apartment. The next
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witness to testify was the victim’s mother. During her testimony, the state published the
911 recording. Williams asserts that the state’s presentation of the evidence in this manner
amplified the jury’s sympathy for the victim and his mother, unfairly prejudicing Williams.
But given the small role the challenged evidence played in the trial and the district court’s
limitation on the state’s ability to present the evidence, we are not convinced that the order
in which the state offered the challenged evidence suggests that there is a reasonable
possibility that the challenged evidence had a substantial effect on the verdict. We
therefore conclude that the first factor weighs in favor of a finding that any error in
admitting the evidence was harmless.
The Persuasiveness of the Evidence
The second factor that we consider is whether the challenged evidence was “highly
persuasive.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 56-57. Williams argues that the challenged evidence
was persuasive because of its emotional impact. When assessing the persuasive value of
challenged evidence that may evoke the jury’s sympathy, we may consider whether other
admissible evidence had a similar effect. See id. at 58 (observing that other, unchallenged
emotion-provoking evidence “lessens any persuasive effect” of challenged evidence). At
trial, Johnson’s mother and friend both testified about seeing the victim—their son and
childhood friend, respectively—die in front of them. Willia ms does not challenge the
admission of this emotion-provoking testimony. Nor does Williams contest the admission
of certain photos that also could have evoked emotion, showing Johnson naked and dead
on an autopsy table. Taken together, this unchallenged evidence likely diminished the
persuasive value of the 911 recording and the body-worn camera footage because it may
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have had a similar, or perhaps even greater, emotional impact than the challenged evidence.
See id. Further, the district court instructed the jury that its decision could not be “governed
by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion.” “Because the jury is presumed to have
followed that instruction, any improper evocation of the jury’s sympathy for the victim was
mitigated.” Id. Finally, neither the 911 recording nor the body-worn-camera footage was
probative of the main disputed issue at trial—whether Williams was involved in the
shooting. Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged evidence was not highly
persuasive, and consequently this factor favors a finding that admission of the challenged
evidence was harmless.
The State’s Reliance on the Evidence in Closing Argument
The third factor is whether the state relied on the challenged evidence in its closing
argument. Id. at 59. It is undisputed that the state did not rely on either piece of contested
evidence in its closing argument. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of a finding that
the admission of the evidence was harmless.
Williams’s Opportunity to Counter the Challenged Evidence
The fourth factor that we consider is whether the defendant had a chance to counter
the challenged evidence. Id. at 59. Unlike the other factors, this factor does not favor
harmless error. There was no way for Williams to counter any sympathy that the
challenged evidence might have evoked in the jury. In fact, Williams’s counsel declined
to cross-examine Johnson’s mother or friend following their testimony—a reasonable
decision given the emotional nature of their testimony as well as the challenged evidence.
We therefore agree with Williams that, assuming the challenged evidence was erroneously
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admitted, there was no way for him to have effectively countered it. Consequently, this
factor favors a finding that the error was not harmless.
Strong Evidence of Guilt
Finally, we consider the strength of the unchallenged evidence. Id. at 59-60. As the
supreme court observed in Bigbear, “[s]trong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive
value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. at 59 (quotation omitted). Here, the evidence of
Williams’s guilt of the offense of aiding and abetting second-degree intentional murder
was strong. Williams does not argue otherwise. The evidence of Williams’s guilt includes
evidence of Williams’s activities on the date of the shooting, DNA evidence tying Williams
to the gun used in the shooting, and witness testimony tying Williams to the shooting.
Because the evidence demonstrating Williams’s guilt is strong, this consideration weighs
in favor of a finding that any error was harmless.
Conclusion
Weighing the foregoing factors, we conclude that Williams did not meet his burden
to establish that there is a reasonable possibility that the admission of the challenged
evidence significantly affected the verdict. We reach this conclusion because the majority
of the factors that we analyzed support this conclusion. We place particular emphasis on
the state’s strong evidence of Williams’s guilt and the small role that the challenged
evidence played in the state’s case. Therefore, assuming without deciding that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence, Williams has not met his
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burden of demonstrating there is a reasonable possibility that the challenged evidence had
a substantial effect on the verdict.
Affirmed.