State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1602

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jason Lloyd Swick,
Appellant.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed; motion granted
Bjorkman, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-20-2058

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Joseph G. Vaccaro, The Law Office of Joseph G. Vaccaro, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant Jason Lloyd Swick challenges his conviction of first-degree possession
of a controlled substance. He argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
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suppress evidence obtained in the execution of search warrants that were invalid because
the first—for a swab of his front door—was not supported by probable cause and because
the second— for a search of his home —was premised on the results of the unlawful door
swab. Respondent State of Minnesota moves to strike portions of Swick’s brief and
addendum as outside the appellate record. We affirm and grant the state’s motion.
FACTS
On January 18, 2019, a detective in the Anoka County Sheriff’s Office applied for
a warrant to enter the curtilage of a specified residence in Andover (residence) to conduct
the brief and “non-invasive process” of using a cloth to swab the residence’s door handles
and frame, to be submitted for an “ION scan” for controlled substances. The warrant
application incorporates a supporting affidavit alleging the following facts.
During the week of January 6, the detective received an anonymous tip that a man
named “Jason Swick” had moved into the residence; that he was operating a
methamphetamine lab in the basement and “moving” about one to three ounces per day ;
and the landlord “allows” it to happen. The tipster also indicated that Swick drives a black
Mustang, has been to prison, and has a conviction “for manufacturing controlled
substances.” The detective was familiar with the residence. He knew of it as a place
“associated with criminal activity” and knew of the landlord as someone who “commonly
rents to people who have warrants and are involved in other criminal activities.” The
detective investigated further.
The detective conducted surveillance at the residence and “several” times saw a
black Mustang parked at the residence with a license plate registered to Swick, which was
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consistent with the tip and led him to believe that Swick was actually residing there. He
also learned that Swick has an “extensive criminal history involving narcotics,” which was
also consistent with the tip.
Then, on January 17, the detective saw a pickup truck in the driveway that he had
not seen before. The truck was registered to an 81-year -old woman, but a “younger” man
came out of Swick’s residence and got in the truck. Such use of another’s vehicle “is
indicative of narcotics behavior as a means to cover and conceal . . . identities.” Detectives
traced the vehicle to an address in Coon Rapids that has an extensive history of police
interactions related to narcotics and other criminal activity. The Coon Rapids address is
on the same street as the residence of K.G., who “has contacts at both addresses,” including
“being mentioned in a methamphetamine arrest” in 2017 “at the target residence.”
After seeing the man exit the truck, the detective swabbed the truck’s door handle
and submitted the swab for ion scanning. The swab “alarmed” during testing “for the
presence of methamphetamine.” And the detective later confirmed that the man driving
the truck was T.H., whom he had previously arrested for first-degree possession of
methamphetamine. Based on all of this information, the detective believed that Swick’s
residence was “being used as an outlet for drug use and trafficking” and T.H. was there
“for narcotics related purposes.”
The district court granted the warrant, and police executed it on January 23,
collecting a swab from the exterior door of Swick’s residence. During ion scanning, the
swab “alarmed for the presence of methamphetamine.”
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On January 25, the detective applied for a second warrant, this one to search Swick’s
residence for controlled substances and related materials. As justification for the second
warrant, the application restated the allegations in the first warrant application and added
that the swab of the residence’s front door tested positive for methamphetamine. The
district court granted the warrant that day, and police executed it on January 31, recovering
more than 230 grams of methamphetamine from Swick’s residence.
Swick was charged with first- degree possession of a controlled substance. He
moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the first warrant was not supported by
probable cause and the second warrant was invalid because it was based on evidence
obtained from executing the first warrant. The district court denied the motion, and Swick
agreed to submit the charge to the district court on stipulated evidence. The district court
found him guilty and sentenced him to prison.
Swick appeals, and the state moves to strike parts of Swick’s brief and addendum.1
DECISION
I. The application for the first warrant provided a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions require that a search warrant be
supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. When
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of a search warrant, we consider the warrant
application and supporting affidavits to determine whether “all the circumstances”

1 After filing this appeal, Swick obtained a stay from this court to pursue postconviction
relief. The district court denied his postconviction petition. Swick does not challenge that
denial in this reinstated appeal.
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identified in the affidavit provided the issuing judge a “substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed.” State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138, 145 (Minn. 2024) (quotations
omitted). We afford deference to the issuing judge, “recognizing that doubtful or marginal
cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Id. at
145-46 (quotation omitted).
Probable cause exists if “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found. ” State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). There must be a “sufficient ‘nexus’ . . .
between the evidence sought and the place to be searched,” but it need not be based on
“direct observation of evidence of a crime at [that] place.” Id. Among the factors a court
considers in weighing probable cause are (1) information linking the crime to the place to
be searched; (2) the freshness of the information; (3) the reliability of the source of the
information; (4) the type of crime; (5) the nature of the items sought; (6) the extent of the
suspect’s opportunity for concealment; and (7) the normal inferences as to where the
suspect would normally keep the items. State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998)
(articulating one through three); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1999)
(articulating four through seven).
Swick challenges the sufficiency of the first warrant based on the third of these
factors—reliability. He argues that the tip was not a reliable enough source of information
to establish probable cause because it was anonymous and not sufficiently corroborated.
He contends that the tip concerned, and police corroborated, only easily obtained
information, and included nothing predictive or indicative of “insider information.”
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Swick is correct that a warrant affidavit that relies on an informant’s tip should
identify a “substantial basis for crediting” the tip, such as police investigation to
corroborate it. Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-42 (quotation omitted). He also is correct that a tip
that accurately predicts future behavior is considered more reliable than one that merely
reports “easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip.” Id. at 245; see
also Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (explaining that if a tipster predicts a
person’s behavior and police verify “significant aspects ” of the prediction, it provides
“reason to believe” the tipster was “honest” and “well informed”). But probable cause is
a “fluid concept,” and that fluidity “extends to the consideration of informant tips as part
of the probable cause inquiry.” State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Minn. 2023)
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232). Even corroboration of “minor details” can “lend
credence” to a tip. Id. at 892 (quotation omitted). And the more information police gather
that tends to corroborate the tip, the more reliable it is. See White, 496 U.S. at 330.
The tip here contained some information that was relatively easy to obtain—Swick’s
name and criminal history, the model and color of his car , and his landlord’s criminal
associations. Swick does not dispute that the detective corroborated all of this information.
This corroboration provides some basis for crediting the part of the tip that addressed
ongoing behavior—that Swick was making and distributing methamphetamine from his
residence. But the detective collected substantial additional information tending to
corroborate that part of the tip. This information included (1) a man with a known
methamphetamine history left Swick’s residence in a truck that is registered to someone
else, which the detective knows to be a practice that those involved with narcotics use to
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conceal their identities; (2) the man drove the truck to another residence associated with
narcotics, which was also on the same street as the residence of a woman associated with
methamphetamine at the place where Swick now resides; and (3) ion scanning of the swab
from the truck’s door handle indicated the presence of methamphetamine.
Swick seeks to diminish the significance of this last piece of information, suggesting
that the ion swab had little corroborative significance because there is no information about
how long the methamphetamine was on the door handle, how it came to be there, or the
“science, accuracy, or any technical detail” about the ion-swab test. He identifies no
authority requiring such information. To the contrary, probable cause is a practical
standard, not a technical one. Gates, 462 U.S. at 241. Even without scientific detail about
the testing process, the positive test result had practical significance because it tended to
corroborate the tip regarding Swick’s methamphetamine involvement. And that test result,
together with the rest of the circumstances, provided a substantial basis for issuing the
warrant authorizing the limited intrusion of swabbing Swick’s exterior door. As such,
Swick has not demonstrated that the warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause.2
II. We grant the state’s motion to strike extra-record material.
In connection with his argument regarding the ion scan from the truck, Swick’s brief
includes a footnote expressing “concern[]” that the technician who “reviewed” the ion
swab in this case was “barred from testifying at trial” in another case and the state “never

2 In one sentence, Swick also appears to reiterate his contention that the second warrant
was invalid because it relied on information obtained during execution of the “invalid” first
warrant. Because he articulates no separate challenge related to that second warrant, this
argument fails along with his arguments regarding the first warrant.
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disclosed” the order articulating that evidentiary ruling. And he included the referenced
order in his addendum. The state moved to strike the order from the addendum, and the
footnote addressing it, on the ground that the order is not part of the record for this appeal.
The appellate record is composed of documents filed in the district court, the
exhibits, and any transcripts. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01; Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02,
subd. 8. “An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on
appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). Accordingly, any matters
submitted to the court that are not part of the record generally “must be stricken.” State v.
Breaux, 620 N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted). We have some
latitude to consider certain types of materials outside the record, but “never . . . for the
purpose of reversing a judgment. ” State v. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d 128, 139 n.4 (Minn.
2007).
It is undisputed that the order in question is not part of the record for this appeal.
And we discern no basis for considering this extra-record document because it is not
relevant to our review of the search warrant at issue in this case and cannot justify the
reversal that Swick seeks. Accordingly, we strike the order from Swick’s addendum and
the footnote addressing it from his brief.
Affirmed; motion granted.