Blue Earth County State of Minnesota v. Lee Wayne Young, Jr. Procaccini, J. Dissenting, Hudson, C.J., Thissen, J

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A23-1606
A25-0334
Blue Earth County
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Lee Wayne Young, Jr.,
Appellant.
Procaccini, J.
Dissenting, Hudson, C.J., Thissen, J.

Filed: September 23, 2026
Office of Appellate Courts
________________________
Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General,
Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to admit a
recording of a statement made by an alleged alternative perpetrator under Minnesota
Rules of Evidence 807 (residual hearsay exception) and 613 (impeachment of prior
statements of witness).

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2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a portion of a
video exhibit under Minnesota Rules of Evidence 611 (scope of cross-examination)
and 403 (unfair prejudice).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the alleged
alternative perpetrator’s internet searches as irrelevant under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 404(b).
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the alleged
alternative perpetrator’s prior methamphetamine possession convictions as irrelevant
under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b).
5. The district court’s exclusion of a learned treatise during cross-examination
of a State expert witness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
6. Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief based on the State’s
introduction of undisclosed expert opinion testimony at trial when appellant did not
object to the testimony at trial and did not show that the opinion testimony affected his
substantial rights.
7. When considered cumulatively, the exclusion of a learned treatise and
introduction of undisclosed expert opinion testimony did not deny appellant a fair trial.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
PROCACCINI, Justice.
In this consolidated direct and postconviction appeal, appellant Lee Wayne
Young, Jr., challenges his conviction for first-degree murder. Young’s appeal is based on

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six alleged trial errors and the cumulative effect of those alleged errors. Young was
indicted on several counts of first-degree murder for the killing of T.B., a two-year-old
boy. T.B.’s mother had a relationship with Young’s father, L.Y . Young and L.Y . would
sometimes spend time at the apartment where T.B. and his mother lived. At trial, the
district court allowed Young to present an alternative perpetrator defense alleging that
L.Y . had committed the crime. But the district court excluded some evidence related to
Young’s alternative perpetrator defense. After Young was convicted, he filed a petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial based on undisclosed
opinion testimony introduced at trial by the State’s expert witness. The district court
denied postconviction relief.
On appeal, Young argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
the following evidence at trial: (1) a recording of L.Y . making a statement to police that
L.Y . had touched the victim, T.B., “in his body”; (2) a police squad car video of Young
and L.Y . being transported to the police station after T.B.’s body was found; (3) L.Y .’s
internet search history for pornography; (4) L.Y .’s prior methamphetamine possession
convictions; and (5) an article about confirmation bias in forensic science. Young further
argues that each of these evidentiary rulings was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
He also challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief,
arguing that the admission of undisclosed expert opinion testimony at trial was reversible
error. Finally, Young argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors deprived
him of a fair trial. Young requests a new trial. Because Young has not shown reversible
error, we affirm the conviction.

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FACTS
At approximately 4:30 p.m. on April 16, 2021, a woman at an apartment building
in Mankato flagged down police officers, asking for help because her son was not
breathing. When they approached the apartment building, the officers saw L.Y . carrying a
small child, T.B., out of the apartment building. T.B. was stiff and lifeless. The officers
observed bruises on T.B.’s face and body, as well as freshly dried blood. The officers also
observed rigor mortis,1 which suggested that T.B. had died some time earlier. T.B. was
taken by ambulance to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. Officers drove
Young and L.Y . to the police station to be interviewed. Young and L.Y . rode in the same
squad car, and while in the car, L.Y . made statements to Young that were recorded on
squad video.
After an investigation into T.B.’s death, including witness statements, cell phone
location data, forensic testing, and the autopsy results, a grand jury indicted Young on
25 counts relating to T.B.’s death. The counts included first-degree murder committed in
the course of criminal sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13.
Prior to trial, Young moved to present an alternative perpetrator defense,
identifying L.Y . as the alleged alternative perpetrator. The district court allowed Young to
present this alternative perpetrator defense but excluded some evidence Young offered
related to this defense, including evidence of L.Y .’s internet searches for “anal teen”
pornography and L.Y .’s prior convictions for methamphetamine possession.

1 Rigor mortis is the stiffening of the body’s joints and muscles after death. Rigor
Mortis, Black’ s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

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The case proceeded to a jury trial on 24 of the 25 counts.2 At trial, the State offered
testimony from police officers, doctors, the medical examiner, forensic scientists, experts
on cell phone tracking data, and family members—including T.B.’s mother and T.B.’s
sister. Around the time of the murder, Young’s father, L.Y ., had a relationship with T.B.’s
mother. Young and L.Y . would sometimes spend time at T.B.’s mother’s apartment.
Police officers testified that, over the course of their investigation, they learned the
following: L.Y . and T.B.’s mother left her Mankato apartment between midnight and
1:00 a.m. on April 16 with the stated intent to purchase a used car in Renville, a couple of
hours away. They left Young and T.B.’s sister in the apartment with two-year-old T.B.
T.B.’s sister, who was 11 years old at the time of the murder, testified about what
happened after L.Y . and T.B.’s mother left the apartment on April 16. According to T.B.’s
sister, both she and Young—who was 16 years old at the time—stayed in the apartment
for most of the day and did not go to school. It is unclear whether anyone checked on
T.B. before the afternoon of April 16. T.B.’s sister testified, however, that she received a
text message from T.B.’s mother in the afternoon and then checked on T.B., who was in
his bed in his room. She found that T.B. was “frozen” and “not moving.” She further
testified that after she found T.B. in that condition, she called her mother, very upset.
According to T.B.’s sister, Young told her not to call the police. L.Y . and T.B.’s mother
returned to the apartment later that afternoon.

2 Prior to trial, the district court dismissed one count, first-degree murder committed
in the course of domestic abuse, for lack of probable cause.

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The medical examiner who performed T.B.’s autopsy testified that T.B. was
covered in bruises that had been inflicted within the 24 hours before his death. The
medical examiner noted significant injuries around T.B.’s head and mouth, including
damage to T.B.’s mouth consistent with someone manipulating it, multiple bruises inside
T.B.’s mouth and on T.B.’s head, and damage to T.B.’s upper frenulum—the tissue
connecting T.B.’s upper lip to his jaw. The medical examiner determined that T.B.
suffered brain and eye hemorrhages and had injuries to his anus that suggested a strong
probability of sexual assault. The medical examiner testified that semen was found in
T.B.’s rectum and within anal lacerations. The medical examiner further testified that
toxicology testing indicated that there was a small amount of methamphetamine in T.B.’s
body but that the methamphetamine did not cause T.B.’s death. Instead, the medical
examiner testified that T.B.’s death was caused by “multiple traumatic injuries due to
physical assault.” Although the medical examiner did not testify as to a precise time of
death, he opined that T.B. had died approximately 8 to 12 hours before his body was
discovered at 4:30 p.m.
The State also presented evidence about L.Y .’s and Young’s whereabouts in the
hours leading up to the discovery of T.B.’s body. The State presented tracking data related
to Young’s cell phone. That data showed that Young’s cell phone remained at the
apartment where T.B. was killed from midnight the night before the death until the next
afternoon, when Young was transported to the police station. The State also presented
photographs that Young had taken of himself that day in the apartment, evidence that
Young logged into his Xbox account while in the apartment that day, and tracking data

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related to L.Y .’s cell phone. L.Y .’s phone movement indicated that on the night before
T.B. died, L.Y . had left the apartment shortly after midnight and arrived in Renville
around 3:00 a.m. The State presented eyewitness testimony confirming that L.Y .
purchased a used car in Renville. Cell phone tracking data suggested that L.Y . did not
return to Mankato until approximately 2:40 p.m. on the day T.B. died. The tracking data
also showed that L.Y . returned to the apartment at approximately 4:30 p.m., suggesting
that he did not go straight to the apartment upon returning to Mankato.
The State also presented forensic evidence related to several items collected from
the apartment and DNA samples obtained from L.Y . and Young. Forensic scientists at the
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) crime lab tested the items and compared the
DNA found on the items to L.Y .’s, Young’s, and T.B.’s DNA. Some of the forensic testing
appeared to inculpate Young. Testing of a towel collected from the apartment showed that
it had Young’s semen and T.B.’s blood on it. Testing of a blanket from the apartment
showed that it also had both T.B.’s blood and Young’s semen on it. Testing of Young’s
underwear revealed a mixture that contained Young’s semen, and T.B.’s DNA could not
be excluded from the mixture. And testing of Young’s shoes revealed both blood and
T.B.’s DNA.
Based on the evidence it presented at trial, the State’s theory of the case was that
after L.Y . and T.B.’s mother left the apartment for Renville, Young, T.B.’s sister, and T.B.
stayed in the apartment—and that at some point while L.Y . and T.B.’s mother were away,
Young sexually assaulted and murdered T.B.

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After the State presented its case-in-chief, Young called several witnesses—
including L.Y ., multiple police officers, and a forensic expert—to support his alternative
perpetrator defense, which asserted that L.Y ., not Young, had sexually assaulted and
murdered T.B.
L.Y . testified that he last saw T.B. alive before L.Y . and T.B.’s mother left for
Renville. He testified that when he returned to the apartment at approximately 4:30 p.m.
on April 16, he found T.B., performed mouth-to-mouth CPR on T.B., and spoke to police
officers at the scene. L.Y . testified that, in his initial conversation with officers, he told
the officers that he had “questions” about providing a DNA sample. L.Y . testified that, in
this conversation, he had explained to the officers that T.B. was potty training and that he
helped T.B. “wipe” when T.B. went to the bathroom. L.Y . also testified that when he
spoke to officers at the scene, he admitted to “sweating and touching [T.B.] in his body.”
Young’s attorney questioned L.Y . extensively about L.Y .’s statement to police officers
that he had “touch[ed T.B.] in his body.” L.Y . appeared to both admit and deny making
that statement. L.Y . further testified about his return to Mankato from Renville, admitting
that he had “smashed” a video camera in the apartment upon his return. Young’s attorney
questioned L.Y . about the statements L.Y . made to Young and to police the evening of
April 16.3 L.Y . also admitted to having been convicted of multiple prior felonies,
but— consistent with the district court’s prior ruling—he did not specify the crimes for
which he had been convicted.

3 Young later argued in closing that L.Y . had lied to the police, attempted to distance
himself from the scene of the crime, and tried to “pin” the blame for the crime on others.

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The police officer who transported Young and L.Y . to the police station testified.
During Young’s direct examination of the officer, Young attempted to publish a portion of
the squad car video showing Young and L.Y . being driven to the station. The district court
excluded the video, determining that it was cumulative of other evidence.
Another police officer testified that he recovered a video camera in a nearby car.
Young did not present the video footage recorded on that camera to the jury.4 But in
closing arguments, Young argued that the camera found in the car was hidden by L.Y . to
cover up evidence, and that L.Y . had lied to the police when he told the police that he
smashed a camera.
Young’s forensic expert witness testified, among other things, about rigor mortis
and its relevance to the time of T.B.’s death and the locations where DNA could have
been found on T.B.’s body. Referring to the evidence showing that L.Y’s DNA was found
inside T.B.’s mouth, Young’s forensic expert witness testified that it would be “unusual to
find another person’s DNA within … the closed mouth of a deceased individual.” The
State attributed the presence of L.Y .’s DNA in T.B.’s mouth to the fact that L.Y . had
attempted to administer mouth-to-mouth CPR when L.Y . arrived at the scene. But Young
argued that the forensic evidence from T.B.’s mouth implicated L.Y . as T.B.’s killer.
Referring to the testimony of his forensic expert witness, Young argued that T.B.’s mouth
would have been opened had someone actually performed mouth-to-mouth CPR, but that

4 The video footage depicts the apartment living room the afternoon that T.B.’s body
was discovered. It shows T.B.’s sister in the living room that afternoon, distraught.

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T.B.’s mouth was closed, and it was therefore unlikely that L.Y . ever performed mouth-
to-mouth CPR.
In sum, Young’s alternative perpetrator theory at trial was that L.Y . killed T.B.,
fled to Renville, and then returned to Mankato the next afternoon, where he then
attempted to destroy evidence, lie to police, and frame someone else for the crime.
The jury found Young guilty of 20 of the 24 counts.5 The district court convicted
Young of first-degree murder committed in the course of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct.
Young filed a direct appeal to this court and a petition for postconviction relief in
district court. We stayed Young’s direct appeal pending the resolution of his
postconviction petition. The district court denied the petition without a hearing, and
Young appealed. We consolidated Young’s direct and postconviction appeals, and we
address both below.
ANALYSIS
In this appeal, Young raises five challenges to the district court’s evidentiary
rulings at trial, a challenge to the district court’s denial of postconviction relief, and a
claim that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors warrants a new trial. We begin
with a discussion of the standard of review for Young’s five evidentiary challenges. We
then address each issue in turn.

5 After the State rested, the district court granted Young’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal only with respect to the two kidnapping-related charges. The jury found Young
guilty of 20 of the remaining 22 counts. It found him not guilty of first-degree
premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder.

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Because Young preserved his objections to the district court’s evidentiary rulings
at issue here, we review each of those decisions for an abuse of discretion. A district court
abuses its discretion when its ruling “is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn.
2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In close cases, we defer to
the district court’s evidentiary rulings, even if another court might have reasonably ruled
differently. See State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 613 (Minn. 2004).
Even if a district court abuses its discretion in excluding evidence, we will not
reverse the district court if the error is harmless. State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114, 123
(Minn. 2024). Because the erroneous exclusion of evidence offered by a criminal
defendant can deprive the defendant of their constitutional right to present a complete
defense, we examine whether any erroneous exclusion of evidence here was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145, 155 (Minn. 2024).
“[E]xclusion of evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, assuming the
potential damage of the excluded evidence were fully realized, a reasonable jury would
have reached the same verdict.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I.
We start with Young’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to offer into evidence the recording of L.Y .’s statement to officers that
he had touched T.B. “in his body.” L.Y . made this statement after the police discovered
T.B.’s body, when an officer asked L.Y . for a DNA sample. L.Y . was initially reluctant to
give the sample, explaining that he had touched T.B. “in his body.” During L.Y .’s direct

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examination, L.Y . acknowledged that on the day of the murder he told officers he had
touched T.B. “in his body.” Although the State did not object to L.Y .’s testimony about
his encounters with police following the murder, it did dispute the admissibility of a
recording of this statement.
Young twice moved to introduce the recording of this statement during L.Y .’s
testimony—once on the grounds that it was admissible hearsay under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 807 and once as impeachment evidence under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 613. The district court declined to admit the recording on either basis. We
review the district court’s two evidentiary rulings in turn.
A.
Young moved to admit the recording of L.Y .’s statement as substantive evidence
under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807, which is one of the exceptions to the rule against
hearsay. Hearsay is a statement made by a declarant, not while testifying at the current
trial, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. State v. Hallmark,
927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019). “A hearsay statement is not admissible except as
provided in the Minnesota Rules of Evidence or any other rules prescribed by our court
or the Legislature.” Id. (citing Minn. R. Evid. 802). There is no dispute that the recording
of L.Y .’s “in his body” statement contained hearsay.
Rule 807 provides a “residual exception,” allowing for the admission of certain
hearsay statements even if other exceptions to the hearsay rule do not apply:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by
the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as

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evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.
Minn. R. Evid. 807.
We have said that the decision to admit a hearsay statement under Rule 807
involves two steps. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 292. First, the district court must consider
the totality of the circumstances to evaluate whether the statement has circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. Second, the district court must evaluate whether the
statement satisfies prongs A, B, and C listed in the rule. Id. at 293. The statement is
admissible only if it has sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and it
satisfies all three prongs.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion, because it reasonably
determined that the recording of the “in his body” statement did not satisfy prong B—the
requirement that the statement be “more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.”
Minn. R. Evid. 807. To the contrary, the district court determined that the recording was
“not more probative than [L.Y .’s] testimony.” Before the district court made this
determination, L.Y . had testified extensively. He testified that he performed CPR on T.B.
and that his mouth “touched” T.B.’s. He testified that he told officers at the scene that
T.B. had recently been potty trained, despite none of the officers asking about potty
training. He explained that he had concerns about giving the officers a DNA sample,
testifying, “My concern was that whatever had happened to him that day while I was

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gone was going to somehow get implicated onto me for reasons I had no idea of.” He
testified that he told the officers at the scene about helping T.B. wipe while T.B. was
going to the bathroom. When defense counsel first asked L.Y . whether he had told police
that he was “sweating and touching [T.B.] in his body,” L.Y . responded, “During CPR? I
don’t know what you’re getting at but—yeah.”
The district court noted that L.Y .’s testimony was not always clear. But the
recorded statement was similarly unclear. When an officer in the recording first
mentioned asking L.Y . for a DNA sample, L.Y . said, “I just gave [T.B.] mouth-to-mouth,”
referring to CPR, and that L.Y . “bathe[s] him.” When asked whether his DNA would be
on T.B.’s genitals, L.Y . said, “No. It shouldn’t be.” When asked whether his DNA would
be on T.B.’s anus, L.Y . said, “I mean when you wipe him,” and he consistently expressed
concerns about being implicated in the crime based on potty training T.B.
Whether the recording of the statement was more probative than the testimony that
L.Y . had already given is a close question, but we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion. L.Y . testified extensively at trial. L.Y . testified that he performed
CPR on T.B., including putting his mouth to T.B.’s mouth. He also testified that he told
police officers that he helped wipe T.B. when T.B. went to the bathroom. He admitted to
telling the police that he “touch[ed] [T.B.] in his body” when he performed CPR on T.B.
Overall, L.Y . testified that he had touched T.B. and testified that he had told the police the
same. Moreover, L.Y .’s testimony was consistent with the recording, which was a
muddled exchange with police officers in which L.Y . expressed concerns about being
implicated in the crime based on DNA evidence found on T.B. via CPR or potty training.

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The district court’s conclusion—that the recording of L.Y .’s specific statement to police
about “touching him in his body” is not more probative than the several instances at trial
in which L.Y . admitted to touching T.B.—is reasonable based on the record.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the recording itself has probative
value. The State argued that Young sexually assaulted and murdered a child, and L.Y .’s
admission to touching that child “in his body” inculpates L.Y . and may cast doubt as to
Young’s guilt. But Rule 807 does not require only that a statement be probative: The
statement must be more probative than any other evidence Young could have reasonably
obtained. See Minn. R. Evid. 807. As noted above, Young elicited testimony from L.Y .
about the “in his body” statement, which Young’s attorney recited in full to L.Y . during
his direct examination. This is a close call, and in close cases, we defer to the district
court’s evidentiary rulings, even if another court could have ruled differently. See Blom,
682 N.W.2d at 613. Accordingly, we defer to the district court’s exercise of its discretion
and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
the recording of the statement was not more probative than other evidence Young could
have procured.
B.
We now turn to the district court’s denial of Young’s motion to admit the recording
as impeachment evidence under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 613. Under Rule 613(b),
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is generally inadmissible unless the
witness is given a prior opportunity to explain or deny the evidence and the opposing
party is afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the evidence. Minn.

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R. Evid. 613(b). Additionally, to impeach a witness with evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement, the proponent of the evidence must show that the witness’s statements are
actually inconsistent. State v. Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1977).
Here, Young sought to impeach L.Y . by admitting the recording of L.Y . stating that
he had touched T.B. “in his body” as evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. He
sought to do so during his direct examination of L.Y . During the direct examination, L.Y .
gave conflicting testimony, appearing to both admit and deny making the statement.
Initially, L.Y . admitted to making the statement. On direct examination, L.Y . was asked,
“Did you tell the police that you were sweating and touching [T.B.] in his body?” L.Y .
answered, “During CPR? I don’t know what you’re getting at but—yeah.” L.Y . further
testified that the statement was taken “out of context.” Young’s attorney attempted to
refresh L.Y .’s recollection of the statement with a transcript of the police interview that
included the statement. After L.Y . reviewed the transcript, Young’s attorney asked L.Y .,
“So you’re saying you never said ‘even though I was sweating and touching him in his
body?’ ” L.Y . responded, “It might have sounded like that but that’s not what was said,
never even once.” Eventually, Young’s attorney asked L.Y ., “[D]id you say those words in
that order?” to which L.Y . replied, “No.”
Based on this muddled exchange, the district court determined that L.Y . did not
deny making the statement. The district court reasoned that L.Y .’s testimony was that he
was confused and under duress when he made the statement and that the statement was
not what L.Y . meant. Having determined that Young had not met his burden to show that

17
the recording contained an inconsistent statement, the district court did not allow Young
to admit the recording.
A district court does not abuse its discretion in excluding an inconsistent statement
if the witness admits to making the statement. State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 271
(Minn. 2017). When it is uncertain or ambiguous whether a statement satisfies
Rule 613(b), the district court has the discretion to “weigh the matter,” and we will not
reverse the district court’s decision “unless it is clearly shown that the [district] court
abused its discretion.” Vance, 254 N.W.2d at 358.
Here, reasonable minds could disagree. L.Y . appeared to both admit and deny
making the statement. In light of the uncertainty and ambiguity in L.Y .’s testimony, the
district court’s weighing of the matter was permissible under Vance. See id. And we
cannot say that Young has clearly shown that the district court’s determination was
inconsistent with the law or the facts in the record. See id. L.Y . expressly or impliedly
admitted to making the statement at least four times. He admitted it when first asked
about the statement, testifying, “I don’t know what you’re getting at but—yeah.” He
admitted it again shortly thereafter, claiming that the officer was taking the statement “out
of context.” When Young’s attorney and the district court judge were discussing
refreshing L.Y .’s recollection, Young’s attorney told the judge that L.Y . “just said that’s
not what he said,” at which point L.Y . interjected, “No, I said that’s not how it sounded.”
(Emphasis added.) And at the end of the exchange, L.Y . testified that he “might have like
said it like on accident or something.”

18
Even if these admissions were equivocal, so were Young’s possible denials. For
example, L.Y . testified, “It might have sounded like that but that’s not what was said,
never even once,” and “That’s not what was meant, no. Might have sounded like that.”
(Emphasis added.) The district court determined that L.Y . did not deny making the
statement but that L.Y . instead testified that he was confused and the statement was not
what he meant. That determination is consistent with the exchange set forth above.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Young’s motion to admit the recording of L.Y .’s statement as impeachment
evidence, because Young did not show that the statements were actually inconsistent.
II.
We next consider Young’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding a portion of a video recording from an officer’s squad car. The first portion of
the video shows a view of the crime scene outside the empty squad car’s windshield, and
the second portion of the video shows a conversation in the squad car between Young and
L.Y ., in which L.Y . does most of the speaking. The State offered and published the first
portion of the video during its direct examination of the police officer. Young moved to
publish the second portion twice: first during his cross-examination of one of the
responding officers in the State’s case-in-chief and then again during his direct
examination of the same officer during Young’s case. The district court denied both
motions, and we review each decision in turn.

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A.
We begin with the district court’s exclusion of the second portion of the video
during Young’s cross-examination of the officer. The district court based its decision on
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611(b), which provides that “[c]ross-examination should be
limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility
of the witness” but that the district court may exercise its discretion to “permit inquiry
into additional matters.” The scope of cross-examination is “largely left to the discretion
of the [district] court,” and we will not overturn a district court’s ruling under Rule 611(b)
“absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Parker, 585 N.W.2d 398, 406 (Minn. 1998).
The district court determined that the scope of the State’s direct examination of the
police officer was limited to “presence at the scene, what happened there,” and that the
scope ended with “the statement that [Young] went into [the officer’s] squad car, and they
then went to the law enforcement center.” The district court determined that the scope did
not include what was said or done during the ride to the police station.
In evaluating the district court’s decision, our reasoning in State v. Parker,
585 N.W.2d 398, is instructive. In Parker, we determined that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding evidence as beyond the scope of direct examination in
part because the defendant who sought to expand the scope of cross-examination could
have called the witness as a defense witness. Id. at 406. Here, not only could Young have
called the police officer as a witness, but he in fact did call the police officer as a witness.
Just as in Parker, here we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

20
declining to allow Young to present the second portion of the video in his cross-
examination of the police officer.
B.
We now turn to the district court’s decision to exclude the second portion of the
squad car video during Young’s direct examination of the officer. At this stage, the district
court excluded the video for two reasons. First, it determined that the video was
cumulative under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403. Second, it determined that the video
contained inadmissible hearsay. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it excluded the evidence because it was cumulative, we do not reach
the district court’s alternative ruling related to hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Ali,
855 N.W.2d 235, 244 n.7 (Minn. 2014) (declining to reach alternative ground for
excluding a document when we determined that the district court excluded it on a proper
ground).
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403 permits the district court to exclude otherwise
relevant evidence for a variety of reasons, including when such exclusion would avoid
the “needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” We have said that evidence is
cumulative when it “merely duplicate[s] other evidence already presented.” State v.
Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 551 (Minn. 1988); see also State v. Zumberge,
888 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. 2017) (explaining the same). But evidence is not cumulative
when it is “probative of material facts in ways unique and distinct from the other
evidence in the case.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Minn. 2005).

21
Here, the district court determined that the squad car video was cumulative when
considered in light of L.Y .’s testimony during direct examination. We will reverse a
district court’s Rule 403 decision for a “clear abuse” of discretion. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d
at 477. And we “routinely affirm the exclusion of evidence on the ground that it would
involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” State v. Foster, 20 N.W.3d 6, 27
(Minn. 2025).
Young argues that the excluded portion of the video contained the only evidence
of the statements that L.Y . made in the squad car. But comparing the video with L.Y .’s
testimony, we note that L.Y .’s statements in the squad car and his testimony at trial were
largely the same: L.Y . left Mankato while T.B. was still alive; was in contact with Young,
T.B.’s sister, and T.B. to some extent over the phone while he was gone; came back to the
scene and panicked; gave T.B. mouth-to-mouth CPR; told Young to either call or speak to
the police; and attempted to reassure Young. There are some minor discrepancies between
the video and L.Y .’s trial testimony as to who had called to check up on T.B. and how
often that happened. Despite these discrepancies, the second portion of the video is
largely duplicative of other evidence. Young presented the information via his direct
examination of L.Y ., instead of via the squad car video. Accordingly, Young’s argument
that the video presents the only evidence of what was said in the squad car is not
persuasive, and the district court was within its discretion to conclude that the statements
in the video are not “probative of material facts in ways unique and distinct from the
other evidence in the case.” Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 479.

22
Young also argues that the video was not cumulative because it corroborates L.Y .’s
testimony. Although we have said that corroboration evidence is not cumulative, see
State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 203 (Minn. 2006), Young’s attempt to apply that
principle to the circumstances here misses the mark. Evidence may corroborate some or
all of a witness’s testimony when it “restore[s] confidence in the truth of” that testimony.
State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 253 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). But Young did not seek to introduce the video to make L.Y .’s testimony
at trial more credible. Instead, according to Young’s characterization of the evidence,
Young attempted to introduce the video to undermine L.Y .’s credibility by showing that
L.Y . lied and scapegoated Young.
We defer to the district court’s evidentiary rulings, even if another court might
have ruled differently. See Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 613; Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362
(Minn. 2020). Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when
it determined that the statements in the second portion of the squad car video were
cumulative under Rule 403, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Young’s motion to admit the video.
III.
We next turn to Young’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence of L.Y .’s internet search history. In pretrial motions, both the State
and Young sought to introduce internet search history evidence at trial. The State sought
to admit evidence that Young searched the Internet for pornography related to sex with a

23
younger stepbrother, and Young sought to admit evidence that L.Y . searched the Internet
for “anal teen” pornography.
In a pretrial order, the district court considered and denied both motions. The
district court first analyzed Young’s internet search history, which was offered by the
State. The district court determined that the evidence was inadmissible because the search
was not a search for child pornography, was not criminal conduct, was not substantively
similar to the charged crime, was “border[ing] on propensity,” and was highly prejudicial.
The district court then explained that a “similar analysis applie[d]” to L.Y .’s browsing
history. With respect to L.Y .’s search for “anal teen” pornography, the district court
reasoned that a “teen” could be a legal adult (18 or 19 years old), the conduct occurred
weeks before T.B.’s death, and these searches were highly prejudicial.
Only the exclusion of L.Y .’s internet search history is at issue in this appeal. Upon
satisfying the threshold requirement to present an alternative perpetrator defense, which
Young did here, a defendant may present evidence that “tend[s] to prove the [alleged
alternative perpetrator] committed the act to create reasonable doubt about [the
defendant]’s guilt.” State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452, 469 (Minn. 2024). Such evidence
may include “evidence of an alternative perpetrator’s other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts
under certain circumstances.” See State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d 124, 134 (Minn. 2024)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We refer to such evidence as
reverse-Spreigl evidence. Id. For reverse-Spreigl evidence to be admissible, the defendant
must show: (1) clear and convincing evidence that the alternative perpetrator participated
in the prior conduct; (2) that the conduct is “relevant and material to the charged crime;”

24
and (3) “that the probative value of the … evidence outweighs its potential for unfair
prejudice.” Id. at 134–35 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first
requirement of the reverse-Spreigl test—that there was clear and convincing evidence
that L.Y . performed the internet searches—is not at issue here. Accordingly, we turn our
analysis to whether the district court abused its discretion when it determined that Young
failed to show that the evidence of L.Y .’s searches was relevant and material to the
charged crime.
Ordinary evidentiary rules apply to the admissibility of alternative perpetrator
evidence, and the defendant must make the same showing of relevance and materiality as
is required to admit prior bad acts of a defendant under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 404(b)(1). Heller, 12 N.W.3d at 469. Accordingly, the defendant must show
that the reverse-Spreigl evidence will “show the alternative perpetrator’s motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Id. at 470; see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). And, consistent with
Rule 404(b)(1), we have further explained that reverse-Spreigl evidence “is not
admissible to prove that the alternative perpetrator had the propensity to commit the
crime for which the defendant is on trial, but it may be admissible for other purposes.”
Heller, 12 N.W.3d. at 469.
When evaluating whether reverse-Spreigl evidence is relevant and material, the
district court must assess the closeness of the relationship between the evidence and the
charged crime in terms of “time, place, or modus operandi.” Glover, 4 N.W.3d at 135
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court examined

25
the closeness in time between the internet searches and the crime charged, determining
that the searches occurred “weeks prior” to T.B.’s death. The district court also examined
modus operandi, determining that a search for “anal teen” pornography was not
sufficiently similar to the sexual assault of a two-year-old, because teens may be legal
adults “of eighteen or nineteen.” The district court reasoned that this meant that the
search was not evidence that L.Y . had searched for child pornography. We conclude that
the district court reasonably determined that the internet searches and the crime charged
were not sufficiently similar in terms of time and modus operandi.6
In sum, in evaluating the evidence of L.Y .’s internet search history, the district
court cited the correct rule of law governing the admission of reverse-Spreigl evidence, it
applied the requirements of Rule 404(b)(1), and it arrived at a logical result. The district
court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it excluded L.Y .’s internet search
history.7 See Bustos, 861 N.W.2d at 666.

6 The parties made no argument to the district court or our court regarding the
relationship between the evidence and the charged crime in terms of “place.”
7 Because we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
excluded the evidence on the grounds that the evidence was not relevant or material to
the crime charged, we need not reach the additional requirements of the reverse-Spreigl
test. See Glover, 4 N.W.3d at 136 n.6 (declining to reach the probative value requirement
after determining that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
reverse-Spreigl evidence was not relevant and material). And because we conclude that
the district court logically and permissibly analyzed relevance and materiality in terms of
time and modus operandi, we need not reach the district court’s determination that the
search history evidence “borders on propensity.”

26
IV .
We now consider Young’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence showing that L.Y . had been convicted of possession of
methamphetamine. The district court determined that this reverse-Spreigl evidence was
not relevant or material to the crime charged. The district court also determined that the
evidence of the prior convictions was prejudicial to L.Y . because it associated him with
an illegal substance. On appeal, Young argues that this was an abuse of discretion because
T.B. had methamphetamine in his system when he died, so evidence that L.Y . possessed
methamphetamine in the past was relevant and material.
To resolve this question, we again analyze whether the district court abused its
discretion in applying the reverse-Spreigl test. As discussed above, reverse-Spreigl
evidence is relevant and material if it “show[s] the alternative perpetrator’s motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Heller, 12 N.W.3d at 470; see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). And we reiterate
that the district court’s analysis should focus on the closeness of the relationship between
the evidence and the charged crime in terms of “time, place, or modus operandi.” Glover,
4 N.W.3d at 135 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court again conducted an analysis guided by the relevant rule of law.
Turning first to the timing of the conduct, the district court noted that the prior
convictions showed only that L.Y . possessed methamphetamine “in the past.” The district
court then determined that the modus operandi was not sufficiently similar, noting that
“nothing about [L.Y .’s] previous conviction illustrates how or why methamphetamine

27
would be in [T.B.’s] body.” Instead, the district court observed, the proffered evidence
“merely show[ed] that [L.Y .] has been in contact with methamphetamine in the past.”8
The district court reasonably determined that possessing methamphetamine and causing a
two-year-old to ingest methamphetamine were not substantially similar. See, e.g., id.
(explaining that we require a “high degree of similarity … between the reverse-Spreigl
incident and the charged crime to establish relevance”). There is no dispute that, although
T.B. had a small amount of methamphetamine in his system, he did not die from
consuming methamphetamine. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that the prior convictions were not relevant and material to the crimes
charged in this case.9
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded
evidence of L.Y .’s prior methamphetamine possession convictions.
V.
Young’s two remaining trial-error claims relate to the testimony of a BCA forensic
scientist who testified as an expert for the State regarding DNA testing that the forensic
scientist conducted on evidence collected from the apartment. Young challenges the
exclusion of a learned treatise during cross-examination and the admission of testimony

8 The parties made no arguments as to whether this reverse-Spreigl evidence was
similar as to “place.”
9 As above, in light of our determination that the district court did not abuse its
discretion because the prior convictions do not meet the relevance and materiality
requirement, we need not reach the other requirements of the reverse-Spreigl test. See
Glover, 4 N.W.3d at 136 n.6.

28
regarding an undisclosed expert opinion. We address the learned treatise here and the
undisclosed expert opinion in section VI.
During cross-examination of the forensic scientist, Young sought to impeach the
forensic scientist with a scientific article that discussed confirmation bias in forensic
science. Under the Rules of Evidence, parties may read a learned treatise into evidence on
direct or cross-examination but not admit the treatise as an exhibit. Minn. R.
Evid. 803(18). The forensic scientist acknowledged that the article was “required
reading” at the BCA and was a learned treatise recognized by experts in the field. Young
sought to use the article to impeach the forensic scientist (specifically, to demonstrate
bias) but did not seek to admit the article as substantive evidence. The State objected to
Young’s use of the article because it had not been disclosed. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02,
subd. 1 (requiring the defense to disclose certain materials prior to criminal trials).
Although the district court excluded the article, it permitted Young to cross-
examine the forensic scientist about confirmation bias. The district court’s reason for
excluding the article is unclear, but it appears to have been based on the district court’s
determination that the article had no probative value. Because the district court’s
reasoning is not clear here, it is difficult for us to determine whether the district court
abused its discretion when it excluded the article. And as for the State’s assertion that the
district court properly excluded the article because it was not disclosed before trial, we
have not squarely addressed whether a learned treatise must be disclosed prior to its
admission at trial.

29
We need not decide that issue here, however, because even assuming that the
district court abused its discretion by excluding the article, we conclude that the exclusion
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Westrom, 6 N.W.3d at 155. “[E]xclusion of
evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, assuming the potential damage of
the excluded evidence were fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same
verdict.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, although Young was not permitted to use the article to educate the jury about
confirmation bias, Young’s attorney was able to effectively cross-examine the forensic
scientist about the same topic. Young’s attorney elicited testimony from the forensic
scientist that lent credibility to Young’s points about confirmation bias. During cross-
examination, the forensic scientist confirmed that he had read the article about
confirmation bias because the article was “required reading” for his job at the BCA and
that the article was “a learned treatise recognized by experts in [the] field.” The forensic
scientist also defined the term “confirmation bias,”10 acknowledged that confirmation
bias is discussed in the forensic scientist community, and admitted that confirmation bias
may be problematic in the work that the BCA performs. This testimony lent authoritative
support to the point being made in cross-examination—that confirmation bias could have
undermined the BCA’s work. For these reasons, even if Young’s attorney had been
permitted to read from the article itself, it would not have significantly affected the tenor

10 The forensic scientist testified that “[c]onfirmation bias is when – where we’re
confirming that someone is involved with a case, or in my circumstance a DNA profile
would be matching a certain known individual in a case.”

30
or impact of the cross-examination, and a reasonable jury would have nonetheless
reached the same verdict. See Westrom, 6 N.W.3d at 155. Accordingly, we conclude that
any error in the exclusion of the article was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
VI.
We next address Young’s other challenge related to the forensic scientist’s
testimony, which he first raised in a petition for postconviction relief.11 Young argues that
he is entitled to a new trial based on the admission of the forensic scientist’s trial
testimony regarding an undisclosed expert opinion. At trial, the expert testified that the
blood on Young’s shoes was human blood, but the expert’s opinion that the blood was
human blood had not been disclosed before trial.
Because Young did not object to the opinion testimony at trial, his challenge is
forfeited unless it meets the exception for plain error. See Arredondo v. State,
754 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn. 2008) (applying plain-error review to a postconviction
claim that required us to analyze the unobjected-to introduction of evidence at trial). To
satisfy the plain-error exception, an appellant must establish “(1) an error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects the [appellant]’s substantial rights.” Pulczinski v. State,
972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022). And plain error is reversible “only when it seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation” of the judicial system. Id.

11 Although Young’s petition for postconviction relief raised three issues, Young
appeals only the district court’s denial of relief on one issue: whether the State’s failure to
disclose an expert opinion about the forensic evidence found on Young’s shoes warranted
a new trial.

31
Before trial, the State disclosed the forensic scientist’s report, which included the
scientist’s opinion that Young’s shoes tested positive for both blood and a mixture of
DNA containing T.B.’s DNA. At trial, beyond what the State disclosed prior to trial, the
forensic scientist also testified that the blood found on Young’s shoes was human blood.
The State concedes that it was plain error not to disclose this opinion as required under
the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4)(c)
(requiring the State to disclose information that is within its “possession or control,”
including expert reports and “findings, opinions, or conclusions the expert will give” at
trial).
Because the State concedes that the admission of the forensic scientist’s opinion
was plain error, we analyze whether Young has met his burden to show that the error
affected his substantial rights. See State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 2013). An
error affects substantial rights when the appellant shows that “there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error[] had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” Bustos,
861 N.W.2d at 663 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When deciding
whether wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict, we generally
consider four non-exclusive factors: (A) “the manner in which the party presented the
evidence,” (B) “whether the evidence was highly persuasive,” (C) “whether the party
who offered the evidence used it in closing argument,” and (D) whether the other party
“effectively countered the evidence.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also consider the overall
strength of the evidence. Id. at 59. If the other evidence against the defendant is strong, it

32
is less likely that the wrongfully admitted evidence affected the verdict. Id. We examine
these factors below.
A.
In reviewing the manner in which the party presented the evidence, we have
tended to examine the role that the evidence played in the case. Id. at 56. The more
prominent the evidence, the more likely it is that the evidence had a significant effect on
the verdict. See State v. Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d 79, 95 (Minn. 2024). To evaluate prominence,
we have considered whether the jury may have “focused unduly on th[e] evidence” based
on the type and variety of other evidence presented. See Townsend v. State,
646 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 2002) (determining that the jury did not unduly focus on the
wrongfully admitted evidence when the trial included “extensive testimony regarding
DNA, ballistics, and an arson investigation” and when the wrongful evidence “was not
the focus of any one witness’ testimony”); Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d at 95 (explaining that if the
wrongfully admitted evidence is presented in a manner that does not give it significant
focus, then it is less likely the jury’s verdict was based on that evidence).
Here, the State did not present the evidence in a way that gave it significant focus,
nor is there any indication in the record that the jury focused unduly on the undisclosed
opinion. In this case, as in Townsend, the State called many witnesses, including police
officers, family members, and experts. See Townsend, 646 N.W.2d at 223 (noting that
“several witnesses” testified about the crime scene and none focused on the erroneously
admitted evidence). These witnesses presented a large volume of evidence spanning a
variety of topics, including the crime scene, the events following the discovery of T.B.’s

33
body, T.B.’s autopsy, Young’s and L.Y .’s whereabouts, and DNA evidence that had been
properly disclosed to Young before trial.
We further note that the undisclosed opinion was not the focus of the forensic
scientist’s testimony. The forensic scientist discussed DNA profiling results from over
20 samples, one of which was from Young’s shoes. These samples were also from parts
of Young’s body, parts of T.B.’s body, T.B.’s teddy bear, Young’s clothing, and towels and
bedsheets recovered from the scene of the crime. Of these samples, the forensic scientist
spent the most time discussing DNA profiling results from samples taken from various
parts of T.B.’s body, as well as profiling results from semen found on Young’s underwear.
The State used this testimony to argue that Young’s semen and DNA were on several
objects connected to the crime, and therefore, that it was Young who committed the
crime. Young’s attorney also spent significant time cross-examining the forensic scientist,
during which Young’s attorney focused on testing errors, confirmation bias, and the
extent to which the DNA evidence actually inculpated Young.
In evaluating the manner in which evidence is presented, we often also examine
whether the evidence was a large part of the State’s case based on the number of
transcript pages occupied by the presentation of the evidence. See State v. Smith,
940 N.W.2d 497, 506 (Minn. 2020) (noting that contested testimony amounted to just
35 pages of a 1,380-page trial transcript). Here, the undisclosed testimony spans a small
fraction of the trial transcript’s 1,076 total pages. The forensic scientist’s testimony
occupies approximately 100 transcript pages. And of those 100 pages, only three pages
relate to the undisclosed opinion. This reflects a significantly smaller percentage than that

34
at issue in Smith, a case in which we determined that the wrongfully admitted evidence
was “only a small part of the State’s presentation.” 940 N.W.2d at 506.
Because the opinion was a small portion of a lengthy trial and was not given
significant focus, the manner in which the evidence was presented weighs against a
determination that the undisclosed opinion affected Young’s substantial rights.
B.
Turning next to the persuasiveness of the improperly admitted evidence, the State
acknowledges that the undisclosed opinion was persuasive. We agree. Here, a qualified
DNA expert offered a conclusive opinion about the nature of the blood on Young’s shoes
based on scientific testing. We generally consider such conclusive, scientific opinions to
be persuasive. See State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 314–15 (Minn. 2006) (concluding
that a BCA report was persuasive because it provided “conclusive proof” not provided in
other testimony). The undisclosed opinion’s persuasiveness favors a determination that
the lack of disclosure affected Young’s substantial rights.
C.
We have reasoned that there is a greater possibility that wrongfully admitted
evidence impacted the verdict when the State focuses on that evidence during its closing
argument. Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d at 95. Here, the State did not rely on the undisclosed
opinion during closing argument. Instead, the State made reasonable inferences based on
the forensic scientist’s admissible testimony that there was both blood and human DNA
on the shoes. We have long held that a prosecutor may make reasonable inferences based
on the admissible evidence in closing argument. See Fraga, 898 N.W.2d at 278; State v.

35
Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 142 (Minn. 2009); State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 336 (Minn.
2006); State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363–64 (Minn. 1995). That is what the
prosecutor did here.
In this case, the State mentioned the blood found on Young’s shoes four times in
its closing argument, noting that “the major profile of the DNA mixture on those shoes”
matched T.B.’s, that T.B. “contributed DNA to the blood stains on defendant’s shoes,”
that human blood was found on the shoes because “[h]uman DNA” was found in the
blood samples on the shoes, and that the jury should “[k]eep in mind the defendant had
[T.B.]’s blood on his Converse shoes.”
Although the State mentioned the blood on Young’s shoes four times, these
statements reflect reasonable inferences based on the admissible portions of the forensic
scientist’s testimony, which included his opinions that the samples from the shoes
contained a mixture of DNA, that T.B.’s DNA was the “major male component” in the
mixture, that there was “human DNA” in the mixture, and that there was blood on the
shoes. The State did not need to rely on the inadmissible portion of the testimony, noting
at trial that “a lot [had been] made about whether … they could say it was human blood.”
The State went on to make a reasonable inference based on the admissible evidence:
“Human DNA was found in all three samples. What does that prove? That it’s human
blood on those shoes.” Because the State’s closing argument relied on reasonable
inferences made from the admissible evidence, the closing argument did not contribute to
the impact of the wrongfully admitted evidence on the verdict. See Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d

36
at 98 (explaining that it was less likely that the wrongfully admitted evidence affected the
verdict when the prosecutor did not refer to the evidence at closing argument).
D.
We next consider whether Young successfully countered the impermissible
evidence, limiting its impact on the verdict. See Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 59. Inadmissible
witness testimony may be effectively countered through cross-examination. See, e.g.,
Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505–06. And here the cross-examination appears to have been
effective. Young’s attorney cross-examined the forensic scientist on the merits of that
opinion. See Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 315 (explaining that evidence is less likely to have
been effectively countered when the admissibility of the evidence is challenged instead of
the merits). Upon cross-examination, the forensic scientist admitted that he had not
disclosed his opinion that the blood on the shoes was human blood to anyone and that he
could not say who the blood belonged to.
In addition to cross-examination, a defendant’s closing argument may also counter
the use of impermissible evidence. See State v. McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 20
(Minn. 2013) (countering was effective when counsel “supported [the defendant’s]
explanation in closing argument”). We note that Young’s closing argument spent
significant time discrediting the forensic scientist’s DNA analysis.
The fact that Young had opportunities to counter the undisclosed opinion both in
cross-examination and in his closing argument—and took advantage of those

37
opportunities—again cuts against a conclusion that the opinion significantly affected the
verdict.12
E.
Our final consideration is the overall strength of the evidence. If the evidence
against a defendant is strong, it is less likely th at the impermissible evidence affected the
outcome of the verdict. Bigbear, 10
N.W.3d at 59. Here, the State presented strong
evidence against Young: He lied t
o the police. He spent most of the day in the apa rtment
with T.B. His semen, along with T.B.’s blood, was found on a towel and a blanket
collected from the apartment. And his underwear had a semen stain that containe d a
mixture from which T.B.’ s DNA could not be excluded. The opinion that the blood on
Young’s shoes was human blood, while undisclosed, is also a reasonable inference given
12 This case is unlike State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 838–41 (Minn. 2012), in
which a plurality of our court concluded that the State’s intimidation of a defendant’s
expert witness violated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense.
In Beecroft, the State’s intimidation convinced the defendant’s expert not to testify, and
the plurality noted that, without the expert witness, the defendant lacked an “equal
opportunity to present to the factfinders the opposing views of the defendant’s experts”
and lost a “critical opportunity to cast doubt on the government’s evidence.” Id. at 839 &
n.14. As discussed above, we acknowledge that the expert’s testimony was persuasive.
But the State did not prevent Young’s expert from testifying or otherwise work to exclude
relevant evidence. We have not held that the erroneous admission of expert testimony
must always substantially affect a verdict or that the only way to counter erroneous
admission of expert testimony is with the testimony of another expert. To the contrary, we
have concluded that a verdict was not substantially affected even when there was no
indication that the defendant countered erroneously admitted expert testimony with their
own expert witness. See State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634–35 (Minn. 2011).

38
the other facts in the forensic expert’s report, which noted that there was both blood and
human DNA on the shoes.13
We acknowledge that Young’s alternative perpetrator defense highlighted evidence
that pointed toward L.Y .’s potential culpability. For example, L.Y . made the unusual
decision to leave home to purchase a used car at approximately 1:00 a.m., and L.Y . also
appears to have lied to the police. And based on the evidence presented at trial, it is
possible T.B. could have died before L.Y . left the apartment. Young also presented
evidence that L.Y . was untrustworthy. For example, Young showed that L.Y . admitted to
destroying a video camera that was in the apartment and which documented the moments
following the discovery of T.B.’s body. But police officers’ search of a nearby car
recovered an undamaged video camera in the pocket of a jacket that L.Y . had placed in
the car after officers arrived on the scene—a fact that Young used to argue that L.Y . had
lied about destroying the camera. As to forensic evidence, Young pointed to the fact that
L.Y .’s DNA was found on T.B.’s mouth. Since no one testified that they saw L.Y . give
CPR and T.B.’s mouth was closed while in full rigor mortis, Young’s theory was that
L.Y .’s DNA was deposited there while T.B. was still alive. Young highlighted this
evidence, arguing extensively that L.Y . killed T.B. or, at the very least, that there was
reasonable doubt about the identity of T.B.’s killer. The jury rejected Young’s theory.

13 As Young’s counsel noted at oral argument, the forensic scientist’s report also
found that “presumptive testing” could not confirm that the blood on Young’s shoes was
“of human origin.” This portion of the report does not express an opinion as to whether
the blood was human blood. That the blood was human blood remains a reasonable
inference that is consistent with the report.

39
Under a plain-error analysis, Young bears the burden to demonstrate that the
erroneously admitted evidence affected his substantial rights by significantly affecting the
verdict. See Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54. But Young has not demonstrated that the forensic
scientist’s single, undisclosed opinion significantly affected the verdict. The opinion
played a minor part in a lengthy trial, and the State did not focus on the opinion during
direct examination or closing argument. When the opinion was admitted during direct
examination, Young countered it with an effective and discrediting cross-examination on
the merits. And the State did not rely on the opinion in its closing argument, instead
relying on reasonable inferences based on the admissible portions of the forensic
scientist’s testimony. Moreover, there was substantial evidence against Young, including
independent and admissible DNA evidence. We therefore conclude that Young has not
met his burden here.
Because the admission of testimony regarding the undisclosed opinion that the
blood on Young’s shoes was human blood did not affect Young’s substantial rights, that
error is not grounds for reversal.
VII.
Finally, we address the cumulative effect of the errors identified above. An
appellant is entitled to a new trial when the district court’s errors, taken cumulatively,
have the effect of denying the defendant a fair trial. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d at 278. To
evaluate the cumulative effect of the errors, we look at “the egregiousness of the errors
and the strength of the State’s case.” Id.

40
Young’s appeal reveals two possible errors for us to consider cumulatively: the
exclusion of the article about confirmation bias during Young’s cross-examination of the
forensic scientist14 and the admission of the forensic scientist’s testimony regarding the
undisclosed opinion that the blood found on Young’s shoes was human blood. Considered
together, these errors did not produce an unfair trial. As discussed above, the exclusion of
the article did not prevent Young from cross-examining the forensic scientist about
confirmation bias—the point he sought to make with the article. And although the State
concedes that the forensic scientist’s opinion about the nature of the blood on the shoes
was improperly admitted because it was not previously disclosed, that opinion was also a
reasonable inference from the admissible portions of the forensic scientist’s testimony,
and it was not the focus of the State’s lengthy presentation of evidence.
We may reverse based on cumulative error in “very close factual cases,” but we
have declined to reverse based on cumulative error when the State’s case against the
defendant is strong. See id. at 279. Here, the district court was required to make close
calls. But the two errors that we have identified occurred over the course of a lengthy,
seven-day trial in which the State put on a strong case, showing not only that Young’s
DNA implicated Young in the crime, but also that Young was in the apartment with T.B.
and had the means to commit the crime. And Young also presented a meaningful defense,
which the jury ultimately rejected. The jury considered a substantial alternative
perpetrator defense that shifted suspicion from Young onto L.Y . and exposed flaws in the

14 Above we assumed without deciding that the exclusion of this article was an error.
We make the same assumption here.

41
State’s forensic evidence. We presume that the jury considers all the evidence presented.
Cf. State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009) (“We assume that the jury followed
the court’s instructions and properly considered the evidence.”). Based on the evidence
presented to the jury, we conclude that the errors, when considered cumulatively, did not
deny Young a fair trial.
Accordingly, a new trial is not warranted based on the cumulative effect of the
errors that we have identified.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and the decision of the district
court denying postconviction relief.
Affirmed.

D-1
D I S S E N T
HUDSON, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The due process clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions
guarantee criminal defendants the right to present a complete defense. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV , § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; State v. Foster, 20 N.W.3d 6, 18 (Minn. 2025).
Although the district court allowed Lee Wayne Young, Jr., to present an alternative
perpetrator defense, its exclusion of inculpatory statements made by his father, L.Y .,
denied Young his constitutional right to present a complete defense. Accordingly, I
disagree with the court’s conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Young’s motion to admit L.Y .’s prior recorded statement under Minnesota
Rules of Evidence 613 or 807.
I also disagree with the court’s conclusion that the State’s undisclosed expert
opinion at trial did not affect Young’s substantial rights. Because I conclude that the
district court’s errors violated Young’s constitutional right to present a complete defense
and denied him a fair trial, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
I respectfully dissent.
A.
I begin with the district court’s exclusion of inculpatory statements made by L.Y .
First, I lay out the relevant background. Next, I evaluate the district court’s evidentiary
rulings and explain why they were abuses of discretion under both Rule 613 and 807.
Finally, I demonstrate that the district court’s errors were not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

D-2
1.
Only four people had access to T.B. around the time of his death: T.B.’s mother,
T.B.’s sister, L.Y ., and Young. Because T.B.’s anal and rectal swabs contained semen,
either L.Y . or Young killed T.B. Young’s defense at trial was that L.Y . committed the
crime.
The district court granted Young’s motion to present an alternative perpetrator
defense, explaining that it did so based upon “evidence that [L.Y .] lied about his location
during the hours leading up to the discovery of the deceased victim, he made various
statements to police about DNA including explaining why his DNA would be on the
victim’s rectal area, [and] his DNA was found on the victim’s oral cavity.”
In a taped statement to police on the same day T.B.’s body was discovered, L.Y .
expressed strong reluctance to give a DNA sample and attempted to preemptively explain
why his DNA and semen might be found in T.B.’s body. The relevant portion of the audio
recording is as follows:
[OFFICER]: There’d be no (inaudible), there’d be no (inaudible, two
speaking at once) - - reason any semen is inside of him from you.
[L.Y .]: No. Like if there was , like I don’t know how to f****** put this
without sounding like one, like I’m trying to hide it and two, like whatever
else ‘cause I don’t and I just don’t want to get f***** over from - - I don’t
know how that works.
…
[OFFICER]: We’re asking you to give a consensual voluntary known DNA
sample, it’s a cheek swab. Okay? For us to use to eliminate you from any,
any evidence of any sexual assault that’s found.

D-3
[L.Y .]: Even though I was sweating and touching him in his body - - just this
afternoon when they took his clothes off, all that - - outside.
(Emphasis added.)
Given the significance of these statements to Young’s defense, Young called L.Y .
as a witness at trial and made multiple attempts to elicit an admission that L.Y . made the
statements in an apparent effort to preemptively explain why L.Y .’s DNA might be found
in T.B.’s body. But Young’s attempts were futile:
[COUNSEL]: And I’m just going to go back to the DNA swab. Did you tell
the police that you were sweating and touching [T.B.] in his body?
[L.Y .]: During CPR? I don’t know what you’re getting at but – yeah.
[COUNSEL]: I’m just saying during an interview with the police –
[L.Y .]: Well, he was just taking it out of context.
…
[COUNSEL]: What – When you said you were sweating and touching [T.B.]
in his body, what did you mean?
[L.Y .]: I never said anything in his body . Like you’re just taking my words
out of context here. You can read whatever you want.
(Emphasis added.)
Following this failed attempt, Young refreshed L.Y .’s recollection with a transcript
of the audio recording. The following exchange then occurred:
[L.Y .]: I don’t know how it got put like that but that never –
[COUNSEL]: So you’re saying you never said, “even though I was sweating
and touching him in his body”?
[L.Y .]: It might have sounded like that but that’ s not what was said, never
even once.

D-4
(Emphasis added.) After L.Y . denied making the statement, Young requested to impeach
him with the audio recording. The State objected, arguing that Young could refresh L.Y .’s
recollection with the audio recording outside the presence of the jury, but impeachment
was inappropriate at that time. Young explained that he should be allowed to impeach
with the recording because “[L.Y .] just said that’s not what he said.” L.Y . interjected:
[L.Y .]: No, I said that’s not how it sounded. It might have sounded like I said
that. That’s not what I said. You’re just trying to make –
[COUNSEL]: What do you mean by that?
[L.Y .]: You’re trying to make a play on words.
[COUNSEL]: Did you say those words in that order?
[L.Y .]: No.
(Emphasis added.)
Again, Young requested to impeach L.Y . with the audio recording. The State
objected, and the district court sustained the objection. The district court allowed Young
to refresh L.Y .’s recollection outside the presence of the jury. After listening to the
recording, L.Y . said the recording did not refresh his recollection. When the jury returned,
the following exchange ensued:
[COUNSEL]: [N]ow that you’ve had a chance to refresh your recollection,
do you agree that you told the police, “even though I was sweating and
touching him in his body”?
[L.Y .]: That’s not what was meant, no. Might have sounded like that. And I
might have like said it like on accident or something because I was confused
like the whole day after I got back it was just chaos.
[COURT]: Next question, please.

D-5
[COUNSEL]: You agree those are the words you said, even if you did not
mean it that way?
[L.Y .]: No.
(Emphasis added.) After L.Y . denied making the statement, once again, Young asked to
impeach L.Y . with the audio recording. The district court denied the request.
In sum, L.Y . unequivocally and unambiguously denied making the statement four
times: “I never said anything in his body”; “that’s not what was said, never even once”;
“No” in response to “Did you say those words in that order?”; and “No” in response to
“You agree those are the words you said, even if you did not mean it that way?”
Young also attempted to question L.Y . about other parts of the taped interview, but
L.Y . said the whole day was a blur, implying he had no memory of his statements. When
Young asked L.Y . whether reviewing the audio recording would refresh his recollection,
L.Y . said it would not.
On the next trial day,1 Young filed a motion to admit L.Y .’s statement that L.Y . was
“touching T.B. in his body” under Rule 807. The basis for Young’s motion was that the
recording was more probative than L.Y .’s testimony because it was not clear that L.Y .
admitted to making the statement. The State urged the district court to give some
consideration to the fact that the testimony was already covered during L.Y .’s direct
examination. The State disputed that L.Y . denied making the statement at issue stating, “I
don’t believe [L.Y .] denied making the statement as suggested.”

1 L.Y . testified on a Friday and thus the next trial day was the Monday following the
weekend.

D-6
In the moments leading up to its ruling, the district court misstated L.Y .’s
testimony several times: “[L.Y .] agreed the words were said”; “my recollection of his
testimony was he did not deny making the statement”; and “He didn’t deny making the
statement.” The court ultimately denied Young’s motion.
2.
“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” State
v. Bonnell, 31 N.W.3d 527, 548 (Minn. 2026). A district court abuses its discretion when
its ruling “is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although our abuse of discretion standard requires us to give
great deference to the district court, the deference is not absolute—the district court’s
rulings must be grounded in the facts in the record. See Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357,
362 (Minn. 2020).
a.
Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 613, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement is generally inadmissible “unless the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to
explain or deny” the evidence and the opposing party is given an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness about the evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 613(b). Additionally, to impeach
a witness with evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, the proponent of the evidence
must show that the witness’s statements are actually inconsistent. State v. Vance,
254 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1977).

D-7
Here, Young sought to impeach L.Y . with an audio recording of L.Y .’s prior
inconsistent statement that he had touched T.B. “in his body.” But the district court
denied Young’s request to admit the recording despite the fact that L.Y . unequivocally
denied making the statement at least four times: “I never said anything in his body”;
“that’s not what was said, never even once”; “That’s not what was said”; in response to
“Did you say those words in that order?” he responded, “No”; and in response to “You
agree those are the words you said, even if you did not mean it that way?” he responded,
“No.” To the extent L.Y . ever admitted to making the statement at issue, it was equivocal
at best: “That’s not what was meant, no. Might have sounded like that. And I might have
like said it like on accident or something ….” And when Young attempted to confirm
whether L.Y . was admitting to making the statement, L.Y . made it clear that he was not.
And yet, the court gives the impression that L.Y .’s testimony on the issue was a
toss-up and that reasonable minds could disagree on whether L.Y . admitted to making the
statement or not. The record tells a different story. L.Y .’s testimony was a series of
unequivocal denials, punctuated by a single, ambiguous, half-hearted admission that L.Y .
immediately confirmed was not an admission. In my view, the question of whether L.Y .
admitted or denied making the statement at issue was not a close call. But even if it was,
an admission must be unequivocal to thwart impeachment by extrinsic evidence. See
Briggs v. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co., 80 N.W.2d 625, 635 (Minn. 1957) (stating that proof of
inconsistency by extrinsic evidence becomes unnecessary “[o]nce a witness has
unequivocally admitted having previously made inconsistent statements” (emphasis

D-8
added)); Price v. Grieger, 70 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Minn. 1955).2 The district court abused
its discretion when it denied Young’s request to impeach L.Y . because its ruling was
against the facts in the record.3 See Bustos, 861 N.W.2d at 666.
b.
Because of L.Y .’s obfuscation and the district court’s ruling, Young was unable to
impeach L.Y . and thus definitively prove to the jury that L.Y . made the inculpatory
statement. Determined to get the statement admitted, Young turned to the “residual
exception” under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807 as an alternative means to admit L.Y .’s
statement. Rule 807 allows for the admission of certain hearsay statements even if other
exceptions to the hearsay rule do not apply:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by
the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admissio n of the
statement into evidence.
Minn. R. Evid. 807.

2 The court implies that the equivocal admissions were adequate simply because the
denials were equivocal too. First, I disagree that the denials were equivocal. There is
nothing equivocal about “that’s not what was said, never even once” or “No” in response
to, “You agree those are the words you said, even if you did not mean it that way?”
Second, whether the denials were equivocal or not is irrelevant—the only question is
whether there was an unequivocal admission. Here, there was not.
3 Although Young’s requests to impeach were made before the State had an
opportunity to cross-examine L.Y . as required by Rule 613(b), that was not the basis of
the district court’s denial of Young’s requests to impeach.

D-9
In support of his motion to admit the audio recording under Rule 807, Young
argued that the recording was more probative than L.Y .’s testimony because it was not
clear that L.Y . admitted to making the statement. But again, the district court denied
Young’s motion because it determined that the audio recording was “not more probative
than [L.Y .’s] testimony.”
Under our abuse of discretion standard, the district court’s ruling should be
accorded great deference. See State v. Diggins, 836 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 2013)
(stating that we defer to the district court’s evidentiary rulings because the district court is
“in the best position” to evaluate the evidence (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But the particular circumstances of this case underscore why that deference is
not absolute. To determine whether the audio recording was more probative than L.Y .’s
testimony, the district court had to compare the two. Although the district court made this
comparison, it did so on the Monday following L.Y .’s testimony on Friday, and without
the benefit of a transcript of L.Y .’s testimony. Unfortunately for Young, the district court’s
recollection of L.Y .’s testimony was inaccurate. In the moments leading up to the district
court’s ruling, the district court repeatedly misstated key elements of L.Y .’s testimony,
observing that: “my recollection of his testimony was he did not deny making the
statement”; and “He didn’t deny making the statement.” Under no plausible reading of
the record, including the one the court adopts today, is it accurate to say that L.Y . did not
deny making the statement. In fact, L.Y . denied making the statement at least four times.
Put simply, the district court’s ruling was not grounded in the facts in the record.

D-10
It is against this backdrop that we must review the district court’s exercise of
discretion. Having the benefit of the transcript of L.Y .’s testimony, we are under no
obligation to uphold an evidentiary ruling that was based on an erroneous recollection of
the facts in the record. See Bustos, 861 N.W.2d at 666 (“[W]e may reverse the district
court when the district court’s ruling … is against logic and the facts in the record.”
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A close look at those facts demonstrates that the audio recording was more
probative on the point for which it was offered than L.Y .’s testimony. Although L.Y . was
adamant about not making the inculpatory statement, his testimony was unclear at best.
L.Y . tried to have his cake and eat it too by employing a combination of obfuscation and
selective recollection. Indeed, the court concedes that L.Y .’s testimony was a “muddled
exchange.” Even the district court, despite its misstatements of the record, acknowledged
that L.Y .’s testimony was confusing: “I think what’s so confusing is this.… And that is,
that, to me is the conundrum here a sort of hybrid. Well, no, I didn’t say that but here’s
the explanation.”
Moreover, by L.Y .’s own admission, his recollection of his statements to the police
was not reliable:
[COUNSEL]: Do you remember generally what you told them?
[L.Y .]: [I] was a little bit like confused and like overwhelmed with the whole
like CPR and stuff like that. So I was kind of like blinded I guess.
…
[L.Y .]: The whole day was a blur.

D-11
[COUNSEL]: … So you don’t have a clear memory of it?
[L.Y .]: From the time I got back and started CPR until I was down with this
I didn’t even get a chance to breathe. I was just answering questions.
In light of this record, the question is whether the confusing, “muddled exchange,”
based on L.Y .’s blurry, vague recollection, was more probative than a recorded
inculpatory statement given to police on the day of the crime. It was not. Accordingly, the
district court abused its discretion by denying Young’s motion to admit L.Y .’s recorded
statement because its ruling was against the facts in the record.
3.
L.Y .’s recorded statement to police in response to a request for L.Y .’s DNA was
critical to Young’s defense and directly affected the ascertainment of guilt. But the district
court improperly excluded this evidence, for the reasons just addressed.
When, as here, evidence was improperly excluded in violation of a defendant’s
right to present a complete defense, we must ask whether the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114, 123 (Minn. 2024). This standard asks
whether “there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the
evidence had been admitted.” State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994). This
assessment requires us to “be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had
been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury
(i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict.” Id. Even in cases where
the State introduced strong circumstantial evidence against the defendant, we must ask
whether “honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts”

D-12
absent the constitutional error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1967); State
v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn. 1997).
I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that an average jury would have
reached the same verdict if L.Y .’s statement had been admitted and fully realized its
damaging potential—honest, fair-minded jurors might well have brought in not guilty
verdicts.
First, if L.Y .’s statement had been admitted, the jury would have learned that L.Y .
lied under oath. Additionally, the jury would have also learned that in the immediate
aftermath of T.B.’s sexual assault and murder, L.Y . was extremely reluctant to give his
DNA sample and that he repeatedly tried to preemptively explain and justify why his
DNA might be found in T.B.’s body. And the jury would have learned that even after
police reminded L.Y . that they would be looking for his semen, he continued to assert that
his DNA—and apparently, his semen—might be in T.B.’s body for some legitimate
reason.
This counterfactual scenario would be damning to L.Y . It is odd, if not highly
suspicious, for an innocent person to volunteer reasons why his DNA, including his
semen, might be found in the body of a murdered child who he knows was sexually
assaulted. And it is possible that the jury would have viewed L.Y .’s statements as
consciousness of guilt. Because this evidence would be inculpatory of L.Y ., the
alternative perpetrator, it would be exculpatory of Young. But the district court excluded
the evidence. Consequently, the jury went into the deliberation room believing that L.Y .
never made the statement. Even worse, the jury might have also been left with the

D-13
impression that Young was misquoting L.Y . or unfairly twisting his words. The exclusion
of the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.
I turn now to the second piece of improperly excluded evidence. The Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure require the State to disclose information that is within its
possession or control, including expert reports and “findings, opinions, or conclusions the
expert will give” at trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4)(c).
Here, the State concedes that it did not disclose the expert’s opinion as it was
required to do under Rule 9.01, and thus there is no dispute that there was plain error. The
court and I agree. Accordingly, the question is whether the error affected Young’s
substantial rights. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). And if it did,
whether the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation” of the
judicial system. See Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022).
I conclude both that the error affected Young’s substantial rights and that a failure
to correct it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the
judicial system.
1.
An error affects substantial rights when the appellant shows that “there is a
reasonable likelihood that the error[] had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.”
Bustos, 861 N.W.2d at 663. When deciding whether an erroneous admission of evidence
significantly affected the verdict, we consider four non-exclusive factors: “(1) the manner
in which the party presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly

D-14
persuasive, (3) whether the party who offered the evidence used it in closing argument,
and (4) whether the defense effectively countered the evidence.” State v. Bigbear,
10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024). We also consider the overall strength of the evidence—if
the evidence against the defendant is strong, it is less likely the wrongfully admitted
evidence affected the outcome of the verdict. Id. at 59. The analysis is fact specific, and
“not all the factors are relevant or persuasive in every case.” Id. at 54– 55. Examining
these factors, I conclude there is a reasonable likelihood that the error significantly
affected the verdict.
The evidence at issue was presented as expert testimony of a forensic scientist,
which the State agrees was a highly persuasive form of evidence, and one we have said
juries often give undue weight. State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 839 n.14 (Minn. 2012)
(acknowledging that jurors tend to assume that scientific evidence is more objective and
accurate than lay testimony). In its closing the State capitalized on the erroneously
admitted evidence to argue that human blood was found on Young’s shoes.
The fact that the erroneously admitted evidence was scientific evidence is
significant. “ ‘[T]he major danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead the
jury’ because ‘an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the
jury to accept it without critical scrutiny.’ ” Id. (quoting Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later,
80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1237 (1980)). Therefore, “if factfinders are exposed to the
opinions of the government’s expert witnesses, a defendant must have an equal
opportunity to present to the factfinders the opposing views of the defendant’s experts.”

D-15
Id. at 839. “When the government has presented expert testimony, a defendant who is
unable to present the testimony of his own well-informed experts loses a critical
opportunity to cast doubt on the government’s evidence.” Id. at 839 n.14.
Here, the jury was exposed to the undisclosed opinion of the State’s expert
witness. Because of the discovery violation, Young did not have an opportunity to present
the views of his own expert to counter that opinion. It is not enough, as the court
contends, that Young “had opportunities to counter the undisclosed opinion both in cross-
examination and in his closing argument—and took advantage of those opportunities.”
See id. at 843 n.16 (observing that defense counsel “cannot be expected to understand
scientific evidence and effectively cross-examine [government] experts … without access
to defense experts” (alteration in original) (quoting Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J.
Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1,
1, (2009))). Under these circumstances, Young should have been afforded an opportunity
to counter the State’s expert with his own expert witness.4
The court distinguishes Beecroft on the basis that the State did not prevent Young’s
expert from testifying or otherwise work to exclude relevant evidence in Young’s case.
However, this distinction ignores the State’s role in the discovery violation and the

4 The court contends that we have never held that the only way to counter erroneous
admission of expert testimony is with the testimony of another expert. But that is beside
the point. The point is that a defendant who wishes to counter the State’s expert with his
own expert should be able to do so. The State’s wrongdoing should not prevent the
defendant from “meet[ing] the State as an equal in our adversarial system of justice.” See
Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d at 839.

D-16
resulting downstream consequences. The State’s role is demonstrated in this key colloquy
between the State and its expert witness in this case:
[STATE]: And are you able to tell again if that’s human blood or non-human
blood?
[EXPERT]: In this circumstance we attempted to try a – Sorry. A presumptive
test for human origin. We were unable to determine if it was human at that
time. However, during my profiling we were able to obtain human DNA from
that swabbing of that shoelace, so, yes.
[STATE]: So, yes, it’s human blood in your opinion?
[EXPERT]: In my opinion, yes, it would be.
Put simply, the State’s leading question prompted the expert’s undisclosed opinion.
The court also reasons that the error here did not affect Young’s substantial rights
because the undisclosed expert opinion was only a small portion of a lengthy trial.
However, even a single sentence can have an outsized impact on a trial. That is especially
true when, as here, the sentence adds a missing piece to the State’s case. The undisclosed
expert opinion is the only evidence that the blood on Young’s shoes was human blood.
Young’s contention is two-fold: that the State’s expert connected the dots for the
jury based on flawed science and that Young had no advance notice that the State’s expert
would connect the dots in this way. If Young had known that the State’s expert would
testify that the blood on Young’s shoes was human blood, he would have prepared
accordingly. Thus, but for the State’s discovery violation, Young would have been
prepared to present countervailing testimony by his own expert to demonstrate that the
opinion of the State’s expert was scientifically dubious. Unless we are willing to

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countenance trial by ambush, Young should not be penalized for not knowing what he did
not know.
Furthermore, the evidence against Young was not overwhelming because the
evidence against L.Y ., the alternative perpetrator, was equally strong and thus made the
State’s case against Young weaker: L.Y . was at the residence within the timeframe when
T.B. was killed; L.Y . lied to police about his whereabouts; L.Y . tried to wipe his phone
remotely following T.B.’s death; after T.B.’s body was discovered, L.Y . removed,
destroyed, or tried to hide a camera from the crime scene; and L.Y .’s DNA—the only
identifiable DNA found directly on T.B.’s body—was found inside T.B.’s mouth.5
Because there is a reasonable likelihood that admission of the undisclosed expert
opinion had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict, the error affected Young’s
substantial rights. See Bustos, 861 N.W.2d at 663.
2.
An error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings” when failing to correct it “would have an impact beyond the current case by
causing the public to seriously question whether our court system has integrity and
generally offers accused persons a fair trial.” Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 356.
The forensic evidence against L.Y . was arguably stronger than the evidence
against Young. Indeed, L.Y .’s DNA, not Young’s, was the only identifiable DNA on

5 The medical examiner testified that T.B.’s mouth was likely “manipulate[d]” by an
assailant. Although L.Y . claimed that the DNA in T.B.’s mouth was a result of CPR, the
doctor’s testimony that T.B. was in rigor mortis and that his mouth could not be opened
undermined L.Y .’s claim.

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T.B.’s body. To counteract the strong forensic evidence against L.Y ., the State exploited
an erroneously admitted expert opinion to bolster its relatively weak forensic evidence
against Young. The error was exacerbated by the fact that Young did not have an
opportunity to offer his own forensic expert witness to mitigate the State’s erroneously
admitted forensic expert opinion. These facts call into question the fairness and integrity
of our court system. See State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 205 (Minn. 2006) (concluding
that erroneously admitted testimony had “a fundamental effect on the fairness and
integrity of the trial” where the testimony “was of critical importance to the state’s case
not just because of its substance, but also due to [the witness’s] likely credibility with the
jury.”).
* * *
Two errors occurred here. The first excluded key evidence against L.Y ., and the
second deprived Young of a meaningful opportunity to counter highly persuasive
evidence against him that was erroneously admitted. These errors, alone and
cumulatively, denied Young his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
Because Young did not receive a fair trial, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
THISSEN, Justice (dissenting).
I join in part A of Chief Justice Hudson’s dissent.