In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1620

In re the Marriage of:

Hillary Mercer Graves, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Richard Charles Graves,
Respondent.

Filed August 12, 2024
Affirmed
Ross, Judge
Dissenting, Reyes, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-FA-18-2612

Kristin Berger Parker, Courtney L. Burks, Jones Day, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Marshall H. Tanick, Stephen M. Harris, Meyer Njus Tanick, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
In this child-custody dispute, mother appeals from the district court’s denial of her
motion to modify the existing custody order, arguing that the court abused its discretion by
finding that she failed to produce evidence of endangerment to justify the motion. Because
the district court acted within its discretion by rejecting mother’s motion based on her
failure to introduce evidence sufficient to prove endangerment, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Hillary Mercer Graves (mother) and respondent Richard Charles Graves
(father) divorced in 2018, agreeing to joint legal and physical custody of their now 15-year-
old daughter and 10-year-old son. Father, who has a history of mental-health issues, began
to struggle in the spring of 2020 and sent text messages and emails that troubled mother
and father’s brother. Mother successfully moved the district court for an ex parte order
granting her emergency sole legal and physical custody of the children. The district court’s
2020 order required father to maintain psychiatric care and to have only supervised
parenting time until he demonstrated control over his disconcerting behavior.
The parties mediated the custody issue in 2021, agreeing that mother would continue
with sole custody through July 1, 2022. They also agreed that father’s parenting time would
be limited, in that his time with their son would occur on one weeknight and every other
weekend and with their daughter only when she was willing. Their agreement also
designated that a consultant would decide parenting-time disputes and required father to
remain medication compliant. The district court approved the stipulation by order, but the
3
parenting consultant soon suspended father’s parenting time after determining that he was
not taking his prescribed mental-health medication.
Mother moved the district court in November 2021 to modify custody by making
permanent her role as sole legal and physical custodian. Father opposed the motion.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing that spanned six days. Much of the
testimony concerned father’s mental health. The evidence revealed that his first major
mental-health event occurred in 1995 and included a suicide attempt. The next occurred in
2009 after the birth of the parties’ daughter. Father’s mental health remained stable until
the divorce in 2018, and he treated his bipolar diagnosis with prescribed nontherapeutic
doses of lithium.
Dr. Scott Fischer, a psychiatrist whom the district court appointed on the joint
agreement of the parties to psychologically evaluate father, testified about father’s mental
health. Dr. Fischer confirmed father’s prior diagnosis of bipolar disorder and recommended
that he continue psychiatric treatment and medication.
Father contested the bipolar diagnosis and introduced the opinions of other
professionals. Two doctors and father’s therapist strongly disagreed with Dr. Fischer’s
diagnosis. Dr. Linda Marshall and Dr. Timothy Beyer questioned Dr. Fischer’s
methodology, and they concluded that father instead was suffering from PTSD. Dr. Beyer,
who had become father’s treating physician, maintained that Dr. Fischer’s two-hour
interview of father was inadequate to support Dr. Fischer’s finding that father presented
manic symptoms because behavior cannot be characterized as manic unless it occurs over
an extended period. Dr. Marshall concurred with Dr. Beyer, testifying that father had been
4
misdiagnosed with bipolar disorder. Father’s therapist, Susan Boyer, also testified that the
bipolar-disorder diagnosis was inaccurate; she instead diagnosed father with PTSD based
on traumatic events in his childhood. These witnesses added that father’s adjusted
treatment plan had improved his PTSD symptoms, that he was mentally healthy and
medication compliant, and that they believed that he could follow court orders.
Others testified about the effects of father’s mental-health behavior on the children.
Mother testified that father sent his daughter a note with flowers in August 2021 stating
falsely that his dog, whom the girl loves, “may have been killed by the Northfield Police.”
And she spoke about a video that showed father and their daughter shooting a Nerf gun at
a whiteboard labeled either “white churches” or “white people’s churches” while father
spoke in the background that they “had plans” and they “definitely have a target.” She also
testified about an incident in which father told the girl that he had given her room at his
house to refugees but that the girl could “sneak in through an unlocked window.” Father’s
brother testified about troubling social-media posts. He testified that father had posted two
videos with his son in which he taught the then six-year -old boy how to use an axe and
how to burn gasoline from the garage floor. He testified about another video show ing the
boy picking up an electric hedge trimmer.
Mother also testified about father’s conduct towards her. She testified that father
had repeatedly made false accusations against her, including alleging that she had stolen
Oxycontin from her workplace and that she was abusing the children. She recounted that
several threatening messages led her to successfully petition for a harassment restraining
5
order (HRO) against father and that father violated the HRO several times—resulting in
four misdemeanor convictions.
Witnesses familiar with the parties also test ified. The Northfield YMCA CEO
testified that father’s erratic behavior led the YMCA to require a behavior agreement for
father and mother. Father rejected the attempt, inscribing the draft agreement with, “[Y]ou
are nuts,” and the YMCA consequently removed the parties’ son from its summer camp.
Mother testified that the removal left the child “tearful.” Northfield Middle School
Assistant Principal Michael O’Keefe testified about the parties’ daughter’s individualized
education plan. Father had strongly disagreed that the girl needed the plan and often
contacted school staff to express his displeasure. Because of the nature of father’s
communications, the school required that father communicate only through O’Keefe.
The district court heard testimony of a physical encounter between father and his
daughter. Father slapped the then 11-year -old child in the face, giving her a bloody nose,
while he was trying to put her to bed. Father immediately informed mother of the incident
and then told his therapist. Father testified that he accidentally slapped the girl while trying
to break up a fight between the children, while mother insisted that it was intentional.
Witnesses who supervised father’s parenting time also testified. Kathey Huisman, a
supervised visitation coordinator, observed many parenting-time sessions and testified that
father did not exhibit behavior that made her question his parenting ability. She found that
father was appropriately responsive to the children while he spent time with them. Erin
Janssens, father’s ex-girlfriend and fellow church member, also observed parenting time
6
between him and the children. She testified that father engaged in no physically threatening
behavior and that she never saw any incidents that endangered the children.
The district court denied mother’s motion to permanently modify custody, finding
that she failed to present evidence rising to the level of endangerment. Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s order denying her motion to modify custody.
We afford the district court broad discretion to determine custody. Hansen v. Todnem, 908
N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). The district court acts within its discretion by finding facts
supported by the evidence, applying the law properly, and issuing a logical and evidentially
supported decision. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). On this
standard, we hold that the district court acted within its broad discretion by denying
mother’s motion to modify custody.
Mother moved to modify the parties’ court-adopted, custody agreement based on
her allegation that the children are endangered. To modify custody based on endangerment,
mother had to establish that the circumstances have changed since the existing custody
order, that modifying custody is in the children’s best interests, that “the children’s present
environment endangers their physical health, emotional health, or emotional
development,” and that the advantages of changing the children’s environment outweigh
the harm caused by the change. Crowley v. Meyer, 897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Minn. 2017); see
also Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (2022). The district court addressed only the endangerment
prong of the analysis, concluding that mother had failed to produce evidence that the
children’s present environment with father endangers them.
7
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding no evidence of
endangerment, relying on two theories: first, the evidence presented proves endangerment,
and second, evidence ignored by the district court proves endangerment. But we will not
set a district court’s finding of fact, including a finding that endangerment has not occurred,
unless the finding is clearly erroneous. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. The term
“endangerment” is imprecise and depends on each case’s particular facts. See Goldman v.
Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008). To satisfy the endangerment element, the
party seeking custody modification must show “a significant degree of danger.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Mother argues that the district court’s fact-findings compel a finding
of endangerment. She points to father’s slapping his daughter’s face, interfering with her
education plan, handing their six-year-old son an axe to hack at a rope, burning gasoline
off the garage floor with the boy nearby, and HRO violations. The district court observed
that it could not find that the slap had been intentional because of the disputed or unclear
testimony. And we cannot say that the district court’s assessment of the other concerns is
contrary to logic, particularly considering the supervised nature of father’s parenting time
and the substantial testimony strongly indicating that father had been misdiagnosed and
that he engaged in the questionable behavior while he had not been properly treated for his
actual mental-health issues. Although mother’s cited incidents suggest a need for caution,
they do not compel a finding of endangerment such that we can say that the district court’s
finding is clearly erroneous and therefore an abuse of its discretion.
We address next mother’s contention that the district court improperly omitted
findings supported by the evidence. The endangerment element requires an analysis of the
8
children’s “present environment,” which we have defined as “the last judicially created
environment.” Hassing v. Lancaster, 570 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. App. 1997). Mother
contends that, by omitting evidence of endangerment established at the evidentiary hearing,
the district court misinterpreted “present environment” by requiring the evidence to have
occurred more recently than the baseline 2018 custody order. But our review of the record
and the district court’s decision informs us that the district court implicitly considered the
omitted evidence and found that it failed to rise to the level necessary to show
endangerment. Mother is correct that the district court’s order did not reference certain
incidents that witnesses discussed at trial. These include father’s sending his daughter the
note falsely suggesting his dog had died, telling his daughter that he had given her room to
refugees, posting a video with his daughter pointing Nerf guns at a whiteboard referencing
“white churches,” refusing to sign the YMCA agreement, and permitting his son to handle
an electric hedge trimmer.
We clarify why we are affirming the district court’s decision despite mother’s stated
concerns. Our opinion does not call mother’s concerns into question, and the potential
implications of the Nerf -gun incident is self-evidently alarming in nature. But again, the
district court’s order recognizes that father’s mental health should improve under his proper
mental-health diagnosis and exercises caution by requiring that his parenting time remain
supervised for a period following the order. In doing so, it implicitly observed that the
troubling incidents occurred before changes were made to father’s diagnosis. The district
court emphasized, “[Father] has not followed court orders, but his medical providers have
reassured the Court that there is no medical reason [he] will not follow future Court orders.”
9
And it explained, “With the issue of [father] remaining medication compliant resolved,
[mother] did not submit evidence sufficient to show [that he] endangers the children ’s
physical health, emotional health, or their emotional and physical development.”
Our deferential standard of review on close calls in custody matters does not open
the door for us to reweigh the evidence or to substitute our judgment for the district court’s.
The district court heard, and was convinced by, testimony from medical professionals
indicating that father’s troubling behavior will improve with the proper treatment. The
district court is in the best position to evaluate the mental-health and behavioral testimony
and to assess whether, now that father has been diagnosed with PTS D, his new treatment
will mitigate the concerns that led to mother’s motion. We emphasize that the record
demonstrates that the district court has continually exercised caution over this matter. It
has continued to maintain mother’s temporary sole legal and physical custody over the
children to allow for reunification therapy, and it has ordered that father’s parenting time
remain supervised. The district court has demonstrated that it remains committed to
protecting the children’s safety and making decisions focused on their best interests. And
we add that our decision rests only on circumstances as they exist at the time of the district
court’s order and that our opinion should not be read to discourage the parties from moving
to modify custody if the circumstances change in a manner that undermines the basis of
the district court’s decision or this court’s affirmance.
We are not persuaded to a different result by the dissenting opinion, which we
believe rests on three errors of fact and two of law. As to fact, first, the dissent emphasizes
father’s interference with the individualized education plan; yet the hearing testimony did
10
not establish that he interfered in any meaningful way but that he frequently expressed his
displeasure to the school and mother. Second, because we are restrained to review the
issues on appeal based only on the record before us as developed in the district court, it is
not our prerogative to base a decision even on part on father’s supposed statement about
taking the children out of the state—an alleged statement occurring after the district court’s
order and not part of the district court’s assessment. Third, our review on appeal rests on
the facts as found by the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, and so our opinion
cannot rest on our own characterization of the circumstances, our own recalculation of the
evidence, or our own credibility determinations. The factual summary in this opinion
therefore differs substantially from the dissent’s. As to law, the dissent relies on no case
that compelled the district court to find endangerment; the dissent’s cited cases simply
affirmed district court findings of endangerment when the district court was persuaded by
the evidence that endangerment had in fact occurred or reversed the district court’s denial
of an evidentiary hearing when the moving party alleged a prima facie case of
endangerment, two circumstances plainly and materially different from those involved in
this case. And we disagree that the district court failed as a matter of law to base its decision
on present events at the time of the trial. The trial included evidence credited by the district
court that father’s behavior will improve now that he has been properly diagnosed. It is
therefore not at all against logic for the district court to find that the children’s present
environment does not endanger them. In sum, we are satisfied in this difficult case with
challenging facts that we have afforded the appropriate deference to the district court.
Affirmed.

D-1
REYES, Judge (dissenting)
When conducting a child-endangerment analysis, a district court must (1) base its
analysis on the children’s present environment and (2) address all relevant evidence of
endangerment. Hassing v. Lancaster, 570 N.W.2d 701, 702- 04 (Minn. App. 1997). The
district court’s order in this case failed to do either. Instead, the district court exceeded the
temporal limits of its analysis of the children’s present environment by relying on the
speculative future i mprovement in respondent Richard Charles Graves’s ( father)
compliance with psychiatric treatment and court orders, rather than taking into account the
impact his past pattern of conduct had on the children. Furthermore, the district court
disregarded relevant evidence of current and past endangerment, including that father
purportedly: locked his daughter out of the house, causing her to run away from home; sent
flowers and a card to his daughter while falsely claiming that her dog may have been killed
by police; and publicly exposed compromising details about his children online. These
examples serve only as an illustrative subset of endangerment evidence presented at trial
but omitted from the district court’s analysis. Because each of these legal errors in the
district court’s analysis constitutes an abuse of discretion, I would reverse and remand for
the district court to reconsider its endangerment finding and then analyze the remaining
custody-modification-order factors. I therefore respectfully dissent.
In November 2018, the district court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage of
father and appellant Hillary Mercer Graves (mother) and granting them joint legal and joint
physical custody of their daughter, born in September 2008, and their son, born in
November 2013. However, following the 2018 custody order, father engaged in a

D-2
continuous pattern of “concerning” behavior around mother and the children, leading the
district court in 2020 to enter an ex parte order granting mother’s request for temporary
sole legal custody and temporary sole physical custody of the children. The district court
limited father’s parenting time to supervised visits and required that he undergo psychiatric
treatment and take “all prescribed medications . . . to maintain his mental health.”
Father’s ongoing concerning behavior also led mother to obtain a harassment
restraining order (HRO) against him, which the district court later extended for 50 years in
April 2021. Father violated the HRO a short time later, leading to his arrest and causing
the parties’ parenting consultant to suspend father’s parenting time in August 2021. The
district court found that the parenting consultant withdrew due to father’s “uncooperative
and disruptive conduct.” In November 2021, mother filed a motion with the district court
to determine permanent modification of legal custody and physical custody of the children.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing, during which both parties testified and called
multiple witnesses, including family members, various community members, parenting
consultants and assessors, and father’s mental-health professionals. Several witnesses
described and corroborated father’s numerous actions that endangered the children. The
majority of these incidents were not addressed by the district court’s order.
The district court denied mother’s motion to modify custody permanently after
determining that she failed to present evidence showing endangerment.

D-3
The district court abused its discretion by failing to base its endangerment
analysis on the children’s present environment and by disregarding relevant
evidence of endangerment.

We will reverse a district court’s custody determination if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). “A district court
abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey , 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). A district
court must set forth the basis of its decision in child-custody matters “with a high degree
of particularity” to enable meaningful appellate review. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249
N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976) (quotation omitted).
A district court may modify a court- ordered custody arrangement if it finds: (1) a
change in circumstances; (2) that modification is necessary to serve the child’s best
interests; (3) that the “present environment endangers the child’s physical or emotiona l
health or impairs the child’s emotional development”; and (4) that the benefits of the
modification outweigh its detriment. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (2022); see also Crowley
v. Meyer, 897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Minn. 2017). The district court must evaluate the totality
of the children’s circumstances based on the “present environment,” which means the last
“judicially approved environment.” Taflin v. Taflin, 366 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App.
1985). In other words, the district court must consider both the current conditions and
“[t]he history of [the] child’s care” in the environment established in the last judicial order
regarding permanent custody. Hassing, 570 N.W.2d at 703. In this case, the district court
issued its last judicial order regarding permanent custody in November 2018.

D-4
“Endangerment” implies a “significant degree of danger” to the child’s physical or
emotional state, Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000), and is analyzed “based on the particular facts
of each case,” Lilleboe v. Lilleboe, 453 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 1990). Even harm
“purely to emotional development” can suffice for endangerment. Geibe v. Geibe, 571
N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App. 1997). The endangerment analysis must include all relevant
evidence showing significant harm to a child’s well-being, including evidence of conduct
that is reasonably anticipated to have an adverse effect on the child’s well-being. See
Hassing, 570 N.W.2d at 703; Sharp, 614 N.W.2d at 263-64. Importantly, a district court
may not disregard relevant evidence in an endangerment analysis. See Hassing, 570
N.W.2d at 703-04.
Here, the district court misapplied the applicable law in two ways, both of which
constitute an abuse of discretion. First, other than one incident in 2019, the district court
erroneously analyzed only father’s conduct during supervised parenting time following the
2020 ex parte order, rather than considering the proper present environment first
established by the November 2018 court custody order. See Taflin, 366 N.W.2d at 321.
The district court’s order focuses on father’s conduct during his supervised parenting time,
noting that “all indications from the notes provided by the parenting time supervisors is
that [father’s] behavior during parenting time with his children was appropriate and
normal.” This analysis fails to address relevant evidence that the district court is required
to consider. See Hassing, 570 N.W.2d at 703-04.

D-5
The district court further misapplied the law by exceeding the timeframe of the
children’s “present environment” when evaluating the risk of endangerment. Instead, the
district court erroneously relied upon father’s speculative future compliance with
psychiatric treatment and court orders. Hassing, 570 N.W.2d at 703 (noting that “present
environment” encompasses environment “at the time of the modification” and
“circumstances in previous years” (emphasis added)). The district court focused on
father’s possible future compliance with district court orders and parenting-consultant
orders, but ignored his conflicting past conduct, which is a relevant and necessary
consideration in the endangerment analysis. Id. at 703 (courts must also analyze parent’s
“history of [the] child’s care” when assessing whether maintaining “the present
environment” will endanger child). Indeed, the district court itself found that father “has
not followed court orders” during the relevant time period yet failed to address his lack of
compliance in its analysis.
Second, the district court erroneously omitted substantial relevant evidence from its
endangerment analysis. In its order, the district court identified only one incident that “rose
to the level necessary to show endangerment” – that, in December 2019 and during both
supervised parenting time and father’s purported compliance with his mental- health
treatment, father slapped then-11-year-old daughter in the face so hard that she suffered a
bloody nose. However, the district court disregarded that incident by stating that “neither
party presented evidence showing any specific instance that rose to the level necessary to
show endangerment.”

D-6
Although the district court addressed a second allegation that father endangered
daughter’s school performance because he disagreed and interfered with her individualized
education plan (IEP), it erroneously dismissed that claim after noting that father’s mental-
health issues did not cause daughter to need an IEP,
1 without discussing the evidence that
father interfered with the IEP after it was in place. Further, the district court then clearly
erred by reiterating that “[t]here are no allegations of emotional abuse or physical harm
that show endangerment” and that “there is no evidence showing [father] would prevent or
harm the children’s emotional, physical, or intellectual development.”
Contrary to the district court’s finding, the evidence shows that father did interfere
with his daughter’s education, specifically, her IEP, even though her IEP had greatly
improved her reading and allowed her to be removed from the special-education reading
class. See Kimmel v. Kimmel, 392 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming finding
that parent’s behavior endangered child based in part on “[s]chool records show[ing] that
[the child] has progressed significantly since placement with his father”), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 29, 1986).
2
As to the third and fourth incidents that were both videotaped by father, one of son
chopping a rope with an axe and another of son standing close to burning gasoline, the

1 Daughter had been placed on an IEP after being diagnosed with learning disorders that
impacted her ability to read and write. Nevertheless, the district court’s analysis misses
the point that father interfered with an IEP that had greatly improved her reading to the
point that she no longer required a special-education reading class.
2 See also Omtvedt v. Jansen, No. A14-0418, 2015 WL 134015, at *5 (Minn. App. Jan. 12,
2015) (parent’s interference with child’s educational stability endangered minor’s
“emotional and psychological development”). Omtvedt is a nonprecedential opinion and
we cite it only for its persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

D-7
district court identified them in its findings of fact but wholly failed to analyze them to
determine whether they constituted child endangerment.
Although the district court gave a limited acknowledgment of these four incidents,
it completely disregarded the majority of the relevant evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing concerning whether father’s conduct endangers the children, including allegations
that father:
• Locked daughter out of the house during supervised parenting time, leading her to
fear him to the point that she ran away. Mother testified that daughter did not feel
safe after the incident and asked mother to pick her up. See Lilleboe, 453 N.W.2d
at 724 (“Fear of the custodial parent . . . is also a recognized sign of present
endangerment”); Harkema v. Harkema, 474 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. App. 1991)
(concluding district court abused its discretion by determining that affidavits
expressing children’s fear of custodial parent did not indicate possibility of
endangerment). Since this incident, now -15-year-old daughter has refused
parenting time with father. See Ross v. Ross, 477 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. App.
1991) (holding that “[t]he choice of an older teenage child is an overwhelming
consideration in [ ] deciding whether [she] is endangered by preserving the custodial
placement [she] opposes”).
• Created and posted videos of his then-six-year-old son picking up an electric hedge
trimmer. Both mother and father’s brother testified that they were concerned about
the son’s safety based on this video and the other two videotaped incidents involving
son.

D-8
• Engaged in such erratic behavior at a YMCA that the CEO asked father to sign a
behavior agreement. Father responded by signing the agreement “UR
Nuts.” Father also sent excessive communications to YMCA staff, resulting in the
YMCA removing son from its summer camp. Mother testified that son loved the
YMCA camp and was “tearful,” “confused,” “worried,” and “appeared really sad”
after being removed from the program.
• Sent flowers and a card to his daughter that falsely told her that her beloved dog
“may have been killed by the Northfield police.” Mother testified that daughter was
dismayed and confused by the flowers and card.
• Sent a text message to his daughter telling her that he was giving her room to a
refugee but that she could still sneak into the house “through an unlocked window.”
Mother testified that, in response to the text, daughter was “worried about her stuff,
the belongings she had [in the room],” and “confus[ed] about why he would do
[that].”
• Used money set aside in a joint account intended for the children’s benefit to finance
his personal expenses, including to obtain bail money. See Taflin, 366 N.W.2d at
320 (finding sufficient showing of emotional endangerment when, among other
factors, custodial parent had used child-support money for their own needs).
• Publicly exposed details about the children online and posted content that
potentially compromised their safety. The evidence showed that father posted
excessive amounts of personal information, including videos of son and daughter,
their names, and addresses, on social media. One video showed father with daughter

D-9
shooting a nerf gun at a whiteboard labeled either “white churches” or “white
people’s churches,” as father narrated that they “had plans” and “definitely have a
target.”
• Made serious false allegations of child abuse against mother. See Sharp, 614
N.W.2d at 263-64 (concluding that mother’s false reports of abuse was probative
evidence of endangerment).
• Stated that, if he obtains joint custody of the children, he will be “changing his name
and moving himself and [his] children to a location where they will not be found,
notwithstanding that daughter has explicitly stated her fear of father and does not
want any contact with him. This disturbing statement was corroborated by both
mother and father’s own father. See Johnson-Smolak v. Fink, 703 N.W.2d 588, 591
(Minn. App. 2005) (endangerment can include likely future harm to child’s physical
or emotional well-being); see also Sharp, 614 N.W.2d at 263-264.
Evidence at the hearing also demonstrated that, in addition to father’s past pattern
of disturbing conduct, at least some of father’s concerning behavior will be ongoing – a
relevant circumstance which the district court did not address. See Sharp, 614 N.W.2d at
263-64 (noting that endangerment analysis properly includes evidence of conduct
reasonably anticipated to adversely impact children’s well-being); Amarreh v. Amarreh,
918 N.W.2d 228, 231 -32 (Minn. App. 2018) (concluding that district court abused its
discretion by dismissing father’s endangerment-based custody- modification motion
without evidentiary hearing when father alleged that mother substantially interfered with
father’s relationship with his children). Further, the district court noted that the evidence

D-10
shows that father has shown an extensive history of disobeying court orders, including the
HRO mother obtained against him. Several parenting consultants also provided testimony
lamenting father’s uncooperative behavior and noncompliance with their orders. The
district court further found that the testimony showed that it was father, not mother, who
was “uncooperative and disruptive” to the point that the parties have been unable to keep
a consistent parenting consultant. See Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360 (Minn. App.
2006) (stating that parents’ inability to “communicate and cooperate” is relevant in custody
determinations), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2006).
Furthermore, the district court’s order reflects that it did not implicitly consider this
probative evidence of endangerment as suggested by the majority. The district court
explicitly stated that “[t]here are no allegations of emotional abuse or physical harm that
show endangerment.” (Emphasis added). This finding is refuted by the record. Not only
are there allegations that father’s conduct endangered the children, but many of those
incidents are corroborated by witness testimony or independent evidence. The district
court’s omission of any reference to the incidents described above therefore constitutes
reversible error. See Sharp, 614 N.W.2d at 263-64.
Aside from the district court’s failure to reconcile vast amounts of evidence
demonstrating father’s endangerment of the children, it also completely omits a discussion
and analysis of the harm to the children. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2022) (requiring
district court to consider “best interests of the child[ren]” when making custody
modification determination). Instead, the district court’s order erroneously focuses
primarily on father’s potential continued future compliance with psychiatric treatment,

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medication, and court and parenting consultant orders. The district court therefore
misapplied the law by disregarding relevant evidence of endangerment to the children. See
Hassing, 570 N.W.2d at 702.
While a district court must determine whether a party’s conduct rises to the level of
endangerment, its discretion is not unlimited. See Harkema, 474 N.W.2d at 14; Taflin, 366
N.W.2d at 321 (concluding district court abused its discretion by denying motion to modify
custody without evidentiary hearing when father’s affidavit made prima facie showing of
endangerment); Dabill v. Dabill, 514 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Minn. App. 1994) (reversing
district court’s child-custody modification when evidence did not show endangerment). A
district court abuses its discretion when the record reflects that it erred by disregarding
relevant evidence of endangerment to the children and failing to address a parent’s history
of care. See Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d at 171 (requiring “basis for the court’s decision be set
forth with a high degree of particularity” to enable meaningful appellate review). Here,
the district court’s order disregarded several disconcerting examples of endangerment and
explicitly stated that, beyond one instance of child endangerment, “[t]here are no
allegations of emotional abuse or physical harm that show endangerment.” The district
court further erred by relying on father’s projected improvement rather than his past pattern
of conduct to evaluate the children’s “present environment.” I would therefore reverse and
remand for the district court to reconsider its endangerment finding and then analyze the
remaining custody-modification-order factors.