State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1626

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kenny Lenard Peaches,
Appellant.

Filed September 3, 2024
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-3891

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the constitutional validity of his guilty plea, arguing that he
was compelled to enter an involuntary guilty plea because he had already received an
executed prison sentence in his previous, unrelated cases. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2022, the district court imposed a domestic -abuse no-contact order
(DANCO) prohibiting appellant Kenny Lenard Peaches from contacting his wife, R.B. In
June 2023, appellant pleaded guilty to both unlawful possession of ammunition and a
DANCO violation (original cases). Before sentencing on the original cases, the state
charged appellant in three separate cases with additional DANCO violations for conduct
that occurred between June 27 and July 5, 2023.
This appeal arises from appellant’s conviction of the DANCO violation from July
5, 2023. On that day, officers performed a welfare check on R.B. at her residence and
discovered appellant attempting to hide underneath a coffee table. Because appellant had
been convicted of two prior domestic-violence offenses within the last ten years,
respondent State of Minnesota charged him with a felony DANCO violation under Minn.
Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2022). The district court scheduled appellant’s three new
cases for an omnibus hearing in August 2023. On July 26, 2023, the week before the
omnibus hearing, appellant received a guidelines sentence in his original cases of 60
months in prison for the unlawful- possession-of-ammunition charge and 29 months in
prison for the DANCO violation.
3
At the omnibus hearing, the parties informed the district court that they had entered
into an agreement for appellant to plead guilty to the July 5 DANCO violation in exchange
for the state’s agreement to dismiss the two remaining charges. The parties als o agreed
that appellant would be sentenced at the low end of the guidelines range and that the
sentence would run concurrent with his sentence in the original cases. The district court
asked appellant if he understood the proposed agreement, if he had enough time to discuss
the agreement with his attorney, and if he wanted to move forward with the agreement.
Appellant answered affirmatively to each question and stated that he had no questions for
the district court.
Before entering his plea, appellant’s attorney went through his plea petition with
him on the record, at which time appellant acknowledged that his attorney had discussed
his constitutional rights with him and that he wished to waive those rights and plead guilty.
During the subsequent plea colloquy, appellant acknowledged that he understood the
charges against him and the terms of the plea agreement, was not under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, had enough time to speak with his attorney, and was not induced to enter
the agreement by any promises or threats. Following the district court’s acceptance of the
plea petition, the state obtained a factual basis for the underlying offense. The district court
then found that appellant made an accurate, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea and
followed the parties’ agreement to impose a bottom-of-the-box sentence of 29 months in
prison, to run concurrent with his sentence in the original cases.
This appeal follows.

4
DECISION
Appellant entered a constitutionally valid guilty plea.
Appellant argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because he
entered it involuntarily . Appellant maintains that, because the district court had already
imposed a 60-month prison sentence in his original cases, he had “no meaningful choice”
but to plead guilty and accept an executed prison sentence to resolve his three pending
cases. We are not convinced.
Although criminal defendants do not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea, State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007), withdrawal is permitted if
“necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest
injustice exists if the guilty plea is not constitutionally valid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A guilty plea is constitutionally valid if it is accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent. State v. Lawrence, 982 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. App. 2022). This court
reviews the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id.
To determine whether a defendant entered a guilty plea voluntarily, the reviewing
court “examines what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea
agreement.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. The voluntariness requirement ensures that a
defendant’s guilty plea is not the result of “improper pressure or coercion.” Id. (Emphasis
added.) A guilty plea is considered involuntary “when it rests in any significant degree on
an unfulfilled or unfulfillable promise, including a promise of a sentence unauthorized by
law.” Uselman v. State, 831 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotations omitted).
This court considers the totality of the relevant circumstances to determine whether a
5
defendant entered their guilty plea voluntarily. Johnson v. State , 925 N.W.2d 287, 289
(Minn. App. 2019).
The supreme court has rejected the notion that a criminal defendant has “no
meaningful choice” but to plead guilty when they still have the option to proceed to trial
or continue to conduct plea negotiations. See Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn.
2017). Like in Dikken, here appellant was free to proceed to trial on his new charges and
had the additional option to plead not guilty and continue negotiations with the state.
Appellant acknowledged that his attorney had advised him of his constitutional rights,
including his right to trial, and that he wished to waive those rights and plead guilty.
Furthermore, appellant’s prison sentence in his original cases is insufficient to
demonstrate that the state induced his guilty plea through “improper pressure or coercion.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Although “[i]mproper pressures or inducements can come in
a variety of forms,” a plea is only involuntary when it is “induced by coercive or deceptive
action.” Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 877. The record here contains no evidence of “coercive
or deceptive action” nor “unfulfillable promises” by the state. Further, appellant
acknowledged before pleading guilty that he had received no threats or promises outside
of the plea agreement. We also note that, by accepting the plea deal, appellant was able to
resolve his three outstanding felony charges without risking any additional jail time. See
State v. Bell, 971 N.W.2d 92, 104 (Minn. App. 2022) (concluding that defendant was not
induced to enter plea because of district court’s representations about parole process, but
because pleading guilty would allow him to avoid life sentence), rev. denied (Minn. Apr.
6
27, 2022). However, even if appellant pleaded guilty only to “cut his losses,” that fact
alone is insufficient to render his plea involuntary. See id.
Because we conclude that appellant entered his guilty plea voluntarily, his plea is
constitutionally valid, and he is not entitled to withdrawal.
Affirmed.