In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1630

In re the Marriage of:

Jesse A Freking, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Audra Jo Freking nka Audra Jo Buxengard,
Appellant,

County of Nobles,
Respondent.

Filed August 26, 2024
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-FA-15-185

Maryellen Suhrhoff, Muske, Muske & Suhrhoff, Ltd., Windom, Minnesota (for respondent
Jesse A. Freking)

Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Braden Hoefert, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
On appeal after remand in this marital-dissolution proceeding, appellant argues that
the district court’s allocation of property and debts is not fair and equitable. Because the
district court’s allocation of property and debts was within its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Audra Jo Buxengard 1 and respondent Jesse A. Freking married in 2004.
Freking sought marriage dissolution in 2015. The district court dissolved the parties’
marriage in 2016, reserving issues of custody, parenting time, property division, and
liability for a later trial. Following the 2017 trial on the disputed issues, the district court
entered a judgment and decree. Freking appealed and this court reversed and remanded
for additional findings related to the division of marital property and debts. Freking v.
Buxengard, No. A18-0250, 2018 WL 6273393 (Minn. App. Dec. 3, 2018).
2
An evidentiary hearing was held on the remanded issues related to the homestead
valuation, valuation of the two semitrucks and trailers awarded to Buxengard, and
allocation of the debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
In April 2022, the district court entered a judgment dividing property and debts.
The district court determined that Buxengard had a $1,003 nonmarital interest in the
homestead, and it awarded the homestead to Buxengard subject to all existing mortgages.

1 Formerly known as Audra Jo Freking.
2 This court also affirmed the physical custody of the children and parenting time for two
of the children. Id.
3
The district court found that, because the semitrucks and trailer s were awarded to
Buxengard and that she benefitted from the sale of those items, the sale amount would be
credited to her. The district court also found that the IRS debt for unpaid payroll taxes was
incurred while Buxengard was working as the company’s bookkeeper and determined that
the parties were responsible for equal shares of that debt.
Buxengard moved for amended findings, claiming personal property was
improperly omitted from the district court’s property division, challenging the district
court’s treatment of the sale of the semitrucks and trailers, and arguing that Freking should
be solely responsible for the IRS debt. The district court issued an amended order granting
in part and denying in part Buxengard’s request for amended findings.
Buxengard appeals.
DECISION
“Upon a dissolution of a marriage, . . . the [district] court shall make a just and
equitable division of the marital property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2022). We will
affirm a district court’s “division of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and
principle even though this court may have taken a different approach.” Servin v. Servin,
345 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Minn. 1984).
Buxengard claims that the property and debt allocation is not fair or equitable.
Property
“A [district] court has broad discretion in evaluating and dividing property in a
marital dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse of discretion.” Antone v.
Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002) (citation omitted). A district court abuses its
4
discretion if its findings are unsupported by the evidence, if it does not properly apply the
law, or if its decision goes against logic and the facts on the record. Woolsey v. Woolsey,
975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262
(Minn. 2022)).
Buxengard argues that the district court failed to make findings to support its
valuation of the property, which was contrary to the property values stipulated by the
parties. We are not persuaded.
A district court’s valuation of property is a finding of fact. Maurer v. Maurer, 623
N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). Appellate courts will not set aside a finding of fact unless
the finding is clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see Goldman v. Greenwood, 748
N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (applying rule 52.01 in family-law appeal). The clear-error
standard of review “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the
decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021).
When applying the clear-error standard of review, appellate courts (1) view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do
not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus,
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all
the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.

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Id. at 222 (quotations omitted); see Bayer v. Bayer, 979 N.W.2d 507, 513 (Minn. App.
2022) (citing Kenney in family-law appeal); Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468,
472 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear-error standard of review). The record supports
the district court’s valuation of the property. “When the record reasonably supports the
findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable
basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted).
1. Homestead
Buxengard challenges the district court’s treatment of the homestead, claiming she
has no equity in the home and noting that it is encumbered by mortgages. Buxengard has
not, however, identified whether the district court erred by adopting the stipulated values,
in calculating her nonmarital interest, or in its subsequent allocation of debt associated with
the homestead. “[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear
affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon
the one who relies upon it.” Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944).
The district court found that the homestead was valued at $52,000 at the time of
marriage, and that the homestead was valued at $63,000 at the valuation date, consistent
with the values to which the parties stipulated. Because Buxengard bought the home before
the parties married, the district court applied the modified Schmitz
3 formula to determine
Buxengard’s nonmarital interest in the home. See Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 102 (explaining
the Schmitz method of determining the marital and nonmarital interests of property). The

3 Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981).
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district court determined that Buxengard’s nonmarital interest in the home was $1,003.89.
The district court’s finding is supported by the record and is, therefore, not clearly
erroneous. The district court also acted within its discretion by crediting Buxengard with
that interest in its asset allocation. See id. at 103-04 (noting that a person retains their
nonmarital interest in a homestead despite increasing the marital debt secured by the
homestead).
2. Semitrucks and Trailers
Buxengard argues that the district court abused its discretion by deviating from the
appraised value of the semitrucks and trailers as stipulated by the parties and crediting to
her the full value of the sale because she did not actually receive the proceeds from the sale
of the items.
The district court found that the value of the semitrucks and trailers was equal to
their sale proceeds. At the evidentiary hearing following remand, Buxengard testified that
she sold the semitrucks and trailer s to repay a loan from her parents for attorney fees and
she agreed that her “obligation to [her] parents ha[d] been reduced by the equity after the
sale of the two semis and the trailer.” In its order, the district court noted that Buxengard
sold the semitrucks and trailers for more than their appraised value and found that “the
actual sale price is more accurate than the stipulated amount.” Thus, the district court’s
valuation is supported by the record and its findings are, therefore, not clearly erroneous.
And, because Buxengard benefitted from the sale of the semitrucks and trailers by paying
off the loan to her parents, the district court acted within its discretion by accounting for
the sale proceeds in its allocation of assets that were received by Buxengard.
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3. Other Property
Buxengard claims that the district court failed to allocate certain items of small
machinery/equipment, insurance proceeds, and a washing machine. Because the record
supports the district court’s findings that these items no longer are in the possession of
either party, it acted within its discretion by not allocating these items.
Debt
“A [district] court’s apportionment of marital debt is treated as a property division
and reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” Berenberg v. Berenberg, 474
N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991).
We previously remanded two issues involving the parties’ debts to district court for
additional findings. Freking, 2018 WL 6273393 at *9-10. The first issue was “that the
district court erred by allocating the entire [Farm Service Agency (FSA)] debt to [Freking]
without making any explanatory findings.” Id. at *9. On remand, Freking agreed to
assume the FSA debt and that is not part of this appeal. The second issue involved IRS
debt related to unpaid payroll taxes by Central Pacific Express Inc. (CPE), Freking’s
partially owned, now-dissolved trucking corporation.
4 We remanded the IRS issue to the
district court because “the district court made no findings to explain its rationale for
allocating the entire IRS debt to [Freking].” Id. at *10.

4 We take judicial notice of the records of the Minnesota Secretary of State, which show
that the state administratively dissolved CP E in 2016. See Minn. R. Evid. 201(b) (“A
judicially noticed fact must be . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”)
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On remand, the district court found that the IRS debt was the result of a failure to
pay payroll taxes at a time when Buxengard was bookkeeping for CPE. The district court
concluded that, because Buxengard was bookkeeping, “it is fair to hold her responsible for
the business’s failure to pay payroll taxes.” The district court’s treatment of the IRS debt
is supported by the record and adequate findings. Therefore, the district court acted within
its discretion by splitting the IRS debt between Buxengard a nd Freking. See Servin , 345
N.W.2d at 758 (noting that this court will affirm a district “court’s division of property if
it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though this court may have taken a
different approach”).
Affirmed.