State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1639

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Angela Renee Jones,
Appellant.

Filed August 5, 2024
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CR-21-8731, 73-CR-21-3952, 73-CR-23-4215

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Ole Tvedten, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for second- degree intentional
murder, appellant argues that her Alford plea was inaccurate because it was not supported
by a strong factual basis, and because she did not acknowledge that the state’s evidence
2
would be sufficient for a jury to find her guilty. Because the state presented a strong factual
basis and appellant adequately agreed that she would be found guilty based upon these
facts, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Angela Renee Jones pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2020), as part of a global settlement with
respondent State of Minnesota. She now seeks to withdraw her guilty plea to
second-degree intentional murder, arguing that it was inaccurate.
Sometime between May 31 and June 2, 2021, Jones and her girlfriend, D.H., arrived
at the victim’s apartment. Later, D.H. left the apartment and Jones and the victim remained.
When D.H. returned to the apartment, she heard a pop or bang and saw a flash. D.H. saw
the victim lying on the ground, dying. Jones and D.H. then left the apartment. The victim’s
body was discovered the morning of June 2.
The medical examiner’s report concluded that the victim died from a gunshot wound
to the head. The bullet entered the victim’s right upper lip and came to rest in the victim’s
vertebrae.
The casing from the bullet that was fired was found in the victim’s apartment and
matched the type of bullets that were found during an unrelated search of Jones’ vehicle
the previous March.
After the murder, Jones had a private conversation with D.H. that D.H. recorded.
During the conversation, Jones told D.H. that she “took care of a problem” and D.H.
understood the “problem” to be the victim. Jones also had a phone conversation with a
3
friend while she was in pretrial custody, which was recorded. During that phone call, Jones
made comments that suggested that she killed the victim and explained her possible motive
for killing the victim.
As part of the global settlement agreement, Jones entered an Alford plea to
second-degree intentional murder. Based on the plea agreement, Jones was to be
incarcerated for a total of 300 months. The district court accepted her guilty plea. After
the plea hearing and at the request of the district court, the state submitted supplemental
exhibits containing the evidence it had described during the plea hearing.
Jones appeals.
DECISION
Jones argues that her Alford plea was inadequate and, therefore, she should be
permitted to withdraw her plea because: (1) the state did not present a strong factual basis
in support of her guilty plea and, even if it had, (2) she did not adequately agree that the
state’s evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
We disagree.
“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). A defendant may, however, seek plea
withdrawal for the first time in a direct appeal on the ground that the plea was not
constitutionally valid . Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). “To be
constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94. The validity of a plea is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.
4
The accuracy requirement of a valid guilty plea “protects the defendant from
pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could properly be convicted of at trial.”
Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. 2008). An accurate guilty plea, therefore,
must be established by an “adequate factual basis” sufficient “to support a conclusion that
[a] defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Id. at
337-38.
In an Alford guilty plea, a defendant maintains innocence while also pleading guilty.
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 648-49 (Minn. 2007) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37- 38 (1970)); see also State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977)
(adopting Alford rationale). Given this inherent conflict, Alford pleas require “careful
scrutiny” of the factual basis. Id. An Alford plea is accurate when the following two
components are met: (1) the state establishes a “strong factual basis” for the offense and
(2) the defendant agrees that the evidence is sufficient to support conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12-13 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). These two requirements “provide the [district] court with a basis
to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be
found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of
innocence.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649.

5
The evidence supported a strong factual basis.
Jones argues that the state did not present a strong factual basis to support her Alford
plea. We are not persuaded.
The district court’s responsibility is “ to ensure that an adequate factual basis has
been established in the record.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). In an
Alford plea, “[t]he strong factual basis and the defendant’s agreement that the evidence is
sufficient to support his conviction provide the court with a basis to independently conclude
that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to
which he pleaded guilty.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. But the district court need not make
an express finding that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty
of the crime to which they plead guilty. State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 217 (Minn.
App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015). Instead, “[t]he statement in Theis
concerning what a district court must ‘independently conclude’ indicates merely that a
district court must assure itself that the accuracy standard is satisfied.” Id. (citing Theis,
742 N.W.2d at 649).
During the plea hearing and in response to the prosecutor’s question, Jones agreed
that the state had evidence that, if presented at trial, created a “substantial likelihood that a
jury or judge . . . would find [her] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” This included, among
other evidence:
(1) a medical examiner’s report stating that the victim died by gunshot wound,

(2) anticipated testimony by D.H. that (a) she and Jones visited the victim on the
night the victim was murdered, (b) she left Jones and the victim in the apartment,
6
and when she returned she heard a bang or pop and saw a flash, and (c) she saw the
victim dying before leaving the apartment with Jones,

(3) a bullet casing from the crime scene that matched casings found in Jones’ car
during a traffic stop two months before the murder,

(4) recorded statements made by Jones after the murder in which she said she “took
care of a problem” and that “problem” was the victim,

(5) a recorded phone call in which Jones made statements suggesting that she killed
the victim and explained her possible motive,

(6) a toxicology report showing that the victim had ingested certain drugs before
dying, and

(7) that Jones had possessed those types of drugs in a backpack she owned.
Based on our review of the state’s summary of evidence that it intended to produce at trial,
we conclude that there was a strong factual basis for Jones’ Alford plea.
1
Jones adequately agreed that the state’s evidence was sufficient to support conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jones argues that she did not adequately agree that the state’s evidence was
sufficient for a conviction, contending that the state’s use of the phrase “substantial
likelihood” did not meet the accuracy requirement.

1 Though the district court sought, and received, from the state additional evidence after
the plea hearing in the form of a computer flash drive, it is not clear what, if any, relevance
this evidence had. The district court had already accepted Jones’ Alford plea and we have
now concluded this plea was supported by a strong factual basis as established on the record
during the plea hearing . And, contrary to Jones’ claim, the evidence submitted with the
flash drive is consistent with the evidence discussed during the plea hearing. However, we
reiterate that in the context of an Alford plea, the strong factual basis is best established by
discussing the evidence with the defendant on the record or admitting the evidence at the
plea hearing. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (stating that “the better practice is for the
factual basis to be based on evidence discussed with the defendant on the record at the plea
hearing” and describing types of evidence commonly used in Alford plea hearings).
7
Three times during Jones’ plea hearing, the prosecutor asked Jones if she agreed
there was a “substantial likelihood” that she would be convicted. Jones claims that the
phrase “substantial likelihood” does not satisfy the requirement set forth in Theis. She cites
as support for her claim the supreme court’s conclusion in Theis that “the defendant ’s
acknowledgement that there is a risk that he could be convicted does not meet the standard
for accuracy.” 742 N.W.2d at 650 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded by Jones’
argument.
In the context of a Norgaard plea,
2 we have previously determined that a
defendant’s agreement that there was “ a substantial likelihood that [he] would be found
guilty” was a sufficient acknowledgement of the evidence’s sufficiency. Williams , 760
N.W.2d at 14 (emphasis added). Although the plea in Williams was a Norgaard plea there
is no difference in the accuracy requirements for Alford and Norgaard pleas. Id. at 12-13.
The language used, therefore, properly reflected the accuracy requirement.
3
The first two times Jones agreed that there was a “substantial likelihood” she would
be found guilty were immediately after she pleaded guilty and, upon review of the record,
were clearly used by the prosecutor to inform Jones what the process for summarizing the
factual basis would be.
Prosecutor: Thank you, Your Honor. Ms. Jones, my
understanding is you have spoken to your attorney at length

2 In a Norgaard plea, the defendant pleads guilty despite a failure to recall specifics of the
offense. Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12; see also State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110
N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961).
3 We reached the same conclusion, that “substantial likelihood” was sufficient for an Alford
plea, in a nonprecedential case. State v. Ranniger, No. A15-1953, 2016 WL 7041865, at
*3 (Minn. App. Dec. 5, 2016).
8
and you obviously know the evidence, and your jail phone calls
show that you know the evidence in this case, correct?

Jones: Correct.

Prosecutor: And you’re aware of the evidence the state would
present and you’re aware of any defenses you might make,
correct?

Jones: Correct.

Prosecutor: You’re choosing to plead guilty via Alford and
you’re admitting that there’s a substantial likelihood that a jury
or a judge reviewing all the evidence that would come in at trial
would find you guilty of murder in the second degree; is that
correct?

Jones: Correct.

Prosecutor: And although you’re maintaining your innocence
as to murdering [the victim], there are probably some things
that we agree on, correct, about that evidence?
I’m going to ask you those first, and then I’m going to
outline the state’s additional evidence that would suggest that
you were responsible for and ask you if you, again, agree that
there’s a substantial likelihood you would be convicted. Does
that make sense?

Jones: Yes.

(Emphasis added). The third time Jones agreed that there was a “substantial likelihood”
that she would be found guilty occurred after she heard all of the evidence that the state
would submit at trial.
Prosecutor: You believe that all that evidence, including what
we’ve talked about now and other evidence in the case you’ve
talked about with your attorney, do you believe there’s a
substantial likelihood that a jury or a judge, your choice, would
find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of intentionally
killing [the victim]?

9
Jones: Yes.

(Emphasis added).
After the state described the evidence it would present at trial, Jones expressed
awareness of the evidence and agreed that there was a substantial likelihood that she would
be found guilty. The use of the phrase “substantial likelihood” satisfies the accuracy
requirement that the offender admit that there is a strong probability that they would be
found guilty. Therefore, we conclude that Jones admitted that the evidence was sufficient
to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.