State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1648

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Connell Walton,
Appellant.

Filed November 25, 2024
Reversed
Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-13157

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
SYLLABUS
A defendant may be convicted of violating a domestic-abuse no-contact order in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(a)(1) (2020), even if the order
was issued by a court of a jurisdiction other than Minnesota.

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OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant argues in this direct appeal that his conviction for violating Minnesota’s
domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) statute must be reversed because appellant was
convicted of violating a no-contact order issued by a Rhode Island court and the Minnesota
law only applies to orders issued by Minnesota courts. We conclude that, under the plain
language of Minnesota’s DANCO statute, a defendant may be convicted of violating a no-
contact order issued by a non-Minnesota court. But because the evidence was insufficient
to support appellant’s conviction, we reverse.
FACTS
In February 2022, a Rhode Island court issued a no-contact order in connection with
a criminal proceeding, which “enjoined and restrained” appellant William Connell Walton
from “having any contact with the alleged victim.” 1 The alleged victim in that order was
the same alleged victim as here, M.M. The order was titled, “No-Contact Order –
Domestic.” Walton personally signed the Rhode Island no-contact order.
In July 2022, Walton and M.M. got into a physical altercation at the Mall of America
in Bloomington. Law enforcement originally arrested Walton for disorderly conduct. But

1 Pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 12-29-2(a)(1)- (17) (Supp. 2021),
domestic violence includes, but is not limited to: (1) Simple assault; (2) Felony assaults;
(3) Vandalism; (4) Disorderly conduct; (5) Trespass; (6) Kidnapping; (7) Child-snatching;
(8) Sexual assault; (9) Homicide; (10) Violation of a protective order; (11) Stalking;
(12) Refusal to relinquish or to damage or to obstruct a telephone; (13) Burglary and
Unlawful Entry; (14) Arson; (15) Cyberstalking and cyberharassment; (16) Domestic
assault by strangulation; and (17) Electronic tracking of motor vehicles. Each offense
noted above is specifically defined in Rhode Island law.
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while conducting a records check, Bloomington police identified M.M. as the petitioner in
a separate order for protection (OFP) against Walton and discovered the Rhode Island no-
contact order. Bloomington police arrested Walton for violating the Rhode Island no -
contact order.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Walton with one count of felony violation
of a DANCO within ten years of two or more qualified domestic-violence-related offenses
under Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 2(d)(1) (2020). The complaint
alleged that Walton violated the Rhode Island no-contact order within ten years of two or
more previous qualified domestic-violence-related offenses , which included North
Carolina convictions for communicating threats and assaulting a detention employee.
In March 2023, Walton waived his right to a jury trial and the matter proceeded to
a court trial. The state called six witnesses, including three Mall of America security
officers, two Bloomington police officers, and a Mall of America video-records custodian.
The district court received six exhibits offered by the state: security video from Mall of
America, a photograph of M.M., the Rhode Island no-contact order, a certified North
Carolina criminal record search, a North Carolina certified arrest warrant, and body-worn-
camera video from a Bloomington police officer. Walton did not testify or call any
witnesses. The district court found that Walton violated a no-contact order and determined
that he was guilty of a felony because the violation occurred within ten years of two prior
qualified domestic-violence-related offenses under Minnesota Statutes section 609.02,
subdivision 16 (2020). At sentencing, the district court determined that Walton’s criminal-
history score was three, sentenced Walton to 21 months in prison , stayed execution, and
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placed Walton on supervised probation for three years. The district court later amended
Walton’s sentence to 18 months. Walton appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err by finding that the Rhode Island no-contact order qualified
as a DANCO under Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(a)(1)?

II. If Minnesota Statutes section 629.75 (2020) applies to non-Minnesota no-contact
orders, was the evidence sufficient to support Walton’s conviction?

ANALYSIS
Walton argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of
violating Minnesota’s DANCO statute because the statute applies only to no-contact orders
issued by Minnesota courts. We first interpret Minnesota Statutes section 629.75,
subdivision 1(a), and conclude that a defendant may be charged for violating a no-contact
order issued by a non- Minnesota court if the no-contact order was issued in a proceeding
consistent with Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(a). Then, we turn to the
sufficiency of the evidence and conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support
Walton’s conviction because the state did not present evidence that the Rhode Island no-
contact order was issued in a proceeding involving one of the offenses enumerated in
section 629.75, subdivision 1(a).
I. The distric court did not err by finding that Minnesota Statutes section 629.75
applies to domestic abuse no contact orders issued outside of Minnesota.

“A sufficiency-of-the evidence claim that turns on the meaning of the statute under
which a defendant has been convicted presents a question of statutory interpretation that
we review de novo.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019). “The goal
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of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature,”
and we construe every law “to give effect to all its provisions.” Staab v. Diocese of St.
Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 645.16
(2022).
When engaging in statutory interpretation, we first “determine whether the statute’s
language, on its face, is ambiguous.” State v. Thonesavanah, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn.
2017). “A statute is ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[I]f the Legislature’s intent is clear from the
statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to its
plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.” State v. Riggs,
865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
Walton contends that the statute applies only to DANCOs issued by Minnesota
courts. Walton argues that the legislature “knows how to punish out -of-state violations if
it wants to” because the legislature intentionally included language about non- Minnesota
OFPs in the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b)
(2022) (stating that the crime of a violation of an OFP occurs “whenever an order for
protection is granted by a judge or referee or pursuant to a similar law of another state, the
United States, the District of Columbia, tribal lands, United States territories, Canada, or a
Canadian province, and the respondent or person to be restrained knows of the existence
of the order” (emphasis added)). Thus, Walton asserts, if the legisl ature had intended for
section 629.75 to apply to non-Minnesota orders, it would have included similar language.
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The state argues the legislature knows how to limit the term “courts” referenced in
statutory provisions to include only courts in the state of Minnesota. See Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, subd. 1(1) (2018) (stating that for the purpose of determining eligibility for
compensation based on exoneration, “‘exonerated’ means that: (1): a court of this state:
(i) vacated or reversed a judgement of conviction . . .; or (ii) ordered a new trial . . .”
(emphasis added)); see also Minn. Stat. § 480.16 (2022) (providing that “[t]he chief justice
. . . has discretionary authority to direct any judge . . . to hold court in any county or district
. . . to the end that the courts of this state shall function with maximum efficiency”
(emphasis added)). 2 The state asserts, if the legislature intended for section 629.75 to
apply only to Minnesota DANCOs, it would have included language doing so.
Under Minnesota law, in order to be guilty of felony violation of a DANCO, Walton
had to know of the existence of the DANCO and violate it “within ten years of the first of
two or more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions.” Minn. Stat.
§ 629.75, subd. 2 (d)(1). Minnesota Statutes section 629.75 defines a “domestic abuse no
contact order” in relevant part as “an order issued by a court against a defendant in a
criminal proceeding [for specified offenses].” Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 1(a) (emphasis
added). The parties’ arguments center on whether the legislature’s use of the phrase “a
court” in section 629.75 was meant to limit the statute’s applicability only to DANCOs
issued by Minnesota courts. To determine the legislature’s intent, we look to the plain

2 In 2019, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 590.11 in the aftermath of Back v. State,
902 N.W.2d 23, 30- 33 (Minn. 2017), in a way that removed the “a court of this state”
statutory language from Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1. See 2019 Minn. Laws ch. 5, art. 2,
§ 13.
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language of the statute and “construe words and phrases according to the rules of grammar
and according to their common and approved usage.” Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. , 931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018))
(citation omitted). And “the meaning of a word is informed by how it is used in the context
of a statute.” State v. Rogers, 925 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2019).
When the legislature has not defined the relevant terms, “we may consider
dictionary definitions to determine a word’s common usage. State v. Cummings, 2 N.W.3d.
528, 533 (Minn. 2024). The relevant definition of a term depends on the context in which
the term is used. Id. To determine the plain meaning of “a court,” we “may look to other
interpretive tools to determine its meaning, including dictionary definitions.” State v.
Glover, 952 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Minn. 2020). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “court”
broadly, including such definitions as “[a] place where justice is judicially administered,”
“[t]he building where the judge or judges convene to adjudicate disputes and administer
justice,” and “[a] tribunal constituted to administer justice.” Black’s Law Dictionary 445
(12th ed. 2024). These general definitions suggest that the legislature did not intend to
limit the statute to only Minnesota courts.
Similarly, it is textually significant that the legislature used the article “a,” as
compared to “the.” See Rogers, 925 N.W.2d at 4-5 (stating that “it is textually significant
when the Legislature uses ‘the’ rather than ‘a’ or ‘an’ because ‘[t]he’ is a limitation word
that refers to a specific person or thing”). “A” is an indefinite article, meaning that it does
not refer to a specific person or thing. See State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Minn.
2020) (“[I]t is well -established that the use of the indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ signals a
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generic reference.”). To read the statute as Walton urges would require us to add words to
the statute, and we cannot modify the statute to read “a Minnesota court” or “a court of this
state,” simply because modifying language appears elsewhere in Minnesota’s domestic
abuse statutes. See Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 438 (Minn. 2009)
(“We cannot rewrite a statute under the guise of statutory interpretation.”); State v. Carufel,
783 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Minn. 2010) (stating that “court[s] cannot add words to a statute not
supplied by the legislature”).
Despite the plain meaning of “a court,” Walton argues that section 629.75 applies
only to DANCOs issued by Minnesota courts because the statute limits the issuance of
DANCOs to cases involving four specific Minnesota offenses. These are:
(1) domestic abuse as defined in section 518B.01,
subdivision 2;
(2) harassment or stalking under section 609.749 when
committed against a family or household member as defined in
section 518B.01, subdivision 2;
(3) violation of an order for protection under section
518B.01, subdivision 14; or
(4) violation of a prior domestic abuse no contact order
under this section or Minnesota Statutes 2008, section
518B.01, subdivision 22.

Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 1(a).
Walton is correct that, when considering whether a statute is ambiguous, we must
“read the statute as a whole and give effect to all of its provisions,” while “presuming that
the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and certain.” State v. Henderson,
907 N.W.2d 623, 625 -27 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). Following this rule, we
conclude that the statute yields only one reasonable interpretation: that a court may issue
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the no-contact order to a defendant in a proceeding involving offenses described in
Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(a).
Section 629.75 lists four proceedings in which “a court” can issue a domestic-abuse
no-contact order. There are proceedings for (1) domestic abuse, (2) harassment or stalking,
(3) violation of an order for protection, and (4) violation of a prior domestic abuse no
contact order. Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 1(a)(1)-(4). Although some of these proceedings
are specifically defined under Minnesota law, as Walton points out, others have general
definitions. For example, the definition of domestic abuse includes “physical harm, bodily
injury, or assault,” or “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1)-(2) (2022). Accordingly, a court in a
jurisdiction other than Minnesota may issue a domestic-abuse no -contact order to a
defendant in a proceeding meeting the general definition of at least one of the four
proceedings defined under Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(a).
In sum, because the plain and ordinary meaning of “a court” supports only one
reasonable interpretation, the DANCO statute is unambiguous. Therefore, we hold that
Minnesota Statutes section 629.75 plainly allows for a defendant to be charged for violating
a no-contact order issued by a court within or outside of Minnesota in a proceeding
consistent with the offenses identified in subdivision 1(a).
II. The evidence is insufficient to support Walton’s conviction.
Alternatively, Walton argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction because the state did not present evidence that the Rhode Island no-contact order
was issued in a proceeding consistent with Minnesota Statutes section 629.75,
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subdivision 1(a). The state argues that the facts presented at trial about the Rhode Island
no-contact order were sufficient for the district court to determine that the no-contact order
was issued in a proceeding consistent with Minnesota Statutes section 629.75,
subdivision 1(a), and for the district court to find Walton guilty. We agree with Walton.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we will “uphold the district court’s
finding[s] if, based on the evidence contained in the record, the [district] court could
reasonably have found [the] defendant guilty of the crime charged.” State v. Vasko, 889
N.W.2d 551, 558 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “The evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved
any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “We use the same standard of review in bench trials and
in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d
727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
Here, the state was required to prove that (1) a court issued a domestic-abuse no-
contact order in a criminal proceeding consistent with one of the four types of offenses
under Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(a), (2) Walton knew of the
existence of the no-contact order, (3) Walton violated the no-contact order, (4) the statute’s
venue requirement is satisfied, and (5) that the violation occurred within ten years of two
previous qualified domestic-violence-related offenses. Minn. Stat. § 629.75.
The only element in dispute is whether the Rhode Island no-contact order was issued
in a proceeding consistent with Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(a). The
state argues that this element is satisfied because the Rhode Island no-contact order is
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captioned “No Contact Order – Domestic,” and orders Walton to “not harass, interfere
with, molest, or threaten the victim in any manner,” which is similar to Minnesota’s
statutory definition of domestic abuse referenced in subdivision 1(a)(1). The state also
points to additional facts apparent from the face of the Rhode Island no-contact order,
including that (1) it was issued as part of a criminal proceeding in which Walton was the
defendant, (2) multiple copies were created for the “Court,” “Defendant,” “Victim,” and
“Police” to receive a copy, and (3) a violation of the no-contact order is a criminal offense
under Rhode Island laws.
However, this evidence simply proves that the Rhode Island no-contact order was
issued in a criminal proceeding involving some type of domestic abuse. At trial, the state
did not present any evidence about what type of criminal proceeding in which the Rhode
Island no -contact order was issued to meet the requirements of section 629.75,
subdivision 1.3 And because Minnesota law requires a domestic-abuse no-contact order to
“be issued to a defendant whose proceeding involves at least one of four statutorily-
enumerated offenses,” we cannot assume that this element was met. State v. Ness, 834
N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2013).
This is particularly true in this case because Minnesota and Rhode Island define
domestic abuse differently. Minnesota’s definition of domestic abuse is limited to
(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; (2) the infliction of fear of imminent physical

3 In Rhode Island, a no contact order is issued in criminal proceedings when a person is
charged with or arrested for a crime involving “domestic violence” as enumurated in Rhode
Island General Laws section 12-29 -2(a)(1)-(17). See R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29 -4 (Supp.
2021).
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harm, bodily injury, or assault; and (3) specific crimes defined by Minnesota statutes—
terroristic threats, criminal sexual conduct, sexual extortion, or interferences with an
emergency call. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 subd. 2(a)(1)-(3) (2022). However, Rhode Island
defines domestic abuse more broadly and lists specific crimes, such as vandalism, trespass,
kidnapping, and arson in its definition. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12- 29-2(a). We conclude that
the evidence was insufficient for a jury to have concluded that the Rhode Island no-contact
order was issued in a proceeding consistent with Minnesota Statutes section 629.75,
subdivision 1(a).
For example, the Rhode Island no-contact order could have been issued in a criminal
proceeding involving vandalism, which may or may not be consistent with section 629.75,
subdivision 1(a), depending on the circumstances of the case. Therefore, although the state
proved the existence of the Rhode Island no-contact order, there was insufficient evidence
for the district court to determine that the Rhode Island no-contact order was issued for
domestic abuse, harassment or stalking, violation of an order for protection, or violation of
a prior domestic-abuse no-contact order as defined by Minnesota law. And we also note
that the state did not present evidence about when the Rhode Island no-contact order was
issued, which further supports our decision to reverse for insufficient evidence. See Ness,
834 N.W.2d at 182 (stating that in Minnesota a DANCO “may only be issued as a pretrial
or postconviction probationary order,” and must “be issued in a proceeding that is separate
from but held immediately following a proceeding in which any pretrial release or
sentencing issues are decided”).
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In sum, we conclude that evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish
that the Rhode Island no-contact order was issued in a proceeding involving at least one of
the offenses enumerated in section 629.75, subdivision 1(a).4 Therefore, because the state
did not present sufficient evidence to prove that Walton violated section 629.75, we hold
that the evidence was insufficient to support Walton’s conviction.
DECISION
We conclude that, under the plain language of Minnesota’s domestic-abuse no-
contact order statute, a defendant may be convicted of violating a no -contact order issued
by a court in a jurisdiction other than Minnesota. But we reverse Walton’s conviction
because the state did not present sufficient evidence for the district court to determine
whether the Rhode Island no-contact order was issued in a proceeding consistent with
Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(a).5
Reversed.

4 At oral argument, the state argued that the presentence investigation (PSI) report
referenced details about Walton’s Rhode Island conviction. But the district court did not
consider the PSI report as evidence at trial because the PSI was prepared after trial. There
was also a pre-plea worksheet that includes a summary of Walton’s criminal record that
references his Rhode Island convictions. The district court did not consider this at trial
because it was not admitted evidence and there was no trial testimony from probation. Cf.
State v. Maley, 714 N.W. 2d. 708, 710-712 (Minn. App. 2006) (concluding, for sentencing
purposes, that the state’s reliance solely on a sentencing worksheet to prove the existence
of out-of-state convictions was inadequate).
5 Walton also argues that the district court erred by sentencing Walton with a criminal-
history score that included his out-of-state convictions. Because we reverse Walton’s
conviction, we need not decide his challenge to his sentence.