State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1651

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Coedy Lonzelle Willis,
Appellant.

Filed September 23, 2024
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-11481

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Asha Jamison-Moreland, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing
that the evidence was insufficient to allow the district court to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt because there were significant reasons to doubt the victim’s credibility.
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Alternatively, appellant argues that his conviction must be reversed and the matter
remanded for a new trial because the district court (1) committed a structural error by
relying on the complaint, which was not admitted as evidence, to find an essential element
of the offenses; (2) erred by finding appellant guilty of violating a statute he was not
charged with; and (3) erred by finding appellant guilty of count 3 without finding that
appellant committed any act during the time period charged in the complaint. Because
there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict and any errors do not require reversal, we
affirm.
FACTS
In June 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Coedy Lonzelle
Willis with three counts of criminal sexual conduct for sexually assaulting his eight-year -
old relative (M.J.). Willis waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties proceeded with a
court trial on stipulated evidence. The parties agreed that if the district court found Willis
guilty of count 1, the state would argue for an executed sentence of 144 months, Willis
would not be permitted to argue for probation, and counts 2 and 3 would be dismissed. If
Willis was found guilty of only count 2 or 3 or both, there was no agreement as to
sentencing.
The parties stipulated to the following exhibits: (1) full copy of police reports,
(2) video of interview with reporting juvenile, (3) transcript of video interview with
reporting juvenile, (4) forensic interview report, (5) child protection report, (6) me dical
reports, and (7) audio of Willis’s interview with police. The parties also agreed that the
district court could consider the state’s notice of intent to offer expert testimony and could
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review the complaint to understand the charges and what statutes Willis was charged with
violating.
The parties submitted written closing arguments and the district court took the
matter under advisement. The district court announced general guilty verdicts in open
court and then issued a written order finding Willis guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the
district court dismissed counts 2 and 3 per the parties’ agreement. The district court
convicted Willis of count 1, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and sentenced him to 144
months in prison. Willis appeals.
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to support Willis’s conviction of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct.

Willis argues that the evidence does not support his conviction of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct because there are substantial reasons to doubt M.J.’s credibility.
Willis argues that M.J.’s testimony was inconsistent on crucial points, there was a lack of
physical evidence of sexual abuse, M.J.’s statements were not given under oath, and the
allegations made against Willis arose in the context of a custody dispute. He further argues
that M.J. made allegations against several other people, and the evidence shows suggestive
circumstances that could have contributed to M.J. making untrue or mistaken accusations.
We address each argument in turn.
To convict Willis of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the state was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Willis engaged in an intentional act of sexual
conduct, (2) Willis committed the act with sexual or aggressive intent, (3) at the time of
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the act, the victim was under the age of 13, (4) at the time of the act, Willis was more than
36 months older than the victim, and (5) the act took place between January 2015 and
December 2018 in Hennepin County. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2014).
“When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d
257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “The evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any
evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. “The verdict will not be overturned if the
fact-finder, upon application of the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of
proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant
guilty of the charged offense.” Id. “[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in
bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v.
Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
A. M.J.’s Statements
Willis argues that M.J’s statements were not credible because they were inconsistent
on crucial points. Specifically, Willis notes that (1) M.J. told mother and the forensic
interviewer that the abuse occurred when she was four years old, but told the doctor that it
first happened a year ago, (2) M.J.’s statements to the doctor and the forensic interviewer
about where Willis touched her and whether penetration occurred were inconsistent with
each other, (3) M.J. told the forensic interviewer that the last incident happened at Willis’s
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house, but later stated it happened at her grandmother’s house, and (4) earlier in the same
year that she reported the abuse, M.J. told her mother that no one had done anything
inappropriate to her. The district court considered these statements and determined there
were “no notable inconsistencies in Juvenile’s accounts of [Willis’s] conduct between her
tellings,” and “[h]er uncertainty about how old she was when the acts started and ended
does not take from her credibility given her still young age when she reported.”
The district court determined M.J. consistently stated that Willis would assure her
it was the last time, gave her money for the acts, Willis removed his and her clothing, and
Willis made sure they were alone. The district court also determined that M.J. consistently
supplemented the details of Willis’s conduct in each statement.
Willis relies on State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1993), to argue that there was
insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because there are
multiple reasons to doubt M.J’s credibility. In Huss, the supreme court concluded that
there was insufficient evidence to support Huss’s conviction for second-degree criminal
sexual conduct involving his three-year -old daughter because of the unusual facts of the
case, including that “the child’s testimony was contradictory as to whether any abuse
occurred at all,” and t he child was exposed to a highly suggestive book on sexual abuse.
Id. at 292-93.
Here, unlike Huss, eight-year -old M.J. consistently reported that Willis assaulted
her. M.J. described details of the assaults to her mother, the forensic interviewer, and the
physician. Any uncertainty about how old she was when the acts started and ended is
reasonable given her young age. The district court as the fact-finder reasonably determined
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that the disclosures were credible, despite the minimal inconsistencies, and found Willis
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mosby, 450 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn.
App. 1990) (stating that inconsistencies in testimony are a sign of human fallibility and do
not prove testimony is false, especially when the testimony is about a traumatic event).
B. Physical Evidence
Willis argues that there is reason to doubt M.J.’s credibility because the statements
were not corroborated by physical evidence. Willis argues that, even though the allegations
arose after mother observed a bump on M.J.’s vaginal area, the subsequent medical exam
was normal. Therefore, Willis asserts, even though the doctor could not rule out sexual
abuse, we should conclude the evidence was insufficient to find Willis guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt because there was a lack of physical evidence corroborating M.J.’s
statements. However, testimony of a single credible witness can provide sufficient
evidence to support a conviction, and the district court found M.J. credible. State v.
Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004). And in a prosecution for criminal sexual
conduct, “the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.” Minn. Stat. § 609.347,
subd. 1 (2022). Here, the medical exam was normal, but did not rule out sexual abuse or
prior penetration. The district court reasonably determined there was evidence sufficient
to find Willis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the lack of physical evidence.
C. M.J.’s Statements Not Under Oath
Willis argues that M.J.’s statements are not credible because they were not given
under oath. Willis waived his right to a jury trial and agreed that the district court could
decide the case based on the stipulated evidence. “Although prior sworn statements—
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made under oath and subject to cross-examination —are generally more reliable than
unsworn statements, [the supreme court has] noted that a totality of the circumstances
approach should be used in evaluating the trustworthiness of the statement regardless of
whether the statement was sworn or unsworn.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 293
(Minn. 2019) (citing State v. Stallings, 478 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn. 1991)). Here, the
district court reasonably considered the totality of the circumstances, including M.J.’s
demeanor, and content and context of her descriptions, and determined that M.J.’s
statements were credible, even though M.J. did not testify under oath.
D. Custody Dispute
Willis argues that the evidence is insufficient because the allegations against him
arose in the context of custody dispute. Willis questions mother’s credibility because she
made a prior accusation of sexual abuse against him during the custody dispute, but later
denied doing so. Here, the district court determined that “[m]otivation to fabricate related
to the custody dispute [was] not apparent.” The district court noted that Willis “[was] not
the person in the custody dispute, nor was he the only male person identified as living in
the home where the abuse occurred.” And despite the allegation that, during the custody
dispute, mother previously alleged that Willis assaulted M.J., the district court reviewed
the evidence and found M.J. credible. In contrast, in Huss, the allegations of abuse were
against the child’s father, and the mother exposed the child to suggestive material in an
effort to induce the child to reveal the sexual abuse and the mother did not want the child
to visit the father before any allegations of abuse were made. Thus, the supreme court
concluded that the “existence of the visitation dispute [was] relevant to [the] overall
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evidence in the case.” 506 N.W.2d at 293 n.3. Given the distinguishable facts of the
custody dispute at issue here, it is not unreasonable for the fact-finder to give little weight
to the custody dispute.
E. M.J.’s Allegations Against Other People
Willis argues M.J.’s statements were not credible because she initially disclosed that
other individuals touched her inappropriately. In Huss, the child testified that both her
mother and father touched her in a bad way, and that six people had touched her, including
a playmate. Id. at 292. The child also was not able to identify appellant in the courtroom,
and testified that her father was bald and blind, although he was neither. Id. In contrast,
here, although M.J. initially disclosed that a family member “James” touched her
inappropriately, M.J. also consistently stated that Willis committed the acts against her and
described the incidents in detail. Therefore, a factfinder could reasonably find M.J.’s
statements credible.
F. Suggestive Circumstances
Willis argues there are reasons to doubt M.J.’s credibility because there were
suggestive circumstances, including the child-protection investigator asking leading
questions, the forensic interviewer pointing to Willis’s name on a board during the
interview, and the mother telling M.J. about her own experience of being sexually
assaulted. The district court considered the evidence and determined that M.J.’s credibility
was “bolstered by her demeanor in her forensic interviews” and “[neither] of her
conversations appeared to be rehearsed statements coached by a third party.” The mother
additionally reported that she did not provide any details of how she was assaulted. This
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is in contrast to Huss, in which the mother repeatedly exposed the child to a suggestive
book on sexual abuse, which was a key factor in the case. Id. at 292 (“[G]iven this
contradictory testimony, we might not be persuaded to reverse absent the repeated use of a
highly suggestive book on sexual abuse.”). Therefore, it is not unreasonable for a factfinder
to give less weight to the circumstances and more weight to M.J.’s statements about the
abuse.
In sum, the reasons raised by Willis to doubt M.J.’s credibility do not amount to the
“unusual facts” described in Huss to require corroboration. 506 N.W.2d at 293 (concluding
that, based on these unusual facts, the state did not meet its burden of proof). When the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, it is sufficient to support
Willis’s first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions. Therefore, we conclude that the
evidence is sufficient to support Willis’s first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction.
II. The errors alleged by Willis do not require reversal and a new trial.

Alternatively, Willis argues that the district court committed three errors in reaching
its verdict that require this matter to be reversed and remanded.
First, Willis argues that the district court committed structural error because the
district court found an essential element of each offense based on the complaint, which was
not admitted into evidence, and thus violated his right to an impartial judge. We conclude
that the district court’s reliance on the complaint was not structural error and Willis is not
entitled to automatic reversal. “An impartial trial requires that conclusion reached by the
trier of fact be based upon the facts in evidence and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching
conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” State v.
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Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 249-50 (Minn. 2005). In Dorsey, the supreme court held that
the district court’s reliance on information discovered during an independent factual
investigation was a structural error that deprived the defendant of his constitutional right
to a fair trial. 701 N.W.2d at 249. Here, the district court used the complaint to establish
that Willis was more than 36 months older than M.J. Although the complaint was not part
of the stipulated evidence, the parties agreed that the district court could view it when
deciding the case. Accordingly, the district court did not consider evidence “beyond that
adduced in court.”
Additionally, Willis’s date of birth was supported by other stipulated evidence in
the record, including the police reports and his recorded interview with police, so it is
unlikely that the district court’s reliance on the complaint would cause the public to
seriously question the fairness and integrity of the judicial system. See State v. Lopez, 988
N.W.2d 107, 120 (Minn. 2023) (outlining factors appellate courts must consider when
determining whether perceived judicial bias requires reversal). And even if the district
court’s reliance on the complaint was structural error, Willis did not preserve the issue at
trial by objecting or filing a posttrial motion. See Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 359
n.9 (Minn. 2022) (suggesting that it was an open question whether all unpreserved
structural errors require automatic reversal).
Second, Willis argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by finding him
guilty of violating Minnesota Statute s section 609.342, subdivision 1a(e) (Supp. 2021), a
statute he was not charged with violating and that did not exist at the time of the alleged
offense. We conclude that any error was a harmless clerical mistake.
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“Clerical mistakes in a judgment, order, or in the record arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any time, or after notice if ordered by the court.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10. A clerical mistake is “ordinarily apparent upon the face
of the record and capable of being corrected by reference to the record only.” State v.
Walsh, 546 456 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Minn. App. 1990); see State v. Verdon, 727 N.W.2d
418, 420 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying this aspect of Walsh in a criminal case). A clerical
mistake “cannot reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or
discretion.” State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 768 n.4 (Minn. 1999).
It is apparent on the face of the record that the district court’s written verdict
contains a clerical mistake and Willis was not convicted of a crime not charged in the
complaint. In its written verdict, the district court found Willis guilty of first-de gree
criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minnesota Statute Section 609.342,
subdivision 1a(e). However, Willis was charged with and convicted of violating
Minnesota Statutes section 609. 342, subdivision 1(a). In its written order, the district court
properly analyzed whether the victim was under the age of 13 according to the version of
the statute charged in the complaint. Minnesota Statutes section 609.342 was amended in
2021. 2021 Minn. Laws ch.11, art. 4, § 16, at 2038-40 . The amendment, effective
September 1, 2021, changed the age of the victim from 13 to 14 and renumbered the
relevant subdivision of section 609.342 from 1(a) to 1a(e). Because the district court
considered whether the victim was under the age of 13, we are satisfied that the district
court analyzed the charged statute, despite referring to the incorrect subdivision in its
written order. Additionally, the district court announced its verdicts in open court and
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stated it “will be entering guilty verdicts.” The Minnesota Court Information System
(MNCIS) and the warrant of commitment reflect that Willis was convicted of the charged
statute, Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(a).
1
Third, Willis argues that the district court found him guilty of count 3, second-
degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2014), without finding
that he committed the act within the charged time period, between August 2020 and
June 11, 2021. Although the district court found Willis guilty of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, the district court did not adjudicate his guilt for that offense or impose a
sentence. Thus, the second-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction is not ripe for a
sufficiency review because there is no judgment or convictions. See State v. Ashland, 287
N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979) (declining to consider insufficiency-of-the-evidence claims
on convictions for which the district court did not formally adjudicate the defendant guilty
and did not impose a sentence).
In sum, we conclude that the alleged errors do not require this court to reverse and
remand for a new trial because the errors are not structural, and the factual findings are
supported by the record.
Affirmed.

1 Because the warrant of commitment and MNCIS reflect that Willis was convicted of
violating the charged statute, we do not remand for the district court to correct the clerical
error in the written verdict. “Clerical mistakes in a judgment, order, or in the record arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time, or after notice if
ordered by the court.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10.