State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1664

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Andre Leon Franklin,
Appellant.

Filed September 30, 2024
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-21-5573

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for the promotion of
prostitution, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting
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respondent’s motion to admit statements made by appellant about prostituting other women
and statements made in a jail call. He challenges the district court’s determinations that
the statements were admissible as Spreigl evidence, 1 and also argues that the jail-call
statements were inadmissible hearsay. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2021, appellant Andre Leon Franklin met A.M.S. outside of a
homeless shelter near Franklin’s apartment. A.M.S. had recently been discharged from a
treatment program and was staying at the shelter. A.M.S. left the shelter and went to
Franklin’s apartment where the two consumed alcohol together. A few days later, Franklin
called 911 and reported that there was a woman with a knife who was trying to stab him.
When police officers arrived, Franklin met them outside and said that there was a woman,
who he identified as “Justine,” inside his apartment with a knife. Franklin stated that the
woman, who was identified by the officers as A.M.S., had been staying with him for a few
days and had just “flipped her wig” and threatened him with a knife after accusing him of
“selling” her to an upstairs neighbor.
When the officers entered Franklin’s apartment, A.M.S. was in the shower and there
were knives in the bathroom. A.M.S. told the officers that Franklin “sold” her to “the man
upstairs,” J.S., and that she felt “disgusting.” Franklin waited outside for the officers to

1 The term “Spreigl evidence” refers to evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that are
admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). See State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389
(Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)).
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remove her from the house. Both A.M.S. and Franklin were intoxicated during their
interactions with law enforcement.
Franklin spoke to the two officers who waited with him outside the house. The
conversation was recorded by the officers’ body cameras. One of the officers asked
Franklin how the incident began. Franklin explained that A.M.S. “got mad because she
went upstairs and sold some p-ssy” but that he did not tell her to go “up there” and do that.
He made repeated statements, however, suggesting that he was involved in prostituting
other women. He made statements such as: “I’m selling these hoes” and “I’m selling these
b-tches.” Franklin also showed the officers his cellphone to show that he was getting phone
calls and texts from other women related to prostituting them. At one point the upstairs
neighbor, J.S., walked by, and Franklin asked him, “Hey, you got my money?” A.M.S.
eventually left Franklin’s apartment and was taken to a crisis center, where she was
interviewed about what happened. Franklin was arrested and transported to jail.
In an interview at the jail, Franklin denied that he had prostituted A.M.S., but he
also continued to suggest that he was involv ed in prostituting other women. Franklin
agreed to allow law enforcement to look through his phone. Franklin’s phone had a text
message sent from Franklin with a picture of A.M.S. along with the statement, “This what
I be running into at night.” As part of the investigation, law enforcement also interviewed
J.S., who indicated that when he came home on the date of the incident, Franklin said
something about wanting to make $40 -$50, and J.S. assumed “it was for sex” because
Franklin had “a lady that’s been with him [for] a few days.” Respondent State of Minnesota
charged Franklin with one count of promoting prostitution.
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At a pretrial hearing held in November 2022, the state moved for the admission of
the statements Franklin made to police about prostituting other women. The state also
moved to admit statements made during a jail call between Franklin and his brother. In the
jail call, Franklin told his brother to call “Lisa” and that she would say she’s “gonna get
[Franklin] up outta there.” The brother replied, “That old (indiscernible) have to sell a lot
of p-ssy there.” And Franklin responded, “Sure will.”
Franklin opposed the admission of the evidence. Franklin argued that the state
failed to provide the requisite notice for the introduction of Spreigl evidence and that the
risk of unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value. Franklin also argued that the jail-
call statements were inadmissible hearsay. Franklin’s counsel acknowledged that he had
planned for the possibility that the statements would be admitted and thus was not claiming
that his preparation was impaired by the state’s lack of notice.
The state argued that notice was not necessary because it was seeking to admit the
evidence as immediate-episode evidence, 2 not as Spreigl evidence. The state further
argued that the jail-call statements were admissible evidence because they were admissions
by Franklin and the statements made by Franklin’s brother were not being offered for the
truth of the matter asserted in the statements.

2 Immediate-episode evidence, also referred to as “intrinsic evidence,” is admissible, even
though such evidence may relate to another crime, when “two or more offenses are linked
together in point of time or circumstances so that one cannot be fully shown without
proving the other, or where evidence of other crimes constitutes part of the res gestae.”
State v. Wofford, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 1962).
5
The district court issued its ruling from the bench. The district court rejected the
state’s argument that the statements were admissible as immediate-episode evidence. As
to the admissibility of the evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) as Spreigl evidence, the
court agreed that the state failed to provide the requisite notice but found that Franklin was
not prejudiced as a result. The district court, however, determined that the evidence was
not admissible because the state failed to establish the “other acts” by clear and convincing
evidence, and that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the potential
prejudice to Franklin.
In December 2022, the state filed notice of its intent to offer Franklin’s “admissions
of selling other women” as Spreigl evidence. At around the same time, the state amended
the complaint to include two additional charges: sex trafficking and solicitation of
prostitution. In June 2023, the state asked the district court to reconsider its prior
evidentiary rulings. The district court agreed to do so, reversed its earlier rulings in another
on-the-record ruling, and determined that the evidence was admissible as Spreigl evidence.
The district court reasoned that the evidence was “relevant for purposes of establishing
intent, absence of mistake or plan, particularly as it pertains to” the charge for sex
trafficking. The district court did not explicitly analyze whether the evidence met the clear-
and-convincing standard but determined that Franklin’s statements did not need to be
corroborated.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which A.M.S., J.S., and the various members
of law enforcement testified to the events as described above. The jury found Franklin
guilty of promoting prostitution and soliciting prostitution but found him not guilty of sex
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trafficking. The district court ordered the entry of a judgment of conviction of promoting
prostitution and sentenced Franklin to 53 months in prison.
DECISION
Franklin argues that the district court abused its discretion when it granted the state’s
motion to admit the statements Franklin made about prostituting other women. Franklin
contends that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the statements because the
statements did not satisfy all of the necessary elements for admission as Spreigl evidence.
He maintains that the district court also abused its discretion in admitting the jail-call
statements because the contents of the call do not come within any of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. In a pro se brief, Franklin challenges the fact that he was arrested when he is
the one who called 911 and was the victim of an assault by A.M.S. We address each
argument in turn below.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Franklin’s
statements about prostituting other women were admissible as Spreigl
evidence.

“A district court’s decision to admit Spreigl evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). If the district court erred
in admitting the Spreigl evidence, “the court must then determine whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
verdict.” Id. at 262. For Spreigl evidence to be admissible, five conditions must be met:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
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(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006); see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Franklin
argues that this evidence does not satisfy the first, third, fourth and fifth conditions.
A. Notice
Pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the state generally “must
notify the defendant or defense counsel in writing of any crime, wrong, or act that may be
offered at the trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.02, subd. 1. In felony cases, “the notice must be
given at or before the Omnibus Hearing under Rule 11” if the conduct is known to the state
prior to the hearing. Id., subd. 4(a). However, where the defense can reasonably infer that
certain evidence may be introduced by the state, and where there is still reasonable notice
given to the defendant, lack of strict compliance with notice requirements does not
necessarily prejudice the defendant and does not require the exclusion of otherwise
admissible evidence. See State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 199 (Minn. 1995).
Here, the state did not provide notice of its intent to admit Spreigl evidence prior to
the November 2022 pretrial hearing, but the state did provide such notice in December
2022, six months before the June 2023 trial. Thus, the notice requirement was ultimately
satisfied here. See State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 427 (Minn. 2009) (noting that “the
underlying purpose of the Spreigl notice is to avoid surprise to the defendant by giving him
time to prepare a defense to the charges” (quotation omitted)).

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B. Clear and Convincing
Next, Franklin claims that the state failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the other acts occurred. Evidence is clear and convincing if there is a high
probability that the facts asserted in the offered evidence are true. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d
at 389.
When the district court initially considered the admissibility of the evidence in
November 2022, it determined that the evidence “doesn’t meet the clear and convincing
standard.” When the district court reconsidered the admissibility of the evidence, it did not
explicitly reconsider whether it met the clear-and-convincing standard but did determine
that the statements did not require corroboration. The district court also observed that the
Spreigl evidence consisted of “statements that were made by Mr. Franklin, at the time this
matter was being investigated, directly to law enforcement.” It appears that the district
court thus implicitly reversed its earlier ruling. Given that the statements were made by
Franklin, himself, and were recorded on body-camera video, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the determination that the state satisfied the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard.
C. Relevance and Materiality
The fourth requirement is that the evidence be “relevant and material to the state’s
case.” Angus v. State, 695 N.W.2d 109, 119 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). In
admitting Franklin’s admissions to law enforcement as evidence, the district court stated it
“want[ed] to make very, very clear about what the ruling . . . is specifically directed at.”
The district court then explained that the jury was “going to be required to determine
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whether or not [Franklin] engaged in sex trafficking,” read the definition of sex trafficking,
and determined the evidence was “relevant for purposes of establishing intent, absence of
mistake[,] or plan, particularly as it pertains to count two [sex trafficking].”
Franklin argues that “[t]he district court failed to find the evidence relevant and
material to a precise disputed fact relating to the promotion and solicitation charges.”
Franklin relies on Ness to assert that the district court was required to identify the precise
disputed facts as to each of the charged offenses. In Ness, the supreme court observed that
“[i]n assessing the probative value and need for the evidence, the district court must
identify the precise disputed fact to which the Spreigl evidence would be relevant.” 707
N.W.2d at 686 (quotation omitted). But this quote is from the supreme court’s discussion
of the fifth Spreigl condition—that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed
by the potential prejudice to the defendant —not the fourth condition—relevance and
materiality. Id. And the record supports the district court’s determination that the evidence
was relevant to establishing Franklin’s intent, the absence of mistake, or a common scheme
or plan, particularly in light of Franklin’s defense that A.M.S. acted on her own and that
he never sought or expected payment related to sex between A.M.S. and J.S.
D. Probative Value vs. Unfair Prejudice
The final requirement for the admission of Spreigl evidence is that “the probative
value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the
defendant.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)(c). The district court determined that the evidence
was not “overly prejudicial” and that “[a]ny unfair prejudice, with respect to it being
misconstrued as character evidence, can be addressed with an appropriate instruction as to
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how it is that the evidence should be used.” Franklin argues that the district court only
allowed the evidence because of its relevance to the trafficking charge and had earlier ruled
that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by prejudice as to the promotion
charge. Yet at trial, the district court allowed the jury to consider the evidence not just in
its deliberations on the sex-trafficking charge but also on the promotion and solicitation
charges.
We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion when it determined
that the probative value of the statements was not outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Significantly, the jury acquitted Franklin of the sex-trafficking charge, apparently not
persuaded by Franklin’s statements, while intoxicated, that he was engaged in trafficking
women. Thus, the prejudicial impact of the statements must have been at least somewhat
limited. In addition, the district court provided an instruction to the jury both before the
evidence was presented and in its final instructions cautioning the jury about the proper use
of the evidence. And we presume that juries follow instructions given by the district court.
State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 167 (Minn. 2024). We thus conclude that the district court
acted within its discretion in admitting Franklin’s statements about prostituting other
women as Spreigl evidence.
3

3 The state also maintains on appeal that the evidence is admissible as immediate-episode
evidence. See Wofford, 114 N.W.2d at 271 (recognizing the admissibility of immediate-
episode evidence). Because we conclude that the evidence is admissible under rule 404(b)
as Spreigl evidence, we need not address the state’s argument that the evidence qualifies
as immediate-episode evidence.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the jail-call
statements.

We next address Franklin’s challenges to the admission of the jail-call statements.
As recounted above, during the phone call between Franklin and his brother, Franklin asked
his brother to get ahold of “Lisa” and that she would bail him out of jail. Franklin then
agreed with his brother’s statement that “Lisa” would “have to sell a lot of p-ssy there.”
The district court initially excluded the phone call as hearsay, but later determined it was
admissible as Spreigl evidence without addressing whether it contained hearsay.
Franklin argues that this remark is inadmissible hearsay. But even if the brother’s
statement qualifies as hearsay, Franklin’s response—“Sure will” —is an admission, which
takes it out of the hearsay context. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A); State v. Lopez- Ramos,
929 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. 2019). In addition, Franklin fails to establish that he was
prejudiced as a result. See State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. 2009) (“On
appeal, a defendant has the burden of proving not only that the district court abused its
discretion in admitting the evidence in question, but also that he was prejudiced by the
admission of the evidence.”). Franklin’s brief generally asserts that “[t]he ‘Lisa’ remark
was hearsay,” but does not contain separate argument or analysis on how he was prejudiced
by the admission of the remark.
Moreover, the “Lisa” statement was brief, vague, made by another individual, and
not discussed extensively at trial. And the state’s evidence was strong, including testimony
by A.M.S., J.S., and law enforcement. On this record, we are satisfied that, even if the
admission of the jail-call statements constituted an error, that the “jury’s verdict was surely
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unattributable” to the admission of the jail-call statements and was thus a harmless error.
Id.
III. The arguments asserted in Franklin’s pro se brief do not entitle him to relief.
Franklin also submitted a pro se supplemental brief. In the brief, Franklin asserts
that the legal issue is whether the district court erred “by allowing the prosecution to have
a complaint document signed by the judge where before-hand there is a procedural
misconduct” by law enforcement that led to his “unlawful arrest.”
It appears that Franklin is asserting that because he is the party that called 911, it
was misconduct for police to arrest him. Franklin argues that “police should have remained
in constitutional compliance and made an ‘on -scene’ arrest of A.M.S. because of exigent
circumstance[s], and should not have arrested [Franklin] or interfere[d] with his freedom
in any significant way.” Franklin notes that when law enforcement arrived, A.M.S. was in
the shower and there were knives in the bathroom, and he suggests that it would not have
been a violation of A.M.S.’s constitutional rights to arrest her immediately despite the fact
that she was in the shower. Franklin also appears to suggest that the knives in the bathroom
could have been seized without a warrant because they were in plain view of the officer.
We conclude that these arguments do not entitle Franklin to relief because it does
not appear that law enforcement committed any misconduct in responding to the situation.
When law enforcement entered Franklin’s home and informed A.M.S. that they were called
to the scene because of the dispute between Franklin and A.M.S., she i mmediately
responded that Franklin “sold” her to the upstairs neighbor and that she felt “disgusting.”
She repeated the assertion that Franklin sold her multiple times and was visib ly upset.
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Franklin himself told one of the responding officers that A.M.S. beca me upset and
threatened him after she accused him of “selling” her. He also stated to law enforcement
that he was “selling” other women, and asked J.S. whether he had Franklin’s money. Under
these circumstances, it was proper for law enforcement to further investigate A.M.S.’s
assertion that Franklin prostituted her to J.S.
Affirmed.