In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1688

In re the Marriage of:

Donald Gerard Sauve, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Haley Marie Lindstrom, f/k/a Haley Marie Sauve,
Respondent,

County of Kanabec, Minnesota,
Intervenor.

Filed September 16, 2024
Affirmed; motions denied
Bratvold, Judge

Kanabec County District Court
File No. 33-FA-21-97

Donald Gerard Sauve, Mora, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Benjamin Kaasa, Benjamin Kaasa Law Office, PLLC, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial in a
marriage-dissolution case. Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on two
irregularities in the proceedings: (1) he “was unable to hear” during the trial and (2) he
renewed his earlier motion for a continuance. While this appeal was pending, appellant
filed three motions in this court, seeking to supplement the record and attend a conference
or hearing in this court . Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellant’s motion for a new trial, we affirm. We also deny appellant’s three motions.
FACTS
Appellant Donald Gerard Sauve and respondent Haley Marie Lindstrom married in
2000 and had nine children. The parties separated on October 20, 2021, and Sauve
petitioned for dissolution on November 19, 2021, requesting joint legal custody, sole
physical custody to Lindstrom, and one day of parenting time “during the week” or “as
negotiated in the future.” At the time of the petition, seven of the parties’ children were
minors. Lindstrom answered and filed a counterpetition seeking sole legal and sole physical
custody, child support, dissolution, and division of property.
1
On March 4, 2022, attorney one filed a certificate of representation for Sauve. The
district court scheduled the matter for trial on July 25, 2022, and ordered the parties to
attempt alternative dispute resolution or arrange for a custodial evaluation. On May 25,

1 Although Lindstrom sought spousal maintenance in her counterpetition, she abandoned
that claim before trial.

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2022, Lindstrom’s attorney wrote to the district court saying that the parties had hired a
neutral custody evaluator but that the evaluator was unable to complete an evaluation in
time for the July 25 trial. The district court amended the scheduling order with a new trial
date of October 3, 2022, and subsequently extended the trial date to December 12, 2022.
On November 18, 2022, attorney one withdrew from representing Sauve.
On November 22, 2022, attorney two filed a certificate of representation for Sauve.
The next day, attorney two requested a continuance of the trial “based upon [his] recent
retention.” The district court granted the continuance and rescheduled the trial for April 17,
2023.
On March 19, 2023, Lindstrom’s attorney wrote to the district court, stating that
attorney two “advised that he no longer represents” Sauve. In the email attached to the
letter, attorney two stated that he was “not currently licensed to practice.” On March 29,
2023, Sauve retained attorney three, who withdrew two days later.
Six days before the scheduled trial date, on April 11, 2023, attorney Perske filed a
certificate of representation for Sauve and a request for a continuance of the trial. Attorney
Perske’s request stated that he was “disappointed with the condition of [Sauve’s] file as it
reached [his] desk” and believed “it will result in an inefficient and confusing trial on the
merits if conducted” as scheduled. Lindstrom’s attorney opposed the continuance, arguing
that the request was not “made in good faith” and was “a form of systemic abuse that keeps
[Lindstrom] and the children controlled” by Sauve. The district court denied the
continuance, stating, “The Court will only readdress this issue if Mr. Sauve pays his portion
of the custody evaluation and makes a significant good faith payment on his temporary

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child support obligation. Without doing so the Court cannot find good cause to continue
this trial.”
On the morning of trial, attorney Perske renewed his request for a continuance. The
district court denied the request, reasoning that there were “multiple delays in this case, it
was beyond the timeframe for resolving divorce matters, that [Sauve] had not paid child
support or his portion of the custody evaluation and that Mr. Perske was the fourth attorney
on this case and appeared prepared to go forward with the trial.”
After a two-day trial, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and an order for judgment. The district court dissolved the parties’ marriage, granted
Lindstrom sole legal and sole physical custody of the minor children, granted Sauve
supervised parenting time, awarded child support, and divided property.
On August 10, 2023, Sauve, still represented by counsel, moved for a new trial.
Sauve argued that he was entitled to a new trial based on the district court’s (1) “denial of
[his] motions for continuance of the trial date” and (2) “errors of law in the denial of [his]
non-marital interest in real property and the overall division of the marital estate and
disposition of the real property.” Lindstrom opposed Sauve’s motion for a new trial.
On September 12, 2023, the district court denied Sauve’s motion for a new trial,
determining that it “properly used its discretion in denying the continuance.” The district
court noted that the “case had been continued well beyond the typical timeline for a
dissolution case,” Sauve “had still not paid his portion for the custody evaluator” or “child
support,” attorney Perske “was prepared sufficiently to move forward with the trial,” and

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“[f]urther delays would result in prejudice to [Lindstrom] who was singly shouldering the
financial burdens of the children.”
Sauve appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sauve’s new-trial
motion.

Sauve challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing
that he is entitled to a new trial based on two irregularities in the proceedings: (1) he “was
unable to hear” during the trial and (2) the district court should have granted his renewed
motion for a continuance.
Appellate courts “review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial for
an abuse of discretion.” Christie v. Est. of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018).
“A district court abuses its discretion when evidence in the record does not support the
factual findings, the court misapplied the law, or the court settles a dispute in a way that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Foster v. Foster, 802 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. App.
2011) (quotation omitted). A new trial may be granted based on an “[i]rregularity in the
proceedings of the court, referee, jury, or prevailing party, or any order or abuse of
discretion, whereby the moving party was deprived of a fair trial.” Minn. R. Civ. P.
59.01(a). “An irregularity is a failure to adhere to a prescribed rule or method of procedure
not amounting to an error in a ruling on a matter of law.” Boschee v. Duevel, 530 N.W.2d
834, 840 (Minn. App. 1995) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 14, 1995). A

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party seeking a new trial based on an irregularity “must prove (1) an irregularity occurred
and (2) they were deprived of a fair trial.” Id.
A. Sauve preserved no error about hearing difficulties, the district court
appropriately addressed Sauve’s request for hearing accommodation ,
and the record does not support Sauve’s claim of any difficulty hearing
during the trial.

For the first time on appeal, Sauve argues that an “irregularity occurred” when the
district court “failed to accommodate [his] hearing loss” in violation of the Language
Access Plan for the Minnesota Judicial Branch (the plan). Lindstrom argues that Sauve
“did not adequately preserve the issue for appeal and it should be deemed waived.”
Alternatively, Lindstrom argues that Sauve’s “hearing issues were addressed during trial
through a stipulation of counsel with the court’s approval” and that “the trial transcript
establishes that [Sauve] was able to hear.”
Although Sauve moved for a new trial in the district court, his motion did not argue
that he had any hearing difficulties during the trial. Minnesota has long followed “the
general rule that matters such as trial procedure, evidentiary rulings and jury instructions
are subject to appellate review only if there has been a motion for a new trial in which such
matters have been assigned as error.” Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn.
1986) (emphasis added) (reaffirming the rule) . The supreme court has articulated strong
reasons for this rule:
[T]he motion for a new trial provides both trial court and
counsel with a unique opportunity to eliminate the need for
appellate review or to more fully develop critical aspects of the
record in the event appellate review is sought. Counsel is
required to focus the trial court’s attention on the specifics of
an objection which, though properly framed during trial, might

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not have been fully explained or the impact of which might not
have been understood during trial. The trial court is given time
for reflection and the opportunity to consider the context in
which the alleged error occurred and the effect it might have
had upon the outcome of the litigation. In short, it is given the
opportunity to correct its own errors without subjecting the
parties and the appellate courts to the time, expense and
inconvenience involved in an appeal.

Id. at 201-02; see also County of Hennepin v. Bhakta, 922 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Minn. 2019)
(“Matters of trial procedure, evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions occurring at trial are
subject to appellate review only if they are assigned as error in a motion for a new trial.”
(emphasis added)).
The only two grounds for a new trial raised in Sauve’s motion were the “denial of
[Sauve’s] motions for continuance of the trial date” and “errors of law in the denial of
[Sauve’s] non-marital interest in real property and the overall division of the marital estate
and disposition of the real property.” Because Sauve’s new-trial motion did not contend
that he had any hearing difficulty during trial, the issue is not preserved for appeal . Error
preservation may affect the scope of review on appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04
(“The scope of review afforded may be affected by whether proper steps have been taken
to preserve issues for review on appeal, including the existence of timely and proper
post-trial motions.”); Bhakta, 922 N.W.2d at 197.
2
Setting aside Sauve’s failure to preserve any error in a new-trial motion, Sauve’s
brief to this court also fails to articulate what irregularity occurred or how he was deprived

2 Similarly, appellate courts “generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted).

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of a fair trial by any hearing difficulty. See Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949)
(stating that an appellant has the burden to show error); Boschee, 530 N.W.2d at 840
(stating that, to obtain a new trial based on an irregularity in the proceedings, the movant
“must prove (1) an irregularity occurred and (2) they were deprived of a fair trial”).
Sauve’s brief on appeal contends that he made a “clear request for hearing
accommodations” during trial and that the district court “decided to proceed” with the trial
despite knowing the hearing-assistance “equipment [in the courtroom] was
non-functional.” Sauve argues that the district court failed to meet the plan despite Sauve’s
“clear request for hearing accommodations.”3 The plan provides that all “limited-English
speaking and deaf or hard of hearing Minnesotans” have a right to “language
access . . . when they are using the court system.” Minn. Jud. Branch, Language Access
Plan 9 (2020), https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scao_library/Court%20
Interpreter/MJB-Language-Access-Plan.pdf [ https://perma.cc/CE6P-T4UV]. The plan
states that, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, “district courts must provide
auxiliary aids and services . . . to all deaf and hard of hearing court users.” Id. at 10.
Sauve’s argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, Sauve’s claim of an
irregularity in the trial proceedings is not supported by the record. The district court

3 Sauve also argues that the district court failed to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act. Title VI provides, “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018). Because Sauve does not argue that the district court
failed to accommodate his hearing issues on the basis of race, color, or national origin,
Sauve cannot rely on Title VI.

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acknowledged that the courtroom’s hearing- assistance equipment was not functioning.
Before calling Sauve to testify at trial, attorney Perske stated that, “due to hearing loss,
[Sauve] was having trouble hearing the witnesses” and that attorney Perske was
“concerned” about “the dialogue due to [Sauve’s] hearing loss.” The parties’ attorneys
proposed that attorney Perske could “utilize the lectern close” to the witness box to
question Sauve; the district court agreed. The district court noted that the court “used to
have some hearing assistance device” but “they’re not working.” Attorney Perske stated
that he “understood” and “this was the workaround.”
Before examining Sauve, attorney Perske clarified that Sauve could “hear [him]
okay ” and stated, “[I]f there’s a question that you cannot hear, please just let us know.”
During Sauve’s testimony, he did not indicate he was having any difficulty hearing. At one
point, attorney Perske asked Sauve whether he had heard a specific part of the custody
evaluator’s earlier testimony. Sauve responded, “I heard it.”
After Sauve testified, attorney Perske rested, and Lindstrom’s attorney called
Lindstrom to testify. During Lindstrom’s testimony, the district court interrupted to request
that she “pull the microphone really close” and “speak really loud” because the district
court thought “Sauve [was] having a hard time hearing.” When Lindstrom’s attorney
resumed his examination after a recess, he reminded Lindstrom to “keep [her] voice
volume elevated” when testifying. At the end of Lindstrom’s testimony, attorney Perske
called Sauve back “for a few rebuttal questions” and clarified at the outset that Sauve could
hear him. In short, after developing a “workaround,” neither attorney Perske nor Sauve

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suggested that Sauve experienced any hearing difficulty or that Sauve required any other
accommodation.
Second, Sauve’s brief to this court points out no instance of hearing difficulty or
any prejudice to him as a result of hearing difficulty. Sauve seems to argue that he was
deprived of a fair trial because he was unable “to address testimony ” because of trouble
hearing. But Sauve does not identify what testimony he did not hear or could not address—
despite having the opportunity to review the trial transcript.
Thus, Sauve preserved no hearing difficulties for review on appeal, his brief to this
court has not shown that any irregularity in the proceedings occurred, and he has asserted
no prejudice because of difficulties hearing during trial.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a
new trial based on Sauve’s renewed request for a continuance.

Sauve argues that an irregularity in the proceedings occurred “when the court denied
[his] request for a continuance.” Lindstrom argues that Sauve fails to show “how he was
prejudiced by the denial of his continuance requests.”
“The granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and its
ruling will not be reversed absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” Jones v. Jones,
402 N.W.2d 146, 149-50 (Minn. App. 1987). When evaluating “the denial of a continuance
motion, the critical question is . . . whether the denial prejudiced the outcome of the trial.”
Torchwood Props., LLC v. McKinnon, 784 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Minn. App. 2010).
Six days before trial, attorney Perske filed a certificate of representation for Sauve
and requested a continuance of the trial. Attorney Perske stated that he could not find a

11
“witness or exhibit list” for Sauve, had “received only partial discovery,” and believed “an
inefficient and confusing trial on the merits” would result absent a continuance. The district
court denied the request for a continuance, stating that it could not “find good cause to
continue this trial” unless “Mr. Sauve pays his portion of the custody evaluation and makes
a significant good faith payment on his temporary child support obligation.”
Attorney Perske renewed his request for a continuance at the beginning of the trial.
Perske added, “[R]egardless of the court’s decision on the continuance request, [opposing
counsel] and I have gone through the list of both petitioner and respondent’s exhibits, and
we’ve reached a substantial amount of agreement as to stipulating the admissibility of
those.” The district court again denied the request, stating that the case was “substantially
over” the timeline for divorce cases, “given all of the delays,” and that attorney “Perske
appear[ed] to be prepared to go” to trial.
After the trial, Sauve moved for a new trial based on the district court’s denial of a
continuance. The district court denied the motion. The district court found that the “case
had been continued well beyond the typical timeline for a dissolution case.” The district
court stated that it “had granted a continuance” in November 2022 “prior to the April 2023
continuance request to allow additional time for [Sauve] to prepare . . . due to the fact that
[Sauve] had new counsel” before attorney Perske. The district court also found that
“[f]urther delays would result in prejudice to [Lindstrom] who was singly shouldering the
financial burdens of the children” and that Sauve “had not paid child support” or “his
portion for the custody evaluator.” And the district court determined that, “although Mr.

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Perske had been on the case for one week, Mr. Perske had put in a lot of work within that
week and was admittedly prepared to move forward with the trial.”
Sauve’s brief to this court fails to show any irregularity in the denial of his renewed
continuance request or that he was prejudiced by the denial. Sauve argues that attorney
Perske “was not allowed the time to prepare [Sauve]” to testify such that Sauve “was unable
to tell [his] story effectively” and that attorney Perske did not have “time to subpoena the
witnesses [they] needed to testify.” Sauve’s arguments are unavailing. Sauve filed his
dissolution petition in November 2021 and had over a year to prepare for trial. The trial
was originally scheduled for July 25, 2022, but because of issues with the custody
evaluation and Sauve retaining attorney two as new counsel, the district court rescheduled
the trial three times, ultimately moving it to April 17, 2023. Though attorney Perske filed
a certificate of representation six days before the April 2023 trial date, Sauve had been
represented by three other attorneys since March 4, 2022. And the district court determined
that attorney Perske was prepared to proceed with trial.
As with the hearing difficulties raised for the first time on appeal, S auve does not
articulate any prejudice because of the denial of the continuance request. Sauve called five
witnesses at trial and does not specify what additional witnesses were “needed.” Sauve
offered his own testimony as well as testimony from the custody evaluator and three of
Sauve’s friends. Sauve also had the opportunity to cross-examine Lindstrom, the only
witness Lindstrom’s attorney called. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a new trial based on the denial of Sauve’s renewed motion for a
continuance.

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In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sauve’s motion for
a new trial based on i rregularities in the proceedings resulting from the district court’s
accommodation of Sauve’s hearing difficulties or the denial of a renewed continuance
request.
II. Sauve’s appellate motions are denied.

Sauve filed three motions with this court. Sauve’s first motion stated, “Due to the
fact that the requested book photos w/ children + photos of residence + possibly other docs
(home receipt?) are as yet unavailable delay hearing to give the opportunity to obtain them.
Also giving time to review attached materials and modify/add as needed. 14 days
continuance.” Sauve’s second motion sought to “supplement file with attached documents
originally submitted for hearings at district court.” Along with his motion, Sauve submitted
hundreds of pages of documents, photos, and a flash drive. Sauve’s third motion asked this
court for an “opportunity to attend a conference/hearing” at which his “litigation is being
discussed in order to advocate [his] case in person.”
Lindstrom opposes Sauve’s three motions. As for the first two motions, Lindstrom
argues that “appellate review is limited to what was in the transcripts and orders of the trial
court” and that “the additional submissions are not a part of the district court record.”
Lindstrom construes Sauve’s third motion as a request for oral argument and argues that
“[t]his matter is submitted on [the] briefs because [Sauve] is not represented by counsel.”
“The documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. ” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01. “An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on

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appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582-83. The supplemental materials submitted by Sauve are either
already included in the district court record—in which case supplementation is not
necessary— or were not part of the district court record—in which case supplementation is
inappropriate. The materials also include motions previously filed in this appeal that were
resolved by an order of this court. Accordingly, we deny Sauve’s first and second motions
to supplement the record.
As to his third motion, “an appeal will be placed on a nonoral calendar and deemed
submitted on the briefs on that calendar date . . . [w]hen any party involved in the appeal
is not represented by counsel.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 134.06. Sauve is not represented by
counsel on appeal. Also, to the extent that Sauve’s motion sought to attend this court’s
conference of his case, he cites no legal authority entitling him to this relief. We therefore
deny Sauve’s third motion “to attend a conference/hearing.”
Affirmed; motions denied.