State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1696

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jonathan Pierre Neita,
Appellant.

Filed August 12, 2024
Affirmed
Florey, Judge *

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-23-3359

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant pleaded guilty to violating an order for protection and the district court
imposed a presumptive sentence of 29 months of imprisonment. Appellant argues in this

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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direct appeal that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a
downward d ispositional departure. Because the district court acted within its discretion by
imposing the presumptive sentence, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2023, appellant Jonathan Pierre Neita was served with an order for
protection (OFP) that prohibited him from contacting M.R.G. Three months later, M.R.G.
reported to a police officer tha t she had received te xt messages from Neita asking her to
visit him at his home in St. Cloud . M.R.G. reported that when she arrived Neita took her
keys and trapped her in the house. When she attempted to escape by breaking a window,
Neita pinned her to the ground and threatened to kill her. Based on M.R.G.’s report, t he
state charged Neita with one count of violating an OFP, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2022).
In May 2023, Neita pleaded guilty to the charged offense pursuant to a plea
agreement. In exchange for Neita’s guilty plea, the state agreed to dismiss the charges in
another court file and not to charge certain other offenses. The parties, however, did not
agree on the imposition of a particular sentence. Neita stated at the plea hearing that he
intended to argue for a downward dispositional departure at sentencing. The district court
released Neita pending sentencing , per his request, to participate in domestic violence
court.
Before sentencing, a probation agent filed a detailed presentence investigation
report (PSI). The report listed seven prior felony convictions since 2010 for first-degree
aggravated robbery, simple robbery, third -degree assault, two violations of an OFP,
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domestic assault by strangulation, and stalking. In four of those cases, Neita had been
placed on probation and, each time, his probation was revoked. The report also included
Neita’s score on a domestic abuse risk assessment, which placed him in the highest risk
category for recidivism. Based on this information, the probation agent concluded 31-year-
old Neita had “ not demonstrated amenability to supervision” and recommended that the
district court impose a presumptive sentence of 29 months of imprisonm ent, specifically
noting Neita’s “poor choices” and “extensive history of violence.”
Days after the PSI was filed, Neita filed a motion for a downward dispositional
departure in which he stated that the probation agent had “done a very good job detailing
[his] background” and argued that he should be placed on probation because prison had
“not been able to make effective changes.” Neita asserted that he had been compliant with
the terms of domestic violence court in the approximately two months since he pleaded
guilty and that he should be placed on probation so that he could continue to parti cipate in
the program.
In support of his motion, Neita filed a memorandum by a dispositional advisor. The
dispositional advisor acknowledged Neita’s “history of failure” on probation and that Neita
is a “high-risk to re-offend .” The dispositional advisor, however, recommended the district
court place Neita on probation because sending him to prison “most likely will do very
little and only address public safety for the duration of the sentence ” but granting a
dispositional departure would allow Neita to participate in domestic violence court and
may “change future behavior.”
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At sentencing , Neita argued that the district court should order a downward
dispositional departure on the ground that he is particularly amenable to probation. The
state opposed the motion and argued for the imposition of the presumptive prison sentence.
The district court denied Neita’s departure motion, stating that it had “reviewed
everything” and that it did not believe him to be particularly amenable to probation. In
making that determination, the district court reasoned that Neita had the second highest
domestic abuse risk assessment score it had ever seen and that he had been “out of prison
for a very short amount of time” when he committed the offense in this case. Finding no
substantial and compelling reasons to depart, the district court imposed a sentence of 29
months of imprisonment.
Neita appeals.
DECISION
Neita argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a
downward dispositional departure on the ground that he is particularly amenable to
probation.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
offenses that are “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history
and offense severity characteristics. ” Minn. Sent ’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (2022); see also
State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) . The guidelines are intended to
“maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn.
Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2022). Consequently, a district court must impos e a guidelines
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sentence “unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to
support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2022).
Substantial and compelling circumstances may support a downward dispositional
departure if a defendant is “particularly amenable to probation.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d
303, 309 (Minn. 2014). When considering whether to grant a dispositional departure, a
district court may consider factors such as “the defendant ’s age, his prior record, his
remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or
family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
District courts have “a great deal of discretion” in sentencing matters, including the
decision to depart or not depart from a presumptive sentence . Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 305.
Accordingly, w e review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a departure from the
presumptive sentence for an abuse of that discretion. Id. If substantial and compelling
circumstances exist, a district court has discretion to order a downward departure. Id. at
308; State v. Best, 449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 1989). But the presence of substantial and
compelling circumstances does not obligate a district court to depart, and the court may
still impose the presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
We will affirm a district court’s departure decision so long as the record demonstrates the
court “carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985). Only in a “rare
case” will an appellate court reverse a district court’s refusal to depart from the presumptive
sentence. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
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In this case, Neita does not argue that the district court did not consider all the
evidence or argument before making its decision. Rather, Neita challenges the district
court’s determination itself: that he is not particularly amenable to probation. But the
record belies his assertion. Not once has Neita successfully completed probation despite
four opportunities, and he expressly acknowledges this. In support of his departure motion,
Neita submitted evidence documenting his “history of failure” on probation and that he is
a “high-risk to re-offend.” In fact, his primary argument to the district court for a departure
rested on the ineffectiveness of both probation and prison at reducing his criminality. Thus,
by his own evidence and argument, Neita demonstrates that he is not amenable to
probation, and certainly is not particularly amenable to probation.
Neita contends that the district court should not have considered his “long criminal
history” in deciding not to depart from the presumptive sentence, asserting that “the test
for amenability to probation is not a cumulative examination of a defendant’s storied past.”
Instead, Neita contends that the district court should have concluded that he is particularly
amenable to probation because he admitted guilt, engaged in domestic violence and mental-
health programing, maintained his sobriety, and complied wi th the requirements of
domestic violence court. In this regard, he is simply incorrect. The district court was
permitted to consider Neita’s criminal history in determining whether he was particularly
amenable to probation. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 311 (stating “ we have specifically
endorsed referring to a defendant ’s criminal history ” for purposes of determining
amenability to probation); Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31. And, as stated above, there is evidence
in the record that would permit the conclusion that Neita is not particularly amenable to
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probation. Neita’s actions in the approximately two months following the plea hearing do
not necessitate that the district court find that he is particularly amenable to probation in
light of more than a decade of criminal activity and non- compliance with probation.
As we are satisfied that the district court thoroughly considered all the evidence
before denying Neita’s motion, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
by imposing the presumptive sentence . See Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at 81.
Affirmed.