Gary Frodermann, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1699

Gary Frodermann,
Appellant,

vs.

Chandler Feed Company,
Respondent,

Hubbard Feeds Management Company,
Respondent.

Filed July 15, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Rock County District Court
File No. 67-CV-23-113

William J. Wetering, Daniel R. Wetering, Hedeen, Hughes & Wetering, Worthington,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Christopher A. Wills, Mara C. Swanson, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota
(for respondent Chandler Feed Company)

Kirsten H. Pagel, Stanley E. Siegel, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent Hubbard Feeds Management Company)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;
and Slieter, Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal, on the grounds of res judicata, of his claims
against respondents for negligence, negligence per se, and breach of express and implied
warranties in relation to allegedly defective animal feed that appellant asserts caused the
death of his calves. Because we conclude that res judicata does not bar appellant’s lawsuit,
we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Appellant Gary Frodermann raises cattle. This dispute arises from respondent
Chandler Feed Company’s delivery of allegedly defective cattle feed to Frodermann.
Frodermann identified respondent Hubbard Feeds Management Company as the
manufacturer of the allegedly defective feed.
During the summer of 2021, Chandler Feed delivered various batches of cattle feed
to Frodermann at a cost of approximately $9,000. This included a June 23 delivery of calf
feed (Calf Krunch) with an invoice amount of $1,530.
Frodermann alleged that after he fed the Calf Krunch to his calves, 257 of them
died. Frodermann returned 21 bags of Calf Krunch to Chandler Feed and received a credit
of $378. Frodermann did not pay for any of the cattle feed deliveries during the summer
of 2021.
Chandler Feed filed a conciliation court claim seeking $9,163.17 from Frodermann
for his unpaid cattle-feed bill, and the conciliation court issued an order for judgment in
that amount against Frodermann. Frodermann timely removed the conciliation court case
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to district court. Chandler Feed issued a credit to Frodermann for $1,152, the remaining
amount due from the June 23 Calf Krunch delivery.
Chandler Feed amended its complaint,1 stating that “[o]n or about January 31, 2022,
[Frodermann] was indebted to [Chandler Feed] in the amount of $8,743.57.” Thus, the
amount requested in Chandler Feed’s amended complaint excluded the $1,530 invoice for
the June 23, 2021 delivery of allegedly defective Calf Krunch. Chandler Feed moved for
summary judgment, and Frodermann did not appear at the hearing. The district court
entered judgment against Frodermann in August.
Frodermann initiated this separate lawsuit against Chandler Feed and Hubbard
Feeds for the allegedly defective feed. Chandler Feed moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that Frodermann’s claim was barred by res judicata. The district court granted
Chandler Feed’s motion and dismissed Frodermann’s lawsuit on the basis that Frodermann
had failed to raise the claim of defective feed in the earlier district court proceeding
regarding the unpaid invoices.
Frodermann appeals.
DECISION
Frodermann argues that the district court erred by dismissing his lawsuit, contending
that the district court erred in its analysis of res judicata. We agree that res judicata does
not bar this lawsuit.

1 Pursuant to Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 522, “[t]he pleadings in conciliation court shall constitute
the pleadings in district court,” but a party can amend its statement of claim in district court
by serving and filing a formal complaint that complies with the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure. Chandler Feed referred to its complaint as an amended complaint.
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Appellate courts review de novo the application of res judicata.2 Rucker v. Schmidt,
794 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2011).
Res judicata is based on the principle that an issue determined by a court cannot be
disputed in a later lawsuit between the same parties. 3 Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686
N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004). Also called claim preclusion, res judicata applies
generally to a set of circumstances that gave rise to an entire lawsuit. Id. It applies
“regardless of whether a particular issue or legal theory was actually litigated.” Id. at 840.
There is a four-prong test for res judicata, and each prong must be met for it to apply. Id.
Res judicata applies as an absolute bar to a subsequent claim
when (1) the earlier claim involved the same set of factual
circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties
or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits;
(4) the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the matter.

Id. Frodermann challenges the district court’s determination on each prong.
Under the first prong, “[t]he common test for determining whether a former
judgment is a bar to a subsequent action is to inquire whether the same evidence will sustain
both actions.” Id. at 840-41 (quotation omitted).

2 Neither party identified whether the basis upon which Chandler Feed moved to dismiss
the lawsuit was pursuant to rule 12.03 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or rule 56 (Summary
Judgment). In any event, because the application of res judicata is reviewed de novo this
does not impact the standard of review in this case.
3 The principle is also aptly penned by Justice William B. Mitchell of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in an 1881 decision: “It is founded upon two maxims of the law, one of
which is that ‘a man should not be twice vexed for the same cause,’ the other that ‘it is for
the public good that there be an end of litigation’ . . . .” Wisconsin v. Torinus, 9 N.W. 725,
726 (Minn. 1881).
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Chandler Feed argues that the facts of both lawsuits are the same because both
lawsuits involved feed delivered during the summer of 2021 and because Frodermann
could have raised the issue of defective feed in the earlier lawsuit. Chandler Feed also
argues that the same evidence supports both claims because “to establish its claim in the
first lawsuit, Chandler [Feed] had to show that Frodermann had no offset: that none of the
feed was defective.”
The record, however, persuades us that Frodermann’s current claim involves
different facts from the earlier collection action commenced by Chandler Feeds. To
succeed in its claim in the lawsuit to collect for unpaid cattle feed, Chandler Feed had to
prove that Frodermann had not paid for the deliveries of cattle feed for which he had been
billed. And Chandler Feed, via its amended complaint in that matter, removed the charges
for the allegedly defective feed from Frodermann’s bill. In other words, Chandler Feed
did not seek judgment in that earlier proceeding for the June 23 delivery of allegedly
defective calf feed.
In contrast, for Frodermann to prove his claim in the present lawsuit, he will have
to show that Hubbard Feeds manufactured defective cattle feed and that Chandler Feed
distributed the defective feed to Frodermann. The same evidence does not sustain both
actions.
Furthermore, Frodermann was not required to raise the issue of defective feed in the
earlier lawsuit. In a lawsuit, a party “may” raise a counterclaim “not arising out of the
transaction that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.02
(discussing permissive counterclaims). In contrast, a party must raise a counterclaim that
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“arises out of the transaction that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.01 (discussing compulsory counterclaims). As we have already
explained, Chandler Feed did not seek payment for the delivery of allegedly defective feed.
Frodermann, therefore, was not required to raise the defective-feed issue in the earlier
lawsuit.
In short, the claims in the prior lawsuit and the current lawsuit are supported by
different evidence. Because t he first prong of res judicata is not met, and because each
prong must be met, we do not consider the other three prongs. Because res judicata does
not bar Frodermann’s lawsuit, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.4
Reversed and remanded.

4 Frodermann also argues that the district court impermissibly relied on facts from the
conciliation court proceedings in its order despite its removal to district court. Because we
reverse and remand on the res judicata issue, we do not address this argument.