Severin M. Chmielewski, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1703

Severin M. Chmielewski, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, a foreign corporation,
Respondent,

Twisted Knot Log Furniture, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed August 19, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-21-3036

Patrick J. Neaton, Neaton & Puklich, PLLP, Chanhassen, Minnesota (for respondents
Severin M. Chmielewski, et al.)

Laura R. Gurney, Gurney Law Office, LLC, Woodbury, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
This appeal arises after a jury verdict finding that appellants Nathan Sztamburski
and Twisted Knot Log Furniture, Inc., negligently caused a fire that destroyed a pole barn.
The barn belonged to respondent Serverin M. Chmielewski, and he used portions of the
barn to operate respondent Daystar Management Group, Inc. (Daystar). Appellants argue
that the district court erred when it denied their motion for judgment as a matter of law
(JMOL) because: (1) respondents presented insufficient evidence for the jury to
reasonably conclude that appellants negligently caused the fire and (2) as a tenant of the
barn, appellants did not have a duty to clean the heater that allegedly ignited the fire. In
the alternative, appellants argue the district court erred when it denied their motion for
remittitur or a new trial on damages because testimony regarding the barn’s value lacked
foundation. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2021, respondents filed an amended complaint, alleging a common-law
negligence claim against appellants. 1 The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial in June
2023, at which the parties elicited the following facts.
Chmielewski owned a 50% interest in Daystar, a small real-estate -management
corporation. Chmielewski’s son (“son”) worked for Daystar. Daystar had offices in

1 Respondents filed their initial complaint against Twisted Knot’s insurer, defendant State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm). The district court granted State Farm’s
motion for summary judgment, respondents did not challenge the district court’s decision,
and State Farm has not participated in this appeal.
3
Bethel, Minnesota, on an approximately 20 -acre property. Chmielewski owned and
resided on the property, where he also maintained multiple commercial buildings,
including a barn.
The barn was approximately 45-by -96 feet and had three floors. Chmielewski
testified that he believed the barn was in “very good condition” and estimated it was worth
roughly $530,000 given his knowledge of rental value, along with replacement and
construction costs. Based only on his knowledge of area rental properties, Chmielewski
estimated that the barn had a marketable value of $500,000.
2 Son estimated that the fire
destroyed over $81,000 worth of personal property, including two antique cars, a car lift,
and a hydraulic hose. There were sometimes mice in the barn, but “[n]ot an unusual
amount.” Son testified that he would see mice droppings “from time to time.”
3
An electrical panel was located on the main floor near the center of the barn. Also
on the main floor, respondents rented out a 900-square-foot area to tenants. Respondents
designed the rental area as a “spray booth” for finishing wood products with partition walls
and fans to pull out overspray. Inside the rental area, for 25 years prior to the fire, Daystar
kept a heater, which it suspended from the ceiling. The heater was located near the center
of the barn. The heater featured “a natural gas flame going up through a metal heat

2 A 2020 tax statement on nine acres of property that included Chmielewski’s home and
three commercial buildings estimated a total market value for the property of $421,400.
However, Chmielewski testified that in his experience, “the taxable market value [was]
typically lower than the market value.”
3 Sztamburski also testified that he saw mice on “one or two occasions.”
4
exchange.” Maintenance on the heater involved using compressed air to blow out the area
where the flame traveled.
In March 2020, Daystar began leasing the rental area to Twisted Knot. Sztamburski
founded Twisted Knot in 2003 and owns 100% of the company. The written lease between
Daystar and Twisted Knot included the following two provisions:
6. MAINTENANCE BY LANDLORD: [Daystar] shall, at its
expense, keep the structural parts of the Building in good order,
safe condition and repair, including the exterior walls, roof,
floor, foundation and interior support columns.

7. MAINTENANCE BY TENANT: [Twisted Knot] shall be
solely responsible for providing and paying for its own
janitorial services, including but without limitation window
washing and replacement of light bulbs for the Premises.4

Appellants used the rental area to manufacture and finish cabinetry and fireplace
accessories. Appellants used “a mechanical airless sprayer” in the spray booth to finish
wood products with lacquer, a flammable product.
Regarding maintenance on the heater, Sztamburski testified that he “knew there was
a flame in [the] heater” but never wiped or otherwise cleaned the heater. He also never
wiped off other surfaces, such as shelves, cabinets, or tabletops, in the rental area to prevent
flammable vapors from accumulating. Sztamburski testified that he understood the lease

4 The lease stated that it expired in August 2020, but contained a provision providing that,
if Twisted Knot continued to occupy the premises upon expiration, “it shall be deemed to
be occupying the Premises as a tenant from month to month,” subject to the terms and
conditions of the original lease “in so far as the same can be applicable to a month-to -
month tenancy.” The parties do not dispute that the lease terms quoted above remained in
effect at the time of the fire.
5
to require Daystar to “maintain the unit heater,” and that he had no training or knowledge
on how to properly clean it.
Son testified that i n August or September 2020, he noticed a trail of “white
footprints coming out of [the rental] area” and could see “little icicles of overspray”
extending over the area that air blew out of the heater. S on also testified that he told
Sztamburski that the amount of overspray was a fire hazard and directed him to clean the
heater. According to son, Sztamburski agreed that he would clean the heater. 5
On February 19, 2021, Sztamburski used the rental area to spray three coats of
lacquer on a wood product. Around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., he turned off the exhaust fan and
turned down the thermostat from 70 or 75 degrees to around 50 degrees. This caused the
heater to turn off. Sztamburski knew the heater would automatically turn on later that night
due to the freezing temperatures. Sztamburski did not notice anyone else in the barn and
locked the barn’s exterior entrance.
At some point in the late evening, a fire started in the barn. According to the barn’s
security system, around 11:18 p.m., a senser on a wall to the immediate exterior of the
rental area detected motion. The security panel then experienced a power failure,
indicating a loss of electricity. At 11:19 p.m., the senser indicated that it was “tampered
with,” meaning it was “either destroyed or the battery [was] melted or crushed.” At
11:21 p.m., a smoke detector was triggered along the barn’s northern wall.

5 In his testimony, Chmielewski also recalled that the amount of lacquer was a fire hazard,
and Sztamburski promised to clean “the whole area.” Sztamburski confirmed the
conversation with son about white footprints but did not recall being asked to clean the
heater.
6
Emergency services received the first reports that the barn was on fire around
11:23 p.m. Police arrived at Chmielewski’s home and informed him that the security
system reported a fire. Chmielewski went outside and saw a glow coming from the barn.
The fire department arrived soon thereafter. Around midnight, Chmielewski called son on
the phone to tell him about the fire . When son arrived at the property, he could smell
lacquer coming from the fire and flames had broken “through the roof in the center of the
building.” A deputy state fire marshal arrived around 2:00 a.m., at which point “[t]he roof
of the [barn] had collapsed in addition to most of the exterior walls.” Sztamburski arrived
around 1:30 a.m., and he recalled that by 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. the fire-suppression efforts had
wound down and the area was “smoldering and smoky.” The fire resulted in a total loss of
the barn.
After the fire, son went to Sztamburski’s office and asked him “what he thought had
happened.” According to son, Sztamburski “told [son] he thought it was the unit heater.”
6
Appellants called two experts at trial to testify regarding the cause of the fire. The
first was the marshal who was at the scene the night of the fire and investigated the incident
in the days that followed. The marshal testified that he interviewed Chmielewski, son, and
Sztamburski for background information on the building, including its contents,
construction, and use. He also watched surveillance videos that monitored activity on the
property before the fire. The marshal concluded, based on his “initial firefighter

6 Through a motion in limine, appellants sought to prevent son from testifying about
Sztamburski’s statement that the heater caused the fire. The district court denied the
motion. At oral argument, appellants explained that they do not challenge the district
court’s ruling on their motion in limine.
7
observations and the security camera review,” that the fire originated in “the center area of
the building,” but would not express any additional conclusions.
The second expert was a trained fire investigator that appellants hired. The
investigator was on -site four days after the fire. By the time he arrived, a backhoe had
already moved much of the debris, displacing “the initial locations of the mechanical [and]
electrical items.” The investigator emphasized that the scope of the destruction limited his
investigation, but he interviewed Chmielewski, son, Sztamburski, and the marshal. He also
reviewed the surveillance videos. Based on “the [surveillance] video and . . . discussion
with the fire department,” he believed the fire originated in the center of the building
“because that’s where [the fire] vented through the roof first.” But he could not determine
the fire’s precise cause without speculating. The investigator testified that he believed the
fire could have started “without the negligence or fault of any party,” pointing to electrical
failure or rodents as potential alternative causes.
During trial, after respondents rested their case, appellants moved for JMOL. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.01. The district court denied the motion. At the conclusion of the trial,
the jury returned a verdict finding both appellants and respondents causally negligent and
attributing 68% of the negligence to appellants and 32% to respondents. The jury found
that $593,000 would adequately compensate respondents for their damages. Appellants

8
then renewed their JMOL motion. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.02. 7 In addition, appellants
moved for remittitur or a new trial on damages. In September 2023, the district court issued
an order denying appellants’ JMOL motion. The district court also denied appellants’
motion for remittitur or a new trial on damages.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellants argue the district court erred when it denied their JMOL motion. In the
alternative, appellants challenge the district court’s decision to deny remittitur or a new
damages trial, arguing the testimony regarding the barn’s value lacked foundation. We
address each argument in turn.
I.
Appellants first argue the district court erred when it denied their JMOL motion.
We review a district court’s decision to deny a JMOL motion de novo. Bahr v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn. 2009). “[W]e view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party,” id., and will “affirm the denial of a [JMOL motion]
unless no reasonable theory supports the verdict,” Vermillion State Bank v. Tennis
Sanitation, LLC, 969 N.W.2d 610, 618-19 (Minn. 2022). “This means that to reverse, the

7 Appellants characterized their motion as one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV) rather than for JMOL. However, Minn. R. Civ. P. 50 was amended in 2006 to
comport with changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Minn. R. Civ. P. 50 2006
advisory comm. cmt. The amended rule replaced “the archaic language and procedures”
of motions for JNOV with the uniform standard of motions for JMOL. Id. While the
amendment adopts a new name for the motion, “[t]his change [was] not intended to change
substantive practice relating to these motions.” Id. As such, pre-2006 caselaw addressing
JNOV motions are applicable to JMOL motions.
9
evidence must be so overwhelming on one side that reasonable minds cannot differ as to
the proper outcome.” Id. at 619 (quotation omitted).
To succeed on its negligence claim, respondents needed to show “(1) [the] existence
of a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury.” Bjerke
v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007). Appellants challenge the district court’s
determination that respondents presented sufficient evidence on the first and third elements
to sustain the jury’s verdict.
A.
Appellants first argue that respondents failed to present sufficient evidence that
appellants were a proximate cause of the fire. Because we conclude respondents presented
sufficient evidence to prove proximate cause, we disagree.
“Proximate cause exists if the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing
about the injury.” Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980). Proximate cause is
generally “a question of fact for the jury.” Jepsen as Tr. for Dean v. County of Pope, 966
N.W.2d 472, 491 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). However, it becomes a question of
law when “reasonable minds can arrive at only one conclusion.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539
N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. 1995). We will only upset a jury’s conclusion on proximate cause
when it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Lamke v. Louden, 269
N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. 1978). A plaintiff may prove proximate cause through
circumstantial evidence; “eyewitness testimony or other direct evidence” is not necessary.
Staub as Tr. of Weeks v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d 613, 621 (Minn. 2021).
10
But the plaintiff’s theory cannot rest on “speculation and conjecture.” Smith v. Runk, 425
N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. App. 1988).
In previous fire cases, the supreme court has upheld a district court’s decision to
grant a JMOL motion when the plaintiff’s proximate-cause theory was too speculative to
sustain liability for the defendant. See Rochester Wood Specialties, Inc. v. Rions, 176
N.W.2d 548, 549 -52 (Minn. 1970) (upholding JMOL because expert testimony positing
that a fan ignited a fire, and that lacquer nearby could have ignited the fire, was “based on
assumptions which were not established by the evidence”); Huseby v. Carlson, 238 N.W.2d
589, 589-90 (Minn. 1975) (per curiam) (upholding JMOL when an expert testified that a
fire began in a tenant’s bedroom, but the expert did not thoroughly investigate the
premises). But the supreme court has indicated that an inference amounts to more than
“speculation or conjecture” when the inference may be reasonable given a jury’s “[l]ife
experience and common sense.” Staub, 964 N.W.2d at 625-26.
In Staub, a woman fell down a flight of stairs at a resort and eventually died. Id. at
616. The woman’s trustee sued the resort and its owner, arguing that they proximately
caused her death by negligently failing to keep the stairs in a safe condition. Id. In
depositions and affidavits, multiple witnesses described seeing the woman rolling to the
ground at the bottom of the stairs, and one witness described warning the owner repeatedly
that the steps were dangerous. Id. at 617-18. The resort and its owner moved for summary
judgment, arguing the trustee’s causation theory was speculative. Id. at 619. The district
court agreed, reasoning that, although the stairs were “cracked, chipped, leaning, and
weathered,” no one observed what caused the woman to fall. Id. The supreme court
11
reversed, concluding “a jury could reasonably infer that the poor and degraded condition
of the stair was a substantial factor in causing [the woman’s] death.” Id. at 625-26. The
supreme court relied on the fact that the record showed that the woman “was on the landing
before she fell and that she, in fact, fell,” and that the stairs were degraded and unsafe. Id.
at 625. The supreme court concluded that “[l]ife experience and common sense,” would
allow a jury to decide “that a degraded, cracked, and chipped stair, leaning away from a
building, is a dangerous condition that may cause a person using the stair to fall.” Id.
We conclude this case is similar to Staub. The jury received evidence that (1) the
heater was hanging in the rental area near the center of the building; (2) appellants used a
flammable lacquer in the rental area to finish wood products; (3) appellants had allowed
excess lacquer to build up and settle on the heater; (4) despite an explicit request from son,
Sztamburski had not cleaned the heater; (5) Sztamburski used the flammable lacquer in the
rental area on the day of the fire; (6) Sztamburski turned the thermostat down to 50 degrees,
causing the heater to turn off, but he knew the heater would turn on later in the evening
given the freezing temperatures; (7) between 11:18 and 11:21 p.m., a motion sensor and a
smoke detector were triggered; (8) after the fire, Sztamburski told son that he believed the
heater ignited the fire; and (9) expert testimony indicated the fire started near the center of
the building. Given the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably found—
and did find —based o n “[l]ife experience and common sense,” see id., that appellants’
conduct caused the heater to ignite and start the fire that destroyed the barn.
Appellants argue that respondents’ proximate-cause theory conflicted with the
expert testimony at trial. An important consideration when deciding a JMOL motion is
12
whether the jury verdict undercut credible expert opinion about causation. See, e.g., Gen.
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Frito-Lay Co., 243 N.W.2d 726, 729- 30 (Minn.
1976) (reversing district court’s decision to grant JMOL after district court excluded expert
opinion that was based on “an extensive personal investigation [into] the circumstances of
the fire”); Dalager v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 350 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Minn. App. 1984)
(affirming district court’s decision to deny JMOL motion after jur y verdict aligned with
expert testimony about the “most likely” cause of the fire). But here, we disagree with
appellants’ characterization that respondents’ proximate-cause theory conflicted with the
expert testimony.
In this case, the experts did not opine that something other than the heater caused
the fire. Instead, both experts indicated that the fire started near the center of the barn, but
they could not otherwise determine the fire’s cause. The evidence presented at trial
illustrates that the heater was hanging in the rental area near the center of the barn. Thus,
the jury’s finding that the heater caused the fire does not conflict with the expert testimony.
Further, notably absent from both expert reports was available information regarding the
lacquer’s flammability and its accumulation on the heater. Based on this additional
evidence, the jury was able to reasonably infer that appellants’ use of the lacquer caused
the heater to ignite and start the fire.
Appellants also argue that they are entitled to JMOL because they presented
alternative theories of proximate cause. When a case proceeds on circumstantial evidence
and the parties present proximate-cause theories that are inconsistent with one another, “the
plaintiff’s theory must reasonably preponderate over any other theories.” Staub, 964
13
N.W.2d at 622 (quotation omitted). Here, witnesses provided extensive testimony about
Sztamburski using lacquer, the lacquer’s flammability, and Sztamburski’s presence in the
barn during the hours preceding the fire. Appellants presented very little evidence to
support their alternative theories—namely, that rodents or electrical-system failure caused
the fire. Therefore, we conclude that respondents’ theory that the heater caused the fire
“reasonably preponderated” over appellants’ alternative theories.
For these reasons, we conclude that, when viewing “the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party,” see Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 919, the district court did not
err when it denied appellant’s JMOL motion on the proximate-cause element.
B.
Appellants also argue that respondents failed to prove appellants had a duty under
the lease to perform maintenance on the heater. We disagree.
Whether a party has a duty of care is generally a legal question that we review
de novo. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 664. “In the absence of a lease provision to the contrary,
a tenant is generally liable in tort to its landlord for damages to the leased property caused
by the tenant’s negligence.” RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rohde, 820 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2012)
(providing framework for insurance companies to pursue subrogation claims against
insured’s tenant when the tenant is negligent). Duties between a landlord and a tenant are
based on “the expectations of the parties as to which party bears responsibility for a
particular loss.” See id. at 14. “[I]f a lease expressly provides that the tenant is not
responsible for a particular loss, the landlord [cannot] bring an action against the tenant in
14
the first instance,” and, beyond the lease itself, “other admissible evidence” might “shed[]
light on the expectations of the parties.” Id. at 15 (quotation omitted).
Here, under the terms of their written lease, Twisted Knot agreed to undertake
“janitorial services, including but without limitation window washing and replacement of
light bulbs for the Premises.” Meanwhile, Daystar agreed to “keep the structural parts of
the Building in good order, safe condition and repair, including the exterior walls, roof,
floor foundation and interior support columns.” Son testified that in August or September
2020, Sztamburski agreed to clean the heater along with other portions of the rental area to
reduce concerns over the lacquer’s flammability. Chmielewski also testified that
Sztamburski agreed to clean the rental area. Viewing the testimony at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict,” see Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 919, we conclude respondents proved,
consistent with the terms in the lease, that the parties reasonably expected appellants to
clean the heater. Thus, respondents established that appellants had a duty to clean the
heater.
For this reason, the district court did not err when it denied appellant’s JMOL
motion on the duty element.
II.
Appellants argue in the alternative that the district court erred when it denied
appellant’s motion for remittitur or a new trial on damages. A district court may grant
remittitur on the grounds that a jury entered an excessive verdict “under the influence of
passion and prejudice or on the ground that the damages are not justified by the evidence.”
Kwapien v. Starr, 400 N.W.2d 179, 184 (Minn. App. 1987). Likewise, a district court may
15
grant a new trial based on “[e]xcessive or insufficient damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(e). Absent “a
clear abuse of discretion” we will not reverse a district court’s denial of remittitur or a new
trial on damages. Kwapien, 400 N.W.2d at 184 (remittitur); LaValle v. Aqualand Pool Co.,
257 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Minn. 1977) (new trial).
Appellants argue the district court clearly abused its discretion when it denied
remittitur or a new trial on damages because Chmielewski’s testimony regarding the barn’s
value lacked foundation and was purely speculative. We disagree.
A property owner is competent to testify about the market value of their property
without any “particular foundation for [the] opinion,” subject to the limitation that the
opinion cannot be “wholly incredible.” Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Zweigbaum, 100
N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn. 1960); see also Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 74 N.W.2d 305,
309 (Minn. 1955) (“In this state the owner of property . . . is presumptively acquainted with
its value and may testify as to its value.”). Weakness in the foundation of a property
owner’s testimony about market value typically “goes to its weight, not its admissibility.”
Vreeman v. Davis, 348 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1984).
Here, Chmielewski testified that the barn had a value of $530,000, relying on a
combination of rental value, replacement costs, and construction costs. Based on his
knowledge of area rental rates, Chmielewski also estimated the barn to be worth $500,000.
In addition, son estimated that the fire destroyed over $81,000-worth of personal property,
which appellants do not challenge on appeal. Based upon this evidence, the jury awarded
$593,000 in damages to respondents.
16
Because property owners are “presumptively acquainted” with the marketable value
of their property, see Lehman, 74 N.W.2d at 309, and weak foundation for a property
owner’s testimony “goes to . . . weight, not . . . admissibility,” Vreeman, 348 N.W.2d at
757, we conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it denied
remittitur or a new trial on damages.
Affirmed.