State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1751

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Larry Dusaun Gray,
Appellant.

Filed November 4, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-513

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant Larry Dusaun Gray challenges his conviction for
first-degree aggravated robbery pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2022). Gray
argues that: (1) respondent State of Minnesota denied him the right to a speedy trial and
2
(2) the district court abused its discretion when it admitted certain identification evidence.1
We affirm.
FACTS
On January 26, 2022, at 4:27 p.m., a black Jeep traveling southbound on
Highway 280 crossed all the lanes of traffic and collided with a pole at Broadway Street
NE, in St. Paul, Minnesota. An F-250 truck, driven by J.W., was stopped at a red light at
the same intersection. The Jeep’s driver, wearing a white or light grey sweatsuit, exited
the Jeep, walked toward the F -250, and entered the F -250’s passenger door. Soon
thereafter, J.W. exited the F-250, and the Jeep’s driver left the scene in the F-250.
Two separate law-enforcement agencies were dispatched to the intersection.
Dispatch informed the responding sheriff’s deputy that: (1) an F-250 had been “carjacked”;
(2) the suspect was a “ [b]lack male in his 30s with a heavy build”; (3) the suspect was
wearing “all black clothing”; (4) the suspect possessed a gun; and (5) the suspect had
abandoned the Jeep. Shortly thereafter, a state trooper arrived at the scene and questioned

1 Gray also submitted a pro se brief raising largely the same issues. Gray additionally
argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and attache d correspondence not
in the record on appeal. We conclude Gray’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
requires us to consider evidence outside the record. Where an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim requires consideration of matters outside the record, we generally conclude
that a direct appeal is not the appropriate forum to raise the issue. See Andersen v. State,
830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013); see also State v. Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn.
2000) (“Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be raised in a
postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal.”). Therefore, we decline to
reach the issue and Gray’s “right to pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a
petition for postconviction relief is preserved.” See Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d at 321.
3
J.W. J.W. informed the trooper that an individual exited the Jeep, pulled a gun on J.W.,
forced J.W. out of the F-250, and drove away in the F-250.
At roughly 4:50 p.m., the trooper found Gray’s Minnesota identification card inside
the Jeep, which provided his height (5 feet, 10 inches), weight (250 pounds), and race
(African American). The trooper showed the identification card to J.W. and asked whether
J.W. recognized Gray. Within seconds, J.W. identified Gray as the Jeep’s driver and
confirmed that statement a few seconds later (hereinafter, “J.W.’s out-of-court
identification”).
Sheriff’s deputies eventually located the F-250 in St. Paul and turned the case over
to local police. Later that evening, law enforcement found Gray at the hospital, but they
were unable to interview him.
The state charged Gray with first-degree aggravated robbery on January 31, 2022,
and arrested him on September 23, 2022.2 At a hearing on October 26, 2022, Gray pleaded
not guilty, demanded a speedy trial, and gave notice that he would challenge the
admissibility of J.W.’s out-of-court identification. The district court set a pretrial
conference for November 16, 2022, a trial-management conference for December 14, 2022,
and a trial date for the two-week period beginning December 14, 2022.
At the pretrial conference, the district court set an evidentiary hearing for
December 8, 2022, to hear Gray’s motion to suppress J.W.’s out-of -court identification.

2 The reason for the delay in Gray’s arrest is not clear from the record.
4
The district court left the trial date on the calendar. For reasons not apparent from the
record, Gray’s counsel did not file the motion to suppress until December 28, 2022.
At a hearing to address Gray’s speedy -trial demand on December 29, 2022, the
district court found good cause to extend the 60-day standard set forth in Minn. R. Crim.
P. 11.09(b) to allow Gray to pursue his suppression motion. On January 17, 2023, the
district court held an evidentiary hearing on Gray’s suppression motion and set a briefing
schedule. On May 25, 2023, the district court issued an order denying the motion to
suppress. The district court determined that the trooper’s identification procedure was
unnecessarily suggestive, but J.W.’s out- of-court identification had an adequate
independent origin under the totality of the circumstances.
On June 22, 2023, the parties appeared for trial, and the district court granted an
extension to July 11, 2023, to accommodate unavailable state witnesses. On July 11, 2023,
Gray waived his right to a jury trial. At the bench trial, the state called several witnesses,
including J.W., the trooper, and the sheriff’s deputy, and submitted a number of exhibits,
including traffic-camera footage of the incident. The district court found Gray guilty of
first-degree aggravated robbery and sentenced Gray to 108 months in prison with credit for
334 days.
Gray appeals.

5
DECISION
On appeal, Gray challenges his conviction on two grounds. First, Gray argues that
he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial when his trial occurred eight months after he
pleaded not guilty. 3 Second, Gray argues the district court abused its discretion when it
admitted J.W.’s out- of-court identification , challenging the determination that the
identification had an adequate independent origin. We address each argument in turn.
I.
Gray argues that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial because his trial
occurred eight months after he pleaded not guilty. We review this issue de novo. State v.
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. In Minnesota, “trial
is to commence within 60 days from the date of the demand unless good cause is shown
. . . why the defendant should not be brought to trial within that period.” State v. Hahn,
799 N.W.2d 25, 29-30 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24,
2011); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b) (requiring trial within 60 days of demand
“unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date”). “When a defendant’s speedy trial

3 Gray argues the state’s pre-arrest delay supports a conclusion that his speedy-trial right
was violated. Because Gray did not raise this issue in district court, all arguments made in
relation to the pre-arrest delay are forfeited, and we decline to consider them. See Roby v.
State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1988).
6
right is violated, the only possible remedy is dismissal of the indictment.” State v. Jones,
977 N.W.2d 177, 190 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Minnesota courts use a four-factor balancing test to determine whether a delay in a
case violates a defendant’s speedy-trial right. State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315
(Minn. 1999). We must evaluate “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay;
(3) whether the defendant asserted his . . . right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay
prejudiced the defendant.” Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)). “None of
these factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of
the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together
with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19
(Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 244 (Minn.
2021) (explaining that “the central question” is whether the state brought “the accused to
trial quickly enough so as not to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial
protects”).
Here, as the state concedes, Gray’s trial began over 60 days from the date of the
speedy-trial demand. In Minnesota, delays beyond 60 days from the speedy-trial demand
presumptively satisfy the first factor. See Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16. We, therefore,
evaluate the remaining three factors. See State v. Johnson, 811 N.W.2d 136, 144 (Minn.
App. 2012) (“Under Minnesota law, a delay of more than 60 days from the date of the
speedy-trial demand is presumptively prejudicial, triggering review of the remaining three
factors.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012).

7
A. Reason for the Delay
Gray first argues the reason-for-the-delay factor weighs in favor of concluding a
speedy-trial violation occurred. Generally, the burden of protecting speedy-trial rights rests
with the state. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 317. But “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a
case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”
Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 748
(Minn. 2003) (concluding no violation when “the procedural history of the case makes
clear that the delays were the result of [the defendant’s actions]”).
When evaluating the reason-for-the-delay factor, “the key question is whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d
at 19 (quotation omitted). To make this determination, we first consider which party
caused the delay. See id. at 19-20; Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 629. Thereafter, we evaluate
the reason for that delay because “different weights should be assigned to different
reasons.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). “For instance, a
[d]eliberate delay to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the prosecution, while
neutral reason[s] such as negligence or overcrowded courts weigh less heavily.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
The record documents four distinct delays in the pretrial schedule that caused Gray’s
trial to occur eight months after his speedy-trial demand. According to Gray, these delays
were largely attributable to the state and, therefore, this factor weighs in favor of finding a
speedy-trial violation. We are not persuaded.
8
The first delay occurred when the district court moved the evidentiary hearing
regarding Gray’s motion to suppress from December 8, 2022, to January 17, 2023. The
record shows the district court offered to set the evidentiary hearing in November 2022,
but Gray’s counsel asked for a later date. Also, for reasons not apparent from the record,
Gray’s counsel filed the motion to suppress on December 28, 2022, 20 days after the
originally scheduled evidentiary hearing on December 8, 2022 . The only explanation in
the record is that the original “date did not work” and that the January 17, 2023 date “was
picked by the agreement of counsel.” We, therefore, conclude that the first delay was
attributable to setting a mutually agreeable hearing date and Gray’s decision to file the
motion to suppress on December 28, 2022, making it neutral in our analysis.
The second delay occurred between the January 17, 2023 evidentiary hearing and
the district court’s order on May 25, 2023, to facilitate briefing and decisionmaking on
Gray’s motion to suppress. “Delays caused by defense motions generally weigh against
the defendant.” Hahn, 799 N.W.2d at 32. Here, the district court informed Gray before he
filed the motion to suppress that the motion may require moving the trial date to facilitate
that process. And filing the motion to suppress did, in fact, require moving the trial date.
Thus, we conclude the second delay weighs against Gray.
The third delay occurred between the May 25, 2023 resolution of the suppression
proceedings and the June 22, 2023 trial date, the earliest trial block available after the
district court decided the motion to suppress. Generally, an administrative delay is not
sufficient to show a violation of “a defendant’s speedy-trial right in the absence of a
deliberate attempt to delay trial.” Id.; see also Mikell , 960 N.W.2d at 251 (stating that
9
delay will not be held against the state where it is the result of routine court scheduling).
And, here, the record shows the state specifically asked for an earlier date to respect Gray’s
speedy-trial demand. Thus, there is no evidence of deliberate delay by the state , and the
administrative delay is viewed more neutrally and not weighed heavily against the state.
The final delay occurred between June 22, 2023, and July 11, 2023 , because state
witnesses were unavailable for the June trial date. When delays are for good cause, they
are not weighed against the state. See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 251. The unavailability of
witnesses can constitute good cause for delay when the delay was not avoidable and the
state is “diligent in attempting to make witnesses available.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 317;
see also Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 251 (describing as good cause for delay situations wherein
key witness of the state is unavoidably unavailable). Here, the district court set the June
trial date “without consultation with whether the witnesses were available.” The state’s
witnesses were unavailable for the June date, and the state asked for a continuance. We
conclude that the record shows the state was diligent in attempting to make its witnesses
available for trial and, therefore, the continuance does not weigh against the state.
Viewing these circumstances in their totality, we conclude that Gray is “more to
blame for the delay.” See Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quotation omitted). The district court
originally set a trial date within the required 60 days following Gray’s speedy-trial demand,
but moved the trial date to accommodate Gray’s motion to suppress. While subsequent
delays precipitated from that motion process , neither weighs heavily against the state.
Therefore, the reason -for-the-delay factor weighs against concluding a speedy-trial
violation occurred.
10
B. Assertion of Speedy-Trial Right
Gray next argues the assertion-of-speedy-trial-right factor weighs in favor of
concluding a speedy-trial violation occurred because he repeatedly asserted his right.
Under this factor, a defendant’s assertion of the speedy-trial right “is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32. We consider “the frequency and intensity of a defendant’s
assertion” as evidence of the seriousness and potential prejudice at play. Hahn , 799
N.W.2d at 32 (quoting Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318); see also State v. Paige, 977 N.W.2d
829, 840 (Minn. 2022) (“[T]he strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness
and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.” (quotation omitted)). However, these
assertions “must be viewed in the light of [the defendant’s] other conduct.” United States
v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986).
We agree with Gray that this factor weighs slightly in his favor. Gray made a
speedy-trial demand on October 26, 2022, and reasserted that demand at later hearings.
Gray also filed a pro- se motion to dismiss for violating his speedy-trial right at the
beginning of trial and renewed that motion at sentencing. Despite this, our conclusion that
Gray’s decision to file the motion to suppress primarily caused the delay means we give
this factor less weight. See Paige, 977 N.W.2d at 841 (explaining assessment “focuses on
whether the speedy-trial demands are accompanied by actions that undermine the ability
for the trial to occur”); see also Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 314-15 (stating that defendant who
repeatedly filed frivolous petitions and motions delaying his trial undermined seriousness
11
of his speedy-trial right demands). Therefore, we conclude the assertion-of-speedy-trial-
right factor only weighs slightly in favor of concluding a speedy-trial violation occurred.
C. Prejudice
Gray finally argues that the prejudice factor weighs in favor of concluding a speedy-
trial violation occurred because: (1) he was incarcerated during the delay; (2) he lost “his
apartment, car, job, and livelihood”; (3) he “missed holidays with his family and his
daughter’s graduation”; and (4) his defense may have been impacted due to J.W. not
remembering the incident accurately.
We assess prejudice by considering the interests the speedy-trial right was designed
to protect, namely “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety
and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. The third interest is the “most serious,” as “the
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system.” Id. Prejudice to a defendant’s case is “obvious” if a witness dies or disappears
during the delay, or if defense witnesses “are unable to recall accurately events of the
distant past.” Id. A defendant need not prove that the delay actually impaired their defense.
See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 254 (explaining that court may consider speculative harm to
defendant because “excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in
ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify” (quotation omitted)).
Beginning with Gray’s arguments regarding the consequences of a lengthy pretrial
incarceration, we conclude that Gray has failed to show prejudice because most of the delay
is attributable to Gray. See State v. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1993) (“[A]lthough
12
defendant’s incarceration might have been unfortunate, the fact that much of the
responsibility for that situation was his own weighs against his claim.”).
And with regard to the impact to his defense, the record does not support Gray’s
contention that J.W.’s potential memory loss prejudiced his case. To the extent that J.W.
failed to recall certain events, that testimony was minimal and immaterial to the elements
the state needed to prove to support a conviction. Further, the state presented additional
identification evidence beyond J.W.’s in-court identification. And Gray’s defense counsel
explicitly used J.W. failing to remember specific details as impeachment evidence to
undermine his in-court identification.
For these reasons, the prejudice factor weighs against concluding Gray was deprived
of his right to a speedy trial.
D. Balancing the Factors
After balancing the relevant factors, we conclude Gray was not deprived of his right
to a speedy trial. While trial occurred eight months after Gray’s speedy-trial demand, the
record shows the delay was most attributable to Gray’s motion to suppress. Additionally,
while Gray did assert his speedy-trial right early and often, the record indicates that Gray
did not suffer any prejudice from the delay. Instead, the delay likely assisted his defense
in providing a basis on which to attack J.W.’s in-court ide ntification. Therefore, we
conclude that Gray was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
II.
Gray argues the district court abused its discretion when it admitted J.W.’s out- of-
court identification. Gray contends the district court correctly determined that the trooper’s
13
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, but abused its discretion when it
determined J.W.’s out-of-court identification had an adequate independent origin.
Generally, we review the district court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). But we review de novo
whether an individual has been denied due process. Spann v. State, 704 N.W.2d 486, 489
(Minn. 2005). “The admission of pretrial identification evidence violates due process if
the procedure ‘was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’” State v. Hooks, 752 N.W.2d 79, 83-84 (Minn.
App. 2008) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).
Minnesota courts apply a two-part test to determine whether a defendant’s police-
procured pretrial identification must be suppressed. State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 921
(Minn. 1995). The test is “designed to measure whether police influence rather than the
witness’s own reasoning and recollection led to the witness’s identification of the
defendant.” Hooks, 752 N.W.2d at 84 (citing State v. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn.
1999)).
Under the test, we first assess “whether the [identification] procedure was
unnecessarily suggestive.” Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 921. Here, the state concedes, and we
agree, that the trooper used an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. We
therefore move to the second part of the test.
Under the second part of the test, we evaluate whether “the totality of the
circumstances establishes that the evidence was reliable.” Id. To do so, we consider five
factors: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
14
(2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of
the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness; and (5) the time
between the crime and the confrontation. Id. We review each factor in turn.
A. Opportunity to View
Gray argues the district court’s determination that J.W. had an opportunity to view
the individual who took the F-250 is not supported by evidence available at the time of the
hearing. We disagree.
The video footage of the incident indicates that J.W. had the opportunity to view the
individual who took the F-250. The accident occurred near the F-250, allowing J.W. to see
the individual as he exited the Jeep and approached the F-250 during daylight hours. J.W.
was only a few feet away from the individual when he opened the F-250’s passenger door
and spoke with J.W. before J.W. exited the F-250. Approximately 26 seconds elapsed from
the time the individual exited the Jeep to J.W. exiting the F- 250. Based on this evidence,
we conclude J.W.’s opportunity to view the individual weighs in favor of admission.
B. Degree of Attention
Gray next argues the presence of a gun negatively impacted J.W.’s attention on the
individual who took the F -250 and should weigh against admission. To support his
argument, Gray cites State v. Gluff where an identification did not satisfy the five-factor
test, in part, because the victim testified “her eyes were riveted on the gun.” 172 N.W.2d
63, 65 (Minn. 1969).
While this case has some factual similarities to Gluff, we are not aware of any case
that establishes that the presence of a weapon, by itself, reduces a victim’s degree of
15
attention. Rather, caselaw indicates a victim’s identification is reliable if the evidence
shows they were “coherent, aware, and attentive” during the incident. State v. Adkins, 706
N.W.2d 59, 63 (Minn. App. 2005).
Here, unlike Gluff, J.W. testified that the presence of a gun caused him to be
“frightened,” but his testimony does not suggest the gun impacted his view of the individual
who took the F-250. See 172 N.W.2d at 65. Instead, J.W.’s initial description to police is
consistent with a high degree of observation and attention to detail. The evidence suggests
that J.W. had a detailed and consistent recollection of the events that transpired, which
support a finding that he was “coherent, aware, and attentive.” See Adkins, 706 N.W.2d at
63. For these reasons, we conclude the degree-of-attention factor weighs in favor of
admitting J.W.’s out-of-court identification.
C. Accuracy of Prior Description
Gray next argues that J.W. provided an inaccurate description of the individual who
stole the F-250. Gray highlights that J.W. reported that the individual was in his 30s and
“wearing all black clothing,” while the video footage plainly shows the individual in white
or light grey clothing and Gray was over forty.
Here, we agree with Gray that J.W. inaccurately reported the color of the clothing
the individual was wearing. But one inaccurate clothing detail does not make the
description unreliable as a whole. See Seelye v. State, 429 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. App.
1988) (classifying description as “on the whole, accurate” even though “[t]he height was
off, and [the witness] did not notice a mustache”). Further, we disagree that J.W.’s report
16
that the individual was in their “30s” inaccurately described a 41-year-old person given the
subjective nature of evaluating a person’s age.
Given the slight inaccuracy , we conclude that this factor is neutral in evaluating
whether J.W.’s out-of-court identification was admissible.
D. Level of Certainty
Gray asserts that J.W.’s certainty when he identified Gray on January 26, 2022, was
likely the result of the suggestive identification procedure and should not support the
identification’s reliability. To support his argument, Gray cites a Massachusetts Supreme
Court case noting that “[s]ocial science research has shown that a witness’s level of
confidence in an identification is not a reliable predictor of the accuracy of the
identification, especially where the level of confidence is inflated by its sugg estiveness.”
See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.2d 157, 168 (Mass. 2014). We are not persuaded.
“[W]e are an error -correcting court and it is not [our role] to abolish established
judicial precedent.” Adkins, 706 N.W.2d at 63. Regardless of the development of social-
science research, we cannot alter the test the supreme court established. And here the
record plainly shows that J.W. expressed certainty in his identification and his subsequent
confirmations occurred without hesitation. For these reasons, this factor weighs in favor
of admissibility.
E. Length of Time
Lastly, Gray emphasizes that the identification was not “instantaneous and certain.”
Instead, Gray observes that the identification occurred roughly 20 minutes after the
17
incident. The state argues 20 minutes is minimal and shows the identification is reliable.
We agree with the state.
We have repeatedly concluded that short gaps in time, like the one that occurred in
this case, support concluding an identification is reliable. Id. at 61, 63 (a show-up
conducted 25 minutes after burglary was “minimal” time between crime and
confrontation); State v. Navarro, No. A22-1246, 2023 WL 5522185, at *3 (Minn. App.
Aug. 28, 2023) (“Generally, when less than 48 hours have elapsed between the witness’s
observation and the identification of the perpetrator, the identification evidence is
considered reliable.” (citing Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 922)). 4 Applying this caselaw, the
20 minutes between the incident and first identification, and subsequent confirmation a few
seconds later, was a relatively short gap in time and weighs in favor of finding J.W.’s out-
of-court identification admissible.
F. Balancing the Factors
Balancing the relevant factors, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates that J.W.’s statement had an independent reliable origin. Four of the factors
support that J.W.’s out-of-court identification had an independent reliable origin, and one

4 This case is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite Navarro as persuasive
authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
18
factor is neutral. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Gray’s motion to suppress.5
Affirmed.

5 Even if the district court had abused its discretion, we conclude the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 913 (Minn. 1996) (“Looking
to the whole of the evidence on which the jury based its verdict, we [conclude] that the
verdict was surely unattributable to [the witness’s] pre-trial identification.”). There was
ample evidence submitted at trial that identified Gray as the individual who took the F-250,
including: a woman identifying Gray as driving a Jeep with the same license-plate number;
video footage from a mall depicting a man with similar physical features committing theft
prior to the incident; a mall-asset-protection manager’s testimony that the theft suspect had
the same physical features and subsequently escaped in a Jeep with the same license- plate
number; traffic-camera footage of the incident; the trooper’s testimony that the contents
found in the Jeep were similar to those held by the mall shoplifter; the trooper’s testimony
that Gray’s identification card was found in the Jeep; and the identification card’s
description and picture matching the same general descriptions provided by the other
sources above.