Isaac Alonzo Cryer, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1763

Isaac Alonzo Cryer, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 19, 2024
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge *

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-6820

Tyler Bliss, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larson , Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reilly ,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant-petitioner Isaac Alonzo Cryer seeks review of his convictions of second-
degree attempted murder, drive -by shooting, and second -degree assault with a dangerous
weapon, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In a first review of his
conviction by petition for postconviction relief , Cryer claimed that his trial counsel’s
performance was deficient because counsel did not raise an alternative -perpetrator defense
even though the evidence showed that a second shooter had been present during the
incident.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court, acting in its postconviction
capacity, determined that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, and that , even if it
had been, Cryer did not suffer any prejudice. On appeal, Cryer argues the district court
abused its discretion by d enying his petition for these reasons. Because Cryer’s counsel’s
alleged error was a matter of trial strategy —and therefore unreviewable —we affirm.
FACTS
Cryer’s convictions arose out of a familial dispute. On September 1, 2019, V.C. and
C.L. received notice from their landlord that they needed to move out of their apartment.
Their landlord was C.L.’s brother. Following news of the eviction, family members and
acquaintances of V.C. and C.L. gathered outside the apartment, but the meeting quickly
devolved into an argument. Sometime during the argument, C.L.’s other brother, T.R.,

1 Cryer raised other issues in his petition for postconviction relief, including other ways in
which he believed counsel’s performance was deficient, but he did not reassert these other
issues on appeal.
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drove up in his SUV. T.R., who had come over to help C.L. move, brought his four -year-
old daughter with him. When T.R. arrived and saw the group arguing, he got out of his
SUV and joined the fray.
Cryer, who is C.L. and T.R.’s cousin, then arrived on scene in a gold sedan. Cryer
and T.R. started yelling at each other as soon as Cryer got out of his car. A short while
later, Cryer “ran to his car[,] got a gun, . . . put [a bullet] in the chamber[,] and told [T.R.]
he would kill [him].” Cryer then told V.C.—who had grabbed a taser during the
argument—that if she “didn’t drop the taser” he would “shoot [her] in [the] stomach.”
Seeing Cryer’s gun, T.R. got back into his SUV and drove away. But when T.R. glanced
at his rearview mirror, he saw Cryer get into the gold sedan and start following him. Cryer
drove up behind T.R.’s SUV and “started shooting.” One of Cryer’s shots hit and shattered
the SUV’s back window. T.R.’s four -year-old daughter, who was sitting in the SUV’s
backseat, was hit by a bullet, but was later treated and survived.
As T.R. was driving away, a red jeep emerged from a side street and pulled in front
of his SUV. The occupants of the jeep shot at T.R.’s car before speeding off. After the red
jeep drove off, Cryer made a U -turn and drove back towards the apartment. He pulled in
front of the apartment and started shooting, aiming at those family members and
acquaintances still gathered outside. V.C. was hit by a bullet but survived.
A police investigation turned up casings from two guns, but no firearms were ever
recovered. The jeep, which had been reported stolen, was found abandoned a few days
after the shooting with its rear and front windows broken in a manner [that was] consistent
with a shooting. The occupants of the jeep were never identified.
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Cryer was arrested and charged with two counts of second -degree attempted
murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018), two counts of drive -by shooting,
Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (2018), one count of second -degree assault with a
dangerous weapon and inflicting substantial bodily harm, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2
(2018) and four counts of second -degree assault with a dangerous weapon, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 1 (2018). Cryer’s trial counsel did not file any pretrial motions and did
not give notice of any specific defenses.
The district court conducted a five -day jury trial. Witness testimony given at trial
was consistent with the above facts. Additionally, photographs and videos from the scene
were introduced as exhibits. The videos show Cryer walking away from the argument and
heading to his car. He can then be seen reaching into his car to retrieve an object. According
to witness testimony, the object he retrieved from his car was a gun. Video also shows
T.R.’s SUV driving away and followed by Cryer’s gold sedan a short tim e later. A few
minutes after that, the gold sedan can be seen driving back towards the apartment. As the
gold sedan approached the apartment, the people still standing outside can be seen running
away. Witness testimony explained that people were running away because Cryer was
shooting at them. Finally, a separate video shows a red jeep and SUV driving down the
street. Before the cars entered the video frame, gun shots can be heard on the video. The
cars then enter the video frame, and the jeep can be seen driving in front of the SUV.
The jury found Cryer guilty on all counts. Cryer did not file a direct appeal but d id
petition for postconviction relief. His petition argued that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his trial counsel did not give notice or present an alternative-perpetrator
5
defense. The district court granted Cryer’s request for an evidentiary hearing on his
postconviction claim.
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing. He stated that he was familiar with
the basic case law about what is necessary to present an alternative perpetrator defense and
that he did not raise the defense because he did not think there was enough evidence to
support it. Trial counsel explained that, while he had reasonable grounds to believe the jeep
was firing shots at T.R. that day, everything else about the jeep—including the identity of
its occupants—“ was pretty much a mystery.” He then testified that his strategy at trial was
to instead use the fact that law enforcement could not determine who the occupants of the
jeep were as “one of the arguments . . . for reasonable doubt.” According to trial counsel,
it was obvious that “there was some type of shooting . . . [but] the lack of . . . a thorough investigation, ” combin ed
with the fact that there was another vehicle at the scene whose occupants also seemed to be shooting, was enough for
grounds for reasonable doubt.
The prosecutor from Cryer’s trial also testified at the postconviction hearing. He
discussed respondent State of Minnesota’s theory of the case. According to the prosecutor,
the state viewed the incident as two separate shootings. The first was when T .R. started
driving away and Cryer followe d and shot out his SUV’s rear window. The second
occurred after Cryer made a U -turn, drove back to the apartment, and shot at people still
gathered outside. The prosecutor then summarized the evidence submitted at trial and
explained why it did not support a finding that the occupants of the jeep were the shooters
for either incident.
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After the hearing, the district court denied Cryer’s petition for postconviction relief.
Cryer appeals.
DECISION
Cryer argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition for
postconviction relief because he claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by not raising an alternative -perpetrator defense. The right to effective assistance of
counsel is guaranteed to all criminal defendants by the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. To establish a claim that
counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of this constitutional right,
a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Strickland test requires the petitioner to show (1) that “counsel’s
representation ‘fell b elow an objective standard of reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). It is the defendant’s burden to establish both
Strickland elements. State v. Nowels, 941 N.W.2d 430, 443 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. June 16, 2020).
“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, we need not consider the
other requirement.” State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).
When an appellate court reviews a postconviction court’s denial of relief on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, it considers only “the court’s factual findings that are
supported in the record.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Minn. 2013). The legal
implication of those facts on the ineffective -assistance claim is reviewed de novo. Id. at
7
504. Appellate courts then “either affirm the court’s decision or conclude that the court
abused its discretion because postconviction relief is warranted.” Id.
A. Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient.
We first address trial counsel’s performance. When applying the first prong of Strickland,
“there is a strong presumption that counsel ’s performance was reasonable.” Andersen v.
State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013) . An attorney provides reasonable assistance when
they exercise “the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney
would perform under the circumstances.” Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn.
2001) (quotation omitted). Counsel’s performance need not be perfect. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 688. It must “simply [be] reasonable[ ] under prevailing professional norms.” Id.
Mistakes alone thus do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance if counsel ’s
performance, taken as a whole, was objectively reasonable. See State v. Bailey, 132
N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn. 1965) (“Mere improvident strategy, bad tactics, mistake,
carelessness, or inexperience do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel
unless taken as a whole the trial was a mockery of justice.” (quotation omitted) );
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (“[E]ven if an omission is inadvertent, relief
is not automatic. The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect
advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.”).
Cryer argues that he received ineffective assistance because reasonable doubt exist ed “as to whether [ the]
shots were fired by an alternative perpetrator in a red Jeep,” so his trial counsel should have asserted an alternative -
perpetrator defense. Due process requires that a defendant is “afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense,” State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn.
8
1992) (quotation omitted) , including the right to “present evidence that a third
party . . . committed the crime for which the defendant was charged,” State v. Woodard ,
942 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Minn. 2020) (quoting Troxel v. State, 875 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Minn.
2016)). But the right to present an alternative-perpetrator defense is not absolute. Woodard,
942 N.W.2d at 141. District courts must go through a two- step process to determine
whether alternative-perpetrator evidence is admissible. State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150,
159 (Minn. 1977). First, the court must consider “whether the proffered evidence has ‘an
inherent tendency’ to connect the alleged alternative perpetrator with the ‘actual
commission of the crime.’” Woodard, 942 N.W.2d at 142 (quoting Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d
at 159). “In considering whether the defendant has established the required foundation, a
court must focus on the evidence, not the assertions, contained in the proffer.” Id. at 142
(quotation omitted). If a defendant cannot establish this foundation, “the alternative
perpetrator evidence is not admissible [,] and the trial court need not consider any of the
alternative perpetrator evidence further.” State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 485 (Minn.
2005). If proper foundation for the defense has been laid, the district court must then review
if the alternative-perpetrator evidence is admissible under the rules of evidence. Woodard ,
942 N.W.2d at 142.
The district court rejected Cryer’s ineffective -assistance claim because it
determined that trial counsel’s decision not to raise an alternative-perpetrator defense was
a matter of trial strategy and was therefore not subject to scrutiny. We agree with the district
court’s reasoning. Appellate courts usually do not “review attacks on counsel ’s trial
strategy.” Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004); see also Nicks, 831 N.W.2d
9
at 50 8 (stating that matters of trial strategy are “virtually unchallengeable”). “ What
evidence to present and which witnesses to call at trial are tactical decisions properly left
to the discretion of trial counsel.” State v. Mems, 708 N.W.2d 526, 534 (Minn. 2006). The
same can be said for “[t]he extent of counsel’s investigation.” Opsahl, 677 N.W.2d at 421.
And t he Minnesota Supreme Court has declared that the decision about whether to assert
an alternative-perpetrator defense is a matter of trial strategy. State v. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d
178, 190 n.19 (Minn. 2021); see also Hodgson v. State, 540 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn. 1995)
(concluding that “trial counsel’s performance was professionally reasonable” because the
“alleged error[] include[d] failure to present to the jury evidence that someone else
committed the murders,” which “relate[s] to ma tters of trial strategy, not errors in
professional performance”). According to the supreme court, appellate courts “are in no
position to second-guess counsel’s decision to focus his strategy on other defenses ” and to
not raise an alternative-perpetrator defense . Opsahl, 677 N.W.2d at 421.
Cryer, citing Nicks, 831 N.W.2d at 505, disputes that trial counsel’s decision not to
raise an alternative -perpetrator defense was mere trial strategy. The petitioner in Nicks
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel due to his lawyer’s failure to obtain and review
cellphone records . 831 N .W.2d at 505. The cellphone records were a central part of the
state’s case against the petitioner. Id. According to the petitioner, his counsel’s failure was
not a strategic decision, but was instead due to his counsel’s inattention and
misunderstanding. Id. The supreme court concluded that the petitioner’s case was unlike
“earlier cases where counsel elected not to pursue a given line of investigation[.]” Id. at
506. Instead, trial counsel in Nicks was “interested in obtaining [the] cellphone records,
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wanted to obtain them, and made several partial attempts to obtain them,” but “either d id
not read, did not correctly interpret, or failed to understand the cellphone service provider’s
response to the subpoena.” Id. at 506-07. Thus, petitioner’s counsel’s failure to obtain the
records was not a strategic decision, but an objectively unreasonable performance. Id. at
508.
The same cannot be said about Cryer’s trial counsel’s performance. Unlike in Nicks,
Cryer’s trial counsel obtained and reviewed the information available regarding the jeep.
He then elected not to pursue an alternative-perpetrator defense because, in his professional
opinion, there was not enough evidence to support it. Trial counsel instead chose to try to
use the lack of information about the jeep to create reasonable doubt as to the identity of
the shooter. The record supports that this decision was not unreasonable because of trial
counsel’s misunderstanding or inattention but rather was a strategic decision. Therefore,
because Cryer’s trial counsel’s choice not to raise an alternative-perpetrator defense was
unreviewable trial strategy, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by holding that Cryer failed to establish that trial counsel’s performance was deficient.
B. Trial counsel’s decision to forgo an alternative-perpetrator defense did
not prejudice Cryer.
Although it is not necessary to address the prejudice prong of Strickland given that
counsel’s performance was not deficient, we choose to do so. See Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at
591 (“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, we need not consider
the other requirement.”). Even if Cryer’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient, his
ineffective-assistance claim still fails as he cannot show this deficient performance
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prejudiced him. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To prove prejudice, a defendant must show
that, but for counsel ’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10. A
reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. And when determining whether an attorney’ s
deficient performance was prejudicial, appellate courts evaluate “the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury.” Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10.
The district court determined that Cryer could not establish prejudice , and we
discern no abuse of discretion in the court ’s conclusion on this issue. If Cryer had been
able to assert an alternative -perpetrator defense, the outcome would have been the same
for two reasons. First, there was ample evidence presented at trial establishing Cryer as the
shooter. Multiple witnesses testified that they saw Cryer with a gun before the shooting,
heard him threaten to shoot multiple people, saw him shooting at T.R.’s SUV as T.R. drove
off, and then saw him shoot at those standing outside the apartment. The video evidence
submitted at trial corroborates this witness testimony.
Second, all available evidence about the jeep was introduced at trial. That evidence
does not support a finding that those in the jeep committed the shootings. Photos of T .R.’s
SUV show that a bullet hit the SUV’s rear window, went through the back seat, and hit
T.R.’s child’s car seat. But video evidence and T.R.’s testimony places the jeep in front of
the SUV for the entire encounter. And eyewitness testimony and video evidence
established that Cryer was the only one who drove back toward the apartment that day after
T.R. left. No evidence was presented that tied the jeep to the shooting in front of the
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apartment. Ultimately, the jeep’s role in the shootings was never hidden from the jury. By
finding Cryer guilty on all counts, the jury concluded that the existence of the jeep did not
create reasonable doubt. Formally a sserting an alternative -perpetrator defense would not
have changed the evidence admitted at trial and therefore we conclude it would not have
swayed the jury’s verdict.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of postconviction relief based on
Cryer’s failure to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.