State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1765

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terrell Joseph Salazar,
Appellant.

Filed November 12, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-13246

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
In this appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted second -degree murder,
appellant asks us to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial , arguing that the
district court err ed by admitting unnecessarily cumulative evidence. Alternatively, he
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argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward
dispositional departure. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Terrell Joseph Salazar with second -degree attempted
murder after he stabbed a man, NH, multiple times following an altercation at a party. At
the ensuing jury trial, the defense claimed that Salazar was not the person who stabbed NH.
A summary of the trial evidence follows.
NH testified that he first met Salazar in February 2022, and that he met him a second
time around April. OM, the mother of Salazar’s son, invited NH to a barbe cue in May
2022. At the barbe cue, NH interacted with Salazar and saw that he was wearing a dark
blue Timberwolves jersey. Salazar and NH had a verbal exchange. Salazar was intoxicated
and behaving aggressively, and he threw a beer can at NH. NH tried to fight Salazar, and
family members attempted to separate the two. Salazar “jumped over a couple people” and
hit NH twice. A melee involving other individuals ensued.
NH then followed a woman, GF, into the backyard and towards his car. NH “heard
the sliding glass door slam open” and heard GF yell, “You better not stab him.” NH turned
around and saw Salazar running at him. NH told Salazar, “[I]t’s not worth it, you got your
son here, . . . go home.” NH saw that Salazar was holding a red pocketknife. Salazar told
NH he was “not going to leave here tonight” and proceeded to stab NH several times. GF
called 911.
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Officer Moua testified that he was dispatched to the scene a round 10:40 p.m. and
rendered aid to NH. He testified that it was “dark out.” Officer G ul testified that he
followed NH to the hospital and asked him who stabbed him, and NH said it was “Terrell.”
Detective Vesey testified that he interviewed NH, and NH identified “Terrell” as
the person who stabbed him. During the interview with Detective Vesey, NH explained
that he had been dating OM, the mother of Salazar’s child , and that although the
relationship had ended, Salazar was trying to exert some “dominance” at the party.
Officer Luckey testified that he spoke to GF after arriving at the scene, and the
district court received a portion of his body-camera video into evidence. The video shows
GF implicating Salazar as the perpetrator.
The state offered GF’s 911 call as evidence , and the defense objected, arguing that
it would be “cumulative” to evidence introduced via Officer Luckey’s body-camera video.
The district court overruled the objection and admitted a recording of the 911 call into
evidence.
GF testified and implicated Salazar as the perpetrator. She testified that it was
“really dark” and that she was using the flashlight on her phone to see. She testified that
she saw “a figure” approaching wearing a Timberwolves jersey. She testified that the
person approaching was Salazar and that she recognized his face. She testified that Salazar
then stabbed NH.
After GF testified, the state moved to introduce an additional portion of Officer
Luckey’s body-camera video as a prior consistent statement by GF. The defense objected
to the additional evidence as cumulative, but the district court overruled that objection.
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The state recalled Officer Luckey, and the district court admitted an additional
portion of his body-camera video into evidence. During the video, GF gave a more detailed
account of the events at the party and Salazar’s stabbing of NH. For example, she stated
that she told Salazar not to “cut” her when she saw his knife with her phone’s flashlight,
and she stated that she warned Salazar to go home and that he would “go to jail” if he
stabbed NH.
The jury found Salazar guilty as charged. Salazar moved for a durational and
dispositional sentencing departure. The district court denied his motion and sentenced him
to serve 153 months in prison.
Salazar appeals.
DECISION
I.
Salazar contends that the district court err ed by admitting “needlessly cumulative
evidence,” specifically, the recording of GF’s 911 call and the additional portion of Officer
Luckey’s body-camera video.
We review rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). On appeal, a party claiming error must
establish that the district court abused its discretion and that the party was thereby
prejudiced. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court’s decision is based on
an incorrect view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record. State v.
Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020).
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Under Minn. R. Evid. 403, a district court may exclude otherwise relevant evidence
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” A district court does not abuse
its discretion by admitting cumulative evidence that is “only marginally repetitive” and
“highly probative.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 480 (Minn. 2005).
The central issue at trial in this case was the credibility of NH’s and GF’s nighttime
identifications of Salazar as the person who stabbed NH . In the brief 911 call, GF stated
that the person who had stabbed NH was Black, had gone “in the house,” and was wearing
a “blue wolf jersey.” In the additional portion of Officer Luckey’s body-camera video, GF
provided additional details regarding Salazar’s stabbing of NH. For example, she relayed
several verbal exchanges between herself and “Terrell,” adding credibility to her claim that
she was able to positively identify Salazar as the person who stabbed NH . In overruling
the defense’s objection to that evidence , the district court effectively reasoned that the
evidence was not unnecessarily cumulative because it refuted Salazar’s defense that he was
misidentified as the perpetrator.
Throughout the trial, the defense challenged the witnesses’ identification of Salazar.
During its opening statement, the defense emphasized that it was dark and that there were
no streetlights in the area . During its cross-examination of NH, the defense challenged
NH’s memory of the events and his claim that he could see his attacker . During its cross-
examination of GF, the defense challenged her memory of the lighting conditions and her
identification of Salazar.
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Given the defense’s efforts to discredit the two eyewitnesses who identified Salazar,
evidence bolstering the credibility of their identifications was not unnecessarily
cumulative. Instead, it was highly probative regarding the identity of the perpetrator, which
was the central issue at trial. Because the evidence at issue was only marginally repetitive
but highly probative, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
See Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 480.
II.
Salazar contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request
for a dispositional departure.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for criminal
offenses and seek to “maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability
in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2020). “Consequently, departures from the
guidelines are discouraged and are intended to apply to a small number of cases.” State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). A district court may depart from the
presumptive sentence only when there are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2021).
If substantial and compelling circumstances exist, the district court has broad
discretion to depart, and we generally will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). This court will reverse the district court’s
refusal to depart from the presumptive sentence only in a “rare” case. Id. We will not
reverse the district court’s refusal to depart “as long as the record shows the [district] court
carefully evaluated all the testimony and information pre sented before making a
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determination.” State v. Pegel , 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation
omitted).
When considering a dispositional departure, the district court focuses “more on the
defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him
and for society.” State v. Heywood , 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). A defendant’s
particular amenability to probation can justify a downward dispositional departure from a
presumptive sentence. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014). The requirement
of particular amenability ensures that “the defendant’s amenability to pro bation
distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and
compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Id. at 309 (quotation
omitted).
Relevant factors for determining whether the defendant is particularly amenable to
probation include the defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude
in court, and support of friends and family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
Even if there is evidence that the defendant would be particularly amenable to probation, a
district court is not required to grant a dispositional departure. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d
662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009).
In seeking a dispositional departure, Salazar asserted that he was particularly
amenable to probation. The presentence investigation report (PSI) recommended a
sentence of 183 and one-half months in prison, a sentence at the top of the presumptive
range, because the offense was “more significant.” The PSI noted Salazar’s prior criminal
record, which included a juvenile felony -robbery offense, several adult misdemeanor
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charges and convictions, and a pending felony domestic -assault-by-strangulation offense.
The PSI also noted that Salazar denied responsibility for the stabbing , claimed h e was
innocent, and did not accept responsibility for his actions. Finally, the PSI indicated that
Salazar presented a risk to community safety.
At sentencing, the district court stated that it had reviewed the PSI and the
statements provided in support of Salazar, including “a family statement, a statement from
Gillette’s children’s hospital and also a statement . . . from [Salazar’s] grandparents.” The
court heard from Salazar and his attorney. Salazar’s attorney argued that Salazar was
particularly amenable to probation because he had been successful on electronic home
monitoring, had followed probation’s rules, had demonstrated a desire to remain sober, and
was engaged in his son’s life.
The district court denied Salazar’s motion, explaining:
I respectfully disagree with your lawyer. This was extremely
serious. You almost took [NH’s] life, and that’s what the jury
found. He was stabbed numerous times. He sustained a fatal
stab wound to one of his major arteries. Was it not for almost
immediate medical intervention, he would have died, and we’d
be here potentially considering a much, much, much longer
sentence.
I don’t know what led you to do this on that day. I know
that -- I believe it was [GF who] told you to just walk away,
[and NH] tried to walk away. And I don’t know if you were
angry or whether it was the alcohol. But you almost took
someone’s life, and there has to be a consequence for that.
I, frankly, don’t see a reason for a departure. I think this
is properly an attempted murder case, and I think I have to
sentence that accordingly to what happened that day. And I
just ask . . . that you don’t give up on yourself or your family.
You have a lot to live for. You’re a young person. But there
has to be a consequence for what happened to [NH] that
night . . . .
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Salazar asserts that the district court improperly focused “only on the severity of the
offense and the need for punishment.” We disagree. The district court carefully considered
the parties’ arguments for and against departure and all of the information presented, and
it ultimately concluded that Salazar was not particularly amenable to probation. Although
the district court emphasized the severity of the offense , it also considered Salazar as an
individual and his amenability to probation, as evidenced by the court’s consideration of
the PSI and the other information presented . See Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255. The district
court reasonably concluded that a departure was not warranted. This is not a “rare” case
in which the district court abused its discretion by imposing a presumptive sentence.
Affirmed.