William Christopher Edrington, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1782

William Christopher Edrington,
Respondent,

vs.

Julianna Lynn Sheridan, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed August 12, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-23-492

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Susan M. Gallagher, Gallagher Law Office, L.L.C., Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Erica A. Holzer, Jevon C. Bindman, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Mary Pat Byrn, Viitala Byrn & Ives PC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, Saul Ewing LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Heather Kemp, Krystal Bordoni-Cowley, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and

Shannon Minter, National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, California (for amicus
curiae National Center for Lesbian Rights)

2
Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss
respondent’s paternity action, arguing that the district court erred in determining that
respondent alleged sufficient facts to (1) compel genetic testing, and (2) obtain standing as
a presumed father. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Appellants Julianna Lynn Sheridan and Catherine Kish Sheridan, a same sex -
couple, married in August 2017. During that summer, appellants asked respondent William
Christopher Edrington, their mutual friend, if he would provide them with his s perm1 so
that they could “have a child in their home.” The parties agreed that respondent would not
be an anonymous donor and that he would take part in the child’s life. No contracts were
signed concerning this arrangement.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
1 In his petition, respondent identifies the genetic material that he gave to appellants, for
use in assisted reproduction, as “semen.” We note that the statutes relevant to this appeal
use both “semen” and “sperm” to describe male genetic material. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 257.56, subd. 1 (2022) (referring to “donated semen”), .62, subd. 5(c) (2022)
(describing genetic material to include “sperm or ovum (egg)”). Because, for purposes of
this opinion, there is no meaningful distinction between the two terms, we refer to the
genetic material that respondent allege d he donated to appellants as “sperm.” See The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1684 (5th ed. 2018) (definin g
“sperm” as “[a] male gamete” or “semen”).
3
Appellants chose to use an at -home method of assisted reproduction known as
intravaginal insemination. To conduct this process, respondent provided appellants with a
sample of his sperm in a sterile collection cup. Appellants then entered a private room , in
either their home or respondent’s home, where Catherine used an insemination syringe to
insert respondent’s s perm into Julianna’s vagina. Respondent was not present for the
insemination process and “had no sexual contact to effectuate the transfer of [his sperm] to
Julianna.” And no medical technology or medical personnel were used to inseminate
Julianna.
The at-home insemination process was successful and Julianna gave birth to A.J.S.,
now six-years old, in July 2018. Because appellants were married at the time of A.J.S.’s
birth, Catherine is A.J.S.’s presumed non -gestational mother and legal parent. See Minn.
Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(a) (2022). Based on her status as A.J.S.’s legal parent , Catherine
was joined to this matter as an interested party. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. Appellants
are the only two individuals listed on A.J.S.’s birth certificate, and together raised A.J.S.
in their home. None of the parties signed a recognition of parentage. And neither Catherine
nor respondent have moved to adopt A.J.S.
In June 2022, appellants requested that respondent not refer to A.J.S. as his
daughter. At first, respondent abided by appellants’ directive. But respondent alleged that
this grew difficult when A.J.S. asked him whether he was her father. Following this
incident, appellants limited respondent’s contact with A.J.S.
In September 2023, respondent filed his fourth amended paternity petition
requesting an order compelling Julianna and A.J.S. to submit to genetic testing, an
4
adjudication establishing that he is A.J.S.’s biological father, and joint legal and physical
custody of A.J.S.2 In his amended petition, respondent alleged that he is A.J.S.’s biological
father because, although there was “no sexual intercourse involved in the conception of
[A.J.S.,]” it was his sperm used to conceive A.J.S. On that basis, respondent requested that
the district court compel Julianna and A.J.S. to submit to genetic testing under Minn. Stat.
§ 257.62, subd. 1(a) (2022).
Respondent also allege d that, since A.J.S. was born , he has received her into his
home and openly held her out as his daughter. As support for this allegation, respondent
states that he was notified when Julianna became pregnant, received sometimes daily phone
calls regarding the pregnancy, met A.J.S. at t he hospital the day that she was born, and
immediately notified his family and close friends that he was “the father of a healthy baby
girl.” And after her birth, respondent alleged that he purchased child-care items for his
home, including diapers, wipes , a crib, bedding, toys, food, and clothing. Relatedly,
respondent alleged that he has cared for A.J.S. on a weekly, and sometimes daily, basis by
feeding A.J.S., changing her diapers, bathing her, and putting her down for naps. Finally,
respondent alleged that he has posted many pictures of A.J.S. on his social media accounts
and that his friends and family —some of whom have met A.J.S. —are “aware that [he is]
very proud to be [her] father.”

2 Respondent filed his original petition in April 2023. In that petition, respondent made
additional requests that his surname be used on A.J.S.’s birth certificate and that he be
awarded child support. Respondent no longer pursues these requests.
5
In March 2023, appellants moved to dismiss respondent’s paternity action for two
reasons. First, that respondent, as a sperm donor, is precluded from compelling genetic
testing to assert that he is A.J.S.’s biological or legal father. See Minn. Stat. § 257.62,
subd. 5(c). Second, that respondent failed to allege sufficient facts to obtain standing to
bring his paternity action. See Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d) (2022).
The district court denied appellants’ motion. In doing so, the district court ordered
that Julianna and A.J.S. submit to genetic testing because respondent claimed to be A.J.S.’s
biological father and alleged the requisite level of sexual contact to conceive A.J.S. through
assisted reproduction. See Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 1(a). The district court also
determined that Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c), which generally precludes donors of
genetic material from using genetic testing to claim parental ri ghts to a child conceived
through assisted reproduction, did not preclude respondent, as a sperm donor, from
asserting parentage over A.J.S. Finally, the district court determined that respondent has
standing to bring his paternity action under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d), because he
alleged sufficient facts to show that he received A.J.S. into his home and held her out as
his biological child.
This appeal follows.3
DECISION
In Minnesota, paternity actions are governed by the Minnesota Parentage Act
(MPA), which is modeled after the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Parentage Act

3 Amicus National Center for Lesbian Rights filed a brief supporting appellants.
6
(UPA). Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Minn. 1985); see also Minn. Stat. § 257.51
(2022) (providing that the MPA includes Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51-.74). The statutory
provisions under the MPA create “the exclusive bases for standing to bring an action to
determine paternity.” Witso v. Overby , 627 N.W.2d 63, 65 -66 (Minn. 2001). Paternity
actions are also governed by the rules of civil procedure. Minn. Stat. § 257.65 (2022).
Consequently, when determining whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss, the facts as
alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be
construed in favor of the nonmoving party. DeRosa v. McKenzie , 936 N.W.2d 342, 346
(Minn. 2019).
The MPA provides standing to bring a paternity action based on a myriad of
paternity presumptions. See Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subds. 1-3 (2022); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 517.201, subd. 2 (2022) (providing that statutes with gendered language are to be
construed “in a neutral manner to refer to a person of either gender ”). Two paternity
presumptions are relevant here. First, a putative father is presumed to be the biological
father of a child “[i]f the results of blood or genetic tests . . . indicate that the likelihood of
the alleged father’s paternity . . . is 99 percent or greater[.]” See Minn. Stat. §§ 257.57,
subd. 2(1) (conferring standing for actions brought under Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(b)),
.62, subd. 5(b) (2022) (providing paternity presumption based on genetic testing).
Second, a putative father is presumed to be the biological father of a child if, “while
the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds
out the child as his biological child[.]” See Minn. Stat. §§ 257.55, subd. 1(d) (providing
holding-out paternity presumption) , .57, subd. 2(1) (conferring standing for actions
7
brought under the holding-out presumption). If a party cannot allege facts sufficient to
show that a presumption applies, they lack standing to assert paternity. Witso, 627 N.W.2d
at 65-66.
Interpretation of the MPA is a question of law that we review de novo. Ramsey
County v. X.L. , 853 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. App. 2014). The goal of statutory
interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2022). We read and construe statutes as a whole and within the context of the
surrounding sections. In re Welfare of Child. of A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn. App.
2019). Generally, words and phrases are construed according to their plain and o rdinary
meaning. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). We “look
to the dictionary definitions of [undefined] words and apply them in the context of the
statute.” Anoka County v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc., 3 N.W.3d 586, 594 (Minn. 2024)
(quotation omitted). And we presume that the legislature intends the entire statute to be
effective and does not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. Minn. Stat. § 645.17
(2022).
The first step of statutory interpretation is determining whether the statute is
ambiguous. A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122. Statutes are ambiguous “if, as applied to the facts
of the particular case, they are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72-73 (Minn. 2012). When a statute’s plain
language is unambiguous, it must be given effect. Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d
206, 210 (Minn. 2001). Only when a statute is ambiguous will this court apply the canons
of construction to discern the legislature’s intent. Id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16.
8
On appeal, appellants challenge the denial of their motion to dismiss respondent’s
petition, arguing that the district court erred in (1) ordering that Julianna and A.J.S. submit
to genetic testing pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 257.62, and (2) determining that respondent has
standing to bring his paternity action under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d). We address
each argument in turn.
I. The district court erred by ordering that Julianna and A.J.S. submit to genetic
testing.

A presumption of parentage will arise when genetic-test results indicate that the
alleged parent has a 99 percent or greater likelihood of being the biological parent of the
child. Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(b). To obtain an order compelling genetic testing,
subdivision 1(a) provides the following:
The court or public authority may, and upon request of
a party shall, require the child, mother, or alleged father to
submit to blood or genetic tests. A mother or alleged father
requesting the tests shall file with the court an affidavit either
alleging or denying paternity and setting forth facts that
establish the reasonable possibility that there was, or was not,
the requisite sexual contact between the parties.

Id., subd. 1(a) (emphasis added).
Appellants assert that the district court erred in determining that respondent has
standing to compel genetic testing pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 1(a), because he
alleged that he did not engage in sexual contact with Julianna. Respondent counters that
because one dictionary definition of “requisite” is “needed for a particular purpose,” the
purpose here being the conception of a child via assisted reproduction, no sexual contact is
required because intravaginal insemination does not involve sex ual contact. The statute
9
does not define “requisite sexual contact.” See Minn. Stat. § 257.62 (2022). But assuming
without deciding that respondent sufficiently allege d the “requisite sexual contact,” we
determine that respondent is precluded from compelling a genetic test to claim parentage
under subdivision 5(c) of the same statute:
A determination under this subdivision that the alleged
father is the biological father does not preclude the
adjudication of another man as the legal father under
section 257.55, subdivision 2, nor does it allow the donor of
genetic material for assisted reproduction for the benefit of a
recipient parent, whether sperm or ovum (egg), to claim to be
the child’s biological or legal parent.

See id., subd. 5(c).
The plain language of subdivision 5(c) states that a “ determination under this
subdivision that the alleged father is the biological father,” does not allow a sperm donor
“to claim to be the child’s biological or legal parent. ” Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c)
(emphasis added). Read in context, a “determination” used “to claim” parentage inferably
means sperm donors are prohibited from using a positive test result to claim parentage to a
child conceived through assisted reproduction. See id. Thus, subdivision 5(c) precludes
sperm donors from using genetic testing to assert paternity over a child artificially
conceived with their donated sperm.
Respondent alleged that he is a sperm donor. And he admitted that he provided his
sperm to Julianna to be used in assisted reproduction. 4 Because this makes respondent a

4 Respondent argues that subdivision 5(c) does not apply here because he donated his
sperm for his own benefit, and not simply for appellants’ benefit. See Minn. Stat. § 257.62,
subd. 5(c) (describing donors who provide sperm “ for the benefit of a recipient parent ”).
Because respondent raised this issue for the first time on appeal, it is not properly before
10
donor of genetic material, he is precluded under subdivision 5(c) from using a genetic test
to claim to be A.J.S.’s biological or legal parent. See id. Because respondent’s only alleged
purpose for the genetic test is to “establish proof of paternity” and be adjudicated as A.J.S.’s
“biological father,” we hold that the district court erred in ordering Julianna and A.J.S. to
submit to genetic testing.
In so holding, we also reject the district court’s interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 257.56
(2022). Under that statute, a person who consents to the artificial insemination of their
spouse, under the supervision of a licensed physician , with a third -party’s sperm, is still
treated as the resulting child’s biological parent. Id., subd. 1. And the third-party donor is
not treated as the child’s biological parent. Id., subd. 2.
The district court determined that sections 257.56 and 257.62 are inseparable
because they both concern artificial insemination and a donor’s ability to assert parentage
over a resulting child. Accordingly, the district court determined that because appellants
used an at -home assisted reproduction procedure , without the supervision of a licensed
physician, they are precluded from receiving protection —as a married couple —under
section 257.56 from parentage claims of third-party donors. Based on that conclusion, the
district court also determined that Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c) does not preclude
respondent from compelling genetic testing to claim parentage over A.J.S. despite his status
as a sperm donor.

us. Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts
generally address only those questions previously presented to and considered by the
district court). But even if it were properly before us, respondent admitted in his affidavit
that he was providing his sperm to appellants so that they could have a child.
11
We reject the district court’s analysis for two reasons. First, we observe, as did
appellants, that interpreting Minn. Stat. § 257.56 with Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c) is
permissible only after determining that the latter is ambiguous under the related -statutes
canon of construction. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16(5) (considering “other laws upon the same
or similar subjects”). And analyzing the two statutes together, does not, as respondent
contends, fit within the scope of the pre -ambiguity whole-statute canon of interpretation
because interpreting two related, but separate, statutes before determining that a statute is
ambiguous requires that the statutes be enacted at the same time —which is not the case
here. See Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc. , 963 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Minn. 2021)
(explaining that the whole-statute canon of interpretation involves reading a singular statute
as a whole to give effect to all of its parts); State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn.
2023) (explaining that the whole-statute canon of interpretation applies to multiple statutes
only when two statutes are enacted at the same time and for the same purpose); see also
1980 Minn. Laws. ch. 589, § 6, at 1072 (enacting Minn. Stat. § 257.56); 2006 Minn. Laws.
ch. 280, § 4, at 3 (enacting Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c)). Because Minn. Stat. § 257.62,
subd. 5(c), is not ambiguous, we need not consider Minn. Stat. § 257.56 when determining
whether respondent can compel genetic testing.
Second, even if Minn. Stat. § 257.56 did bear on our determination, it does not limit
the reach of Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c). At the outset, the former is irrelevant to the
facts as alleged by respondent because Julianna was not artificially inseminated under the
supervision of a licensed physician. See Minn. Stat. § 257.56. Further, Minn. Stat.
§ 257.56 does not afford donors any affirmative right to assert parentage, much less the
12
right to bypass the clear directive in subdivision 5(c) that precludes positive genetic test
results from being used to assert parentage over a child conceived through assisted
reproduction. See Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c). Put another way, Minn. Stat. § 257.56
acts as a shield for married couples who conceive through assisted reproduction, under the
supervision of a licensed physician, from facing parentage claims from third-party donors.
See Minn. Stat. § 257.56. But it does not act as a sword fo r donors to assert parentage
based on positive genetic test results against married couples who used at -home assisted
reproduction procedures. See id. Accordingly, the district court erred in determining that
Minn. Stat. § 257.56 limits Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c), and that it allows respondent
to compel genetic testing.
We recognize that the Minnesota legislature has recently passed new laws governing
assisted reproduction and the MPA. See 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 101, art. 4, § 1-10 (to be
codified at Minn. Stat. § 257E.10-.27 (2024)). These laws will not come into effect until
August 1, 2024. See Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (2022) (providing that, generally, “[e]ach
act . . . enacted finally at any session of the legislature takes effect on August 1 next
following its final enactment”). The parties did not brief the issue of whether the new laws
apply retrospectively to this case. However, shortly before oral argument, counsel for
appellants filed a letter, which was docketed as a motion, asking this court to order
supplemental briefing on the applicability of these legislative amendments. 5 Counsel for

5 Generally, to be properly before this court, an application for relief “shall be made by
serving and filing a written motion.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 127. A letter to the court
usually is not considered to be a motion. See In re Enbridge Energy, Ltd. P’ship , 930
N.W.2d 12, 19 n.3 (Minn. App. 2019) (distinguishing a request for relief made by letter
13
respondent filed a response opposing the request. We declined to order supplemental
briefing before oral argument, and the topic was not addressed at oral argument before this
court. Thus, we deem the request for supplemental briefing to be moot. And we do not
address the legislative amendments further here.
In sum, the district court erred by ordering that Julianna and A.J.S. submit to genetic
testing because the plain language in Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c), prohibits donors of
genetic material for use in assisted reproduction from using genetic test re sults to claim to
be the biological or legal parent of a resulting child. See Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c).
II. The district court err ed in determining that respondent has standing under
Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d).

Apart from proving parentage based on a genetic relationship, a putative parent who,
“while the child is under the age of majority , . . . receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his biological child” is presumed to be the biological parent
of the child and has standing to bring a paternity action . See Minn. Stat. §§ 257.55,
subd. 1(d) (providing holding -out paternity presumption) , .57, subd. 2(1) (conferring
standing to presumed fathers under the holding-out presumption). Accordingly, we first
address whether respondent alleged sufficient facts to show that he received A.J.S. into his
home before turning to whether respondent alleged sufficient facts to show that he held
A.J.S. out as his biological child.

from a request for relief made by motion); In re Petition of Halberg Const. & Supply, Inc.,
385 N.W.2d 381, 384 n.1 (Minn. App. 1986) ( explaining that “any request for relief from
this court must be made by serving and filing a written motion” rather than a letter
(quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. June 19, 1986).
14
A. Respondent’s allegations would not show that he received A.J.S. into his
home.

The holding-out presumption does not provide a definition for the requirement that
a putative parent “receive[]” the child into his or her home. See id. But our analysis in
Larson v. Schmidt , 400 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. App. 1987), is instructi ve. In Larson, we
analyzed only whether the putative father had “received the child into his home” because
it was undisputed that he “openly held [the child] out” as his own. Id. at 133 (quotation
omitted). In doing so, we adopted the California Supreme Court’s receipt standard, which
construed a similar phrase. 6 Id. at 135 (citing In re Richard M. , 537 P.2d 363, 369 (Cal.
1975)).
In Richard M., the California Supreme Court held that receiving a child into the
home is accomplished when the putative father either temporarily resides with the mother
and the child or the putative father accepts the child into his home, even “for occasional
temporary visits,” as “a constructive reception may suffice.” Richard M., 537 P.2d at 369-
70. But the California Supreme Court ultimately did not rely on “constructive reception,”
as the putative father, the child’s mother, and the child had lived t ogether after the child’s
birth—during which time the putative father cared for the child. See id. And even after
the putative father no longer lived with the child, the child spent every other weekend at
his home. See id.

6 The holding-out presumption in Larson—modeled after the UPA—is nearly identical to
the version applicable here. See Larson, 400 N.W.2d at 133 (providing that, under Minn.
Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d) (1984), a putative parent “is presumed to be the natural [parent]
of a child if . . . [w]hile the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child” (emphasis added)). And the
15
Applying the reasoning in Richard M. to the facts in Larson, this court determined
that the putative father, Larson, had received the child into his home based on these
circumstances: (1) “for the first year and a half of the child’s life, [the child’s mother] and
the child stayed about two nights per week with [Larson]”; (2) before Larson entered a
half-way house for addiction recovery, he “spent a good deal of time” with mother and the
child; (3) Larson spent a c ouple of mornings each week with mother and the child; and
(4) Larson had done “some overnight babysitting” at his brother’s house. Larson, 400
N.W.2d at 135 (quotations omitted). The Larson court also noted that, among other things,
Larson had paid chil d support and engaged in “frequent conversations” with the child’s
mother about formally becoming the child’s father. Id. (quotation omitted). The Larson
court reasoned that Larson, the undisputed biological father, “ accept[ed] the child into his
home to the extent possible under the particular circumstances,” given the child’s mother’s
sporadic denial of visitation and Larson’s living arrangement while recovering from
addiction. Id. (quotation omitted). In reaching its decision, the Larson court explained that
it was guided by Minnesota’s approach of providing “children born out of wedlock the
same legal status as other children.” Id. at 134 (quotation omitted).
Respondent argues that his allegations are like the facts in Larson because he alleged
that he (1) cared for A.J.S. weekly or when permitted by appellants, (2) had told friends
and family that A.J.S. was his child since her birth, (3) purchased a crib and other care

Larson court examined a similar presumption under California law. See Richard M., 537
P.2d at 369-70 (interpreting California Civil Code § 230 (1984): “received the child into
his family”).
16
items for A.J.S. to be kept and used at his home, (4) vacationed with Catherine and A.J.S.,
and (5) regularly spent time with A.J.S. and his family. Respondent emphasizes that he
received A.J.S. into his home to the extent possible given that appellants limited his access
to A.J.S. Appellants respond that Larson is distinguishable because A.J.S. has neither lived
with nor slept overnight at respondent’s home. And they note that A.J.S. is not a child born
out of wedlock, and instead, has always been under the care of her two married mothers.
We agree with appellants.
Although the Larson court pronounced a “flexible” approach to applying the
holding-out presumption, it did so based on circumstances vastly different from those
present here. See id. at 135 (describing receipt of the child into the home as a “flexible
requirement”). In Larson, Larson had lived with the child before the child’s mother halted
visitation and before he began living in a half-way house. 400 N.W.2d at 135. The Larson
court was concerned for the child’s illegitimacy and determined that Larson—who engaged
in “frequent conversations” with the child’s mother about formally becoming the child’s
father—was the child’s biological father. See id. (quotation omitted). And we observe that
this court, as well as some foreign courts, have been persuaded by appellants’ position that
the holding-out presumption is satisfied when the putative father and the child previously
lived together. See Zentz v. Graber, 760 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. App. 2009) (involving
parties that lived together with the child for alm ost two years after the child’s birth) , rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009); State v. D.E.A., No. A06-2426, 2007 WL 1816471, at *1, 4
17
(Minn. App. 2007) 7 (involving putative father who lived with the child and the child’s
mother for eight years, cared for the child as his own, and was regarded by the child and
many others as the child’s father), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007 ); see also LC v. TL,
870 P.2d 374, 377 -78 (Wyo. 1994) (considering that mother and child lived with father
rent free); D.S.P. v. R.L.K., 677 P.2d 959, 960-61 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (involving putative
father who lived with the child and the child’s mother for around 16 months).
Respondent has not alleged that he has ever lived with A.J.S. or that A.J.S. has slept
overnight at his home. And because A.J.S. was not born out of wedlock, there is no concern
here that A.J.S. would be deprived of “the same legal status as other children.” See Larson,
400 N.W.2d at 134 (quotation omitted) (applying a “liberal construction” to the MPA to
ensure children born out of wedlock are afforded a father -child relationship).8 Therefore,
the facts in Larson are distinguishable from the facts as alleged by respondent.
Respondent submits two additional arguments that do not persuade us otherwise.
First, respondent argues that a “familial relationship exists” between him and A.J.S.
because he “agreed to be [A.J.S.’s] father.” But respondent’s petition allege d that, as to

7 We cite nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c).
8 Recently, a California appeals court distinguished the decision in Richard M. from its
decision in W.S. v. S.T. because Richard M. was decided in a “much different statutory
context.” 228 Cal. Rptr.3d 756, at 767-68 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2018). The W.S. court noted
that Richard M. predated California’s adoption of the UPA and was mainly concerned
about avoiding classifying children as illegitimate. Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 645.22 (2022)
(“Laws uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and construed to effect their
general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.”) ; see also In
re Estate of Jotham, 722 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Minn. 2006) (relying on decisions from other
UPA courts as persuasive authority in interpreting the MPA).
18
the agreement he made with appellants, he made it “clear” that he “was not agreeing to be
[an] ‘anonymous donor,’ and that it was understood [that he] would be present and
involved in the child’s life.” (Emphasis added.) Based on respondent’s allegations,
appellants have honored this agreement. And we are not convinced that an agreement to
be present in A.J.S.’s life is the same as being regarded as the child’s biological father. See
Minn. Stat. § 257.54 (2022) (providing that “the biological father may be established under
sections 257.51 to 257.74 or 257.75”).
Second, respondent refers to his weekly visits with A.J.S. as “parenting time.” We
disagree with that characterization. A father’s rights to custody and parenting time are
addressed under Chapter 518 . See Minn. Stat. § 257.541, subds. 2, 3 (2022). The
provisions of Chapter 518 relevant to the adjudication of a particular father’s custody and
parenting rights are determined by how the father’s legal relationship with the child is
established. See Minn. Stat. § 257.541, subds. 2(a), (b) (identifying the statutory
provisions for addressing a father’s rights to custody and parenting time if “paternity has
been acknowledged under [Minn. Stat. § 257.34] and paternity has been established under
[the MPA,]” if paternity “has not been acknowledged under [Minn. S tat. § 257.34] and
paternity has been established under [the MPA]” and “[i]f paternity has been recognized
under [Minn. Stat. §257.75,]” respectively). Here, respondent fits none of the categories
listed in Minn. Stat. § 257.541, subds. 2, 3. Therefore, respondent’s access to A.J.S. is not
“parenting time” under any of these provisions.
Moreover, under Chapter 518, “parenting time” is defined as “the time a parent
spends with a child regardless of the custodial designation regarding the child.” Minn.
19
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 5 (2022). Chapter 518 does not define a “parent.” But how a parent-
child relationship is established is addressed by Minn. Stat. § 257.54. Respondent fits
neither of the relevant categories in Minn. Stat. § 257.54. Thus, respondent’s access to
A.J.S. does not fit the definition of “parenting time” in Chapter 518.
In sum, respondent ’s allegations, even if they are true, would not show that he
received A.J.S. into his home.
B. Respondent’s allegations would not show that he held A.J.S. out as his
biological child.

The holding-out presumption also requires that the putative parent “ openly holds
out the child as his biological child .” See Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d). The statute
does not define the phrase “holds out.” See id. Appellants cite Pierce v. Pierce , 374
N.W.2d 450 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 4, 1985), for the proposition that
the “‘holding out’ element is not satisfied where (1) the claimant has waited years to claim
paternity, and (2) the child uses the surname of another person.”
In Pierce, the putative father, Pierce, failed to hold the child out as his own because
he took no action to claim paternity, and he allowed the child to continue using his
presumed father’s surname—who paid child support and regularly visited the child. Id. at
451. Pierce also conceded that he was not sure if the child was his. Id. at 452; cf. Zentz,
760 N.W.2d at 2, 6 (explaining that putative father openly held the child out as his own
when the child’s mother acknowledged that he was the child’s fathe r, he lived with the
child’s mother, the child bore his surname, and he appeared on the child’s birth certificate).
20
Although, unlike in Pierce, respondent has alleged that A.J.S. is his biological child
and has regularly cared for her, we are not persuaded that his allegations, even if they are
true, are sufficient to show that respondent openly held A.J.S. out as his biological child.
Similar to Pierce, respondent waited almost five years to assert parentage over A.J.S. See
Pierce, 374 N.W.2d at 451. And not only do appellants refuse to refer to respondent as
A.J.S.’s father, but respondent admits that A.J.S. recognizes that she has two mothers, and
that she does not have a father. See Zentz, 760 N.W.2d at 2, 6 (determining that father
openly held the child out as his own, in part, because the child’s mother acknowledge d he
was the child’s father).
Moreover, similar to Pierce, respondent is not listed on A.J.S.’s birth certificate, has
not signed a recognition of parentage, and has not maintained his objection to A.J.S. using
Catherine’s surname. See Pierce, 374 N.W.2d at 452. And r espondent cites no authority
that supports his argument that posting pictures of A.J.S. on social media and referring to
her as his child to only his family and friends is sufficient to show that he “ openly holds
out [A.J.S.] as his biological child.” See Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d).
In sum, respondent’s allegations, even if they are true, would not show that he has
held A.J.S. out as his biological child . Therefore, respondent lacks standing under the
holding-out presumption to bring his paternity action.
Because we hold that respondent cannot compel genetic testing to establish
paternity, and has failed to allege facts sufficient to obtain standing under the holding -out
presumption, we hold that the district court erred in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss.
21
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the district court to dismiss respondent’s petition
with prejudice.
Reversed and remanded.