State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1787

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Lee Haley,
Appellant.

Filed July 1, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-21-3740

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that
the need for his confinement did not outweigh the policies favoring probation. Appellant
also challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a reduced sentence. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Daniel Lee Haley
with felony domestic assault, alleging that he had two or more previous qualifying
convictions and “smacked” BB, the mother of his children, on the arm. Haley pleaded
guilty to the charge, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled for a later date.
The probation department prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI), which
listed Haley’s six prior felony convictions, including two felony burglary convictions and
two felony convictions for violating an order for protection (OFP). The PSI noted that , as
to domestic violence, Haley “scored at high risk for recidivism.” The PSI also noted that
Haley previously received a dispositional departure on a felony OF P violation and that
Haley was on probation for that offense when he was arrested and pleaded guilty to the
current felony domestic assault. The probation department recommended that the di strict
court sentence Haley to serve 27 months in prison for the felony domestic assault.
Nonetheless, at the August 2021 sentencing hearing, the district court granted
Haley’s motion for another dispositional departure, stayed a 32-month prison sentence, and
placed Haley on probation for up to five years. The 32 -month sentence was within the
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presumptive sentencing range, but the district court indicated that it selected “the high end”
of that range so Haley would go to prison “for more time” if he violated probation.
In February 2023, the state alleged that Haley had violated the terms of his probation
by failing to remain law abiding, failing to contact probation as directed, and failing to
notify probation within 72 hours of his contact with law enforcement. The state alleged
that Haley had been charged with two new offenses: felony violation of a harassment
restraining order (HRO) and felony domestic assault. The probation department filed a
violation report, which noted that Haley had “a long pattern” of violating OFPs and HROs
and that the victim “stated that she is scared for her life and her children’s [lives].”
Haley pleaded guilty to the felony HRO violation, and the state dismissed the felony
domestic-assault charge. Haley admitted that he v iolated probation. Specifically, he
admitted that he failed to remain law abiding and to contact probation as directed. The
district court released Haley from custody to attend treatment pending a probation -
disposition hearing.
At the probation -disposition hearing, Haley requested a reduced sentence of 24
months pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, arguing that reduction of his
previously stayed 32 -month sentence was permissible under caselaw. The district court
denied Haley’s motion, stating that it was “not aware of any law that permits the [c]ourt to
resentence.” Next, the court described Haley’s extensive criminal record and said that it
was not going to “question th[e] wisdom” of the 32 -month sentence that was previously
imposed and stayed.
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The district court found that Haley violated the conditions of probation by failing to
remain law abiding, that the violation was intentional and inexcusable, and that the need
for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. As to the last f inding, the
district court reasoned that “it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if
probation were not revoked.” The district court revoked Haley’s probation and executed
his 32-month sentence.
Haley appeals.
DECISION
I.
Haley contends that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation.
“The [district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to
revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discre tion.”
State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 249 -50 (Minn. 1980). A district court “abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted).
Before a district court revokes a defendant’s probation, it must (1) “designate the
specific condition or conditions that were violated,” (2) “find that the violation was
intentional or inexcusable,” and (3) “find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the
policies favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. “[I]n making the three Austin
findings, courts are not charged with merely conforming to procedural requirements;
rather, courts must seek to convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence
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relied upon.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). We review de novo
whether a district court made the required Austin findings. Id. at 605.
Haley’s challenge is limited to the district court’s finding on the third Austin factor:
“whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id. at 606.
When determining whether to revoke probation , the district court “must balance the
probationer’s interest in freedom and the stat e’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and
the public safety.” Id. at 606-07 (quotation omitted). The district court must bear in mind
that “the purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last
resort when treatment has failed.” Id. at 606 (quotation omitted).
In balancing the probationer’s and the state’s interests, a district court should
consider (1) whether “confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal
activity by the offender,” (2) wh ether “the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined,” or (3) whether “it would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.” Id. at 607
(quotation omitted). The existence of only o ne of those circumstances is sufficient to
establish the need for confinement. See id. (using the disjunctive “or” in discussing the
bases for revocation); State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023) (“Only one
Modtland subfactor is necessary to support revocation.”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27,
2023).
Haley argues that the record does not support the district court’s finding that not
revoking his probation would unduly depreciate the seriousn ess of the violation. For the
reasons that follow, we disagree. First, a district court may consider a grant of a downward
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dispositional departure when deciding whether to revoke probation. See State v. Fleming,
869 N.W.2d 319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). Haley’s
underlying sentence was a dispositional departure, and it was not his first —Haley
previously received a dispositional departure on a felony OFP violation. Second, as the
district court reasoned, Haley’s current p robation violation and resulting conviction was
consistent with his documented history of violating OFPs and HROs. Thus, Haley
continued to commit the same type of offenses even though he had been granted two
opportunities to avoid executed prison term s. And third, the district court reasonably
rejected Haley’s argument that he was benefitting from mental -health therapy and
medications, noting that Haley had previously taken steps to address his mental health and
yet continued his pattern of unlawful conduct. The district court explained:
I just read that PSI and you were addressing your mental health
at that time too. You were seeing a counselor once a week.
It’s not like this is something new to you, but what this [c]ourt
sees is it’s just another -- a new angle for you to avoid the
consequence of your behavior.

In sum, the PSI in the underlying case indicates that Haley had six felony
convictions at the time of sentencing. Yet, the district court gave him a second opportunity
to avoid a n executed prison sentence. Despite that opportunity —and previous
opportunities to demonstrate law-abiding behavior through the use of probation
supervision and services—Haley committed and was convicted of another crime: a felony
HRO violation while on probation for felony domestic assault. This record supports the
district court’s finding that not revoking probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness
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of Haley’s violation. Thus the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Haley’s
probation.
II.
Haley contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a sentence reduction at the probation -disposition hearing. He asks us to remand for
imposition of a 24-month sentence.
Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, “[t]he court may modify a sentence during
a stay of execution or imposition of sentence if the court does not increase the period of
confinement.” In State v. Hockensmith, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a district
court has discretion to reduce a defend ant’s sentence when revoking a stay of execution. 1
417 N.W.2d 630 , 633 (Minn. 1988). “We review a district court’s decision to deny a
motion under rule 27.03 for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Provost , 901 N.W.2d 199,
201 (Minn. App. 2017).
Haley asserts that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to reduce his
32-month sentence to 24 months, arguing a reduction was appropriate based on (1) his
progress during two years of probation, (2) the fact that his domestic -assault conviction
“would be a misdemeanor but for [his] prior convictions,” (3) the fact that “[t]here was no
significant bodily harm and the conduct involved grabbing the victim’s wrist,” and (4) the

1 We note that in denying Haley’s request for resentencing, the district court stated that it
was “not aware of any law that permits the [c]ourt to resentence.” But the record does not
suggest that the district court denied Haley’s request based on a mistaken belief that it did
not have discretion to reduce his sentence. Instead, the record shows that the district court
made a discretionary dec ision not to reduce Haley’s sentence based on his extensive
criminal record and its deference to the original sentencing decision.
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fact that “the victim had supported a continuation of probation.” Haley ar gues that a 32 -
month sentence “unfairly exaggerated the criminality of the conduct” and that a “24-month
sentence would have been proportional to the offense severity and would have given
consideration to [Haley’s] subsequent progress on probation.”
Although the Hockensmith court stated that a district court has discretion to reduce
a lawful sentence when revoking probation and executing a sentence, nothing in that
decision indicates that a district court is required to reduce a sentence. 417 N.W.2d at 631-
33. In fact, the Hockensmith court indicated that appellate courts should not interfere with
the district court’s discretionary decision not to reduce a sentence, stating, “The [district]
court’s refusal to exercise its discretion in [the] defendan t’s favor was simply a
discretionary sentencing decision of the sort that the court of appeals presumably would
not have and should not have interfered with in any event.” Id. at 633.
Haley does not provide any authority or argument persuading us that it is appropriate
to interfere with the district court’s sentencing discretion in this case. Nor do we discern
any reason to do so.
Affirmed.