State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1792

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Purna Bahadur Bhujel,
Appellant.

Filed November 25, 2024
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-21-6770

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant Ramsey County
Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence. We
affirm.
2
FACTS
The state charged appellant Purna Bahadur Bhujel with fifth-degree criminal sexual
conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1a(1) (Supp. 2021). 1 According to the
complaint, in October 2021, Bhujel hugged a female coworker (first coworker) and groped
her breast. Bhujel acknowledged hugging the coworker but said that he touched her breast
by accident.
The state moved to introduce Spreigl evidence about a second incident where Bhujel
touched another female coworker (second coworker). At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the
state explained that in June 2017, Bhujel was working at a restaurant and commented upon
the second “coworker’s body, and then hugged her and groped her breast.” According to
the state, in 2018, the second coworker filed a civil lawsuit against the restaurant over the
incident, and in 2022 filed a police report. The state intended to present testimony about
the prior act to rebut Bhujel’s theory that touching the first coworker was a mistake or
accident. After the hearing, the district court granted the state’s Spreigl motion, concluding
that evidence about the prior act was clear and convincing, relevant and material to the
state’s case, and its probative value was greater than the potential unfair prejudice to
Bhujel.

1 Section 609.3451, subdivision 1a(1), criminalizes “nonconsensual sexual contact.”
Under the statute, “sexual contact” includes intentionally touching someone’s intimate
parts, including “the clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate parts,” without
consent, and “with sexual or aggressive intent.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(a)(i), (iv)
(Supp. 2021); see Minn. Stat. § 3451, subd. 1a (incorporating definitions from section
609.341, subdivision 11(a)).

3
The case proceeded to a jury trial in June 2023. The first coworker testified that in
the fall of 2021, when she was 19, a staffing agency placed her at a company in Arden
Hills. One day, Bhujel approached her during a work-break. When she got up to wash her
hands and throw away her trash, Bhujel followed her to a coffee area and commented on
her body. Bhujel then asked for a hug, but she felt shocked and did not respond . Bhujel
then hugged her. Initially, they were face-to-face for a first hug, but Bhujel then hugged
her again from behind and placed his hand on her breast. The first coworker asserted that
Bhujel did not touch her breast by accident. The two hugs happened quickly, and no one
walked by while they happened. After Bhujel left, the first coworker returned to work.
Bhujel testified that on the day of the incident, he and the first coworker were talking
in the break room and then went to the coffee area as “friends working in the same place.”
He noticed that she was being “very friendly towards [him],” and he asked whether she
wanted a hug, at which point, “she spread out her arms.” The hug seemed normal to him,
and she “looked happy.” Afterward he returned to work. Bhujel testified that he did not
know whether he touched the first coworker’s breast during the interaction.
Both the state and defense counsel presented images and clips from surveillance
footage where the first coworker and Bhujel pace and brush up against each other in a
hallway. However, the footage does not clearly show Bhujel hugging or touching the first
coworker’s breast.
The second coworker testified about the separate incident from June 2017. Prior to
her testimony, the district court instructed the jury that the state was offering her testimony
“for the limited purpose of assisting [it] in determining whether the defendant committed
4
the act he’s charged with in this case.” Furthermore, the district court instructed the jury
that it should not use the testimony “to prove the character of the defendant or that he acted
in conformity with such character,” and that he “is not being tried for and may not be
convicted of any offense other than the charged offense in this case.”
The second coworker testified that in June 2017 she was 19 years old and was
working at a restaurant in St. Paul. Bhujel was also working at the restaurant and was
eating in a booth during break when he told the second coworker to sit down with him.
Bhujel “said some things” to the second coworker, and “then he got up and then out of
nowhere he took his right hand . . . and put it on [her] left breast.” The second coworker
was “shocked” and went into “the bathroom to clean.” Bhujel “came into the bathroom”
and asked for a hug. She “just tried to get away from him and he was disappointed.” Later
that day, the second coworker was emptying the mops, and Bhujel approached her and
again asked for a hug. The second coworker gave him a hug and then “just got out of
there.” The second coworker testified it was “[a]bsolutely not” an accident when Bhujel
touched her breast. The second coworker contacted law enforcement about the incident in
February 2022 after she looked up Bhujel’s name online and discovered his arrest for the
present offense.
The jury returned a guilty verdict for fifth- degree criminal sexual conduct. The
district court convicted Bhujel and sentenced him to two years of probation. This appeal
followed.
5
DECISION
On appeal, Bhujel argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting
the Spreigl evidence because the state did not provide clear and convincing evidence that
the prior act occurred, the evidence was not relevant and material to the state’s case, and
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice.
Under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” However, such evidence may “be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.” Id. In Minnesota, evidence of “prior bad acts” is known as Spreigl
evidence. See State v. Washington, 693 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v.
Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)). For a district court to admit Spreigl evidence:
the state bears the burden for securing its admissibility by
(1) providing notice that the state intends to use the evidence,
(2) clearly indicating what the evidence is being offered to
prove, (3) offering clear and convincing proof that the
defendant participated in the other offense, (4) proving that the
Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state’s case, and
(5) proving that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is
not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice.

Washington, 693 N.W.2d at 201.
We review “the district court’s decision to admit Spreigl evidence for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
6
and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
However, even when the district court wrongly admits Spreigl evidence, we will still affirm
unless the defendant establishes prejudice. State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 347 (Minn.
2007). Prejudice occurs when “there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id.
Clear and convincing evidence
Bhujel first argues that the second coworker’s allegations do “not rise to the level
of clear and convincing evidence.” “Clear and convincing evidence is more than a
preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 464 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). The evidence must show
that “the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable.” Id. (citation omitted).
We grant the district court “great deference” in evaluating whether Spreigl evidence was
clear and convincing. State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 788 (Minn. 2005).
Bhujel argues that the Spreigl evidence was not clear and convincing because the
second coworker “waited almost five years to report [the incident] to the police.” However,
evidence can be clear and convincing despite a delay in disclosure. In Ness, for instance,
the Spreigl evidence consisted of a 43-year-old testifying about incidents from his
childhood when the defendant inappropriately touched him. 707 N.W.2d at 682-83.
Before the witness testified, his mother sent him an article about the defendant’s pending
charges and contacted prosecution about the inappropriate touching from years earlier. Id.
Without mentioning the decades-long timeframe between the witness’s allegations and the
disclosure to prosecution, the supreme court upheld the district court’s conclusion that the
7
Spreigl evidence was clear and convincing, noting that other evidence in the record added
veracity to the witnesses’ allegations, the witness told others about the allegations earlier
in his adulthood, and that “he drove over 1,500 miles to testify” with the risk “of losing his
employment.” Id. at 686.
Here, in its order granting the state’s motion to admit Spreigl evidence, the district
court determined that the 2022 police report and the 2018 civil action were clear and
convincing evidence of the second coworker’s allegations. The district court emphasized
that the second coworker’s earlier statements from depositions in her civil action were
consistent with her later police report. We conclude that the second coworker’s delay in
reporting the earlier incident does not prevent the Spreigl evidence from being clear and
convincing.
Bhujel also argues that the evidence was not clear and convincing because the prior
incident never resulted in criminal charges against him. We are unpersuaded. First, Spreigl
evidence may not only involve “another crime,” but also another “wrong” or “act.” Minn.
R. Evid. 404(b); see also Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 685-86 n.2 (noting that although most
“Spreigl cases use the term other-crime evidence, . . . [rule] 404(b) pertains to ‘other crimes,
wrongs, or acts’”). We also note that under Minnesota caselaw, the state’s dismissal of
criminal charges against a defendant does not prohibit the state from using evidence about
the dismissed charges as Spreigl evidence of another crime. State v. Lande, 350 N.W.2d
355, 358 (Minn. 1984) (stating that “unless the defendant was acquitted of the other crime,
evidence of the other crime may be admitted against the defendant” if clear and
8
convincing). Therefore, we conclude that the lack of criminal charges against Bhujel also
does not prevent the Spreigl evidence from being clear and convincing.
The district court properly exercised its discretion by determining that the Spreigl
evidence was clear and convincing.
Relevant and material
Bhujel also argues that the Spreigl evidence was not relevant and material to the
state’s case. Whether Spreigl evidence is relevant and material depends on a “balancing
process as to time, place, and modus operandi.” State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 617
(Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). There is no “bright-line rule for determining when a
prior bad act has become too remote [in time] to be relevant.” Washington, 693 N.W.2d at
201. However, when dealing with “an arguably stale Spreigl incident,” a district court
should continue to balance “time, place, and modus operandi,” while keeping in mind that
the more distant the incident “is in terms of time, the greater the similarities as to place and
modus operandi must be to retain relevance.” Id. at 202.
Here, the district court concluded that the Spreigl evidence was relevant and
material because it was probative of Bhujel’s “sexual intent in hugging and touching his
younger female coworker in this case, and it undermines [his] statement [that] any sexual
touching was accidental.”
Bhujel first contends that the prior act lacks materiality and relevance because he
never asserted a prior defense of mistake or accident against the second coworker’s
allegations. Bhujel relies on a supreme court case where the defendant’s prior assertion of
similar defenses against similar allegations of criminal conduct demonstrated a “pattern of
9
operation” without “mistake or accident.” See State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 227
(Minn. 1988). However, Bhujel never asserted a prior defense of mistake or accident
against the second coworker’s allegations because she did not notify police about the
incident until she heard about his present offense. And the lack of a prior defense does not
negate the substantial similarities between the two incidents. See State v. Elvin,
481 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Minn. App. 1992) (determining, without reference to any prior
defenses, that Spreigl evidence was material and relevant for showing the “absence of an
accident”). Both acts took place in a work setting, involved young women who were
19 years old, involved Bhujel asking to hug and hugging the women, and concerned Bhujel
putting his hand on their breasts.
Bhujel also points out that the prior act occurred almost five years earlier, but the
substantial similarities between the incidents reduce concern about the time gap between
them. See Washington, 693 N.W.2d at 202 (“[T]he more distant the Spreigl act is in terms
of time, the greater the similarities . . . must be to retain relevance.”) .2 Bhujel also notes
that one incident took place in St. Paul while the other took place in Arden Hills. But given
the strong overlap between the two incidents, minor differences in location are not

2 Bhujel also argues that because fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct is a specific intent
crime, evidence about the absence of a mistake or accident cannot be material or relevant
because it only shows a lack of general intent . However, Bhujel testified at trial that he
“did not know” whether he touched the first coworker’s breast. Therefore, the second
coworker’s testimony that Bhujel did in fact touch her breast in a similar circumstance, and
that he did not do so by accident, is material and relevant to the question of whether he
specifically intended to engage in “nonconsensual sexual contact.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3451, subd. 1a(1); Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(a)(i), (iv).

10
meaningful to our analysis. See Robinson, 427 N.W.2d at 227 (permitting Spreigl evidence
about prior acts in separate states).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the Spreigl
evidence was relevant and material to the first coworker’s allegations against Bhujel.
Probative value and potential for unfair prejudice
Finally, Bhujel argues that the probative value of the second coworker’s testimony
was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. A district court should
exclude Spreigl evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.” State v. Harris, 560 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. 1997). “Prejudice”
refers to an “unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by
illegitimate means.” Id. (quotation omitted). To determine whether the probative value of
Spreigl evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, the
district court should examine the “purposes for which Spreigl evidence is offered” against
the need for the Spreigl evidence. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 690. “Need” does not necessarily
mean that the state lacks “sufficient other evidence to convict.” State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d
191, 197 n.2 (Minn. 1995). Rather, it means, “as a practical matter, [that] it is not clear
that the jury will believe the state’s other evidence bearing on the disputed issue.” Id.
Here, in its order granting the state’s motion to admit Spreigl evidence, the district
court noted that without testimony from the second coworker, the state would likely have
to rely on witness statements and video evidence that “does not capture the precise incident
alleged.” Therefore, the district court determined that the second coworker’s testimony
had high probative value in corroborating the first coworker’s assertion that Bhujel touched
11
her breast, and that he did not do so by accident. Furthermore, the district court concluded
that while the second coworker’s testimony would be prejudicial, such prejudice would be
mitigated by the district court’s cautionary instructions to the jury on its use of the Spreigl
evidence and by Bhujel’s opportunity to cross-examine the second coworker.
Later at trial, the only witnesses who provided firsthand accounts of the incident
between the first coworker and Bhujel were the first coworker and Bhujel themselves, both
of whom gave deeply contradictory descriptions of what happened. Moreover, as the
district court stated, the surveillance footage did not clearly show the precise nature of their
interaction. And, consistent with its order, the district court provided cautionary
instructions directing the jury not to use the second coworker’s testimony as evidence of
Bhujel’s character “or that he acted in conformity with such character.” Finally, during the
second coworker’s testimony, Bhujel cross-examined her.
Bhujel argues that the state did not need the Sprei gl evidence because the state
presented detailed evidence about the first coworker’s version of events and because Bhujel
admitted to hugging her. But because her account conflicted with Bhujel’s version of
events, and because the surveillance footage of the interaction did not provide much
support for her account , it was “not clear that the jury [would] believe the state’s . . .
evidence bearing” on whether Bhuje l committed the offense. See Bolte, 530 N.W.2d at
197 n.2.
Bhujel also contends that the Spreigl evidence “suggested that he had a general
propensity for groping female co- workers’ breasts and it attacked his character.” But the
district court expressly instructed the jury not to use the evidence to determine that Bhujel
12
acted in conformity with a character trait, and “[j]urors are presumed to follow limiting
instructions.” See State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249-50 (Minn. 2014).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the probative value
of the Spreigl evidence was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice.3
Affirmed.

3 Because we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion by permitting
the Spreigl evidence, we do not address Bhujel’s argument that he is entitled to a new trial
because the Spreigl evidence had a prejudicial impact on the verdict.