State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1800

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terry Izeal Heggs,
Appellant.

Filed September 2, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-23-687

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelson, Mower County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of failure to register as a predatory offender
and violation of a domestic -abuse no -contact order (DANCO), arguing that the district
court erred in determining that respondent’s failure to disclose the source of a tip that led
to his arrest was not a Brady violation because the information was attorney -client
privileged. He further argues that the district court erred in concluding that he did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney did not bring a motion to
suppress the search warrant that was based on information that was attorney -client
privileged. Appellant also filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2023, appellant Terry Izeal Heggs was required to register as a predatory
offender and was the subject of several DANCOs in effect. Appellant, aware of his
registration duties to report any address where he was staying on a regular or occasional
basis until 2041, verified that his address for registration purposes was in Albert Lea.
On March 31, 2023, a detective received a tip that appellant was residing at the
Rodeway Inn in Austin. In reliance on this tip, combined with the detective’s knowledge
that appellant was required to register as a predatory offender, as well as his own research
confirming that appellant had not registered at the Rodeway Inn, the detective began an
investigation. The detective drove to the Rodeway Inn and conversed with the manager.
The manager confirmed that appellant had been renting one of the rooms si nce March 18,
3
2023, and that a woman had been staying with him. A DANCO prohibited appellant from
having contact with the woman.
After leaving the office, the detective observed the woman whom appellant was
prohibited from having contact with walking away from the direction of appellant’s room.
The detective then knocked on the door of appellant’s room, but did not receive a response.
The detective subsequently left the Rodeway Inn to obtain a search warrant. The search
warrant stated in part: “On March 31, 2023, your affiant learned that [appellant] had been
in court earlier that day and advised he was living at the Rodeway Inn.” The detective then
executed the search warrant and found appellant inside, as well as evidence that he and the
woman were staying together in the room.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with failure-to-register, felon-in-
possession of tear gas, and violation of a DANCO. Appellant’s trial counsel subsequently
filed a demand for disclosure of evidence relating to the case, including any material or
information within respondent’s control that tends to negate or reduce guilt under Brady.1
Included in respondent’s disclosure was the search warrant containing the detective’s
statement that appellant had been “in court” on March 31, and “was living at the Rodeway
Inn.” Trial counsel reviewed a court transcript from the March 31, 2023 hearing, and could
not find any instances of appellant mentioning that he was staying at the Rodeway Inn.
On the first day of trial, trial counsel questioned the detective regarding the source
of the tip to impeach his credibility. Respondent objected to the revelation of the source.

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4
The district court sustained the objection, finding that the disclosure would not “overcome
what appears to be an attorney -client privilege.” Trial counsel later discovered that the
source of the tip was appellant’s former defense attorney (hereinafter “former attorney”).
After this revelation, trial counsel introduced the source of the tip at trial before the district
court. The district court asked appellant whether he had disclosed to his former attorney
that he was living at the Rodeway, to which app ellant responded, “No, I never told him
anything about me staying at a Rodeway Inn or anything.” The district court then
determined that, since appellant never told his former attorney where he had been staying,
the information was not privileged because “there’s no privilege to communications
. . . never made,” and former attorney had “an obligation to update the [c]ourt as to
address.” Following this determination, appellant agreed to proceed with the trial.
Appellant was found guilty of failure to register and violation of a DANCO. He
was sentenced to 36 months in prison for failing to register, and 364 days to be served
concurrently for violation of a DANCO. Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal,
which was then stayed pending his petition for postconviction relief. Appellant then
petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that respondent committed a Brady violation
by failing to disclose the source of the tip that would have led to the dismissal of appellant’s
charges, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s
failure to challenge the release of attorney-client-privileged information at trial.
An evidentiary hearing was held on appellant’s postconviction petition at which
appellant’s former attorney (hereinafter “former attorney”) testified about the events
preceding the disclosure of the information that led to appellant’s arrest. He testified that
5
appellant reached out to him over a phone call to terminate his representation. According
to former attorney , appellant informed him that appellant was having “transportation
issues” and that former attorney should come meet appellant in person. Former attorney
testified that they agreed to meet at a gas station located on the east side of Austin, south
of the Rodeway Inn. Former attorney stated that he was familiar with the gas station and
that he was inside when appellant arrived to meet him. Former attorney recalled appellant
coming from a different direction than that of the Rodeway Inn and that, once appellant
was inside, the two discussed and signed paperwork regarding appellant ’s discharge of
former attorney. Former attorney further testified that “the Rodeway Inn was not part of
any type of discussion or didn’t really cross my mind.”
Former attorney testified that, on March 31, 2023, while at the courthouse, he ran
into the chief deputy prosecutor (hereinafter “deputy prosecutor ”) of the Mower County
attorney’s office. Former attorney claimed that, during a short conversation regarding a
global settlement for several of appellant’s cases, he told deputy prosecutor that he had met
appellant “‘at a gas station out by the Rodeway Inn, and he had signed paperwork indicating
he no longer wanted us to represent him.’” Deputy prosecutor testified that former attorney
told her “‘it took me a while to track [appellant] down ,’” and that former attorney
specifically “said something about the Rodeway.” She testified that she could not recall
precisely what former attorney said, but was certain that her “ brain heard Rodeway.”
Deputy prosecutor also did not recall former attorney mentioning any transportation issues.
And deputy prosecutor acknowledged that, prior to this conversation, she did not possess
any information about appellant not living in Albert Lea.
6
Deputy prosecutor testified that, after speaking with former attorney, she spoke with
an assistant prosecutor (hereinafter “assistant prosecutor ”) at the office about the
information regarding appellant and the Rodeway Inn. Deputy prosecutor testified that she
remembered that appellant was last registered in Albert Lea and requested th at assistant
prosecutor reach out to a detective to investigate whether appellant was living at the
Rodeway Inn. Assistant prosecutor then sent an email to the detective, as king “[h]as
[appellant] registered his new address yet? His counsel stated he is residing at the Rodeway
Inn.” The detective testified that , although he did not remember receiving this email, he
did remember a phone conversation with assistant prosecutor, wherein the detective was
told that appellant “was living at the Rodeway Inn.” This tip initialized the investigation
into appellant’s residence at the Rodeway Inn, as the detective stated that, prior to receiving
the tip, he had no idea that appellant was potentially staying at the Rodeway Inn.
The district court determined that , since former attorney “received no privileged
communication, and he relayed no privileged information,” and because he “had no reason
to believe such information was secret or detrimental to [appellant],” there was no violation
of attorney-client privilege. In reliance on this determination, the district court found that
a Brady violation did not occur, as the “source of the tip was not material to the trial,” and
that, had appellant received the information earlier, “it would have had no impact on the
outcome of trial.” The district court also found that appellant’s trial counsel conducted a
thorough investigation, satisfying her duties to provide effective assistance of counsel.
According to the district court, had trial counsel “been less diligent, the information
regarding [former attorney] may never have come to light.” Therefore, the district court
7
denied appellant’s postconviction petition, concluding that appellant “failed to meet his
burden of proving he is entitled to postconviction relief for alleged violations of attorney
client privilege, for sixth amendment violations, for ineffective assistance of counsel , or
for the alleged Brady violation.” This court then dissolved appellant’s stay, and appellant
raises issues decided in his postconviction evidentiary hearing and at the trial.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief. “When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue
postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decision s using the same
standard that we apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn.
2012).
I.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that respondent did not
violate Brady when it failed to disclose information regarding the source of the tip that led
to the investigation and conviction of appellant. “Whether a discovery violation occurred
presents a question of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Colbert, 716
N.W.2d 647, 654 (Minn. 2006). The “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. To establish a Brady violation, three elements must be satisfied:
(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it
would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the
evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution,
8
intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be
material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must
have caused prejudice to the defendant.

Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295, 304 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
“Evidence is material under Brady if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Zornes v. State , 903 N.W.2d 411, 418 (Minn. 2017) (quotations and citation
omitted). “[A] new trial is not required simply because a defendant uncovers previously
undisclosed evidence that would have been possibly useful to the defendant but unlikely to
have changed the verdict.” Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010). The district
court’s determination of materiality is reviewed de novo. Id.
The district court found that appellant failed to demonstrate the first and third prongs
of a Brady violation. The district court reviewed the email tip in camera and found that the
email did not contain any privileged information. The district court also found that
appellant was not prejudiced by respondent’s failure to disclose this information because,
even if trial “counsel obtained the information earlier, it would have had no impact on the
outcome of trial.” The first part of appellant’s argument f ocuses on whether the district
court erred in finding that assistant prosecutor’s email to the detective did not violate
Brady. This question hinges on whether the information former attorney conveyed to
deputy prosecutor, that was later included in the email tip to the detective, violated the
attorney-client privilege.
9
A. The information conveyed by former attorney did not violate attorney -client
privilege.

Appellant argues that former attorney violated attorney -client privilege when he
disclosed to the deputy prosecutor that he met appellant at a gas station out by the Rodeway
Inn. With some exceptions, the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an
attorney from “knowingly reveal[ing] information relating to the representation of a
client.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6. An attorney may reveal such information when “the
information is not protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, the client
has not requested that the information be held inviolate, and the lawyer reasonably believes
the disclosure would not be embarrassing or likely detrimental to the client.” Id. 1.6(b)(2).
An attorney shall also make “reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation o f a
client.” Id. 1.6(c). And the rules state that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client
in a matter shall not “use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except . . . when the information has become generally known.” Id.
1.9(c)(1).
Minnesota considers privileged “any communication made by the client to the
attorney or the attorney’s advice given thereon in the course of professional duty.” Minn.
Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(b) (2024). This privilege protects from disclosure “communications
that seek to elicit legal advice from an attorney acting in that capacity, that relate to that
purpose, and that are made in confidence by the client unless the privilege is waived.” State
v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 21 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Attorney-client privilege
10
does not attach to “confidences given in the presence of third parties.” State v. Rhodes ,
627 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Minn. 2001) ; see also Schwartz v. Wenger , 124 N.W.2d 489, 492
(Minn. 1963) (holding that discussion of privileged information in a public place waives
the privilege insofar as the testimony of the obvious third -party is concerned). Once
waived, privilege cannot be later reasserted for the same information. State v. McNeilly, 6
N.W.3d 161, 186 (Minn. 2024).
We are not persuaded that the disclosure violated the attorney -client privilege
because the record does not show that the communication conveyed any privileged
information. The district court found that former attorney’s testimony from the evidentiary
hearing was credible, and that former attorney did not tell the deputy prosecutor that
appellant was staying at the Rodeway Inn. The district court further found that the record
does not support that there was any mention by former attorney to the deputy pro secutor
of appellant having transportation issues. Based on our review of the evidentiary hearing
testimony, we cannot say that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous. According
to former attorney’s testimony, the only information that he conveyed to the deputy
prosecutor was the location of the public meeting at the gas station near the Rodeway Inn.
This location cannot be considered privileged, as meeting in a public space necessarily
defeats the purpose of attorney -client privilege: to pr otect communications that are made
“in confidence.” See Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 21. Confidence means “made in trust and not
intended for public disclosure.” Black’s Law Dictionary 375 (12th ed. 2024). Appellant
fails to show how the location of a meeting satisfies a communication not meant for public
disclosure when the location was intentionally public. Accordingly, the location of the
11
meeting between appellant and his former attorney was not information protected by
attorney-client privilege. See Sprader v. Muller, 121 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Minn. 1963) (“The
existence of the privilege is a question of fact which must be proved by the one asserting
it.”).
Without the attachment of attorney -client privilege, an attorney is authorized to
reveal information relating to representation if “the client has not requested that the
information be held inviolate, and the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure would not
be embarrassing or likely detrimental to the client.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(b)(2).
Here, appellant made no indication that the location of the meeting should be kept secret.
Instead, appellant required that the meeting occur at a public locatio n. A reasonable
attorney would not assume that such a location ought to be protected when he had no reason
to believe that his client was violating the law.
Appellant argues that a competent attorney should nonetheless know that the
disclosure of the location of a public meeting, coupled with knowledge that his
representation included a charge of failing to register, would be detrimental to his client.
Again, we are not persuaded. Former attorney responded on cross-examination that he did
not know that appellant was staying at a hotel near the meeting, or that appellant had failed
to register the Rodeway Inn as a place of residence. The purpose of the meetin g was to
discuss the termination of former attorney’s representation.
Appellant relies on cases from other jurisdictions to support his argument that the
location of the meeting was protected by attorney -client privilege. First, he cites In re
Custodian of Recs., Crim. Div. Manager, in which the defendant sought qualification for a
12
public defender in response to numerous charges, including falsifying records and money
laundering. 19 A.3d 1032, 1033 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011), aff’d sub nom. 68 A.3d
308 (2013). The government subsequently issued a trial subpoena to the custodian of
records demanding release of the application for the public defender . Id. The superior
court affirmed the trial court’s quash of the subpoena, finding that the information was
protected under attorney -client privilege, as allowing discovery on the application would
“violate one of the basic purposes of the attorney-client privilege, which is to allow a person
to seek legal representation without suffering any detrimental consequences.” Id. at 1035.
The New Jersey Supreme Court later affirmed the decision to quash the subpoena.
Custodian of Recs., 68 A.3d at 322.
Custodian of Recs. is easily distinguished. Attorney-client privilege is attached to
communications that “seek to elicit legal advice from an attorney acting in that capacity,
that relate to that purpose, and that are made in confidence by the client .” Nat’l Texture
Corp. v. Hymes, 282 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Minn. 1979) (emphasis added). The location of a
public meeting is not a disclosure made in confidence, and thus, attorney -client privilege
would not attach. Without this attachment, the “basic purposes of the attorney -client
privilege” alluded to by the New Jersey Superior Court do not apply. See Custodian of
Recs., 19 A.3d at 1035. Further, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not even adopt the
superior court’s privilege analysis, instead finding prohibition of the disclosure on other
grounds. Custodian of Recs., 68 A.3d at 319. The court noted that the form that “governed
defendant’s disclosure unambiguously assured him that the financial information on the
. . . form would not be used in a grandy jury proceeding or at trial.” Id. at 318. Here, the
13
record demonstrates that appellant and his former attorney had no discussion regarding the
secrecy of the location of the meeting.
Appellant also relies on In re Stolar , in which a New York federal district court
quashed a grand -jury subpoena requesting the address and telephone number of a client
from his attorney. 397 F. Supp . 520, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). There, the client, who was
being sought by the FBI for questioning regarding information he possessed about another,
disclosed his name and home address to his attorney. Id. The agency, after the attorney
refused to supply the information, served the attorney with a grand-jury subpoena. Id. The
Stolar court quashed the subpoe na, finding that , because the “information sought was
communicated to the attorney confidentially and solely for the purpose of receiving legal
advice,” the client had “a legitimate basis to expect that such information disclosed to his
attorney was made in confidence and would no t be revealed.” Id. at 524. This case, too,
is distinguishable, since in Stolar, the client’s purpose of seeking legal advice was to
determine whether to submit to questioning by revealing his location, id. at 521, whereas
here, appellant’s purpose for the meeting was to terminate his representation, completely
unrelated to any desire of keeping his location confidential.
Lastly, appellant argues that attorney -client privilege would nonetheless apply to
the location of the meeting because appellant disclosed this location within a
communication to his former attorney prior to meeting him, and the original purpose of the
communication of the location was to elicit legal advice. But notwithstanding whether this
communication would be privileged, former attorney did not reveal anything about the
telephone call between him and appellant.
14
To reiterate, the disclosure by former attorney to deputy prosecutor does not fall
within information protected by attorney-client privilege.2
B. Respondent did not violate Brady because the information was not favorable,
and the absence of the evidence did not cause prejudice.

Appellant next argues that the district court erred in determining that respondent did
not violate Brady when it failed to disclose the assistant prosecutor’s email containing the
statement that appellant was residing at the Rodeway Inn, and when it failed to provide
discovery regarding the information that the source of the tip was from appellant’s former
attorney. We are not persuaded.
In his petition for postconviction relief, appellant argued that all three elements of
Brady were met. Appellant claimed that the email was favorable because it established
that former attorney “had disclosed attorney -client privileged information.” Appellant
argues that, h ad respondent not failed to provide discovery on the source of the tip, he
“could have challenged [ former attorney’s ] attorney -client privilege violation prior to
trial,” resulting in the dismissal of both convicted charges.
The district court did not find that the evidence was favorable, concluding that, even
if trial “counsel obtained the information earlier, it would have had no impact on the
outcome of the trial.” The district court noted that respondent “proved the counts

2 Appellant repeatedly states that former attorney told deputy prosecutor that he was having
trouble locating appellant, arguing that this disclosure, in combination with the location of
the meeting, creates a violation of attorney-client privilege or is “detrimental to the client.”
This fact is unsupported by the record. While deputy prosecutor testified that former
attorney told her “‘it took me a while to track him down,’” former attorney made no
mention of that in his testimony and was never questioned about it.
15
. . . beyond a reasonable doubt without reliance on the source of the tip.” Appellant’s
conclusion that the evidence is favorable because it reveals attorney -client-privileged
information fails here because the email does not contain evidence of a violation of
attorney-client privilege. Without a showing of a violation of attorney -client privilege,
appellant’s argument about an alleged Brady violation fails. The remaining evidence—the
source of the tip leading to the eventual investigation and conviction of appellant—has no
exculpatory value because it does not tend to reduce or negate appellant’s guilt.
Finally, the evidence of the source of the tip was not material. Appellant was able
to use the erroneous information of the tip that was on the warrant to impeach the detective.
Knowing the source of the tip earlier would not have changed the outcome of the trial
because the information was not attorney-client privileged and, as the district court found,
the “resulting evidence would not have been suppressed.” The district court found that
respondent “proved the counts for which [appellant] was found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt without reliance on the source of the tip.” Thus, since there is no reasonable
possibility that the outcome of the case would have been different, appellant has suffered
no prejudice. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999).
Appellant fails to meet his burden of showing that the evidence was favorable to
him, as he could not show that it was either exculpatory or impeaching, nor can he
demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from any suppression by respondent. Thus,
respondent did not violate Brady, as appellant failed to prove the first and third prong s of
16
his claim.3 Accordingly, appellant has not met his burden in showing that the district court
erred in determining that respondent did not commit a Brady violation.4
II.
Appellant next argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his
trial counsel failing to properly investigate a false statement that formed the basis for the
search warrant, and for failing to bring a claim for suppression of evidence relating to the
information he claims is attorney -client privileged. This court reviews the decision of
whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel de novo, as it involves a
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).
An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is examined under the two-prong test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See State v. Andersen , 830
N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). “The appellant must prove that (1) counsel’s performance
‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, ’ and (2) but for counsel’s error, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543, 556

3 Appellant also claims that respondent violated Minnesota discovery rules. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 9.01 subd. 1(3), (6) ( providing that when requested, the state must disclose
“[m]aterial or information in the prosecutor’s possession and control that tends to negate
or reduce the defendant’s guilt”). According to appellant, this claim succeeds because, had
“the e-mail been provided to [trial] counsel earlier, a successful motion to suppress would
have been filed prior to trial.” We do not agree. Even assuming that respondent failed to
disclose information in violation of rule 9, any error that may have occurred was harmless.
A motion to suppress would not have been successful, as there was no violation of attorney-
client privilege.
4 Appellant also claims that respondent violated his Sixth Amendment rights in intruding
upon a confidential relationship and that the subsequent investigation following the tip was
the fruit of illegality. But at oral arguments, appellant conceded that all these residual
arguments fail if a violation of attorney-client privilege is not proved.
17
(Minn. 2024) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). A court need not address both prongs
of the test if either one is determinative. Id.
The first prong of the Strickland test defines the objective standard of
reasonableness as “representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and
diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar
circumstances.” State v. Jones , 977 N.W.2d 177, 193 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
This court applies “‘a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable,” ’
and generally does not “‘review matters of trial strategy or the particular tactics used by
counsel.”’ Id. (quoting State v. Hokanson , 821 N.W.2d 340, 358 (Minn. 2012) ).
“‘[J]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” ’ State v.
Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 844 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to satisfy the first prong of Strickland
because an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably
competent attorney would perform would have discovered the disclosure of privileged
information earlier into the trial and would have brought a motion to suppress. He argues
that trial counsel’s investigation into the detective’s claims was incomplete because she
failed to inquire as to the source of the detective’s tip , despite possessing knowledge that
it was false. He also argues that trial counsel’s subsequent failure to bring a motion to
suppress was the result of her unfamiliarity with the issues and failure to inform herself of
the relevant caselaw.
The district court found that trial counsel represented appellant “in a manner that
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.” We agree. Trial counsel
18
performed her duties well within the reasonableness standard provided by Strickland,
demonstrated by the fact that , after filing a request for disclosure and receiving the
information in the search warrant, she diligently reviewed the March 31 transcript to
confirm that appellant had not disclosed his location while in court. Armed with this fact,
she reasonably inquired of the detective and attempted to use the information to impeach
his credibility. According to the district court, “[i]f [ trial counsel] had been less diligent,
the information regarding [former attorney] may never have come to light.”
Appellant nonetheless argues that a competent attorney should have instead
investigated the statement before trial. But this goes to the heart of trial counsel’s trial
strategy of impeachment and concerns of a speedy trial, both of which fall entirely within
her discretion and are not reviewable. See Leake v. State , 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn.
2007) (stating that appellate courts typically will not “second -guess[]” matters of trial
strategy, which “lie within the discretion of trial counsel”).
Lastly, appellant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to bring a suppression motion regarding the disclosure of attorney -client privileged
information. Appellant asserts that, had this motion been brought, “the motion should have
been granted and the charges dismissed.” Appellant relies on Kimmelman v. Morrison, in
which the Supreme Court noted that “[n]o reasonable lawyer would forego competent
litigation of meritorious, possibly decisive claims.” 477 U.S. 384, 382 n.7 ( 1986). This
argument fails. The district court noted that “such a motion would have been denied for
the reasons expressed in the trial.” Without a showing that the information the detective
relied on was protected by attorney -client privilege, a suppression motion would never
19
have succeeded. Thus, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not bringing
a motion that would have failed.
Because appellant cannot satisfy his burden of proving the first prong of Strickland,
we need not consider the other prong. See Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at 591. Accordingly,
appellant is unable to show that the district court erred in determining that he was deprived
of effective assistance of counsel.
III.
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he reiterates arguments
contained in appellant’s principal brief, restates the facts, and raises only one new argument
relating to a police officer purportedly lying in the application for the search warrant. But
these arguments fail to contain a citation to any legal authority. Appellate courts “will not
consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either arguments or citations to
legal authority.” State v. Reek , 942 N.W.2d 148, 165 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
As such, we do not consider appellant’s arguments in his pro se supplemental brief because
they are not properly before us.5
Affirmed.

5 We also note that the record does not support any allegation of perjury by the police
officer.