State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1824

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Demetrius Redd,
Appellant.

Filed July 14, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-22-472

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Chris Florey, Assistant County Attorney,
Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura G. Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm appellant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm because
(1) the district court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of a firearm
found in his house, (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings
during trial, (3) there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant possessed the firearm, and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief.
FACTS
At the time of this offense, appellant James Demetrius Redd was on parole and
subject to conditions of supervised release. Under those conditions, Redd could not legally
possess or own any weapons. In April 2022, Redd’s supervising parole officer learned of
a seven -month-old video that depicted Redd brandishing a firearm while riding in a
recreational vehicle. After viewing the video, the parole officer collaborated with local
law enforcement to prepare for a search of Redd’s home. During that preparation, local
law enforcement did not apply for a warrant to search Redd’s home.
Around three weeks later, several parole and police officers visited Redd’s home to
search for a firearm. When they arrived, Redd was outside of his house. A police officer
arrested Redd and acquired the keys to his home. Law enforcement then entered Redd’s
home to conduct the search. Upon entering Redd’s home, officers were met by Redd’s
daughter and toddler-aged granddaughter, who came out of a spare bedroom. The officers
instructed Redd’s daughter and granddaughter, who did not live there, to leave.
3
The search of Redd’s home ensued. One parole officer searched Redd’s bedroom
and found a gun-cleaning kit in Redd’s closet. Another parole officer searched the spare
bedroom, where he found a gun holster and packages of laser cartridges. In Redd’s
bathroom, an investigator found a loose vent cover on the floor. The investigator opened
the vent, reached in, and found a gun that was hidden in a sock. Based on the gun found
in Redd’s home, respondent State of Minnesota charged Redd with one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2)
(2020).
Redd moved to suppress evidence of the handgun found in his home, arguing that
the warrantless search of his home was unlawful. The district court held a contested
omnibus hearing on Redd’s motion, at which the state called Redd’s supervising parole
agent and the investigator who found the gun. The state also admitted exhibits containing
the video of Redd brandishing a firearm and Redd’s conditions of parole. Following
briefing, the district court denied Redd’s motion.
The case proceeded to a two-day jury trial. Before jury selection, the district court
granted Redd’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior criminal conduct or
convictions. After that ruling, the prosecutor disclosed that he intended to call three parole
officers and asked whether he would “get in trouble if [he] . . . elicit[ed] some testimony”
about Redd’s supervision. The district court noted the fact of Redd’s supervision “can’t be
avoided.” But the district court cautioned the prosecutor that “any reference to the reason
that he is [subject to supervision] . . . obviously would be . . . objectionable.” Redd then
stipulated to having a prior conviction of a crime of violence, thereby waiving his right to
4
a jury determination on the element of whether he was ineligible to possess a firearm. As
a result, the only issue for the jury was whether Redd possessed a firearm on April 28,
2022.
During the trial, the state called six witnesses: three parole officers, two police
officers, and a forensic scientist from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(BCA). The state also introduced 13 exhibits, consisting of the handgun found in Redd’s
home, photographs taken during the search, and the forensic scientist’s report. The parole
officers and police officers generally testified about the investigation and search of Redd’s
home, as described above.
The forensic scientist testified that she analyzed DNA samples gathered from the
gun found in Redd’s home and compared it to Redd’s DNA. According to the forensic
scientist, samples from the gun’s grip and trigger each contained a mixture of three people’s
DNA. Redd’s DNA was more prominent than the other DNA on the handle. Likewise,
Redd could not be ruled out as a contributor to the mixture of DNA found on the trigger.
On cross-examination, the forensic scientist acknowledged that DNA testing was
not conclusive of whether Redd in fact handled the gun. The forensic scientist conceded
that Redd’s DNA could have been transferred onto the gun by someone else who touched
it after inadvertently acquiring Redd’s DNA by, for instance, shaking Redd’s hand. The
forensic scientist also admitted that she did not analyze the sock that was covering the gun
and that Redd’s DNA could have been transferred to the gun via the sock.
Redd did not testify in his own defense. Instead, Redd called J.E., who testified that
the gun was his —and not Redd’s. J.E. testified that he was working on a car on Redd’s
5
property in April 2022. J.E. said that, while he was working on Redd’s property, his fiancé
called him and said that police were at his home with a warrant for his arrest. J.E. claimed
that he was carrying a .45 caliber handgun that day. J.E. testified that he wanted to hide
the gun so it would not be confiscated by law enforcement. So, according to J.E., he went
into Redd’s bathroom, where he found a pile of Redd’s clothes. J.E. alleged that he
“grabbed a sock, stuffed [the gun] in that sock, and threw it in [Redd’s] floor vent.”
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked J.E. about discrepancies between his
trial testimony and his initial statement to the defense, which he gave six weeks before the
trial. For instance, J.E. did not initially mention that he placed the gun in a sock, but instead
disclosed that he “wrapped the gun.” And, contrary to his trial testimony, J.E. initially
stated that the gun was a nine-millimeter firearm.
Following the parties’ presentation of evidence and closing arguments, the jury
found Redd guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court convicted Redd
and committed him to the commissioner of corrections for an executed sentence of 60
months.
Redd appealed directly from the judgment of conviction, but we stayed his appeal
so he could pursue postconviction relief in district court. In his petition for postconviction
relief, Redd argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney
did not adequately cross-examine the forensic scientist or call an expert witness to rebut
the DNA testimony. The district court denied Redd’s petition without holding a hearing,
concluding that the purported ineffectiveness of counsel amounted to unreviewable trial
6
strategy. After the district court denied his motion for reconsideration, we dissolved the
stay and reinstated this appeal.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by denying Redd’s motion to suppress evidence
of the handgun.

Redd first argues that the district court erred by denying his pretrial motion to
suppress evidence of the handgun. When reviewing a pretrial suppression ruling, we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de
novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). The facts are not in dispute,
and so we review de novo “whether the police articulated an adequate basis for the search
. . . at issue.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Redd contends that evidence of the handgun should have been suppressed because
the warrantless search of his house was unlawful. Both the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions protect the rights of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches of their
houses. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable, but that presumption may be overcome in some
circumstances. State v. Stavish , 868 N.W.2d 670, 675 (Minn. 2015). And the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches “is a personal right, the
protection of which may be invoked by showing that a person ‘has an expectation of
privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.’” State v. Heaton ,
812 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. App. 2012) (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88
(1998)), rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2012).
7
An individual’s “expectation of privacy [is] diminished simply by [their] status as a
parolee.” Id. at 908. A parolee’s reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished because
“the state has a legitimate, substantial interest in ensuring that parolees abide by the terms
of parole and protecting potential victims from illegal conduct the parolee may commit.”
Id. at 908-09 (quotation omitted). For these reasons, “a warrantless search of [a parolee’s
home is] lawful if reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct can be established.” Id. at 909.
“Reasonable suspicion requires a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct
is occurring to make the intrusion on the [parolee’s] privacy interest reasonable.”
State v. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). Reasonable
suspicion, which is more than an “unarticulated hunch,” requires “a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting a person of criminal activity.” Id. (quotations omitted). We
consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether law enforcement had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search. State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn.
2021). “The state has the burden to allege specific and articulable facts that establish that
such objectively reasonable suspicion exists. ” State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 256
(Minn. 2007).
Redd, who concedes that his reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished by his
status as a parolee, argues that the state did not allege sufficient facts to establish that law
enforcement reasonabl y suspected he was engaged in criminal activity by possessing a
firearm in his house. At the contested omnibus hearing, the state introduced the recording
of Redd brandishing a firearm and the testimony of a parole officer and an investigator.
8
The state established that the parole officer viewed the video seven months after it was
created. Based on the video, law enforcement searched Redd and his home for firearms
The district court determined that the video provided law enforcement with
reasonable suspicion of Redd’s criminal activity, thereby authorizing the warrantless
search. The district court found that the video showed Redd “clearly possessing a firearm
in violation of his probation status.” The district court added that the video “appears to
show [Redd] drawing the firearm from his side pocket and maintaining possession of it,
suggesting the firearm belonged to and stayed with him to support a suspicion of ongoing
criminal activity.” Lastly, addressing the age of the video, the district court found that a
firearm is “not likely to perish” and Redd’s parolee status made it “very unlikely that he
could have transferred the firearm to anyone else” in that time. We agree with the district
court’s analysis. The video of Redd drawing a firearm from his hip area is a “specific and
articulable fact[]” that gives rise to objective, reasonable suspicion that Redd was harboring
a firearm in his house at the time of the search. See Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 256.
Redd argues that the district court’s reliance on the video is misplaced because it
was created over seven months before law enforcement searched his residence. Redd also
contends that there is an insufficient nexus between the gun depicted in the video and his
residence. We are not persuaded by either argument.
Redd first asserts that the video was too “stale” to support reasonable suspicion. At
times, information can be too old to support a reasonable search and is therefore “stale.”
State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 1998). Whether information is stale is not
subject to bright-line temporal guidelines but must instead be determined case-by-case.
9
State v. Jannetta, 355 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. App. 1984) (citing Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1932)), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 14, 1985). The supreme court has
identified a nonexclusive list of four factors relevant to assessing whether information is
stale: (1) “whether there is any indication of ongoing criminal activity”; (2) “whether the
articles sought are innocuous or incriminating”; (3) “whether the property sought is easily
disposable or transferable”; and (4) “whether the items sought are of enduring utility.”
Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750.
1
In support of his staleness argument, Redd focuses on the ongoing-criminal-activity
and ease- of-disposability factors. But even assuming that there was no indication of
Redd’s ongoing criminal activity and that Redd could easily have disposed of the handgun,
the fourth factor—regarding the enduring utility of a handgun —outweighs those other
factors. Information “has been held not stale even after the passage of several months
where the items sought are of enduring utility” to their possessor. State v. DeWald, 463
N.W.2d 741, 746 (Minn. 1990) (quotation omitted). While interpreting the reasonableness
of a search under the Fourth Amendment, federal courts have consistently held that,
because of the enduring utility of firearms, months-old information related to firearm
possession is not stale. See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 528 F.3d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 2008)
(“Information that someone is suspected of possessing firearms illegally is not stale, even

1 We note that Souto concerned whether information was stale for the purposes of a
probable-cause determination. 578 N.W.2d at 750. Probable cause is a higher standard
than reasonable suspicion. State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008). As
such, the extent to which the Souto staleness factors apply to a reasonable-suspicion
determination is unclear. Because the state does not dispute the applicability of a staleness
analysis here, we assume without deciding that the Souto factors apply.
10
several months later, because individuals who possess firearms tend to keep them for long
periods of time.”). Consistent with these authorities, we conclude that the seven-month-
old video of Redd brandishing a firearm, an object of enduring utility, was not stale for
purposes of establishing reasonable suspicion that Redd continued to possess a firearm at
the time of the search.
Redd also argues that there is an insufficient nexus between the video and his home.
For a search to be reasonable, there must be a nexus “between the evidence sought and the
place to be searched.” State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014). “A nexus
may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
Redd argues that there is no nexus between the gun depicted in the video and his
house. Redd asserts that “[t]he video showed [him] on a four-wheeler in some unidentified
location.” Although Redd’s location in the video is indiscernible, the video depicts Redd
drawing the handgun from his person. We agree with the district court that a reasonable
inference from the video is that Redd therefore owned the handgun. And the supreme court
has recognized that, “[r]egarding gun evidence, . . . it is reasonable to infer that such
evidence would be kept at a defendant’s residence, thereby satisfying the nexus
requirement.” Id. at 623. For these reasons, it was reasonable for law enforcement to infer
from the video that Redd likely possessed a firearm in his house. The state therefore carried
its burden of establishing a sufficient nexus between the gun in the video and Redd’s home.
In sum, the state articulated sufficient facts at the omnibus hearing establishing that
law enforcement had reasonable suspicion that Redd kept a firearm in his house in violation
of his parole conditions. Accordingly, the warrantless search of Redd’s home was
11
reasonable under the federal and state constitutions. See Heaton, 812 N.W.2d at 909. The
district court did not err by denying Redd’s motion to suppress.2
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the state’s
witnesses to testify about Redd’s parole status.

Redd next challenges the district court’s ruling permitting the state to present
evidence about his parole status. A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
Before trial, the prosecutor informed the district court that he intended to call three
parole officers, and he wanted to clarify that he would not “get in trouble if [he]
. . . elicit[ed] some testimony” about Redd’s supervision. While the district court noted
that evidence of Redd’s supervision was unavoidable, the court cautioned the prosecutor
against eliciting any testimony about the underlying offenses that resulted in Redd’s
supervision.

2 In his supplemental brief, Redd argues that he did not sign an agreement regarding
certain conditions of his release, including a condition subjecting him to unannounced
searches of his home. Redd contends that this fact establishes that the search of his home
was unreasonable. But it is undisputed that Redd was on parole at the time of his search.
And our caselaw is clear that, regardless of which conditions were explicitly agreed to,
Redd’s mere status as a parolee diminishes his reasonable expectation of privacy. See
Heaton, 812 N.W.2d at 908. While we are sympathetic to Redd’s position, our decision in
Heaton did not infringe on Redd’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches. Instead, we simply stated that warrantless searches of a parolee’s home based
only on reasonable suspicion are reasonable. Id. at 909. In light of Heaton, the precise
conditions of release that Redd agreed to are immaterial to our analysis of reasonableness.
12
During trial, the state elicited the following evidence of Redd’s parole status. One
parole officer testified that he had supervised Redd for two years and visited his home 25
to 30 times; Redd was under both “special conditions” and “standard conditions” of parole;
Redd’s status required home visits; and Redd was required to consent to unannounced
searches. Another officer testified that his agency supervised Redd on a “day to day basis,
a few times a week”; the officer had “performed many field visits” at Redd’s home; Redd’s
“level of supervision . . . required more supervision than is standard”; and a team of parole
officers supervised Redd because “in these higher level of supervision cases . . . [the
officers] see [the parolee] more often.”
Redd contends that this evidence was irrelevant because it “had nothing to do with”
the only material fact at trial—whether Redd possessed a firearm on April 28, 2022.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the eviden ce.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is presumptively
admissible and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. “[E]vidence is
generally admissible to give jurors the context for an investigation.” Ali, 855 N.W.2d at
249.
We conclude that the limited testimony about Redd’s parole status provided the jury
relevant context as to why law-enforcement officers were investigating Redd for
possessing a firearm. This evidence was further relevant to establish a basis for parole
officers’ extended knowledge of Redd’s past living arrangements, which supported the
state’s argument that Redd’s possession of the gun was more likely because he lived alone.
13
The evidence was also relevant to Redd’s defense. Defense counsel cross-examined one
agent about his “multiple” prior visits to Redd’s house as part of the supervision. Through
that cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that the agent had never seen
any firearms in Redd’s house during those past visits, which supported Redd’s defense that
the firearm was not his. The parties’ use of this evidence demonstrates that it had, at the
very least, “any tendency” to make Redd’s possession of the firearm more or less likely.
See Minn. R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added). Thus, the evidence was not irrelevant.
Redd next argues that the evidence should have been excluded because it was
unfairly prejudicial. When evidence’s probative value is “substantially outweighed” by its
danger of unfair prejudice, the district court may exclude the evidence. Minn. R. Evid.
403. “Unfair prejudice ‘does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from
the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that
results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.’”
State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 33 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d
191, 197 n.3 (Minn. 1995)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011).
Redd argues that evidence of his parole status ran the risk of unfairly prejudicing
him by “insinuating that [he] was a scary man who needed heightened supervision.” But,
because there was no evidence of the nature of the crimes underlying Redd’s supervision,
the risk of unfair prejudice was diminished. See State v. Halverson, 381 N.W.2d 40, 44
(Minn. App. 1986) (holding that the risk of unfair prejudice from evidence of a defendant’s
incarceration was limited “by the fact that no evidence of the nature of the crime for which
[the defendant] was in jail was introduced”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 21, 1986).
14
Additionally, Redd’s reliance on the evidence suggests that it was not unfairly prejudicial.
See State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 686 -87 (Minn. 2001) (holding that defendant was not
prejudiced by evidence where defendant’s theory of defense was not affected by
admission). For these reasons, any risk of unfair prejudice was significantly diminished.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the challenged evidence’s risk of unfairly
prejudicing Redd substantially outweighed the evidence’s probative value. See Minn. R.
Evid. 403.
In sum, Redd has not demonstrated that the evidence of his parole status was
irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the evidence.
III. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Redd possessed the firearm found in his bathroom vent.

Next, Redd asks us to reverse his conviction because the evidence at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm. The state
charged Redd with unlawful possession of a firearm under section 624.713, subdivision
1(2), which required the state to prove that Redd had been convicted of a crime of violence
and that he “possess[ed]” a firearm on the date in question. Due process requires the state
to prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 654 (Minn. 2023). Because he stipulated to his prior
conviction of a crime of violence, the state had to prove only that Redd possessed the
firearm found in his home on April 28, 2022.
15
“Possession may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.”
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). The parties agree that the state’s
theory at trial was that Redd constructively possessed the handgun. As applicable here, an
individual constructively possesses an item when the state shows “there is a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the time [the item was found] the
defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control over it.” 3 Id.
The purpose of the constructive-possession doctrine is to include “those cases where the
state cannot prove actual or physical possession at the time of arrest but where the inference
is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the [firearm] and did not
abandon his possessory interest in the [firearm].” State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159
(Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). This requires the state to “prove more than the
defendant’s mere proximity to the firearm.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
Redd argues that the state’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he knowingly exercised dominion and control over the firearm when law
enforcement found it in his home. When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction, “we conduct a painstaking analysis of the record to
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction,
was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Friese, 959

3 The state can also prove constructive possession when an item is found “in a place
under the defendant’s exclusive control to which other people normally did not have
access.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. This version of constructive possession is
inapplicable here because it is undisputed that Redd’s daughter and granddaughter had
access to Redd’s bathroom on April 28, 2022.
16
N.W.2d 205, 214 (Minn. 2021). We will not reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence
“if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity
of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [the]
defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465,
476-77 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
It is undisputed that Redd’s constructive possession of the firearm was proved with
circumstantial evidence. Unlike direct evidence, “circumstantial evidence always requires
an inferential step to prove a fact.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599. When proof of an element
of an offense depends on circumstantial evidence, we use “a heightened two-step standard”
to assess the sufficiency of the evidence. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn.
2017).
Our first step is to “identify the circumstances proved by the state.” Id. In
identifying these circumstances, we defer to “the jury’s acceptance of the State’s evidence
and its rejection of any evidence in the record that is inconsistent with the circumstances
proved by the State.” Id. At step two, we determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent solely with guilt. Id. If the circumstances proved are also consistent with “any
rational hypothesis other than guilt,” we must reverse the conviction. Id. (quotation
omitted). During the second step, we do not defer to the jury and instead “independently
examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances
proved.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Applying this two-step standard here, we first identify the circumstances proved by
the state. On April 28, 2022, law-enforcement officers visited Redd’s home to conduct a
17
search. The officers found Redd outside and acquired Redd’s house keys to enter his home.
Redd’s daughter and granddaughter, who did not live in Redd’s home, were in a spare
bedroom when officers entered the house. Although parole officers had encountered
various people at Redd’s home during past visits, Redd was the only person who
permanently resided there. Upon searching Redd’s home, a parole officer found a gun
cleaning kit in Redd’s bedroom closet. In the spare bedroom, another officer found a gun
holster in a box and packages of laser cartridges in a desk drawer. In the bathroom, an
investigator found a gun wrapped in a sock hidden inside of a vent. DNA testing on the
gun’s grip and trigger revealed three DNA profiles, including Redd’s. Redd’s DNA was
the most prominent profile on the grip, and his DNA could not be ruled out from the trigger
sample.
Redd argues that these circumstances are consistent with the rational hypothesis
“that someone other than [Redd] was consciously exercising dominion and control over
the firearm law enforcement found in the air vent.” Redd asserts that the state’s theory of
Redd’s possession “is just as easily applied to Redd’s daughter.” We disagree.
Redd is correct that the circumstances proved include that Redd’s daughter had
recently exited the spare bedroom where law enforcement found a gun holster and laser
cartridges. But the circumstances proved lack any evidence that those items, which were
in a drawer and a box, were linked to Redd’s daughter. And Redd’s daughter came out of
the spare bedroom when officers arrived, not the bathroom where the gun was found.
Moreover, the state proved that Redd’s daughter did not reside in Redd’s home. Simply
put, it is not reasonable to infer from these circumstances that Redd’s daughter, by her mere
18
proximity to the gun and the gun accessories (which were hidden from plain sight), was
actively exercising dominion and control over the gun hidden in Redd’s bathroom vent. 4
The only rational inference from these circumstances is instead that Redd exercised
dominion and control over the gun hidden in his bathroom vent. The evidence was
therefore sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Redd constructively possessed
the gun.

4 Redd likens the facts in this case to those in State v. Smith, No. A20-0654, 2021 WL
2528432 (Minn. App. June 21, 2021), and State v. Sanchez, No. A20-0136, 2021 WL
318463 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2021). In both Smith and Sanchez, we reversed unlawful-
possession convictions for insufficient evidence of the appellant’s constructive possession.
2021 WL 2528432, at *5-6; 2021 WL 318463, at *2-3.
The problem with Redd’s reliance on these cases is twofold. First, they are not
precedential. See Kruse v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 554, 559 (Minn. App.
2018) (noting that this court’s nonprecedential decisions are not binding).
Second, each case is distinguishable. In Smith, law enforcement searched a home
occupied by both the appellant and his mother. 2021 WL 2528432, at *1. Law
enforcement found a gun in a woman’s purse in a room that appellant’s mother was
sleeping in when law enforcement arrived. Id., at *5. We concluded that these
circumstances supported a reasonable hypothesis that the appellant did not constructively
possess the firearm. Id. Unlike in Smith , there is no evidence here that Redd’s daughter
resided in Redd’s home or kept any belongings there.
And Sanchez involved ammunition found in a home into which the appellant had
only recently moved. 2021 WL 318463, at *1. The house’s previous owner of 20 years,
who still had access to the house, had only partially moved his belongings out of the house
at the time of the search. Id. We determined that it was reasonable to infer that someone
other than the appellant possessed the ammunition. Id. at *3. Unlike in Sanchez , the
circumstances proved establish that Redd was the sole owner and occupant of his residence
for more than a year prior to this search.
For these reasons, Redd’s reliance on this court’s nonprecedential decisions is
unpersuasive.
19
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Redd’s postconviction
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Lastly, Redd challenges the district court’s denial of his postconviction petition. A
person convicted of a crime may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition in the district
court alleging that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or
laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2022). The
district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition “[u]nless the petition and the
files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no
relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022). When determining whether the petitioner is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the district court must consider the facts alleged in the
petition as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.
Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018). “[T]he burden is on a petitioner
to show facts entitling the petitioner to relief.” Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 541
(Minn. 2023). We review the summary denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012).
In his postconviction petition, Redd alleged that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. A postconviction petitioner is entitled to a hearing on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel only when they allege facts that, “if proven by a fair preponderance
of the evidence,” would satisfy the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Under
Strickland, a defendant must prove that (1) “counsel’s represen tation fell below an
20
objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “there was a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-96). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance
was reasonable. Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). If an appellant cannot
meet one of the Strickland prongs, the claim fails, and this court need not address the other
prong. Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020).
In his postconviction petition, Redd argued that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his trial attorney should have better leveraged resources in the public
defender’s office before trial and “attacked the DNA evidence” more thoroughly on cross-
examination. The district court summarily denied Redd’s petition, concluding that his
allegations related to unreviewable issues of trial strategy. We agree with the district
court’s conclusion.
Appellate courts typically will not “second-guess[]” matters of trial strategy, which
“lie within the discretion of trial counsel.” Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn.
2007). Unreviewable matters of trial strategy include “conduct[ing] cross-examination in
a certain manner,” State v. Irwin, 379 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. App. 1985) , rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 23, 1986), deciding how to impeach adverse witnesses, Andersen, 830 N.W.2d
at 13, and determining “[w]hich witnesses to call at trial and what information to present
to the jury,” State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986).
In his petition, Redd alleged that, as part of a “secondary transfer” defense theory,
defense counsel should not have conceded that Redd’s DNA was present on the gun.
Instead, Redd asserted that defense counsel should have presented scientific articles that
21
refuted the forensic scientist’s conclusion that Redd’s DNA was present. Redd also alleged
that defense counsel’s cross-examination was deficient because counsel “did not request
review of his case from the specialized DNA team within the public defender’s office nor
did he even request the entire BCA file.” Redd further contended that defense counsel
should have consulted a forensic DNA expert. Lastly, Redd asserted that defense counsel
should have consulted a specific attorney in the public defender’s officer to assist with trial
preparation or “even conduct the cross-examination in Redd’s case.”
Redd’s allegations relate to defense counsel’s manner of cross-examination and
decisions about what evidence to present and which witnesses to call. As the district court
noted, rather than attacking the reliability of the DNA analysis linking Redd to the
handgun, defense counsel instead argued that Redd’s DNA could have gotten on the gun
through a secondary transfer and that J.E. hid the gun in the vent . And defense counsel
successfully elicited testimony from the forensic scientist casting doubt on the implication
of the presence of Redd’s DNA on the firearm. We are “in no position to second-guess
counsel’s decision to focus his strategy on other defenses instead of investigating” the
alternative DNA theories Redd points to on appeal. See Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414,
421 (Minn. 2004). We conclude that all of Redd’s allegations of ineffectiveness fall firmly
within unreviewable matters of trial strategy. Thus, even if Redd’s trial-strategy
allegations are true, he has not established that defense counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.

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Because Redd has not satisfied the first Strickland prong, we need not reach the
second. Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by summarily denying Redd’s postconviction petition. See Minn. Stat. § 590.04,
subd. 1.
Affirmed.