State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1834

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Leslie Nicole Moore,
Appellant.

Filed September 3, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-688

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
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for a downward dispositional departure in sentencing. We discern no abuse of discretion,
and we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Leslie Nicole
Moore with unlawful possession of both a firearm and ammunition in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2022).
According to the complaint, a gun was fired in Moore’s apartment on or about
February 4, 2023. The bullet traveled through the floor into the apartment directly below,
passed through the kitchen wall, and struck the stove. Three people were in the lower
apartment when the bullet entered it. Moore told the officers that she had a gun in her
waistband. They located the gun and found two bullets in her sweatshirt pocket.
Within weeks after her first appearance, Moore pleaded guilty to unlawful
possession of a firearm . Moore admitted that she knowingly possessed a firearm and that
she had been convicted previously of terroristic threats —a crime of violence. Pursuant to
the plea agreement, the remaining charge of unlawful possession of ammunition was
dismissed and Moore was released to inpatient treatment pending sentencing.
Moore moved for a downward dispositional departure from the presumptive
sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, requesting a stayed sentence. In
support of her motion, Moore argued that her success in treatment, prior success on
supervised release, commitment to recovery, age, remorse, and acceptance of responsibility
demonstrated her particular amenability to probation. The state argued for imposition of
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the presumptive sentence, citing multiple probation violations in other cases, a new charge
of second-degree assault with a knife, and public-safety concerns.
The district court denied Moore’s motion and sentenced her to the guidelines
sentence of 60 months in prison.
Moore appeals.
DECISION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “prescrib[e] a sentence or range of sentences
that is presumed to be appropriate.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014)
(quotation omitted). The district court must order the presumptive sentence provided in the
sentencing guidelines unless “aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present, and
those circumstances provide a substantial and compelling reason not to impose a guidelines
sentence.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c
(2022) (stating that court has discretion to depart from presumptive sentence only when
“substantial and compelling circumstances” are present). The district court is not required
to provide an explanation when it considers reasons for departure but chooses to impose
the presumptive sentence. State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).
Appellate courts “will not ordinarily interfere with a sentence falling within the
presumptive sentence range, either dispositionally or durationally, even if there are grounds
that would justify departure.” State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006)
(quotation omitted). Appellate courts “will affirm the imposition of a presumptive
guidelines sentence when the record shows that the sentencing court carefully evaluated all
the testimony and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Johnson,
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831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17,
2013). A district court has great discretion when making sentencing decisions, and
appellate courts will reverse those decisions only when the district court abuses that
discretion. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. “Only in a rare case will a reviewing court reverse
the imposition of a presumptive sentence.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn.
App. 2011).
A downward dispositional departure may be based on a determination that the
defendant is “particularly amenable to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.”
State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Minn. 1981). In evaluating a defendant’s particular
amenability to probation, a district court may consider factors including the defendant’s
age, prior record, remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and support of friends and
family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
The district court explained that it was denying Moore’s motion for a downward
dispositional departure because Moore was not particularly amenable to probation. It
stated:
[T]here are six prior felony convictions. There are five
probation violations, that are recorded at least. There is a new
charge in this matter that is a concern for public safety. And I
also see that within the last five years, you’ve already received
a dispositional departure, and yet these continue. So I do not
find you particularly amenable to probation.

Moore asserts that the district court abused its discretion in determining that she was
not particularly amenable to probation for two reasons: (1) because the district court
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“erroneously held her successful probation history against her” and (2) because the district
court “failed to consider other factors showing her amenability.”
Probation History
Moore asserts that the district court abused its discretion in considering her
probation history. She contends that her successful completion of probation in other cases
demonstrates her particular amenability to probation.
As an initial matter, Moore contends that the district court made a factual mistake
about her probation violations. She asserts that the district court mistakenly attributed a
probation violation to her felony conviction for violating a no-contact order. The record
shows that Moore was convicted of a gross misdemeanor in 2017 for violating a domestic-
abuse no-contact order and had two probation-violation hearings related to this conviction.
It further shows that she was convicted of a felony in 2019 for violating a no-contact order
and had no probation violations associated with this conviction. The district court correctly
attributed a probation violation to Moore’s gross-misdemeanor conviction— not to her
felony conviction—when it stated that “there was a probation violation hearing in a
domestic abuse violate no contact order from 2017.”
Apart from that asserted mistake, Moore argues that the district court incorrectly
weighed her probation history. She contends that the district court “apparently believe[ed]
her alleged violations resulted in her probation being revoked,” which is “contrary to the
facts in the record.” She also argues that the decision is “contrary to logic” because
“[s]uccessfully completing probation on multiple occasions demonstrates amenability, not
unamenability, to probation.” These arguments are unconvincing.
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The sentencing transcript shows that the district court recognized that Moore’s
probation was not revoked. After Moore stated that she completed probation in other cases,
the district court acknowledged that she had done so. And, while success on probation
could certainly weigh in favor of a determination of a defendant’s particular amenability
to probation, we discern no abuse of discretion in considering violations of probation as an
indicator against particular amenability to probation.
Other Factors
Moore also contends that “[t]he district court failed to deliberately consider factors
both for and against imposing a probationary sentence.”
Moore first asserts that the district court did not consider that four of her six felonies
were 20 to 30 years old and decayed. But this information was contained in the presentence
investigation report, which the district court reviewed before making its decision.
Moore next asserts that the district court did not consider that she successfully
completed treatment, secured stable housing, quickly took responsibility, and expressed
remorse, or that short- term public safety concerns could be addressed through local jail
confinement rather than prison. Moore cited her success in treatment, acceptance of
responsibility, and remorse in her motion for a downward dispositional departure and
acknowledged at the sentencing hearing the district court’s potential views on her motion.
Further, at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel “ask[ed] the court to consider the
request for a dispositional departure in this case based primarily upon her success in the
treatment program.” Defense counsel continued, “Perhaps if the court was inclined to give
her an additional local correctional consequence as a part of that, that would be
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appropriate.” There is no evidence in the record showing that Moore secured stable
housing. Contrary to Moore’s argument, the record shows that the district court considered
the other factors cited by Moore.
Finally, Moore argues that the district court must have considered only factors
against departure because the court began pronouncing her sentence before allowing
defense counsel to argue for probation and denied Moore’s departure motion before
affording her the right of allocution. The district court acknowledged and immediately
corrected its mistakes, listening to defense counsel’s oral presentation of Moore’s written
motion and listening to Moore’s statements. The oral argument from defense counsel
mirrored the argument presented in Moore’s motion papers. And Moore’s statement about
having completed probation was conveyed in the presentence investigation report. These
records were before the district court, and the district court’s initial oversights at the
sentencing hearing do not demonstrate a failure to fully consider the factors for and against
departure. The record demonstrates that the district court considered factors for a departure
before exercising its broad discretion to impose a guidelines sentence.
Affirmed.