Travis Clay Andersen, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1835

Travis Clay Andersen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 1, 2024
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge *

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-07-251

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Jeffrey D. Albright, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Cleary, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief from 2007 convictions of
terroristic threats and domestic assault, appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it summarily denied his petition for postconviction relief as untimely
because this was the first review of his convictions and sentences and his petition met the
interests-of-justice exception. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2007, appellant Travis Clay Andersen was charged with kidnapping, false
imprisonment, terroristic threats, domestic assault, and interference with an emergency
telephone call. As part of a plea agreement, Andersen pleaded guilty to felony terroristic
threats in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2006), and to gross misdemeanor
domestic assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 2 (2006). The other charges
were dismissed. At sentencing, Andersen received a stay of imposition and was placed on
probation. Andersen was successfully discharged from probation on the domestic-assault
offense in September 2009 and on the terroristic-threats offense in August 2012, receiving
misdemeanor convictions for both.
In July 2023, just over 16 years later, Andersen filed a petition for postconviction
relief and thereafter was appointed an appellate public defender who filed a supplemental
memorandum in support of his petition. In his petition, Andersen argued that there was an
insufficient basis for his arrest and charges, the facts he pleaded guilty to are untrue, the
victim (his mother) would recant the statements she made to law enforcement, he received
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ineffective assistance of counsel, asked to withdraw his plea, and stated that he should not
receive a criminal -history point for a stay of imposition. The district court summarily
denied Andersen’s petition as untimely and therefore did not address the merits.
Andersen appeals.
DECISION
Andersen argues that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying
his petition for postconviction relief because he has never had his constitutionally
guaranteed review of these convictions or sentences wit h the assistance of counsel and
because his petition meets the interests-of-justice exception to the postconviction statute’s
two-year statute of limitations. Andersen claims he only “recently” learned that he had
entered a straight guilty plea and not an Alford plea, and that his public defender in district
court was ineffective because she misinformed him about the impact of the plea on his
criminal-history score during the stay of imposition, failed to tell him that he would have
to register as a predat ory offender , and she herself seduced him which is why he ple aded
guilty in the first place. None of these arguments persuade us to reverse.
We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). “A postconviction court
abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review l egal issues de novo and factual findings
for clear error. Id.
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Under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2022), “[n]o petition for postconviction
relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of
conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of
petitioner’s direct appeal.” “A petition that is filed outside the statute of limitations may
be summarily denied, . . . unless a statutory excepti on applies.” Andersen v. State , 913
N.W.2d 417, 423 (Minn. 2018). The statute provides for five exceptions including if “the
petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is
in the interest of justice.” M inn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2022). “Any petition
invoking an exception . . . must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2022).
Only in “exceptional and extraordinary situations” does the inte rests-of-justice
exception apply. Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 607 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
And this exception “is intended for injustices related to delays in filing a petition, not an
injustice related to the merits of the petition.” Andersen v. State , 982 N.W.2d 448, 456
(Minn. 2022). To satisfy this exception, a petitioner must allege an injustice that prevented
them from meeting the two- year statute of limitations. See Sanchez v. State , 816 N.W.2d
550, 557 (Minn. 2012). Andersen has failed to do so.
Andersen does not give a time when he became aware of these claims, just saying
it was “recent ly” and that he should at least be afforded a postconviction evidentiary
hearing to address the merits of his arguments. Andersen pleaded guilt y 17 years ago and
the record reflects that he knew about these claims at the time he pleaded guilty, or at a
minimum shortly thereafter. Andersen has petitioned for postconviction relief in other
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cases, so his delay in this case is unexplained. And , as the state points out, on the same
day Andersen entered pleas in this case, he entered an Alford1 plea in a different case, so
he knew the difference.
Andersen also knew of his attorney’s alleged ineffectiveness at the time he pleaded
guilty and failed to raise it. The transcript from the plea hearing reflects that Andersen
understood the charges, had enough time to discuss the case and charges with his attorney,
gave up his rights to challenge the admissibility of evidence and remain silent, and was
willing to give a factual basis to support his guilty plea. When he was on probation for this
case, Andersen was convicted of other crimes , and while he ar gues he should not have
received a felony criminal-history point while he was on probation for this case, Minnesota
caselaw is clear that a sta y of imposition of a felony sentence results in a felony criminal -
history point. State v. Watson, 925 N.W.2d 658, 659- 60 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied
(Minn. May 28, 2019). And the duty to register as a predatory offender is a collateral
consequence of a guilty plea, so counsel’s alleged failure to inform Andersen of this duty
does not make his plea unintelligent or counsel’s assistance ineffective. Kaiser v. State ,
641 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. 2002). Andersen also argues that his attorney was ineffective

1 A defendant can enter an Alford plea when the defendant maintains innocence but pleads
guilty because the record reflects, and the defendant reasonably believes, that the state has
sufficient evidence to convict. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007) (citing
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970)).

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because she “manipulated” him into pleading guilty by seduci ng him, a claim that is
completely unsubstantiated. 2
For all of these reasons it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny
Andersen’s petition for postconviction relief as time barred. And the interests -of-justice
exception does not apply because Andersen has not alleged an injustice that prevented him
from meeting the two- year statute of limitations.
Affirmed.

2 Andersen also asserts that he should be able to withdraw his plea based on insufficient
evidence, but he has failed to file a “timely motion” and provide proof that withdrawal is
necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.