In re the Marriage of: Valentin Arkadievich Povarchuk, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1839

In re the Marriage of:
Valentin Arkadievich Povarchuk, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Rebecca Joyce Povarchuk,
Respondent.

Filed July 15, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-16-382

Valentin Povarchuk, Eagan, Minnesota (self-represented attorney)

John DeWalt, Melissa Chawla, Dewalt, Chawla + Saksena, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
In this third appeal arising from a parenting dispute between appellant-father
Valentin Arkadievich Povarchuk and respondent-mother Rebecca Joyce Povarchuk, father
challenges a district court’s order finding him in civil contempt and imposing fees. We
affirm.
2
FACTS
Valentin and Rebecca were married in 2001.1 After the parties dissolved their
marriage in 2016, the y agreed to share joint legal and joint physical custody of their two
children and established a parenting plan. See Minn. Stat. § 518.1705, subd. 3
(2022) (defining and providing requirements for parenting plans). Following a request to
modify the parenting- time provision in the parenting plan, the district court ordered a
parenting-time evaluation. The parties later agreed to the parenting-time evaluator’s
recommendations and to use a parenting consultant (PC) for a three-year term. During this
three-year term, the parties requested, and the PC made, approximately 19 determinations
related to, among other things, parenting time and activities for the children.
In July 2021, Valentin appealed some of the PC’s determinations to the district
court. The parties engaged in negotiations and, on June 17, 2022, the district court filed a
stipulated order adopting the parties’ agreement (June 2022 order). The June 2022 order,
in relevant part, provided:
The parties share equally the costs and the benefits of the
mutually agreed-upon significant purchases for the children,
including, but not limited to, major items of clothing, footwear,
and sports equipment. It is understood that the following items
are mutually agreed-upon expenses that the parties shall share
in:
i. Summer camps involving expenses up to $2,000
per parent for each child per year;
ii. Violin for [A.P.] through 2022-2023 school year;
iii. Violin for [R.P.] through the 2023-2024 school
year; and
iv. Religious school at Mount Zion temple for both
children.

1 Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by their first names for clarity.
3
On November 22, 2022, Rebecca filed a motion asking the district court to, in
relevant part, order Valentin to allow the children to participate in specific school and
extracurricular activities. On December 5, 2022, Valentin filed a motion requesting the
district court modify the parenting-time schedule.
In a December 21, 2022 order, the district court denied Valentin’s motion and
granted Rebecca’s motion (December 2022 order). With respect to Rebecca’s motion, the
district court ordered that the children continue participating in activities and the parties
share the costs. In relevant part, the district court stated:
The parties’ minor children, both [A.P.] and [R.P.] . . . shall
continue to go to school and/or extracurricular activities
including:

a. Violin lessons with the Northern Lights School for
Strings;
b. At least one sport or exercise activity per season;
c. Summer camps, specifically including but not limited
to, OSRUI and violin camp;
d. Mount Zion Religious School; and
e. Membership at the St. Paul JCC.

. . . The parties shall share equally in the costs of all above-
mentioned school and/or extracurricular activities.

Valentin appealed and, as relevant here, challenged the district court’s decision to
grant Rebecca’s motion, arguing that “res judicata barred the district court from identifying
specific camps and activities for the children in its December 2022 order” when the
June 2022 order also “addressed camps and activities.” See Povarchuk v. Povarchuk,
No. A23-0208, 2023 WL 6381567, at *2 (Minn. App. Oct. 2, 2023) (Povarchuk I). We
affirmed the district court. Id. at *5. We concluded that Valentin failed to “analyze the
4
elements of res judicata,” and, therefore, did not meet his burden to show an error on
appeal. Id. at *2.2 And even construing Valentin’s appeal to challenge the differences
between the two orders, we noted that Valentin failed to “explain how the[] specific camps
and activities [listed in the December 2022 order] differ[ed] from the general categories of
camps and activities identified in the June 2022 order.” Id. at *3. Thus, we determined
that Valentin did not “demonstrate that the district court’s December 2022 order . . . was
barred by res judicata.” Id.
According to Valentin, he interpreted our opinion in Povarchuk I to mean that he
only needed to comply with the June 2022 order, not the December 2022 order. Based on
this reading, Valentin concluded that “he ha[d] no obligation to share costs of [A.P.’s]
violin training beyond the 2022-2023 academic year and [R.P.’s] training beyond the 2023-
2024 academic year, or the costs of camp beyond $2000 per year, per child.”
In November 2023, Rebecca filed a motion for the district court to hold Valentin in
constructive civil contempt for failure to comply with the portion of the December 2022
order related to the children’s activities. 3 She also requested that the district court direct

2 Regarding Rebecca’s motion, we also rejected an argument from Valentin that the district
court lacked legal authority over “the children’s participation in specific camps and
activities.” Povarchuk I, 2023 WL 6381567, at *3. Moreover, we concluded the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Valentin’s motion to modify the parenting-
time schedule. Id. at *4-5. Valentin filed a second appeal challenging the district court’s
denial of his motion to modify custody and the parenting-time schedule, and we affirmed.
See Povarchuk v. Povarchuk, No. A23-1168, 2024 WL 1047921, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Mar.
11, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2024).
3 Rebecca also requested that the district court hold Valentin in constructive civil contempt
for failure to comply with a portion of an October 2021 order related to parent coaching.
The district court granted this request, and Valentin does not challenge it on appeal.
5
Valentine to pay $5,000 for his contempt. Valentin opposed the motion and requested
changes to the children’s activities.
Following a hearing, the district court granted Rebecca’s motion and largely denied
Valentin’s motion.4 The district court determined that Valentin’s argument that he only
needed to comply with the June 2022 order had “no basis in the record” and was contrary
to the June 2022 order, the December 2022 order, and Povarchuk I. Notably, the district
court found that Valentin did not argue the activities listed in the December 2022 order
were not in the children’s best interests and, instead, “his argument seem[ed] to be that he
found a loophole in the record” that allowed him to avoid sharing costs.5 Accordingly, the
district court found Valentin in civil contempt pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 588.01, subd. 3
(2022). The district court also ordered that the children continue to participate in the
activities listed in the December 2022 order and determined that Valentin would pay his
share of the cost for the children’s camps. The district court imposed $10,000 in conduct-
based fees against Valentin pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022), which it
ordered would go towards the cost of the children’s 2024 summer camps.
Valentin appeals.

4 The district court did order Rebecca to provide Valentin with “information necessary to
access and regulate the children’s [use of] electronic devices.” Rebecca does not challenge
this decision on appeal.
5 At the hearing and in its order, the district court repeatedly expressed its strong concerns
about the parties’ litigiousness, failure to communicate and compromise on issues
regarding their children, and failure to act in their children’s best interests. This being our
third opinion in this matter in less than nine months, we share the district court’s concerns.
6
DECISION
Valentin challenges the district court’s decision to find him in civil contempt.
Valentin argues that: (1) he cannot be held in civil contempt for failure to comply with the
December 2022 order; (2) the district court erroneously imposed criminal-contempt
sanctions; and (3) the district court abused its discretion when it ordered Valentin to pay
conduct-based fees pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1.6
We review these issues for an abuse of discretion. See Sehlstrom v. Sehlstrom, 925
N.W.2d 233, 239 (Minn. 2019) (contempt); Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 264-65
(Minn. App. 2000) (conduct-based fees), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000) . “A district
court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
We address each argument in turn.

6 Valentin also argues the district court violated his due-process rights because he was
denied an impartial decisionmaker. Valentin did not raise this argument in the district
court; therefore, it is forfeited. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
Responding to Rebecca’s argument that Valentin forfeited the issue, in his reply brief
Valentin argues we should consider his due- process argument in the interests of justice.
See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. We are not persuaded that we should consider this issue
in the interests of justice. See Morton v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 223 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn.
1974) (declining to consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal where the court
did “not feel that appellants’ arguments or the peculiar facts of th[e] case justif[ied] a
departure from [its] well-settled precedents”).
7
I.
Valentin argues the district court abused its discretion when it found he failed to
comply with the December 2022 order. We are not persuaded.
First, Valentin argues that we concluded in Povarchuk I that the December 2022
order merely enforced the June 2022 order and, therefore, he need only comply with the
June 2022 order. Valentin mischaracterizes our prior opinion.
In Povarchuk I, we addressed Valentin’s argument that res judicata barred the
district court from ordering specific camps and activities for the children in the December
2022 order. 2023 WL 6381567, at *2-3. We concluded that Valentin did not meet his
burden to show the district court erred. Id. We explained that “Valentin [did] not analyze
the elements of res judicata to demonstrate that they [were] met. Thus, even if res judicata
could apply . . . , Valentin ha[d] not shown why it should apply and relief [was] not proper
on [that] point.” Id. at *2. Further, we determined that even if Valentin had made a
sufficient argument, he failed to show that the district court abused its discretion. Id. at *3.
We noted that Valentin failed to explain how the December 2022 order differed “from the
general categories of camps and activities identified in the June 2022 order.” Id. On these
bases, we concluded that Valentin “fail[ed] to demonstrate that the district court’s
December 2022 order regarding camps and activities was barred by res judicata.” Id. Thus,
we affirmed the December 2022 order—meaning it is enforceable. 7

7 We note that, generally, to obtain relief on appeal, a complaining party must show that
the district court erred, that the complaining party was prejudiced by the error, and that the
prejudice to the complaining party arising from the error was substantial. Minn. R. Civ. P.
61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285
8
Second, Valentin contends that, even if the December 2022 order was enforceable
under Povarchuk I, the district court abused its discretion when it found him in contempt
because he plausibly understood Povarchuk I to only require him to comply with the
specific terms in the June 2022 order. We disagree because Valentin does not set forth a
reasonable interpretation of Povarchuk I. Fundamentally, we affirmed the district court’s
decision to issue the December 2022 order because Valentin failed to meet his burden to
show the district court abused its discretion. See Povarchuk I, 2023 WL 6381567, at *2-4.
There is no reasonable reading of Povarchuk I that would have relieved Valentin of his
obligation to comply with the district court’s December 2022 order.
Third and finally, Valentin reasserts the argument he raised in Povarchuk I that the
district court’s decision to issue the December 2022 order is barred by res judicata to the
extent it conflicted with the June 2022 order. Rebecca asserts that Valentin’s argument is
barred because Valentin raised the same issue in his prior appeal.8 We agree with Rebecca.
The supreme court has held in the family law context that “an adjudication on the
merits of an issue is conclusive, and should not be relitigated.” Loo v. Loo , 520 N.W.2d

(Minn. 2008) (applying rule 61 in a family appeal); Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 105
(Minn. App. 2009) (noting appellate courts ignore prejudicial error when prejudice is de
minimis); see also Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987) (noting appellate
courts will not reverse district court if it reached affirmable result for wrong reasons).
8 Rebecca frames her argument under the “law of the case” doctrine. We question whether
the law-of-the-case doctrine applies in the technical sense to the procedure that occurred in
this case. See Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (noting “law of the case
. . . . ordinarily applies when an appellate court has ruled on a legal issue and has remanded
the case to the lower court for further proceedings”). But see Huntsman v. Huntsman, No.
A12-2147, 2013 WL 5777908, at * 10 (Minn. App. Oct. 28, 2013) (applying “law of the
case” in family law matter when we refused to revisit issue decided in earlier appeal
(quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2013).
9
740, 744 (Minn. 1994); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 140.01 (“No petition for rehearing
shall be allowed in the Court of Appeals.”). In Povarchuk I, we rejected Valentin’s
challenges to the December 2022 order. See 2023 WL 6381567, at *3-4. Valentin’s res
judicata argument in the current appeal is simply an attempt to have this court decide the
same issue—the validity of the December 2022 order—at a subsequent stage of the same
case. See Loo, 520 N.W.2d at 744. Because we already adjudicated the merits of this issue
in Povarchuk I, we will not revisit our decision in this appeal.9
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that it had
authority to enforce the December 2022 order and Valentin failed to comply with that
order.

9 Valentin also argues the district court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct a
best-interests analysis regarding the children’s activities. But neither Valentin nor Rebecca
filed a motion to modify parenting time. Instead, the district court resolved Rebecca’s
motion for contempt and sanctions for failing to comply with its December 2022 order.
Valentin provides no authority that the district court must conduct a best-interests analysis
for this type of motion. See Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn.
App. 1994) (declining to address allegations unsupported by legal authority). Nor did
Valentin request that the district court make such findings. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582
(stating that appellate courts generally address only those questions previously presented
to and considered by the district court). Further, we observe that the record amply shows
that these activities are in the children’s best interests. As the district court acknowledged,
neither Valentin nor Rebecca argue d that participating in these camps and activities was
not in the children’s best interests. At the November 2023 hearing , both parties spoke
about how the OSRUI camp is beneficial for their children. And the primary dispute about
the violin lessons relates to how to divide the cost of the lessons among the parties, not
whether the lessons themselves are appropriate.
10
II.
Valentin next argues the district court abused its discretion because it imposed a
criminal-contempt sanction in this civil- contempt dispute. We disagree that the district
court imposed a criminal-contempt sanction.
Minnesota law recognizes both civil and criminal contempt. See State v. Tatum,
556 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. 1996). A district court imposes a criminal-contempt sanction
to “vindicate[e] the court’s authority by punishing the contemnor for past behavior.” Id.
A district court imposes a civil-contempt sanction to “vindicat[e] the rights of a party by
imposing a sanction that will be removed upon compliance with a court order that has been
defied.” Id. As such, “[c]ivil contempt proceedings are designed to induce future
performance of a valid court order, not to punish for past failure to perform.” Mahady v.
Mahady, 448 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. App. 1989).10
Here, the district court imposed a civil-contempt sanction. Rebecca moved for a
contempt finding, and the district court granted her motion. Contrary to Valentin’s
assertions, the district court applied the sanctions to encourage compliance with its existing
order. The district court specifically provided that the sanctions would go toward the cost
of the children’s summer camp—one of the issues prompting the contempt motion. Thus,

10 The Minnesota Supreme Court outlined eight minimum requirements, known as the
Hopp factors, for district courts to consider when addressing whether to impose civil-
contempt sanctions. See Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216-17 (Minn. 1968). Valentin
observes that the district court may not have satisfied one of the factors but does not argue
that this failure was a basis for reversal. Therefore, we do not reach this issue. See Loth v.
Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (providing that error on appeal is never presumed
and it is appellant’s burden to prove error before there can be reversal).
11
the sanction was remedial rather than punitive because the district court intended to induce
Valentin’s compliance with the December 2022 order, not to punish Valentin for his past
behavior. See id. (“Civil contempt proceedings are designed to induce future performance
of a valid court order, not to punish for past failure to perform.”).
Furthermore, the supreme court has classified similar contempt proceedings as civil.
See Hopp, 156 N.W.2d at 216. In Hopp, the supreme court held that a contempt order in
the child-support context was a civil proceeding, noting that a parent’s failure to comply
with a court order to pay child support is a “serious social problem” and district courts need
tools to enforce those obligations. Id. The same reasoning applies with equal force to the
civil-contempt order in this case. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 4 (2020) (defining
“basic support” to include expenses related to a child’s care); cf. McNulty v. McNulty, 495
N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. App. 1993) (affirming district court’s decision that significant
expenses for child ’s extracurricular activities can support upward deviation from
presumptively appropriate guideline-support obligation), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 12,
1993).
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found Valentin in civil
contempt.
III.
Finally, Valentin challenges the district court’s decision to award Rebecca fees
under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. He specifically contends that the district court abused
its discretion because it imposed “a private fine.”
12
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, a district court may, “in its discretion,” award
“fees, costs, and disbursements against a party who unreasonably contributes to the length
or expense of the proceeding.” Such fees, costs, and disbursements “may be awarded at
any point in the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. The district court must specify
what conduct justified the award of conduct-based fees, costs, or disbursements and explain
whether that conduct occurred during the litigation process. Geske v. Marcolina, 624
N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (Minn. App. 2001).
Valentin asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed what he
characterizes as “a private fine.” He contends that Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, only
authorizes attorney fees and does not authorize a district court to impose $10,000 in fees.
This argument is unpersuasive. As set forth above, the statute plainly allows the district
court, in its discretion, to award “additional fees, costs, and disbursements against a party
who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.14, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Here, the district court properly exercised its
discretion when it determined that Valentin was unreasonably contributing “to the length

13
and expense of this proceeding” and imposed a fee accordingly. Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it imposed this fee.11
Affirmed.

11 Valentin separately argues the district court abused its discretion when it relied on
inadmissible hearsay statements. In particular, Valentin highlights the district court’s
finding that the challenged activities are beneficial to the children’s wellbeing. But
Valentin does not explain how that finding prejudiced him. See In re Welfare of D.J.N. ,
568 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (“We cannot determine prejudice where there is
little indication that the court considered evidence from prior records, no showing that use
of the material otherwise materially affected the result, and no showing of an offer of proof
to contradict information that might have been used by the court.”). Further, our review of
the record indicates that non-hearsay testimony from both Rebecca and Valentin supported
the district court’s finding.