State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1842

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Adam John Haeska,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Schmidt, Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-22-1359

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

David Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
In this appeal from the final judgment, appellant Adam John Haeska challenges his
convictions of criminal sexual conduct and domestic assault. Haeska argues the district
court abused its discretion by admitting improper relationship evidence. Haeska also
argues the district court erred by entering convictions on verdicts stemming from the same
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course of conduct. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
relationship evidence, we affirm Haeska’s conviction for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct while using coercion and one conviction for felony domestic assault. But we
reverse and remand for the court to vacate the conviction for criminal sexual conduct while
using force and to vacate the other conviction for felony domestic assault because those
convictions arose from the same course of conduct as the two convictions that we affirm.
FACTS
N.O. and Haeska were in a relationship for nine years. In August 2022, Haeska
taped N.O.’s arms together and forcibly penetrated her anally and vaginally. N.O. reported
the incident to the police. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Haeska with two counts
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of domestic assault. Haeska pleaded
not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.
In a pretrial motion, the state sought to admit multiple relationship-history incidents
under Minnesota Statute section 634.20 (2022). Haeska objected to N.O. testifying about
three of the incidents: (1) on the day N.O. gave birth to her daughter, Haeska told N.O. her
friends do not like her and she should kill herself; (2) after N.O. made Haeska speak to his
dying grandmother on the phone, Haeska grabbed his gun and chased her down a hallway;
and (3) N.O. once woke up to Haeska lying on top of her and saying he was going to melt
into her, and then Haeska chased her, waving his arms before holding a gun to her head.
The district court granted the state’s motion to admit all but one instance of relationship
evidence, including the three incidents to which Haeska raised objections.
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At trial, N.O. testified to Haeska’s forced, nonconsensual anal and vaginal
penetration. She testified about the three relationship -evidence incidents that Haeska
challenges on appeal. N.O. also testified about Haeska cheating on her, other times he
physically abused her, and instances where the police were called. Other witnesses testified
about N.O.’s demeanor after the assault, DNA evidence from a vaginal swab, and crumpled
up tape found in the bedroom. Haeska did not testify at trial.
The jury found Haeska guilty on all four counts. The district court entered
convictions on all four verdicts, but sentenced Haeska only on the first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the three incidents
as relationship evidence.

On appeal, Haeska argues one of the objected-to incidents of relationship evidence
should have been excluded because it does not qualify under the statute as domestic
conduct. Haeska further contends that all three incidents were inadmissible because the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence.
“Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic
conduct . . . is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury[.]” Minn.
Stat. § 634.20. “‘Domestic conduct’ includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic
abuse,” violations of different kinds of protective orders, harassment, stalking, or obscene
telephone calls. Id. The legislature has defined domestic abuse as family or household
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conduct that involves: “(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; (2) the infliction of fear
of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3) terroristic threats, . . . criminal
sexual conduct, . . . sexual extortion[,] . . . or interference with an emergency call[.]”
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1)-(3) (2022).
A district court’s decision to admit relationship evidence under section 634.20 is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004).
Whether evidence falls within the scope of the statute is a question of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Minn.
App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). To reverse a district court’s evidentiary
ruling, the appellant must prove that admitting the evidence was both “erroneous and
prejudicial.” State v. Loving, 775 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Minn. 2009).
A. Haeska’s comment to N.O. that her friends do not like her and she
should kill herself constitutes domestic conduct under the statute.

Haeska argues that his comment to N.O. on the day she gave birth was not “domestic
conduct” as defined in the statute. Haeska claims his statement did not constitute any crime
listed in the statute and was not similar to any of the enumerated offenses. We disagree.
The language of the statute states that domestic conduct “includes, but is not limited
to, evidence of domestic abuse[.]” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. The statute, therefore, is not
limited to just the enumerated crimes. Instead, the legislature broadly wrote the statute to
encompass a range of conduct, including domestic abuse. Id.
Our state’s caselaw has recognized this broad interpretation of the statute . In
State v. Andersen, for example, the district court admitted evidence of the defendant both
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verbally and physically abusing the victim earlier in the relationship. 900 N.W.2d 438,
441 (Minn. App. 2017). In affirming the district court’s admission of the evidence, this
court stated that the physical and verbal abuse evidence illuminated “the volatility of the
relationship and put the . . . incident in the context of the couple’s interaction with each
other.” Id. at 441-42. Similarly, in State v. McCurry, this court referred to the “not limited
to” language in the statute as encompassing “general testimony about the relationship,
including conduct that does not rise to the level of the crimes listed in the definition of
‘similar conduct.’”1 770 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. App. 2009) (“Such evidence was
admitted in this case, when [the victim] described ongoing tension, arguments, or minor
spats between her and [the defendant].”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009).
Here, the district court determined that Haeska telling N.O.—on the same day she
gave birth—that her friends do not like her and she should kill herself does not constitute
physical abuse, but it does constitute “extreme emotional abuse. ” The district court
determined that the conduct fell “right within the context of the 634.20 statute.” We agree.
Haeska’s conduct falls within the heart of what the legislature intended to capture when
enacting section 634.20. Although the abuse was verbal, the district court appropriately
deemed the conduct “extreme emotional abuse” given the context of the words used
(N.O.’s friends do not like her and N.O. should kill herself) and when Haeska used those
words (on the same day that N.O. gave birth to her daughter). We conclude the district
court acted within its discretion by admitting the relationship evidence.

1 The statutory language changed from “similar conduct” to “domestic conduct” in 2013.
2013 Minn. Laws ch. 47, § 7, at 208.
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B. The probative value of the relationship evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Haeska argues that all three pieces of challenged evidence admitted as relationship
evidence were inadmissible because their probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree.
A district court abuses its discretion if it admits evidence that, although relevant,
has limited probative value and is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice. Loving,
775 N.W.2d at 879-80 . We review the district court’s weighing of the probative value
against its unfair prejudice for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 879.
Haeska first argues the evidence was not needed to support N.O.’s credibility. But
the evidence went beyond N.O.’s credibility; it helped the jury put the relationship into
context, which the supreme court has held is a proper use of relationship evidence. See
McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 159 (holding relationship evidence is properly used “to illuminate
the history of the relationship, that is, to put the crime charged in the context of the
relationship between the two”).
The evidence also addressed several other relevant topics with significant probative
value: the assumption that sex in a functioning relationship is consensual; why N.O. did
not call the police immediately after being assaulted or abused in the past; and how “the
escalating nature of the conduct affected N.O.’s behavior, particularly in going to work”
after the sexual assault. These reasons—articulated by the state in advocating to admit the
evidence—are valid purposes to admit the relationship evidence that extends beyond
N.O.’s credibility. See, e.g., Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at 441 (affirming admission of
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relationship evidence to demonstrate victim’s past fearful interactions with defendant);
State v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. App. 2008) (affirming admission of
relationship evidence to provide context for why victim recanted, explain victim’s
confusion about exact locations and times, and impeach defendant’s credibility).
Haeska next argues the probative value of the evidence was substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice because the three incidents constituted improper character
or propensity evidence. In support, Haeska cites this court’s decision in State v. Hormann,
which concluded that certain relationship evidence admitted had limited probative value
that was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 805 N.W.2d 883, 891 (Minn.
App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). But the evidence in Hormann consisted of
the victim’s general testimony about her marriage with the defendant, which lacked
specificity in “time, place, circumstance, or context[.]” Id. Nevertheless, we concluded
that the district court properly admitted four other specific prior incidents that the victim
detailed in her testimony because that evidence established the context of the crime, the
defendant’s intent, and the effect these actions had on the victim. Id. at 890.
The four incidents properly admitted in Hormann are more analogous to the three
challenged incidents here than the improper testimony in Hormann that Haeska cites. N.O.
testified to three specific instances that put her relationship with Haeska into context,
showed her mindset in the relationship, and demonstrated how the abuse began, continued,
and became worse over time. The district court properly admitted evidence of these three
instances because they could “aid the trier of fact in understanding this couple[’]s relation
and how patterns of abuse could escalate and culminate in the current charges.”
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Finally, Haeska argues the district court “did nothing meaningful to prevent the jury
from misusing the ‘relationship evidence’ as character or propensity evidence when
determining Haeska’s guilt.” The record belies Haeska’s contention. Before allowing
testimony on the relationship evidence, the district court instructed the jury:
The State is about to introduce evidence of conduct by the
defendant . . . on prior occasions. This evidence is being
offered for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and
extent of the relationship between him and this witness in order
to assist you in determining whether the defendant
committed . . . those acts for which he has now been charged
in the Complaint. He is not being tried nor may he be convicted
of any behavior other than that found in the charges. You are
not to convict him based on the conduct you hear about from
an earlier occasion. To do so might result in unjust double
punishment.

The district court gave another limiting instruction before closing arguments,
echoing the prior language, and stating that the jury is not to “convict the defendant on the
basis of any other conduct or occurrence.” The district court took great care to limit any
unfair prejudice. The cautionary instructions “lessened the probability of undue weight
being given by the jury to the evidence.” State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted). We “presume that juries follow instructions given by the district
court.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 167 (Minn. 2024).
Because there was a need for the evidence, it was not improper character or
propensity evidence, and the court provided limiting instructions, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged relationship evidence.
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C. Even if the evidence was improperly admitted, any error was harmless.

Even if the incidents should not have been admitted, we conclude the admission was
harmless. For a harmless-error analysis, we consider other evidence of the defendant’s
guilt, “the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was highly
persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively
countered by the defense.” State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Minn. 2005).
The three incidents were a small part of the total evidence presented at trial, which
otherwise consisted of strong evidence of guilt. N.O. gave clear testimony of the sexual
assault, third parties testified to her demeanor after the assault, and a swab of N.O.’s vaginal
area had DNA matching Haeska. N.O.’s testimony about the three incidents composed
four pages of the trial transcript, while her total testimony was over 60 pages. In closing
argument, the prosecutor mentioned the first incident where Haeska told N.O. everyone
wants her dead and that Haeska had “held a gun to [N.O.’s] head multiple times[,]” but
otherwise generally referred to Haeska’s abusive conduct. In addition, other instances of
prior abuse were admitted without objection and support the prosecutor’s closing argument
related to the general abusive conduct. Defense counsel countered the state’s evidence by
pointing out inconsistencies in N.O.’s testimony during cross-examination and in his
closing argument. Defense counsel also argued that not one prior instance of abuse
involved sexual abuse. Based on the other evidence, the limited presentation of the
objected-to evidence, and the effective countering by the defense, we conclude that any
assumed error in admitting the challenged evidence was harmless.
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II. The district court erred in entering multiple convictions.

The district court entered convictions on all charges—two counts of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree and two counts of felony domestic assault. Haeska argues— and
the state concedes— that two convictions were improper. We agree.
A defendant “may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense,
but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2022). This law applies when multiple
convictions are “for the same offense against the same victim on the basis of the same act.”
State v. Goodridge, 352 N.W.2d 384, 389 (Minn. 1984).
Haeska’s two criminal sexual conduct convictions are for penetration that caused
injury to the victim while using “coercion to accomplish the act” and for penetration using
force that inflicted bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c)(i), (d) (2022). These
convictions are against the same victim and arose from acts committed during a single
behavioral incident. Thus, we reverse and remand for the district court to vacate the
first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction on count two.
Haeska’s two domestic assault convictions are for committing “an act with intent to
cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death” and for intentionally inflicting or
attempting “to inflict bodily harm upon another[.]” Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1), (2)
(2022). These convictions are against the same victim and arose from acts committed
during a single behavioral incident. Thus, we reverse and remand for the district court to
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vacate either count three or count four. On remand, the guilty verdicts on all four counts
shall remain intact. State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.