State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1849

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Clinton Albert Christopher Juring,
Appellant.

Filed October 14, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-21-806

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Julia Forbes, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Melissa Haley, Special Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. He argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the
conviction. In the alternative, appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the
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district court abused its discretion in making various evidentiary rulings and that the
prosecutor committed misconduct . Because we conclude that appellant’s conviction is
supported by sufficient evidence and his arguments for a new trial are unavailing, we
affirm.
FACTS
In May 2021, 13-year-old D.O. was taken to the hospital by her mother, M.O., after
M.O. found cut marks on D.O.’s wrist. At the hospital, D.O. told a nurse that her mother’s
ex-boyfriend, appellant Clinton Albert Christopher Juring, routinely forced her “to give
him hand jobs.” A law-enforcement officer with the Owatonna Police Department
responded to the hospital to investigate D.O.’s allegations. D.O. told the officer that Juring
had forced her to touch his penis “too many [times] to count,” starting when she was 11 or
12 years old.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Juring with two counts of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct. The first count alleged that Juring had a significant relationship
with D.O., D.O. was under the age of 16 at the time of the offense, and the abuse involved
multiple acts over an extended period. See Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2018).
The second count alleged that Juring was more than 36 months older than D.O. and D.O.
was under the age of 13 at the time of the offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd 1(a)
(2018). Juring pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the state presented the testimony of D.O., M.O., Juring’s cousin, and two
investigating officers. D.O., who was 15 years old at the time of trial, testified that Juring
forced her to rub his penis with her hand. At trial, D.O. did not remember exactly when
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Juring started forcing her to touch him, but she recalled that the abuse started while Juring
was in a relationship with D.O.’s mother and was living with them . D.O. stated that the
abuse happened “almost every day,” often more than once a day, and that the total number
of times was “too many” to count.
One of the peace officers testified that he recorded D.O.’s statements at the hospital
after her initial disclosure. The state introduced D.O.’s recorded statement, which was
admitted as an exhibit and played for the jury during trial. In the recording, the officer
asked D.O., “Was it over a period of a year, six months, a month?” D.O. responded,
“Longer than three.”
D.O. also testified that the abuse happened while Juring was alone with her. She
stated the first time that it happened was when her mother “left to the gas station with [her]
younger brother.” When asked why she did not tell anyone about Juring’s repeated abuse
until she was at the hospital, D.O. testified that Juring threatened to kill her or her mom if
she disclosed the abuse. D.O. also testified that she feared Juring because he once “put a
knife to [her] and [her] younger brother’s throat.” She added that Juring had punished her
in the past by keeping her up all night and forcing her to “face the wall, do wall sits, [and]
do burpees in the basement.” 1 D.O. testified that Juring threatened her with similar
punishments if she did not touch his penis.
On cross-examination, D.O. testified that she did not like Juring “when he came into
the picture.” On redirect, D.O. testified that her dislike for Juring was not due to Juring

1 D.O. testified that burpees are “a pushup and then you stand up and jump, and then go
back down and do a pushup.”
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taking up her mother’s attention. D.O. stated her mother “still made time for” her. Rather,
D.O. did not like Juring “[b]ecause he’s a bad person.” The prosecutor then asked D.O. if
she thought Juring was a “bad person” because of “the things that [D.O.] testified . . . about
like physical and sexual abuse and threats.” D.O. responded, “That and the past.”
Defense counsel also attempted to question D.O. about an alleged suicide attempt
in 2022, more than a year after she last saw Juring, and about comments she made to the
prosecutor about Juring potentially dying in prison. The district court ruled that D.O.’s
purported suicide attempt was “too attenuated” and foreclosed defense counsel’s
questioning on the topic. Regarding D.O.’s comments about Juring dying in prison, the
district court rejected defense counsel’s argument that those comments showed D.O.’s
desire that Juring go to prison where he might be harmed, adding that such testimony “adds
nothing” and would be an impermissible “appeal to [the jury’s] sympathy and emotion.”
D.O’s mother, M.O., testified next. She told the jury that Juring started living in the
same house with her and her children in October 2019, when D.O. was eleven. M.O. last
saw Juring in September 2020, when he fled from her car on foot after they were involved
in a physical altercation in the car. M.O. was not employed while Juring lived with her.
She testified that there were times when Juring was alone with D.O., mostly when M.O.
was sleeping or shopping. M.O. testified that she sometimes woke up at night and found
Juring downstairs on the couch with D.O. lying on his lap. On cross-examination, M.O.
testified that D.O. never disclosed Juring’s abuse to her, even when she was home with
D.O. while Juring was away at work.
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The state also called Juring’s cousin to testify about past abusive conduct by Juring
against the cousin and her daughter in 2014. Before trial, the state filed a notice informing
Juring’s counsel of the state’s intention to introduce the cousin’s testimony as evidence of
Juring’s past abuse of a family member. In the notice, the state provided a detailed
description of that testimony. Juring filed a motion seeking an order prohibiting admission
of the evidence. In a written pretrial order, the district court determined that the cousin’s
testimony about Juring’s prior abusive conduct was admissible as relationship evidence
under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 (2022). But the district court limited the scope of
the testimony and required the state to indicate when it intended to elicit the testimony so
that the court could provide the jury with an instruction.
At trial, the district court issued a cautionary instruction prior to the cousin’s
testimony, instructing the jury that the testimony about Juring’s prior conduct was admitted
for the limited purpose of helping the jury determine whether Juring committed the acts
with which he was charged in the current case. The district court also instructed the jury
that Juring “is not being tried for, nor may he be convicted of, the other act that you are
about to hear.” The cousin then testified that she and her daughter lived with Juring for a
time in 2014, during which she “experience[ed] sexual abuse.” The cousin wanted to leave
Juring’s home, but Juring threatened to kill her and her daughter if she left. According to
the cousin, Juring had control over where she went and who she saw “at all times.”
The cousin also testified that she witnessed Juring “torture” her daughter by hitting,
slapping, and strangling her. “[Juring] would choke her, put his hands over her mouth,
shove his fingers down her throat” and hit her with “shoes, belts, buckles, whatever he
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could get within his reach.” She further testified that Juring also forced her daughter to do
pushups and “wall sits for hours on end” until her legs started shaking, and that Juring
“would sweep her feet out from underneath her so she would hit her head and her face.”
The cousin testified that, at times, Juring did not allow her daughter to eat, and that her
daughter had “bruises all the time, [and] cuts and scrapes.” The cousin stated that she was
able to escape when Juring sent her to the grocery store and she was able to explain her
situation to a “person in uniform” and ask for help getting her child away from Juring. The
state also called as a witness the “person in uniform,” a corrections officer, who testified
about her encounter with the cousin at the grocery store.
Juring did not testify. During his closing argument, Juring’s attorney emphasized
that D.O. “did not like” Juring and argued that D.O. fabricated her allegations of sexual
abuse because “she could not stand” Juring. His attorney also focused on the fact that D.O.
did not immediately report Juring’s abuse to anyone, and instead disclosed the abuse when
her mother brought her to the hospital, months after Juring was out of their lives.
The jury found Juring guilty of both counts of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct and the district court sentenced Juring to a 300-month executed sentence on count
one.
Juring appeals.
DECISION
Juring argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
second-degree criminal sexual conduct under section 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii), because the
state failed to prove that Juring engaged in “multiple acts” of sexual abuse “committed
7
over an extended period of time.” He also argues that the district court abused its discretion
by limiting his cross-examination of D.O. and by admitting the testimony of Juring’s cousin
and the corrections officer. Lastly, Juring argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct
warranting a new trial. We address each of Juring’s arguments, beginning with his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
I. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Juring’s abuse of D.O. included multiple acts committed over an extended
period of time.

Juring was convicted of second -degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of
section 609.343, subdivision 1(h)(iii). To be convicted of this offense, the state was
required to prove, among other elements, that the sexual abuse perpetrated by Juring
involved “multiple acts committed over an extended period of time.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii). Juring argues that his conviction should be reversed because the
state failed to prove this element of the offense. We are not persuaded.
Due process requires that the state prove each element of a charged offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 354 (Minn. 2023). When
considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conduct “a painstaking
review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury
to reach its verdict.” Lapenotiere v. State, 916 N.W.2d 351, 360-61 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). In addition, we assume that the jury disbelieved any evidence that
conflicts with the verdict. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016).
8
The phrase “multiple acts committed over an extended period of time” as used in
section 609.343 is not statutorily defined. Words and phrases in statutes are to be
interpreted according to “their common and approved usage” absent a statutory definition.
Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2022). We may rely on dictionary definitions when determining the
“common and ordinary meaning[]” of a term. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 436
(Minn. 2017). “Multiple” means “consisting of more than one individual, element, part, or
other component.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1157 (5th
ed. 2018). An “act” is “something done or performed.” Id. at 16. “Over” means “[t]hrough
the period or duration of.” Id. at 1254. “Extended” means “[c]ontinued for a long period
of time; protracted.” Id. at 627 (5th ed. 2018). And “long” means “of a relatively great
duration.” Id. at 1033. Thus, per common usage, “multiple acts committed over an
extended period of time” refers to something done more than once and through the duration
of a relatively great length of time.
Based on the trial record, we conclude that the state’s evidence was sufficient for
the jury to find that Juring committed “multiple acts” of abuse against D.O. “over an
extended period of time.” The jury heard D.O.’s recorded interview with one of the police
officers, in which D.O. said that the abuse occurred over a span of more than three months.
And D.O. testified that Juring made her touch his penis almost every day. A reasonable
inference from t his evidence is that Juring forced D.O. to rub his penis nearly every day
for approximately three months, which is a time period of “relatively great duration”—
especially in the context of coerced sexual acts. Thus, the evidence sufficiently supports
Juring’s conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexual abuse involving
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multiple acts committed over an extended period of time under section 609.343,
subdivision 1(h)(iii).2
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence under section 634.20.

Next, Juring challenges the district court’s admission of testimony concerning his
prior abuse of his cousin and her daughter under section 634.20. We will not reverse a
district court’s evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. Dolo v. State ,
942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020). We “largely defer to the [district] court’s exercise of
discretion in evidentiary matters and will not lightly overturn a [district] court’s evidentiary
ruling.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision
is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”
State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020).
Under section 634.20,
[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against
the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

2 Juring contends that an “extended period of time” means “over the course of several
years.” Juring cites State v. Suhon, in which we merely acknowledged that several years
is an extended period of time. 742 N.W.2d 16, 22 (Minn. App. 2007) , rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 19, 2008). He also relies on State v. Williams, in which we considered whether the
term “an extended period of time” is unconstitutionally vague. 363 N.W.2d 911, 912, 914
(Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. May 1, 1985). Because these cases do not endorse
a minimum temporal requirement for an “extended period of time,” Juring’s reliance on
them is misplaced.
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“Domestic conduct” includes, among other things, “evidence of domestic abuse.” Minn.
Stat. § 634.20. Evidence offered under section 634.20 is commonly referred to as
“relationship evidence.” State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272, 273 (Minn. 2019). “[T]he
rationale for admitting relationship evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate the
relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime in
the context of that relationship. ” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn.
App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). As this court has recognized, “evidence
showing how a defendant treats his family or household members . . . sheds light on how
the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant
may interact with the victim.” Id. Under the terms of section 634.20, relationship evidence
is presumptively admissible and may only be excluded if “the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Here, the district court permitted the state to introduce evidence of Juring’s abuse
of his cousin and her daughter under section 634.20 to explain D.O.’s delayed reporting
and to rebut the inference that D.O. fabricated her allegations. The district court ruled that
this relationship evidence “has not just probative value, but substantial probative value.”
Still, recognizing the “breadth and depth” of the proffered relationship evidence as noticed
by the state, the district court took measures to curb its risk of unfairly prejudicing Juring.
The district court ruled that the cousin could only testify about events that she “personally
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experienced, heard, or saw” and that the jury would receive a cautionary instruction prior
to the elicitation of the relationship evidence.
Juring argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting this
relationship evidence because the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .3 Juring makes a two-part argument. First,
he contends that the relationship evidence has minimal probative value because the
evidence involves a different victim and “did nothing to explain the . . . current relationship
between [Juring] and D.O.” Next, Juring argues that the probative value of the relationship
evidence was substantially outweighed by its risk of unfair prejudice because the cousin’s
testimony was “extreme” and “likely clouded” the jury’s decision making. He adds that
D.O.’s and M.O.’s testimony provided “sufficient evidence of the context of the
relationship [between D.O. and Juring].” We are not persuaded by either argument.
With regard to the probative value of the relationship evidence, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the evidence of Juring’s
prior domestic abuse of his cousin and her child has “substantial probative value.”

3 Juring also contests the admission of the evidence because it is not sufficiently similar to
the charged offense. Juring relies on State v. McCoy, in which the supreme court held that
section 634.20 “provides for the admission of evidence of ‘similar conduct’ by the
accused.” 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2002)). But,
in McCoy, the supreme court applied an older version of s ection 634.20, which was
amended in 2013 to replace “similar conduct” with “domestic conduct.” 2013 Minn. Laws
ch. 47, § 7, at 208 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (Supp. 2013)). Since the amendment,
the supreme court has noted that “evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against
family or household members other than the victim may be admitted pursuant to [section]
634.20.” State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015). Accordingly, Juring’s
reliance on McCoy to the extent that relationship evidence is only admissible if it involves
“similar conduct” is unavailing.
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Evidence has probative value “when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.”
State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005). Regarding relationship evidence,
“[e]vidence that helps to establish the relationship between the victim and the defendant or
which places the event in context bolsters its probative value.” State v. Barnslater,
786 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct 27,
2010). The cousin’s testimony has substantial probative value because it demonstrates that
Juring’s cousin, like D.O., submitted to his sexual abuse due to his threats of physical
violence if the abuse were to be disclosed. And, as the district court noted, evidence that
Juring’s coercion was effective on his adult cousin makes the evidence “all the more
compelling” in a case involving a minor victim—“if an adult was coerced out of fear of
Mr. Juring, then it is more reasonable that a child would also be inhibited due to fear.”
Moreover, because Juring attacked D.O.’s credibility based on her delayed reporting, the
cousin’s testimony is particularly probative. Because Juring’s treatment of his cousin and
her daughter helps to illuminate his conduct toward D.O., we agree this relationship
evidence has substantial probative value. See Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637.
Next, we turn to the district court’s determination that the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. “When
balancing the probative value against the potential prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely
damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence
that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell,
719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). “Evidence that is probative,
though it may arouse the passions of the jury, will still be admitted unless the tendency of
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the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means overwhelms its legitimate probative force.”
Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 478-79.
While the cousin’s testimony was likely harmful to Juring’s case —and the state
concedes as much—the proper inquiry is whether the evidence carried a risk of unfairly
prejudicing Juring, and, if so, whether that risk substantially outweighed the evidence’s
probative value. The record reflects that the district court was keenly aware of the
relationship evidence’s risk of prejudicing Juring, and that it took measures to curtail that
risk. First, the district court noted “there is a legitimate concern over the breadth and depth
of the details” noticed by the state. In an effort to avoid “the possibility of a jury convicting
Mr. Juring largely because he may have done horrible things in the past,” the district court
restricted the cousin’s testimony to only those events listed in the state’s notice that she
“personally experienced, heard, or saw.”
In addition, the district court instructed the jury that the cousin’s testimony was
“being admitted for the limited purpose of helping [the] jurors in determining whether
Mr. Juring committed the acts with which he is charged in this case” and that he was not
being tried for the acts the cousin would describe. Both the supreme court and this court
have upheld the admission of relationship evidence when accompanied by a cautionary
instruction. State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015); State v. Andersen ,
900 N.W.2d 438, 441-42 (Minn. App. 2017). “A limiting instruction from the district court
lessens the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” State v.
Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 805-06 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). And we assume that juries abide by a district court’s instructions.
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Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 373 (Minn. 2016). Because the district court issued a
cautionary instruction regarding the relationship evidence, its risk of unfair prejudice was
diminished.4
Lastly, Juring asserts that the relationship evidence was needlessly cumulative
because D.O.’s testimony provided “sufficient evidence of the context of the relationship
[between D.O. and Juring].” We disagree. The purpose of relationship evidence is to
“shed[] light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests
how the defendant may interact with the victim.” Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637. D.O.’s
testimony alone could not provide this context or assist the jury in weighing her credibility.
And the cousin’s testimony included details such as Juring forcing the cousin’s daughter
to perform demanding exercises as punishment that placed Juring’s domestic conduct in
context and corroborated D.O.’s testimony. Thus, Juring has failed to demonstrate that the
relationship evidence was needlessly cumulative, much less that its probative value was
substantially outweighed by this consideration. See Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
In sum, the district court carefully considered the relationship evidence and
concluded that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair
prejudice. In doing so, the district court created reasonable guardrails to curtail the risk of
unfair prejudice. Additionally, Juring has not established that the cousin’s testimony was

4 Juring also asserts that the relationship evidence carried a risk of misleading the jury or
confusing the issue. But, given the district court’s multiple cautionary instructions
regarding the purpose of the relationship evidence, Juring has not demonstrated that the
evidence’s probative value was substantially outweighed by these risks. See Andersen,
900 N.W.2d at 442.
15
needlessly cumulative of D.O.’s testimony. For these reasons, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it admitted the relationship evidence.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Juring’s cross-
examination of D.O.

Juring next argues that the district court abused its discretion by limiting his cross-
examination of D.O. Determining the scope of cross-examination is an evidentiary matter
that “rest[s] within the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Glover,
4 N.W.3d 124, 136 (Minn. 2024). Juring challenges the district court’s rulings that
prevented him from cross-examining D.O. about her mental-health struggles in 2022 and
her comment to the prosecutor that she believed that Juring might die in prison if convicted.
The due-process clause of both the federal and state constitutions “guarantee a
criminal defendant’s right to present a complete defense.” State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114,
123 (Minn. 2024) (citing Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; U.S. Const. amend. XIV). As such,
criminal defendants have the right to present their version of the facts through witness
testimony. State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 331 (Minn. 2016). A defendant’s right to
present a complete defense is not absolute, however. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d at 123. A defendant
“must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence.” State v. Guzman,
892 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Minn. 2017).
In addition to the right to present a complete defense, a defendant has a
constitutional right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Glover, 4 N.W.3d
at 136 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6). “The district court’s
ability to curtail cross- examination is limited by the right of confrontation.” Id. But a
16
defendant is only guaranteed a right to cross- examination, “not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Thus, the right to confrontation is not violated by a district court’s limitation on
cross-examination when “the jury is presented with sufficient information from which to
appropriately draw inferences as to the witness’s reliability.” Id. (quotation omitted).
District courts have “wide latitude” to reasonably limit cross-examination of a witness for
a variety of reasons, including over concerns of relevance or harassment. Id.
Juring asserts that the district court’s evidentiary rulings prohibited him from fully
cross-examining D.O. about her mental health and dislike of Juring. The state counters
that the district court acted within its discretion in limiting Juring’s cross-examination. We
agree with the state.
D.O.’s Mental Health
While cross-examining D.O. about her initial disclosure of Juring’s abuse during a
hospital stay in May 2021 for self-harm, defense counsel tried to elicit testimony about her
alleged suicide attempt in 2022. After the state objected based on lack of relevance,
defense counsel argued that evidence of D.O.’s ongoing mental-health issues in 2022
would rebut the inference that Juring’s conduct resulted in D.O. being brought to the
hospital in 2021. The district court ruled that the alleged 2022 suicide attempt was “too
attenuated” and sustained the state’s objection.
On appeal, Juring makes a similar argument. Juring contends that he should have
been permitted to cross-examine D.O. about whether she attempted suicide in 2022 because
her testimony would rebut the inference that Juring’s conduct caused D.O. to self-harm “by
17
establishing that she continued to suffer from mental health issues long after” she disclosed
the abuse during her 2021 hospitalization. We are not persuaded.
The district court’s ruling that the alleged 2022 suicide attempt was too attenuated
falls squarely within its “wide latitude” in limiting cross-examination regarding marginally
relevant evidence. Id. at 136. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence . . . more probable or less probable.” Minn. R.
Evid. 401. D.O.’s purported suicide attempt in 2022 is marginally relevant, if at all,
because whether D.O.’s mental-health issues were caused by Juring’s conduct was not a
fact of consequence. During D.O.’s direct examination, the state did not evoke any
testimony suggesting that D.O.’s 2021 hospitalization was because of Juring’s conduct.
And to the extent that Juring wished to probe D.O.’s credibility, that was accomplished
when D.O. testified at trial that she was struggling with her mental health at the time of her
initial disclosure in 2021. In sum, Juring has not demonstrated the relevance of this
evidence. Therefore, t he district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Juring’s
cross-examination into the collateral issue of D.O.’s alleged suicide attempt in 2022.
D.O.’s Dislike of Juring
During cross-examination, D.O. affirmed that she told the prosecutor that she
“wanted [Juring] to get life out of this case.” The state objected on relevance grounds. The
district court allowed the answer to stand but instructed defense counsel to “move on.”
Defense counsel approached the court to make a record of his intention to ask D.O. about
a comment that she allegedly made to the prosecutor, namely: “If [Juring is] in prison, once
they find out he’s a [sexual predator], . . . he’s dead.” Defense counsel offered that this
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evidence was probative of D.O.’s bias against Juring. The state countered that D.O.
“already said she doesn’t like [Juring],” which established the bias that Juring intended to
show. The state argued that asking D.O. about Juring’s potential prison sentence “would
ultimately confuse the jury and introduce something that they’re not even supposed to be
considering.” The district court ruled that defense counsel could not proceed with the
question, noting that the evidence “adds nothing” and would instead be “an appeal to
sympathy and emotion” of the jury.
One purpose of the confrontation clause is to permit defendants to “reveal a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635,
640 (Minn. 1995). “Bias is a catchall term describing attitudes, feelings, or emotions of a
witness that might affect her testimony . . . .” Id. (quotation omitted). “Evidence of bias
may properly show hatred or enmity between a witness and a party.” Id. A witness’s bias
is “always relevant” for impeaching the witness’s credibility. Id. (quotation omitted).
Juring contends that the district court’s ruling abridged his right to confront D.O.
about her bias against Juring. This argument is not persuasive because the district court
admitted D.O.’s testimony that she wanted Juring to receive a life sentence and that she did
not like Juring. Thus, the jury was already apprised of D.O.’s disdain for Juring, especially
considering her inherent bias as a victim of criminal sexual conduct. Because the jury had
sufficient evidence to assess D.O.’s potential bias, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting Juring’s cross-examination in this manner. See Glover, 4 N.W.3d at
136 (holding confrontation right not violated when “the jury is presented with sufficient
information from which to appropriately draw inferences as to the witness’s reliability”).
19
IV. Juring has not established prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trail.

Finally, Juring argues that the prosecutor engaged in four instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. Because Juring did not object to the purported misconduct at trial, we “review
the prosecutor’s statements under a modified plain error analysis.” State v. Davis,
982 N.W.2d 716, 726 (Minn. 2022). Under this analysis, the defendant has the burden to
prove an error that is plain. State v. Parker, 901 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017). “An error
is plain if it was clear or obvious.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006)
(quotations omitted). Typically, plain error is established “if the error contravenes case
law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. If the defendant establishes plain error, “the
burden shifts to the [s]tate to demonstrate that the plain error did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights.” Parker, 901 N.W.2d at 926. If the state does not satisfy its burden, the
reviewing court must “consider whether the error should be addressed [and a new trial
ordered] to ensure fairness and the integrity of judicial proceedings.” Id.
Juring argues that the prosecutor committed plain-error misconduct by (1) eliciting
testimony from D.O. that he was a “bad person,” (2) arguing that the state “did not have to
prove all the facts beyond a reasonable doubt,” and (3) arguing that the only logical
conclusion to draw from D.O.’s and the cousin’s testimony was that they were telling the
truth.5 The state counters that none of these incidents constitute plain-error misconduct.
We agree with the state.

5 Juring also summarily states that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing during
closing argument that it was Juring’s idea for D.O. to use saliva when touching his penis,
questioning for “what other reason” D.O. would mention saliva in her testimony and her
prior statements. Juring does not provide argument or caselaw in support of his assertion.
20
“Bad Person” Testimony
Juring first asserts that the prosecutor committed plain-error misconduct by eliciting
testimony from D.O. on redirect that she did not like Juring because he is a “bad person”
on account of “the things that [she] testified [about at trial] like physical abuse and sexual
abuse and threats.” A prosecutor cannot ask questions “calculated to elicit or insinuate
inadmissible and highly prejudicial character evidence and which are asked in the face of
a clear trial court prohibition.” State v. Harris, 521 N.W. 2d 348, 354 (Minn. 1994). But
nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor intentionally elicited inadmissible,
“highly prejudicial character evidence.” Id. The state asked D.O. on redirect why she
testified on cross-examination that she did not like Juring. The state asked the question to
rebut defense counsel’s insinuation that D.O. fabricated her claims of abuse by Juring
because she was jealous of Juring receiving M.O.’s attention. While D.O. responded on
redirect that she did not like Juring because he is a “bad person,” she affirmed that her
opinion of him was based on Juring’s abuse and threats that she had already testified about
at trial. The prosecutor did not commit plain-error misconduct by asking D.O. why she did
not like Juring.

“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915
(Minn. 2015). Because we discern no prejudicial error, we consider Juring’s argument
waived.
21
Burden Shifting
Next, Juring asserts that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof. “The
[s]tate must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy the requirements of
due process.” Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d at 654. “[M]isstatements of the burden of proof are
highly improper.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 690 (Minn. 2002) (quotation
omitted). When reviewing a closing argument for prosecutorial misconduct, we must
consider “the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks
that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d
602, 607 (Minn. 1993).
Juring argues that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof during
closing when she said that the state did “not have to prove all of the facts in this case beyond
a reasonable doubt.” We are not persuaded.
Our review of the closing argument as a whole demonstrates that the prosecutor
accurately explained the state’s burden of proof to the jury. Although the prosecutor twice
stated that the state did not need to prove “all of the facts in this case” beyond a reasonable
doubt, the prosecutor preceded those statements by telling the jury that the state “must
prove all of the elements of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” And the prosecutor
correctly described the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt three other times
during closing argument. Thus, the prosecutor’s description of the state’s burden was, “at
worst, . . . unartful, not misconduct.” State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. 1996).
22
Vouching for Witnesses Credibility
Lastly, Juring argues that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for D.O.’s
testimony during closing argument. It is misconduct when a prosecutor “implies a
guarantee of a witness’s truthfulness” or “expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’s
credibility.” State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 106 (Minn. 2009). “While a prosecutor must
not personally endorse a witness’s credibility, the [s]tate may, in closing argument, argue
that a witness was or was not credible.” Id. Prosecutors have “a right to analyze the
evidence and vigorously argue that the state’s witnesses [are] worthy of credibility.”
State v. Googins, 255 N.W.2d 805, 806 (Minn. 1977); see also State v. Fields,
730 N.W.2d 777, 786 (Minn. 2007) (discerning no prosecutorial misconduct when alleged
vouching concerned statements about “the credibility of witnesses in the context of the
evidence before the court and the conclusions that can be drawn from that evidence.”).
During closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned that both D.O. and the cousin
testified that Juring forced his child-victims to perform strenuous physical exercises. The
prosecutor asserted that the only “logical conclusion” was therefore that D.O. and the
cousin were telling the truth about the exercises. While the prosecutor did argue that the
witnesses were credible, she did not “personally endorse” the witnesses’ testimony.
Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 106. Instead, the prosecutor analyzed the evidence and argued that
the similarities between D.O.’s and the cousin’s testimony about forced physical exercises
made that testimony credible. Thus, the prosecutor did not commit plain-error misconduct.
Affirmed.