Deco Shakopee, LLC, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1866

Deco Shakopee, LLC,
Respondent,

vs.

Janet K Fullenwiley,
Appellant.

Filed July 15, 2024
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-23-14698

Nigel H. Mendez, Carlson & Associates, Ltd., Vadnais Heights, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Janet K Fullenwiley, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges an eviction judgment, arguing (1) the district court erred by
not considering her alleged defenses and (2) the district court did not set the correct
redemption amount. We affirm.

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FACTS
In November 2022, appellant Janet K Fullenwiley entered a six-month residential
lease with respondent Deco Shakopee LLC. Deco charged $1,474 for monthly rent, which
included $1,419 for base rent, a $5 administration fee, and $50 for utilities. The lease also
included a utilities provision that imposed a $30 monthly fee if the tenant did not place the
utility bills in their name and the office was required to bill back for service. The lease
contained a termination-of-lease provision that stated:
Either party may terminate this Lease at the end of the Lease
Term by delivering to the other written notice of termination.
For the notice of termination to be effective, it must be
(a) written and (b) given at least 60 days prior to the end of the
lease period. If this Lease is not renewed, the Lease shall
automatically renew on a month-to- month basis with an
additional fee of $500 per month.

In May 2023, the lease ended and was not renewed. On September 28, 2023, Deco
served a lease-termination notice on F ullenwiley, terminating the month-to-month lease
effective October 31, 2023. On November 1, 2023, Deco filed an eviction action alleging
that Fullenwiley failed to vacate the property. A day later, Fullenwiley filed a motion to
dismiss. Fullenwiley argued the lease-termination notice was improper because Deco was
required to provide a 60-day notice under the lease. In response, Deco filed an amended
complaint and added a claim for nonpayment of rent for October and November 2023.
Fullenwiley filed another motion to dismiss arguing improper notice.
The matter proceeded to trial. At the beginning of the trial, Deco informed the
district court that it was dismissing its failure-to-vacate claim and proceeding solely on its
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nonpayment-of-rent claim. As a result, the district court excluded any evidence related to
the notice to vacate.
The district court received the lease and ledger as exhibits without objection. Deco
called its community manager as a witness. The community manager testified that
Fullenwiley owed Deco $3,588.05, which did not include a $5 statutory attorney fee. 1
During cross-examination, Fullenwiley challenged the $298 filing fee and $55 writ-of-
recovery charge. Fullenwiley also attempted to introduce evidence about improper notice
and retaliation. The district court limited Fullenwiley to discussing the nonpayment-of-
rent claim and informed her she could introduce her evidence when she presented her case
in chief. Fullenwiley did not testify or offer any exhibits at the trial.
In its order after the trial, the district court found that Fullenwiley did not pay rent
for October and November 2023 and ordered that Fullenwiley could redeem her tenancy
by paying a redemption amount of $3,538.042, which included two utility-service fees ($30
each), two late fees ($113.52 each), the court-filing fees ($298), and the statutory attorney
fee ($5) by 4:00 p.m. on November 27, 2023. The district court entered judgment for Deco
and stayed the issuance of a writ of recovery of premises and order to vacate until the
following day. Fullenwiley filed a request to vacate the order for judgment and grant a
new trial, which the district court denied. Fullenwiley then filed an additional motion to
vacate judgment and grant a new trial, making similar arguments to the previous motion

1 Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(a) (2022).
2 This is a $0.01 difference from the amount ordered on the record.
4
and arguing the district court denied the previous motion due to bias. Fullenwiley did not
redeem the tenancy and vacated the apartment on December 1.3 Fullenwiley appeals.
DECISION
An eviction action “is a summary proceeding through which an occupant may be
removed from possession of real property by the process of law.” Nationwide Hous. Corp.
v. Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2018);
Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2022).
On appeal from an eviction judgment, we determine whether the evidence sustains
the findings of fact and whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Minneapolis
Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Greene, 463 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Minn. App. 1990). We “review the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo” and “uphold the district court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous.” Nationwide, 906 N.W.2d at 907. “[Appellate courts]
will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, [they] are
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” NY Props.,
LLC v. Schuette, 977 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. App. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)). The scope of an

3 On November 27, 2023, Deco filed correspondence requesting a writ of recovery because
the redemption amount had not been paid. On November 29, 2023, the district court issued
a writ of recovery of premises and order to vacate. On November 29 and 30, Fullenwiley
filed two motions seeking to stay the judgment and either stay or quash the writ of recovery.
On November 30, 2023, the district court denied Fullenwiley’s motion to quash the writ of
recovery and granted her motion to stay the writ pending appeal; however, the sheriff
served the writ of recovery.
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eviction proceeding is generally limited to “whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
true.” NY Props., LLC v. Schuette, 977 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation
omitted); Minn. Stat. § 504B.355 (2022).
I. The district court did not err by excluding Fullenwiley’s alleged improper-
notice and statutory retaliation defenses because the eviction was based solely
on nonpayment of rent.

On appeal, Fullenwiley argues that the district court erred by entering judgment for
Deco based on its nonpayment-of-rent claim.
A landlord may bring an eviction action for nonpayment of rent. Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.291, subd. 1(a). “Such an eviction action is equivalent to a demand for the rent. ”
Id. There are limited defenses in an eviction action based solely on nonpayment of rent.
A tenant may defend against an eviction action for nonpayment of rent by proving that rent
actually has been paid. See id. (discussing rebuttable presumption that rent has been paid).
Additionally, “a tenant may defend against an eviction action alleging non-payment of rent
by proving that rent is not unpaid because it is not due.” SVAP III Riverdale Commons
LLC v. Coon Rapids Gyms, LLC, 967 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn. App. 2021). “But if rent is
due and unpaid, the analysis is straightforward and clear: [w]here the plaintiff shows
defendant in possession under a lease, and failure to pay the stipulated rent, his cause of
action under the statute is complete. The defenses that can be interposed are strictly
limited.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Fullenwiley argues that she was entitled to improper-notice and retaliation defenses.
We address each defense in turn.

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Notice to Quit
First, Fullenwiley argues that Deco failed to provide her proper notice to quit before
bringing an eviction action based on her failure to vacate the property. Fullenwiley’s
argument, however, ignores that Deco conceded that it did not provide sufficient notice for
the failure-to-vacate claim , dismissed the claim, and proceeded solely on the claim for
nonpayment of rent.
Fullenwiley also argues that, under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.135 (2022), a
14-day notice to quit for nonpayment must be given before a landlord can file an eviction
action. Section 504B.135(b) provides notice requirements to terminate a tenancy at will
for nonpayment of rent. “If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent due on a tenancy at
will, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 14 days notice to quit in
writing.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.135(b). 4 Here, Deco complied with section 504B.135(b)
because it provided more than the required 14-days notice to quit. Even if notice was
improper, Deco was not required to provide notice to Fullenwiley before bringing an
eviction action for nonpayment of rent. 5 Therefore, the district court did not err by
declining to consider Fullenwiley’s improper-notice defense.

4 In 2023, the legislature repealed section 504B.135(b), which provided the shorter timeline
to terminate a tenancy based on nonpayment of rent. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19,
§ 97, at 1177. The repeal took effect for leases entered or renewed beginning January 1,
2024. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 102, at 1180. This change does not impact the
analysis under this lease agreement.

5 Effective January 1, 2024, Minnesota requires a 14-day notice before a landlord brings
an eviction action for nonpayment of rent. Minn. Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 1a (2022 & Supp.
2023); 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 117, at 1187.
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Retaliation
Second, Fullenwiley argues that the district court erred by declining to consider her
alleged retaliation defense under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.285, subdivision 2
(2022) Fullenwiley argues that Deco has a history of retaliating by threatening evictions,
filing evictions, overcharging for rent, and allowing tenants to disturb her by making
excessive noise.
Statutory retaliation defenses do not apply to all eviction actions. See Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.285, subd. 2 (providing for retaliation defense in eviction action “following the
alleged termination of a tenancy by notice to quit”); Cloverdale Foods of Minn., Inc. v.
Pioneer Snacks , 580 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Minn. App. 1998) (concluding that the statutory
retaliatory-eviction defense does not apply to eviction based on breach of lease). As
discussed above, Deco proceeded solely on its claim for nonpayment of rent, so
Fullenwiley has not demonstrated that the statutory retailiation defense under Minnesota
Statutes section § 504B.285, subdivision 2, applies.
A tenant may defeat an action based solely on nonpayment of rent if the tenant
proves “that the plaintiff increased the tenant’s rent or decreased the services as a penalty
in whole or part” because of the tenant’s “good faith attempt to secure or enforce rights
under a lease” or “good faith report to a governmental authority of the plaintiff’s violation
of a health, safety, housing, or building code or ordinance.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.285,
subds. 2, 3 (2022).
At the trial, Fullenwiley did not allege or argue that Deco improperly increased her
rent or decreased her services, nor did she allege that she attempted to secure rights under
8
a lease or report a violation. Fullenwiley stated that retaliation was her basis for not paying
rent. Fullenwiley stated that she reported noise disturbances that prevent her from sleeping,
but nothing has been done. When given the opportunity, Fullenwiley did not testify or
attempt to introduce additional eviden ce related to retaliation. Nothing in the record
suggests that Fullenwiley complained to any government entity. Therefore, the district
court did not err by excluding the retaliation defense because the eviction was based on
nonpayment of rent and Fullenwiley did not otherwise introduce evidence related to an
applicable defense.
II. The district court did not clearly err in setting the statutory redemption
amount.

Fullenwiley also argues that the eviction judgment was improper because the district
court erred in setting the amount of redemption.
Under Minnesota law, “the tenant may, at any time before possession has been
delivered, redeem the tenancy and be restored to possess ion by paying to the landlord or
bringing to court the amount of the rent that is in arrears, with interest, costs of the action,
and an attorney’s fee not to exceed $5.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(a).
If the tenant has paid to the landlord or brought into court the amount
of rent in arrears but is unable to pay the interest, costs of the action,
and attorney’s fees required by paragraph (a), the court may permit
the tenant to pay these amounts into court and be restored to
possession within the same period of time, if any, for which the court
stays the issuance of the order to vacate . . . .Id., subd. 1(b).

Specifically, Fullenwiley argues that Deco had a history of overcharging her and
she wanted to go over the ledger with the office. During the trial, Fullenwiley argued the
correct redemption amount was $3,175.04, which consists of two months’ rent and two late
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fees. Fullenwiley believed this was the correct amount because it was the amount Deco
previously told her she owed. Fullenwiley also disputed the inclusion of the filing fee and
writ fee and requested to pay costs of the action and the attorney fees later.
Here, the record contains reasonable evidence to support the redemption amount
ordered by the district court. The district court included in its redemption amount two
months’ rent, two late fees, and two utility fees, amounts that are “the amount of the rent
that is in arrears ” as required by Minnesota Statutes section 504B.291, subdivision 1(a),
and that Fullenwiley agreed with. The district court also included the court filing fees in
the amount of $298 and a $5 attorney fee, amounts that are the “costs of the action, and an
attorney’s fee not to exceed $5, ” as required by Minnesota Statutes section 504B.291,
subdivision 1(a). The lease and ledger support the $3,538.04 redemption amount.
Therefore, the redemption amount of $3,538.04 was supported by the record and not clearly
erroneous. Any error by the district court in calculating the redemption amount is also
harmless. Fullenwiley did not pay, or attempt to pay, any amount to redeem the tenancy
before the writ issued, or otherwise argue how she was prejudiced by the district court’s
inclusion of the utility fee, filing fee, and attorney fee. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring
harmless error to be ignored).
In sum, Fullenwiley’s improper -notice and statutory retaliation defenses are not
applicable to the allegation of nonpayment of rent. Fullenwiley did not present a defense
that rent was not due and owing, or that rent was increased as a penalty. Fullenwiley agreed
she owed rent for October and November and agreed she owed late fees. The district court
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received evidence of what Fullenwiley owed, and the redemption amount is supported by
the record. Therefore, the district court did not err in entering judgment for the landlord.
Affirmed.