State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1873

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dwayne Edward Roach,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2024
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-22-5563

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson , Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this appeal from the judgment of conviction of first-degree arson, appellant
Dwayne Edward Roach argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
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motion for a downward durational sentencing departure. He maintains that he was entitled
to the departure because he has a history of mental illness that caused him to lack
substantial capacity for judgment at the time of the offense. Because we discern no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s imposition of a presumptive sentence, we affirm.
FACTS
On May 4, 2022, Scott County sheriff’s deputies were dispatched to a fire occurring
at a homestead in Cedar Lake Township.1 Upon arrival, the deputies observed flames and
heavy smoke coming from a barn on the property and an unoccupied New Prague Fire
Department sport utility vehicle (SUV ) parked in the driveway. The deputies observed a
person identified as Roach driving a side-by-side all-terrain vehicle around the yard. The
deputies eventually were able to apprehend Roach and place him under arrest. Roach was
wearing a New Prague Fire Department jacket and was holding a Bic lighter. While not
explicitly in the state’s summation of the evidence at the plea hearing, a necessary
conclusion is that Roach had no connection to the family who owned the property, no
reason to be at the homestead, and was not associated in any way with the fire department.
While the deputies were onsite, they also saw smoke coming from the residence on
the property. The fire department was called to respond to the blaze. It was determined

1 The facts underlying Roach’s offense are taken from the summation of evidence presented
by the state in conjunction with Roach’s guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. Roach
entered a Norgaard plea, which allows a defendant to plead guilty even though “he or she
is unable to remember the specific facts of the offense because of intoxication or amnesia
but is persuaded that he or she is likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 621 n.1 (Minn. 2016); see also State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash,
110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961).
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that the fire in the residence “started in the basement and that it was set with an open flame
starting on the bed.” A box of matches was found in the basement bedroom and a window
in the bedroom was broken.
Roach admitted to the deputies, as they were transporting him to the jail, that he
stole the fire department SUV. The investigation revealed that Roach “had entered the
New Prague Utilities Building without permission and turned dials on a water control panel
that would have resulted in the New Prague Water Tower overflowing causing damage
well over $1,000.” An alarm, however, sounded and workers were able to reset the dials
and prevent an overflow.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Roach with, as relevant here, one count
each of first-degree arson, second- degree arson, second- degree burglary, third- degree
burglary, first-degree damage to property, theft of a motor vehicle, fifth-degree possession
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and introduction of contraband into the jail.
During the pretrial proceedings, Roach was initially found not competent to stand trial.
The evaluators noted a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder- bipolar type, a significant
psychiatric history, and chemical-abuse issues. Roach was found competent a few months
later.
The parties reached a n agreement to resolve the case with Roach entering a
Norgaard plea. Roach advised the district court during the plea hearing that he had taken
methamphetamine on the day of the offense and could not recall how he obtained the drugs
or anything that occurred afterward. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, Roach
pleaded guilty to first-degree arson and third-degree burglary, and the state dismissed the
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balance of the charges. Roach was allowed to argue for a downward durational departure
at sentencing, but the plea agreement barred him from seeking a dispositional departure. 2
The district court accepted Roach’s guilty plea.
At sentencing, Roach argued that he should receive a downward durational
departure because his mental illness caused him to lack substantial capacity for judgment
at the time of the arson offense.3 After hearing Roach’s departure argument, the district
court indicated that it could not find authority that would allow the court to grant a
downward durational departure based on mental impairment. The district court judge
stated:
Where the Court is struggling is that I’ve looked in every area
that I can as we’ve been even sitting here today and before
coming here today, just to see if the Court is wrong. I cannot
find anything which gives this Court permission to durationally
depart based on the factors that are present here.

The district court denied Roach’s departure motion and sentenced him, as relevant here, to
50 months in prison for first-degree arson.

2 “A dispositional departure places the offender in a different setting than that called for by
the presumptive guidelines sentence. . . . By contrast, a durational departure is a sentence
that departs in length from the presumptive guidelines range.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at
623.

3 Roach also suggested other bases for departure to the arson offense in his argument to the
district court, but on appeal he challenges only the district court’s determination
surrounding lack of substantial capacity for judgment.
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DECISION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2022). A district court must impose a presumptive
sentence unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances that warrant a
departure. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011); Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2021). If circumstances warranting a departure exist, “[t]he
decision whether to depart from [the] sentencing guidelines rests within the discretion of
the [district] court.” State v. Oberg, 627 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 22, 2001).
Even if factors supporting departure are present, a district court is not required to
depart. State v. Olson, 459 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Oct.
25, 1990). A district court need not explain its reasoning “when [it] considers reasons for
departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d
77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).
We review the denial of a downward-departure motion for abuse of discretion. State
v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion if it
misapplies the law or makes a decision contrary to the facts in the record. State v. Guzman,
892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). A district court properly exercises its discretion “as
long as the record shows [it] carefully evaluated all the testimony and information
presented before making a determination.” Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255 (quotation omitted);
see also State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2013). Only in rare cases will an appellate court reverse a district court’s decision
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to impose a presumptive sentence. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App.
2009).
The factors relevant to consideration of a durational departure typically focus on
offense-related characteristics— whether the defendant’s conduct in committing the
offense is significantly more or less serious than that involved in the typical offense. State
v. Abrahamson, 758 N.W.2d 332, 337-38 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31,
2009). By contrast, the factors relevant to a dispositional departure typically focus on
offender-related characteristics—“characteristics of the defendant that show whether the
defendant is particularly suitable for individualized treatment in a probationary setting.”
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623 (quotation omitted).
In support of his argument, Roach points to the sentencing guidelines, which
provide that a mitigating factor supporting a departure may be present when “[t]he
offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for
judgment when the offense was committed.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(3) (Supp.
2021). He maintains that this factor is an appropriate consideration for not just a
dispositional departure, but also a durational departure. Roach cites two cases of the
supreme court as authority for his argument: State v. Hennum, in which the supreme court
reduced a sentence from the presumptive sentence that had been imposed by the district
court when the defendant killed her husband after suffering severe physical and mental
abuse throughout their relationship, including physical abuse on the night of the homicide,
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441 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn 1989);4 and State v. Wall, in which the supreme court reversed
an upward durational departure that was almost 50% longer than the top of the presumptive
range and directed imposition of a presumptive sentence when the defendant had a severe
mental illness and it was “clear from the record that [the] defendant, because of * * *
mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was
committed,” 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984) (quotation omitted).
In Hennum, the supreme court noted that Wall was the only case where the supreme
court “reduced a trial court’s sentence to the presumptive sentence because the defendant
lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed.” 441 N.W.2d
at 801 (quotation omitted). And the court emphasized that it is only in “rare cases” that an
appellate court would be “justified in interfering with the trial court’s decision not to
downwardly depart.”
5 Id.
The state argues that a mental impairment, regardless of how extreme, can only
serve as a mitigating factor in connection with a motion for a dispositional departure, not
a durational one. The state cites to a more recent supreme court opinion, State v. Rund, in

4 Hennum was abrogated in part on a different issue by State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392
(Minn. 2001).

5 Roach also cites two cases from this court. In the first case, State v. Martinson, we
affirmed a downward durational departure based on an extreme mental impairment,
rejecting an appeal by the state that the district court abused its discretion in granting a
durational departure due to a mental impairment. 671 N.W.2d 887, 891-92 (Minn. App.
2003), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2004). In the second case, State v. Barsness, we rejected
an appeal by the defendant that he was entitled to a longer downward durational departure
than the departure granted by the district court based on the defendant’s borderline
intellectual disability and severe depression. 473 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Minn. App. 1991) ,
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 29, 1991).
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which the court expressly stated, albeit in a footnote, that “mental impairment is an
offender-related characteristic that cannot justify a downward durational departure.” 896
N.W.2d 527, 534 n.11 (Minn. 2017). The footnote in Rund appears to eliminate mental
impairment as a mitigating factor when considering a durational departure. 6 But because
we conclude that Roach did not establish the elements of the factor —that “because of . . .
mental impairment, [he] lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was
committed”—we need not decide whether the supreme court intended to categorically bar
consideration of a mental impairment as a mitigating factor for a durational departure.
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(3).
Here, Roach admitted in his plea colloquy that he was high on methamphetamine
during the offense and that is why he had no memory of what occurred. The sentencing
guidelines expressly exclude mental impairment due to “[t]he voluntary use of intoxicants”
from consideration as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Id. And while Roach clearly
suffers from mental illness and has a significant psychiatric history, the record does not
support that any alleged lack of substantial capacity for judgment during the offense was
due to mental illness and not due to his voluntary ingestion of methamphetamine.

6 The state also cites to Solberg, an opinion of the supreme court decided a year before
Rund, where the court rejected remorse as a factor relevant to a durational departure
because such a “departure is justified only if the defendant’s conduct was significantly less
serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” 882 N.W.2d at 624
(quotation omitted). But the court stopped short of “entirely foreclos[ing] consideration of
remorse in the context of durational departures,” if the remorse relates back to the offense
such that it could “be considered as evidence of remediation that makes the conduct
significantly less serious than the typical conduct underlying the offense.” Id. at 625-26.
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Moreover, t he sentencing transcript in this case bears out that the district court
thoughtfully and with empathy considered all information presented, including Roach’s
significant history of mental illness. The fact remains, however, that Roach’s offense
involved voluntary intoxication, which cannot serve as a basis for establishing a mental
impairment impacting the defendant’s capacity for judgment. And Roach entered into a
plea agreement that barred him from arguing for a dispositional departure. Given these
constraints, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing of Roach to
a bottom-of-the-box presumptive sentence.
Affirmed.