State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1874

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Vincent Lee Sims,
Appellant.

Filed December 2, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Ross, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-22-1426

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A woman awoke to find her boyfriend in a different, darkened room standing over
her five-year-old granddaughter. Her boyfriend, Vincent Sims, quickly covered his crotch
and knocked the woman’s phone from her hand when she tried to call the police, yelling,
“It’s not what you think!” After a bench trial, the district court convicted Sims of first-
2
degree criminal sexual conduct and interference with an emergency call. Sims argues on
appeal that the district court erroneously admitted hearsay statements from the child victim
and that his sentence must be reversed to correct a conflict between the district court’s oral
sentencing pronouncement and its written sentencing order. Sims’s hearsay challenge fails
because the child’s statements to the forensic interview er were properly admitted under
Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 3 (2022) , and because admitting into
evidence her statements to the police officer was harmless error. We therefore affirm in
part. But we reverse in part and remand for the district court to clarify the sentencing
ambiguity.
FACTS
Thirty-three-year-old Vincent Sims stayed over at his then-girlfriend’s home in
Mankato one night in April 2022. His girlfriend, whom we will call Alice to maintain her
privacy, woke up during the night to an unusually dark house. Alice always left the lights
and television on at night, so she was suspicio us and went to investigate. She found Sims
in a dark room standing over a couch where her five-year -old granddaughter lay . Alice
clicked on the lights. Sims flinched and grabbed a plastic bag, which he used to cover his
crotch.
Alice confronted Sims, demanding, “What the ‘f’ you doing?” Alice whisked her
granddaughter to the bathroom. Her granddaughter, whom we will refer to as Lucy, told
Alice, “[M]y brain is hurting” and “telling m[e] crazy things.” Alice noticed that Lucy
began to tremble when she saw Sims appear in the doorway. After Lucy indicated that Sims
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had hurt her, Alice tried to call the police. But Sims knocked her phone out of her hand,
repeatedly yelling, “It’s not what you think!”
One of Alice’s sons was also in the house, and he called his older brothers to come
over. When Sims heard them arriving, he repeatedly pleaded to Alice, “[K]ill me.” The
older brothers beat Sims until Mankato police officers arrived.
Officer Larry Stone interviewed Lucy. Lucy told him that a man had touched her
shoulder and her throat, and then pulled down his pants. Later that day, Dr. Arne Graff, a
specialist in child-abuse pediatrics, examined her. Lucy told Dr. Graff that Sims placed her
on the couch, removed her pants and panties, and put his penis “all the way in” her mouth.
Officials directed Lucy to the Child and Family Advocacy Center for a forensic interview.
During the recorded interview, she appeared unfocused, fidgety, and fatigued. Lucy told
the interviewer that Sims hurt her and that his “dookie dookie” went on her face, head, and
eyes. When asked if his “dookie dookie” went anywhere else, Lucy pointed at her mouth,
and she said that he “came in my mouth with poop on it.” The state charged Sims with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, domestic assault, and interference with an emergency
call.
Before trial, the state submitted a notice to the district court and Sims of its intent to
offer at trial statements Lucy made to Officer Stone, as well as the video recording of the
forensic interview. Sims objected to the admission of the forensic-interview video and
submitted an expert report challenging its reliability. The parties argued over admission of
the video at the pretrial hearing, where the district court deferred ruling on the objection
until “before or during trial.”
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In the two-day bench trial, Lucy testified that Sims’s “boy part” touched her mouth.
When asked if anything went inside her mouth, Lucy replied, “no.” The district court
allowed the prosecution to play the full forensic interview over Sims’s hearsay objection.
The district court also allowed the prosecutor to elicit Lucy’s hearsay statements to Officer
Stone, overruling Sims’s hearsay objection. After receiving the evidence, the district court
found Sims guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and interference with an
emergency call. It sentenced Sims to 273 months in prison for criminal sexual conduct .
The district court at sentencing referred to the conviction of interference with an emergency
call and stated, “[N]o sentence imposed, or whatever the notation is. 364 days credit.” But
on its warrant of commitment, the district court stated that Sims was “sentenced to 364
days” with 364 days of credit for time served.
Sims appeals.
DECISION
Sims makes two principal arguments on appeal. He argues first that the district court
improperly admitted into evidence Lucy’s forensic interview and her statements to Officer
Stone. We address this hearsay argument in two parts for ease of analysis. Sims contends
second that the case must be remanded to correct the warrant of commitment for his
interference-with-an-emergency-call sentence. Only his sentencing argument partially
prevails.
I
Sims argues unconvincingly that the district court should have excluded Lucy’s
forensic interview. We review objected-to evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
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Holt v. State, 772 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn. 2009). The appellant must show both that the
district court erroneously received the evidence and that the error prejudiced his defense.
Id. We hold that Sims’s arguments in favor of exclusion fail for the following reasons.
Sims argues that Lucy’s recorded interview statements constituted inadmissible
hearsay. But the district court may admit an out-of-court statement made by a sexual-
assault victim under the age of ten as substantive evidence if the statement is reliable based
on the time, content, and circumstances of the statement as well as the credibility of the
person to whom the statement was made. Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3(a). Reliability
depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. State v. Sime, 669
N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. App. 2003). Relevant circumstances include statement
spontaneity and consistent repetition, use of age-appropriate language, lack of leading
questions, close proximity in time between the statement and events described, the lack of
preconceived notions by the interviewer, and other indicia of trustworthiness. Id. at 927–
28. The record informs us that the district court had a sufficient basis to fi nd Lucy’s
statements in the forensic interview trustworthy and that it implicitly did so. The
interviewer had received training from CornerHouse, a well-established child-interview
organization. She had conducted over 250 forensic interviews. She was a neutral examiner
without a stake in Lucy’s responses. She followed the child-interviewing protocols and
asked few leading questions. The interview occurred only hours after the incident. The
interview was conducted in a child-friendly setting at The Child and Family Advocacy
Center, where the interviewer was serving as executive director. The interviewer also
engaged Lucy us ing age-appropriate language when describing Sims’s genitalia. Lucy
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repeated facts in the interview consistent with what she told Dr. Graff and with what she
later testified to at trial when detailing sexual abuse involving Sims’s penis touching her
mouth. Lucy’s other descriptions in the interview similarly match her trial testimony,
including that Sims moved her to the couch and that her uncles beat Sims. We hold that,
based on Minnesota Statutes section 595.02 (2022), the district court properly exercised its
discretion by admitting the forensic interview.
Sims maintains that section 595.02 cannot be the basis for affirming because the
district court did not cite the statute when it admitted the forensic interview. Sims is correct
that the district court gave no rationale for admitting the interview over his hearsay
objection. But we will uphold a ruling when the record and law support it. See State v.
Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003). The state notified Sims well before trial of its
intent to offer the interview recording. Sims expressly addressed the statute when he
challenged the evidence. The parties also argued over the recording’s reliability at the
pretrial hearing. Although the district court did not make explicit findings, the record
includes evidence sufficient for us to address reliability. And Sims does not challenge the
other elements of the statute on appeal. See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (holding that appellate courts will not
reach issues that a party fails to adequately brief). Sims argues that the interview was
inadmissible hearsay on other grounds, but we need not discuss them because the district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the interview under section 595.02.

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II
Sims also argues that the district court improperly admitted Lucy’s statements to
Officer Stone. An appellant who argues that the district court improperly admitted evidence
must establish that there was a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict. State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016). In
deciding what effect erroneously admitted evidence had on the verdict, we consider how
the evidence was presented, how persuasive it was, whether it was used in closing
argument, and whether it was effectively countered. Townsend v. State, 646 N.W.2d 218,
223 (Minn. 2002). While Sims’s hearsay arguments have some merit, based on the
following analysis we conclude that any error in allowing Officer Stone to recount Lucy’s
statements was harmless.
There is no reasonable possibility that Lucy’s statements to Officer Stone
substantially impacted the verdict. The conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
can stand only if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Sims sexually penetrated
or contacted Lucy. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2022). As Sims acknowledges
on appeal, Lucy’s statements to Officer Stone did not allege sexual penetration or contact,
but that “a man” touched her shoulder, touched her throat, and took off his clothes. The
district court does not mention these statements in its conclusions of law and its factual
findings do not indicate that it found them compelling. These circumstances weigh against
reversing. See State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54–55 (Minn. 2024) (including the manner
in which the party presented the evidence and whether it was highly persuasive as factors
bearing on the harmless-error assessment). By contrast the district court found other
8
evidence compelling when convicting Sims. “S trong evidence of guilt undermines the
persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. at 54. The district court found Lucy’s
reaction to seeing Sims in the doorway of the bathroom to be “particularly compelling.” It
found the testimony of Dr. Graff credible recounting Lucy’s statements that Sims put his
penis “all the way” into her mouth. It found Alice’s testimony “highly reliable.” Alice had
testified to the events leading her to discover Sims standing over Lucy, speaking with Lucy
in the bathroom, and confronting Sims afterward. The district court also found specific
details from the forensic interview compelling, such as Lucy’s recounting that Sims’s
“dookie dookie” touched her lips and mouth. And the district court found Lucy’s testimony
that Sims’s “boy part” touched her mouth to be credible. All of this evidence that the district
court found credible overwhelmingly substantiates first-degree criminal sexual conduct
and shows that Lucy’s comparatively innocuous and vague statement to Officer Stone had
little bearing on Sims’s guilty verdict.
III
Sims urges us to reverse his sentence of 364 days’ imprisonment on his conviction
of interference with an emergency call. The district court stated at his sentencing hearing
that Sims was “convicted but no sentence imposed, or whatever the notation is. 364 days
credit.” The written order and warrant of commitment lists that Sims is sentenced to 364
days in jail, with 364 days credit. Sims argues that the oral statement of “no sentence
imposed” should prevail over all else. The state agrees that the sentence should be reversed
and remanded, but only to clarify ambiguity in the sentencing order . We agree with the
state. When a district court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence and a written sentencing
9
order conflict, the oral pronouncement usually prevails. See State v. Staloch, 643 N.W.2d
329, 332 (Minn. App. 2002). But the district court’s oral sentence here is unclear. Having
“no sentence imposed” contradicts the notion that Sims receives “364 days credit,” since
there would be no need to apply credit to a nonexistent sentence. The written order, giving
364 days credit on a sentence of 364 days, suggests that the district court meant no further
sentence would be imposed. But the oral pronouncement remains ambiguous even with the
context provided in the written order. We are also reluctant to use proclamations outside a
sentencing hearing to determine judicial intent. Pageau v. State, 820 N.W.2d 271, 277–79
(Minn. App. 2012). We therefore reverse Sims’s sentence for interfering with an
emergency call and remand the case to the district court to clearly pronounce Sims’s
sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.