State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1881

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Aren Franc Hatton,
Appellant.

Filed April 21, 2025
Reversed and remanded; motion denied
Slieter, Judge

Lincoln County District Court
File No. 41-CR-23-13

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Glen Petersen, Lincoln County Attorney, Tyler, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Stacy L. Bettison, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
This direct appeal from convictions of criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping was
stayed to allow appellant to pursue postconviction relief in district court where he raised a
Brady claim.1 Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Alter natively, appellant argues that
his kidnapping conviction must be reversed for insufficient evidence, claiming that the
requisite confinement was incidental to the underlying criminal- sexual-conduct offense.
Finally, appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused
its discretion by admitting evidence of a syringe that was found in appellant’s home two
days after the incident, which field-tested positive for methamphetamine.
We first conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support appellant’s kidnapping
conviction because it was incidental to the criminal-sexual-assault offense. We therefore
reverse the kidnapping conviction and remand to the district court with instructions to
vacate that conviction and sentence. We next conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting unfairly prejudicial evidence involving the syringe that field-tested
positive for methamphetamine, which had a significant effect on the verdict. Therefore,
we reverse the third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and remand to the district
court for a new trial on that count. Finally, because we reverse appellant’s convictions and

1 A Brady claim involves the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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remand for a new trial, we do not consider whether the district court abused its discretion
by summarily denying appellant’s postconviction petition alleging a Brady violation.
FACTS
In January 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Aren Franc
Hatton with four counts of criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342,
subd. 1(c)(i) (first-degree), .343, subd. 1(c)(i) (second -degree), .344, subd. 1(a)
(third-degree), .345, subd. 1(a) (fourth-degree) (2022), and one count of kidnapping in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2) (2022). The case proceeded to a two-day jury
trial in July 2023. The jury heard testimony from the victim J.P., J.P.’s sister, responding
officers, Hatton’s wife, and Hatton. Ten exhibits were received into evidence.
During trial, J.P. testified that she was previously in a romantic relationship with
Hatton, and, on January 18, 2023, she asked Hatton to come over to snowblow her
driveway. Hatton went to J.P.’s home and told her that they needed to talk. J.P. let Hatton
inside and he began to pace , which made her think that he “was under the influence of
something.” J.P. was sitting on the couch, and Hatton told her to “get your f------ a-- in
this bedroom right now.” J.P. testified that she did not want to go into the bedroom, but
Hatton “grabbed [her] wrist and then pulled [her] up off the couch [and] . . . into the
bedroom.” Over the course of approximately four hours, Hatton sexually penetrated J.P.
J.P. testified that Hatton pushed her back onto the bed every time she tried to leave.
Sometime later, a relative of J.P. ’s reported the incident to law enforcement. On
January 19, an officer interviewed J.P. regarding the incident and drove her to a medical
center for a sexual-assault examination. The same officer also interviewed Hatton about
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the incident. When asked whether the officer was “familiar with Mr. Hatton prior to
January 19th,” the officer indicated that he was.
On January 20, two days after the incident, the officer went to Hatton’s home with
a drug-task-force officer. The officer asked Hatton’s wife for permission to search the
home. Hatton’s wife consented to the search. The officer testified that they “were looking
for drug paraphernalia.” A syringe was located during the search, which field-tested
positive for methamphetamine. A photo of the syringe was received into evidence over
Hatton’s objection. Three additional photos, depicting where the syringe was located, were
also received into evidence.
The jury found Hatton guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and
kidnapping and not guilty of first -, second-, and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct .
The district court subsequently entered convictions on both counts. On the third-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, the district court imposed an executed sentence of 180
months’ imprisonment. On the kidnapping conviction, the district court imposed a
concurrent sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment.
Hatton appealed and then moved to stay the appeal to seek postconviction relief.
This court granted Hatton’s motion to stay the appeal. Hatton petitioned for postconviction
relief, claiming that the state withheld evidence favorable to the defense. The district court
denied Hatton’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. This court dissolved the stay of
Hatton’s appeal.

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DECISION
I. The evidence is insufficient to support the kidnapping conviction.

“When a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of the statute under
which a defendant has been convicted, [appellate courts] are presented with a question of
statutory interpretation that [they] review de novo.” State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623,
625 (Minn. 2018). “Under the de novo standard, we do not defer to the analysis of the
[district court], but instead we exercise independent review.” Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d
558, 563 (Minn. 2018). “After deciding the meaning of the statute, [appellate courts] apply
that meaning to the facts to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction.” State v. Bradley, 4 N.W.3d 105, 109 (Minn. 2024).
A defendant is guilty of kidnapping if the defendant “confines or removes from one
place to another, any person without the person’s consent . . . to facilitate commission of
any felony or flight thereafter.” Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1 (2022). But if “the
confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a
separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.” State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 32
(Minn. 2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 ( Minn.
2005).
Hatton argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping
conviction because the confinement and removal of J.P. was incidental to the underlying
criminal-sexual-conduct offense. Specifically, he claims that the evidence proves that
J.P.’s “removal and confinement occurred simultaneously to the underlying offense.”
Respondent does not claim that pulling J.P. off the couch and into the bedroom constitutes
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kidnapping but, instead, argues that Hatton kidnapped J.P. by confining her to the bedroom
for approximately four hours.
Two Minnesota Supreme Court cases inform our analysis. In Smith, the supreme
court considered whether there was sufficient evidence to support a separate
kidnapping-related murder conviction. 669 N.W.2d at 32. The court determined that there
was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the victim “was confined only
momentarily” after the attack was underway. Id. at 32-33 (“The momentary blocking of
the doorway was completely incidental to the murder for which appellant was convicted
and, therefore, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence of confinement to support
appellant’s conviction for first-degree murder while committing kidnapping.”).
In State v. Welch, the supreme court considered whether there was sufficient
evidence to support a kidnapping conviction when the victim was confined during an
attempted sexual assault. 675 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Minn. 2004). The court reversed the
kidnapping conviction, concluding that the confinement that formed the basis of the
kidnapping conviction—the defendant throwing the victim to the ground and restraining
her hands—was “the very force and coercion that supports the attempted second- degree
criminal sexual conduct conviction.” Id.
Whether J.P.’s confinement was incidental to the underlying
criminal-sexual-conduct offense is a close question. Here, the evidence of confinement
includes J.P.’s testimony that Hatton would not let her leave the bedroom for over four
hours. But J.P. also testified that Hatton engaged in several acts of sexual penetration
during that time. We acknowledge that the confinement in this case was significantly
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longer than the momentary confinement in Smith, 669 N.W.2d at 23, but the length of time
is not determinative under Smith. 669 N.W.2d at 32. Rather, the question is whether “the
confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental” to a separate felony. If so,
then “it does not constitute kidnapping.” Id. Here, the evidence demonstrates that J.P.’s
confinement was “completely incidental” because it occurred after the offense started, and
Hatton continued penetrating J.P. during her confinement. Id.; see also Welch, 675 N.W.2d
at 617 (involving restraining a victim immediately before attempting sexual assault).
Based on these facts, Hatton’s act of confining J.P. —preventing J.P. from leaving the
bedroom— occurred during the commission of the underlying criminal-sexual conduct for
which Hatton was tried. Because the confinement was incidental to the
criminal-sexual-conduct offense, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support
Hatton’s kidnapping conviction. We therefore reverse Hatton’s kidnapping conviction and
remand to the district court with instructions to vacate that conviction and sentence.
II. The district court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of a syringe
that field-tested positive for methamphetamine, which significantly affected
the verdict.

“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and we
will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855
N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). Hatton made a timely objection to the syringe evidence
and therefore the harmless-error standard applies. State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802
(Minn. 2016). “Under the harmless-error standard, an appellant who alleges an error in the
admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional ri ght must prove that there
is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
8
verdict.” Id. (discussing factors courts consider when determining whether wrongfully
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict) (quotation omitted).
Hatton argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a
syringe found at his home two days after the incident. We agree.
Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency” to make the existence of any material fact more or less
probable. Minn. R. Evid. 401. This is a low bar requiring only that evidence assist, even
if remotely so, the fact-finder in resolving the ultimate issue. State v. Swinger, 800 N.W.2d
833, 839 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2011). Evidence is inadmissible
if it is not relevant, Minn. R. Evid. 402, or if it is confusing, misleading, or unfairly
prejudicial, Minn. R. Evid. 403.
During trial, J.P. provided minimal testimony suggesting Hatton was under the
influence.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. All right. So, you unlocked the door
and then what happened after?
WITNESS: Then he came in.

PROSECUTOR: He came in. What did you observe about
him when he first came into your home?
WITNESS: He seemed like he was under the influence of
something.

PROSECUTOR: Why would you say that?
WITNESS: Because he was pacing back and forth.

PROSECUTOR: Okay.

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Fifteen pages of direct examination of J.P. followed with no additional reference to Hatton
being under the influence and there was no further reference to it during defense counsel’s
cross-examination.
Later, during the state’s direct examination of the officer, the state sought to
introduce evidence of a syringe found at Hatton’s home two days after the incident,
claiming that the evidence is relevant because it bolster’s J.P.’s credibility by supporting
her testimony that Hatton was “under the influence when he came to her house . . . and the
[syringe that field-tested positive for methamphetamine] indicates that [he] has access to
methamphetamine supports her story . . . .” Hatton objected, arguing that a syringe found
two days after the incident is not relevant because it says nothing about the sexual-assault
incident. The district court overruled Hatton’s objection without explanation and allowed
the state to present the evidence during the direct testimony of the officer. During Hatton’s
subsequent testimony he admitted to the use of methamphetamine. Hatton’s wife also
testified that Hatton uses methamphetamine. However, Hatton testified that he did not use
it prior to the sexual-assault incident and his wife testified that Hatton did not appear to be
under the influence when she saw him later that day.
The syringe evidence tends to prove that Hatton uses methamphetamine and does
so intravenously. But whether Hatton uses methamphetamine is not material to whether
he committed the offenses for which he was charged. See Minn. R. Evid. 401 (asserting
that evidence is relevant if it supports a material fact); see also State v. Lubenow, 310
N.W.2d 52, 56 (Minn. 1981) (determining that evidence was not relevant and noting that
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“[t]here was no showing that the [evidence] w[as] in any way connected with the
crime . . . .”).
Moreover, even if we assume the syringe evidence has some relevance, “[relevant]
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R.
Evid. 403.
Respondent asserts that the syringe evidence is probative of J.P.’s credibility and
there is no risk of unfair prejudice because Hatton admitted to using methamphetamine. 2
We disagree.
Because the syringe evidence tends to prove only that Hatton uses
methamphetamine, which is not related to any element of the charged offenses, its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and could have
confused or mislead the jury. Cf. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 689 (Minn. 2006)
(determining that probative value of Spreigl evidence was outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice because it was not relevant or needed to strengthen an element of the charged
offense). We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
the syringe evidence.

2 Respondent also argues that no unfair prejudice exists because the jury already heard
testimony that Hatton has four prior felonies. Hatton’s prior felony convictions were
admitted under Minn. R. Evid. 609(a), which allows evidence of prior convictions to be
admitted to attack the credibility of a witness, here, Hatton. Therefore, this evidence is not
probative of J.P.’s credibility. Because evidence of Hatton’s prior convictions cannot be
used to bolster another witness’s credibility, we do not factor it into our analysis.
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Having determined that the evidence was wrongfully admitted, we next consider
whether it significantly affected the verdict. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at 802. In deciding what
effect the erroneously admitted evidence had on the verdict, the reviewing court considers
“[n]on-exclusive factors . . . includ[ing]: (1) the manner in which the party presented the
evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who
offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively
countered the evidence.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted).
The state offered direct testimony of an officer stating that he and a drug-task-force
officer located the syringe that field-tested positive for methamphetamine. This evidence
depicts Hatton as a drug user. And four of the ten trial exhibits relate to the evidence of
the syringe and the area of the basement where it was found. The evidence was highly
persuasive because it shows that Hatton uses methamphetamine intravenously.
At the beginning of its closing argument, the state informed the jury that “we did
learn during Mr. Hatton’s testimony that he was a user of methamphetamine, because he
admitted to using methamphetamine and a syringe that field-tested positive for
methamphetamine was found . . . in the basement of his home; and there is a photograph
of that that you will see in your deliberations.” Respondent claims that Hatton effectively
countered the evidence because he testified that the syringe was his and that he used
methamphetamine. But we are confident that Hatton would not have testified about his
methamphetamine use if the evidence had not been admitted into evidence over his
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objection. To say it another way, Hatton’s admission did not counter the prejudicial
evidence, it confirmed it.
Balancing the foregoing factors, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability
that the wrongfully admitted evidence of a syringe that field -tested positive for
methamphetamine significantly affected the verdict. We therefore reverse Hatton’s
third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and remand for a new trial on that count.3
Reversed and remanded; motion denied.

3 Hatton’s postconviction claim of a purported Brady violation related only to his
third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. Because we reverse his third-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and remand for a new trial on that count, we do not
address that issue. As a result, we deny Hatton’s motion to strike the corresponding
supplemental record as unnecessary.